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
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
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THE
LIGHT OF NATURE
PURSUED.

BY
ABRAHAM TUCKER, Esq.

FROM THE SECOND LONDON EDITION,
REVISED AND CORRECTED.

TOGETHER WITH
SOME ACCOUNT
OF THE
LIFE OF THE AUTHOR.

BY
SIR H. P. ST. JOHN MILDMAY, BART. M. P.

VOL. I.

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SOME ACCOUNT

OF

THE LIFE

OF

ABRAHAM TUCKER, Esq.

I HAVE often heard it lamented by admirers of Mr. Tucker's writings, that no account has been hitherto given to the world of his private life: and it has been suggested to me that in offering a new edition of the "Light of Nature" to the public, some biographical sketch would be expected at my hands.

I regret my inability to comply with these suggestions so fully as my inclination, and the unfeigned respect, veneration, and gratitude which I feel towards the memory of Mr. Tucker would dispose me to do.

The life of a man devoted to study and retirement; to the investigation of metaphysical truth, and the practice of religious duties, can indeed hardly be expected to afford much in the detail to amuse or interest the public: and the uniform regularity of the life of the author of the "Light of Nature" was certainly interrupted by few extraordinary occurrences. But instruction might possibly be afforded and example held out to future excellence, by tracing the several incidents which may be supposed to have influenced the mind and genius of such an author, to have given the original bent to his course of study, and turned his thoughts into that channel in which they continued to flow. I am, however, enabled to add nothing upon these points to the short history which Mr. Tucker has given of the disposition and progress of his own mind, in the following passage:—

"My thoughts," he says, "have taken a turn from my earliest youth towards searching into the foundations and measures of

right and wrong ; my love for retirement has furnished me with continual leisure, and the exercise of my reason has been my daily employment."

The account which I am about to give of the most important events of his life, (if any events can be said to be important of a life so retired and undiversified,) is necessarily rendered more imperfect by the loss of a near relation, "Mrs. Judith Tucker," by whom alone I could have been furnished with materials for a fuller statement.

All that I now offer to the public is collected from what I can remember to have heard from her, when alive, from some biographical notes which she left behind her, and from some scattered hints and notices which Mr. Tucker's own papers supply. And however otherwise unimportant or uninteresting the narrative may be, I have preferred to leave it so, rather than to embellish it with anything for which I had not the most indisputable authority, and am contented that it should pretend to no other merit than that which would have been esteemed its greatest recommendation by him whose life it is intended to commemorate, a strict and faithful adherence to the truth.

The family of Mr. Tucker is of Somersetshire extraction, but he was himself born in London on the second of September, 1705. His father, who appears to have been a merchant of some eminence in the city, married Judith, daughter of Abraham Tillard, Esq. and died in his son's infancy, leaving him to the guardianship of his uncle, Sir Isaac Tillard, a man remarkable for the purity of his morals and the austere integrity of his character.—Of the memory of this relation Mr. Tucker, to the latest hour of his life, never failed to speak with extreme affection and gratitude, frequently observing that he was indebted for every principle of honor, benevolence, and liberality which he possessed, to the indefatigable pains and bright example of his uncle.—It appears, however, that although Mr. Tucker might be greatly obliged to Sir Isaac Tillard for the early seeds of those moral principles with which his conduct and writings were afterwards so eminently tinctured ; he did not probably receive much assistance from him in the usual accomplishments of modern education : I have frequently heard him say, that when called on, as a boy, to pay a periodical compliment to some distant relations, he was invariably referred by his guardian to St. Paul's Epistles, as the most complete model of epistolary correspondence.

Mr. Tucker was educated in a school at Bishop's Stortford, which he quitted in 1721, and was entered a gentleman commoner at Merton College, where it appears that he devoted the

principal part of his time to metaphysical and mathematical pursuits. During his residence in the University, he found means in the intervals of leisure from more serious application, to make himself complete master of the French and Italian languages, and to acquire a considerable proficiency in music, for which he possessed great natural talents.

About the year 1724, he went into chambers in the Inner Temple, where, for some time, he applied very closely to the law, in which he acquired such a degree of knowledge as enabled him to conduct with advantage the management of his own affairs, and frequently to render very essential service to his friends and neighbors: but his fortune not requiring the aid of a profession, to the pursuit of which neither his constitution nor his inclination were adapted, he was never called to the bar. While he continued at the Temple, he commonly passed the vacation in tours through different parts of England or Scotland, and once made a summer excursion into France and Flanders.

In 1727, he purchased Betchworth Castle, near Dorking, an ancient seat of the Browns, and formerly part of the extensive possessions of the Earl of Arundell. As this purchase was considerable, and included a large tract of landed property, Mr. Tucker immediately set about acquiring every sort of information that is generally thought necessary to the advantageous management of land. With his usual industry he committed to paper a great variety of remarks which he either had made himself, collected from his neighbors and tenants, or selected from different authors, both ancient and modern, who have treated on rural economy.

In 1736, Mr. Tucker married Dorothy, daughter of Edward Barker, of East Betchworth, Cursitor Baron of the Exchequer and Receiver of the Tenths. By this lady, who died in 1754, he had two daughters: Judith, who survived him, inherited his estates, and died unmarried in 1795, and Dorothea Maria, who in 1763 married Sir Henry Paulet St. John, Baronet, of Dogmersfield Park, in Hampshire, and died in 1768, leaving no issue but the writer of these remarks.

As my grandfather had always lived with his wife on terms of the tenderest harmony and affection, he was severely afflicted by her death. As soon as the first excess of his grief was somewhat mitigated, he occupied himself in collecting together all the letters that had passed between them at periods when they were accidentally separated from each other, which he transcribed twice over, under the title of "The Picture of Artless Love." One copy he gave to Mr. Barker, his father-in-law, and the other he kept, and frequently read over to his daughters.

His active mind, after this event, became engaged in the education of his children, to whom he himself taught French and Italian: he also instructed them in many other branches of science which he thought might, in future, contribute to their advantage or amusement; but he was, above all, careful to instil into their minds the purest principles of morality, benevolence, and religion.

In the year 1755, at the request of a friend, he worked up some materials that were sent him, into the form of a pamphlet, under the title of "The Country Gentleman's Advice to his Son on the Subject of Party Clubs." This little tract I have seen, though it has long since been out of print. It seems to have been dictated by no party feelings, even in the person by whom the materials were compiled, but generally cautions young men against engaging in political societies in which their passions are liable to be inflamed, and, from the zeal and enthusiasm of the moment, their honor often pledged to support measures which their cooler reason and reflection disapprove.

Mr. Tucker had no turn for politics: he was very strongly solicited, on several occasions, to offer himself as a representative for the county in which he resided, to which situation both his landed property and his private character gave him the best pretensions. This he uniformly refused. He was once only prevailed on to attend a county meeting at Epsom, where party ran very high, and though he took no active part in the proceedings there, he was introduced into a ludicrous ballad, where he is described, with several other gentlemen of respectability and talents, as confounded by the superior powers and eloquence of the Whigs of that day, Sir Joseph Mawbey and Humphry Cotes. This circumstance afforded to Mr. Tucker abundant matter for humorous animadversion, and whenever politics were the subject of conversation he seldom failed to advert to the ill success of his only essay in public life; and was so much amused with the figure he made in verse, that he set the ballad to music.

From the papers which Mr. Tucker left behind him, it does not appear that previous to the year 1755, he had any thoughts of the work which he afterwards completed, nor has the former editor, nor have I, been able to ascertain from what circumstance he was first induced to undertake it. About the year 1756, however, he began "The Light of Nature pursued."

He made several sketches of the plan of his work, (one of which he afterwards printed in the shape of a dialogue,) before he finally decided on the method he should pursue; and after he had ultimately arranged and digested his materials, he twice transcribed

the whole copy in his own hand. Conscious of the defects in his style, he had it in contemplation, as he says himself, to have revised and corrected in some degree, the most inharmonious and inelegant passages in the work, before he sent it to the press, though for various reasons assigned in his Introduction, he never accomplished his design.

To qualify himself, however, for appearing before the public as an Author, he had employed a considerable portion of his time, previous to his great undertaking, in studying, with the utmost accuracy, the most elegant Greek and Latin classics, in order, (as far as it is possible in the more advanced periods of life,) to supply the defects of early education; and he actually took the pains of translating the most admired pieces of Cicero, Demosthenes, Pliny, &c. several times over.

Of these studies many have been thrown aside and destroyed, but I am still in possession of such a collection as is sufficient to show that Mr. Tucker's industry and perseverance have been very rarely surpassed.

He published the first specimen of his work in 1763, under the title of "Freewill," which seems to have been a selection from four octavo volumes, which he afterwards printed in 1765, under the fictitious name of "Edward Search." Why he assumed a feigned name, I am ignorant, but I am disposed to ascribe it altogether to his disinclination to attract public notice. The remainder of the work was edited by his daughter, from a manuscript, and published with the real name of the Author, some time after his decease.

At a late period of life he printed, but did not publish, a little tract on vocal sounds, wherein he attempts, very ingeniously, with the aid of a few additional letters, to fix the pronunciation of the whole alphabet in such a manner that the sound of any word may be conveyed on paper as easily as by the voice. This little treatise was composed in support of certain positions which he had advanced at a literary meeting of some of his friends, and on which a difference of opinion had arisen. Having occasion in the course of this work to speak of the Hexameter metre, he expresses his conviction, "that the English is as capable of that mode of versification as the Greek or Latin languages. To exemplify this opinion, he subjoins a hasty attempt of his own, from which it may not be thought foreign to my present purpose to insert a very short extract. The Classical Reader will immediately perceive that it is a literal translation of part of Virgil's account of the Pythagorean doctrine.

A spirit eternal penetrates through earth, sky, and ocean,
 Mounts to the moon's lucid orb, and stars in countless abundance;
 One soul all matter invigorates, gives life to the system,
 O'er each particular member diffuses alertness;
 Thence men and all animals sprang forth, beasts and feathered fowl,
 And whatever monsters swarm through the watery kingdom.
&c. &c. &c.

Mr. Tucker also published, probably at an earlier period, a pamphlet entitled, "Man in quest of himself, by Cuthbert Comment," in reply to some strictures that appeared in a note on Search's Freewill, in the Monthly Review of July, 1763. In the latter end of it he explains his view in the publication, namely, "in reply to a doctrine advanced, that the mind and material elements fluctuate and change into one another; which seems a revival of the old atheistical notion, that a perceptive and active being may be formed of senseless and inert principles."

Mr. Tucker, though by no means of an athletic form, or a robust constitution, possessed great bodily activity. He always rose early in the morning to pursue his literary labors. During the winter months, he commonly burnt a lamp in his chamber for the purpose of lighting his own fire. After breakfast he returned again to his studies, for two or three hours, and passed the remainder of the morning in walking, or in some rural exercise. As he was remarkably abstemious, he lost but little time at the table, but usually spent the early part of the evening in summer in walking over his estate, collecting information on all agricultural subjects from his tenants, and committing the result of their practical experience to paper. In winter, he completed the regular measure of his exercise, by traversing his own apartment, and after accomplishing the distance he had allotted to himself, he employed the remainder of the afternoon in reading to his daughters. In London, where he resided some months every year, his time was apportioned, nearly in the same manner, between study and relaxation; and he commonly devoted much of his evenings to the society of his friends, relations, and fellow collegians, among whom he was particularly distinguished for his dexterity in the Socratic method of disputation. His walks were chiefly directed to the transaction of any incidental business, always choosing rather to execute his own commissions, even of the most trivial nature, than to entrust them to a third person. This singularity arose from the construction of his mind, which was rarely satisfied without some object in view; and when no inducement presented itself, he would sometimes walk from Great James Street, where he resided, to St. Paul's or to the Bank, to see, as he would good-humoredly observe, what it was o'clock.

The enumeration of these little peculiarities may, I am aware, have the effect of casting something like ridicule on Mr. Tucker's biographer: but I must entreat the indulgent reader to carry in his mind, through the whole of this humble sketch, the notice with which I introduced it to the public, that few important incidents were to be expected in tracing the life of Mr. Tucker; and I trust, that men who admire the original genius displayed in the annexed work, will not find their time wholly misemployed in perusing those little indications of character, which, in the failure of more weighty incidents, may serve to give some idea of the nature and formation of the Author's mind.

Mr. Tucker lived in habits of considerable intimacy, when in town, with a near relation who had a house in the same street. This was Mr. James Tillard, a gentleman highly distinguished by his classical attainments and general knowledge; and who was one of the numerous authors of that time who opposed by their writings the opinions of Bishop Warburton.

It does not appear that his intimacy with Mr. Tillard, during the progress of this controversy, led Mr. Tucker to take any part in the dispute, though I am disposed to believe that he thought lightly of some opinions of the learned Prelate, from an admirable specimen of sarcastic humor which I meet with in one of his private letters, in evident reference to a passage in the Bishop's work on the Divine Legation of Moses.

Besides Mr. Tucker's attainments in literature, and the sciences, he was perfectly skilled in merchants' accounts, and kept the books relating to his private affairs, and to some charitable institutions of which he was a member, with all the regularity of an accounting house. He acted as a Magistrate with great assiduity in the division of the populous county in which he resided, though, from a dislike to public meetings, he rarely attended the quarter sessions.

His incessant application gradually weakened his eyes, and, at length, brought on cataracts, which increased so much in consequence of a fever in 1771, that he could no longer amuse himself by reading, and soon afterwards became totally blind.

This affliction, the greatest that could befall a man of his pursuits, he not only bore with composure and resignation, but with the utmost cheerfulness, being frequently much diverted with the mistakes into which his infirmity betrayed him.

His favorite object, however, was not abandoned in consequence of this calamity, his mechanical ingenuity enabling him to direct the construction of a machine which guided his hand, and helped him to write so legibly that his productions were easily transcribed by an amanuensis.

It was at this period that the amiable character of his daughter had occasion to display itself. It would be as impossible to do justice to the filial affection, to the nice and unwearied attentions, by which she contrived to mitigate the weight of her father's misfortune, as any attempt would be hopeless, to express the obligations for which the editor of this work has, in succeeding years, been indebted to her tenderness and attention, to her precept and to her example. She transcribed the whole of his voluminous work for the press; and so entirely did she devote her time, like Milton's daughter, to those pursuits which would make her most useful to her father, that she applied herself to the study of the Greek language, in which she made such a proficiency as to be enabled to preserve to her father, during the remainder of his life, an intercourse with his favorite authors, of which his misfortune must otherwise have deprived him.

During Mr. Tucker's blindness, he completed the latter volumes of the "Light of Nature;" but before the necessary arrangements of their publication were concluded, he was seized, in 1774, with an illness which proved fatal; and he died, as he had lived, with perfect calmness and resignation.

Having thus stated the few particulars I have been enabled to select from the manuscripts in my possession, relative to the Life of the Author of the "Light of Nature," I shall venture to offer a very few observations on the edition which I have thought it my duty to publish.

To attempt any commentary on the work itself, would be presumptuous on my part: the most ample testimony has already been given to the original genius, the moral excellence, the benevolence, and the perspicuity of the Author, by many of the most enlightened men of the present age. Some of them, with that spirit of liberality which accompanies pre-eminent talents, have openly acknowledged the assistance which they have derived from Mr. Tucker's researches.*

* "There is one work to which I owe so much, that it would be ungrateful not to confess the obligation: I mean the writings of the late Abraham Tucker, Esq. part of which were published by himself, and the remainder since his death, under the title of the 'Light of Nature pursued by Edward Search, Esq.' I have found in this writer more original thinking and observation upon the several subjects that he has taken in hand, than in any other, not to say in all others put together. His talent also for illustration is unrivalled. But his thoughts are diffused through a long, various, and irregular work. I shall account it no mean praise, if I have been sometimes able to dispose into method, to collect it into heads and articles, or to exhibit in more compact and tangible masses, what, in that otherwise excellent performance, is spread over too much surface."—Paley's Preface to Moral and Political Philosophy, page 26. See also Dr. Parr—and Sir James M'Intosh's Lectures, &c.

I have thought it incumbent on me, as his sole surviving representative, to reprint his work, in consequence of the various applications which have been made to me on account of the increased demand for it, and the scarcity of the remaining copies.

It has indeed been suggested to me, that an abridgement of the whole of these volumes might have been more acceptable to the world at large, or that the bulk might have been conveniently reduced by the omission of the most abstruse and metaphysical parts, without injury to the general argument and essential object of the work.

Feeling, however, the great difficulty that must attend such an abridgement or selection, and conscious of my own insufficiency for the undertaking, and entertaining moreover some scruples, as to the right of an editor to compress or curtail the work of his Author according to his own notions of convenience or improvement,—I have judged it most expedient, on mature consideration, to republish it as it came from the pen of Mr. Tucker.

I am aware that the immediate connexion between the various subjects treated on in the work, may not appear obvious to many of Mr. Tucker's readers, and that something in the nature of an analysis of the general scheme of the Author, would have been extremely desirable. I was indeed in hopes to have offered some observations on this head to the public, from the pen of Sir James M'Intosh, had not the pressure of professional engagements interfered, and the high situation to which he has been called in a distant country finally defeated the plan he had in contemplation.

It will be observed, that I have ventured to restore a Chapter* which treats on a point, that has been thought, by the most able Commentators on the New Testament, to be involved in much doubt and obscurity. I am aware, that in this instance, I expose myself to the censure of many of Mr. Tucker's warmest admirers, by whom I may be accused of something more than indiscretion, in submitting opinions to the public eye, which the prudence and good sense of his immediate successor had thought it wise to suppress, in the former edition. I must, however, observe, with the most sincere veneration for the memory of the person to whom I have had frequent occasion to allude, that the circumstances under which the work is now sent to the press, are widely different from those under which it made its first appearance.

Whether the Author, when he published the fragment on Free-will, had it in contemplation to extend his materials to the present

* Posthumous Works, Chap. xxii. "Word, or Logos."

length of the work, or whether he found himself gradually led on as he pursued his subject, must remain a doubt. His earliest production is unquestionably the most abstruse of all his works, nor did the four volumes he published before his death meet with that encouragement from the public which they have since been thought to deserve. Their title was unfortunate, and contributed to raise prejudices against them.* At the time of the publication many fanciful theories were afloat on subjects of religious controversy : these had disgusted the public, and a work professing in its title-page to pursue the Light of Nature might be reasonably suspected as unfavorable to the doctrines of Revelation. On this ground, therefore, it was thought advisable by the respectable authorities with whom the late Editor consulted when she printed the posthumous works of her father, to suppress a part of them which did not appear essential to the general scheme of the Author, and might tend to confirm the prejudice raised by the title. But the motive which operated most strongly on the mind of the late Mrs. Tucker, on this occasion, was her conviction that her father was strictly and conscientiously attached to the doctrines of the Church of England, and she was cautious of hazarding anything which might expose his principles to an opposite construction, and which, she was aware, would be eagerly caught at by those who differed from the established persuasion.

Such were the motives which influenced the conduct of the former Editor, in suppressing a Chapter which treats on the construction of the four first verses in the Gospel according to St. John. Her objections to its publication, however judicious at that moment, have now lost much of their weight. The prejudices excited by the title have vanished on the world becoming acquainted with the contents. The religious and moral principles of the Author have stood the test of public investigation, and no longer remain open to misapprehension. The sentiments, the doctrines, the arguments, and the illustrations in every part of the work are equally those of Mr. Tucker, and the particular Chapter of which I am speaking was prepared in his own hand-writing for the press. The great and benevolent object of the Author was the establishment and promulgation of truth : his conjectures (for they are no more,) on this abstruse point, should they prove

* Soon after Mr. Tucker's death, various attempts were made by different sectaries to enlist him under their banners, particularly Mr. Lindsay, who endeavored to show, by several partial extracts from his works, that he was inclined to the opinions of the Unitarians. A very full refutation of these misrepresentations was soon afterwards published by Thomas Kynaston, Esq. under the signature of "A Layman," by which Mr. Tucker's religious character was completely vindicated.

satisfactory, may lead to that desirable end, by their publication : should they be thought otherwise, it can reflect no discredit on his memory, to have hazarded an unsuccessful opinion on a subject which the most learned and enlightened men have acknowledged themselves unequal to explain.

H. P. ST. JOHN MILDMAY, M. P.

INTRODUCTION.

RELIGION and **MORALITY**, being of universal concern to persons of all conditions and denominations, as well with regard to their present happiness as their future expectations, have always engaged the thoughts of such as were disposed to think seriously upon anything; and the minds of men being variously turned, that natural fondness which attaches every one to the decisions of his own judgment, especially in matters nearly affecting his interest, has given birth to innumerable disputes among the learned in all ages; from whence great disorders and mischiefs have frequently arisen among the rest of mankind. But though contention has never ceased, nor is ever likely to cease, yet the particular subjects exciting it from time to time have often changed: one set having divided the ancient philosophers, another the doctors in the reign of school divinity, and another the several sects of Christians at and after the reformation.

All these old topics of litigation are now happily laid aside, or lie dormant in the closets of the studious, where they are treated of as matters of speculation, giving no disturbance to the world in general. The principal, or perhaps only question agitated with any degree of warmth and earnestness in these times and countries, seems to be, Whether Reason alone be sufficient to direct us in all parts of our conduct, or Whether Revelation and supernatural aids be necessary. For upon this hinge the merits of our present religious disputes chiefly turn, rather than upon external evidence, which one may observe always carries more or less weight with men, according as they are prepossessed either in favor or prejudice of the doctrines enforced thereby; nor indeed would deserve regard at all without prospect of some advantage to accrue from the result. For, were a Revelation proposed which should offer nothing more than we could discover by our

own sagacity, or attain by common industry, nobody would think it worth while to be at any trouble either in recommending or entering upon an examination of its authenticity.

Upon this question, concerning the sufficiency of Reason, many treatises are written and much thrown out in the pulpits and in private conversation : nor would means be neglected of interesting the populace in the dispute, which from a dispute would then become a quarrel and occasion of civil commotions, did not our laws wisely provide for the maintenance of peace and good order by restraining the fiery zeal of some and wanton licentiousness of others. While the contest stands thus confined within the limits of argumentation, no very mischievous consequences can ensue. We need not fear truth should lie long overwhelmed under the sophisms of falsehood : it will always rise at last triumphant over the strongest opposition ; or rather like gold, which comes brighter and purer out of the furnace, will get clear of that rust and dross that gathers upon the soundest doctrine by too long quiet. When men are all of a mind they grow careless, seldom giving themselves the trouble to enter into the grounds of what passes current by universal consent : or else graft their own airy imaginations upon the solid substance. But the vigilance of an adversary suffers no foreign mixtures that will not stand the strictest scrutiny : and his misrepresentations give occasion for what remains, to be fully explained and more clearly understood.

But how great advantages soever may accrue from controversy, it is attended by no less inconvenience. It draws off men's attention from the main end of Religion, which is to make them better, by leading them insensibly into a persuasion that orthodoxy on one hand, and freedom from bigotry on the other, is to stand in lieu of all the practical duties of life : it destroys that mutual good-will and esteem from whence the benefits of society chiefly result ; and it cuts off half the means of improvement by shutting our eyes against the clearest truths and most shining examples presented by those of whom we have received an ill impression. For it is no uncommon thing to combat an opinion or vilify an action of the person we dislike, merely because they are his, without once considering the merits of either.

Wherefore the worst kind of disputing is that which proceeds solely in the spirit of opposition, tending to overthrow but not to establish : for there is scarce any system so bad as not to be better than none at all. He that pulls down his neighbor's house does him a diskindness, however inconvenient soever it were, unless he furnishes him with a plan and materials for building one more commodious. Let every man by my consent offer whatever

he thinks beneficial to the public ; we stand obliged to him for his good intentions, however ineffectual they may prove, or how much soever we may perceive him mistaken ; provided he does not meddle with the opinions of others until he finds them standing directly athwart his way ; then indeed disputation becomes necessary, but it is never desirable, nor perhaps ever excusable, unless when absolutely necessary.

In order to avoid this disagreeable necessity as long as possible, it seems advisable to begin with building upon ground that nobody claims or that we all possess in common : I mean, by working upon principles universally agreed to, and gathering all the conclusions they will afford that may be serviceable to the world, and wherein everybody may acquiesce without prejudice to his favorite tenets. For there are many inducements to prudence, to honesty, to benevolence, to industry, acknowledged by persons of all persuasions ; and if these were improved to the utmost, much good might be done to mankind, both towards advancing their knowledge and regulating their behavior, before we need touch upon any controversial matters.

This method appears likely to render the benefit of our endeavors more extensive, because being looked upon as a common friend, we shall be heard favorably by all : nor is it impossible that our interposition may bring the contending parties into better humor with one another, rendering them more candid, more open to conviction, by showing they agree already in many respects themselves were not aware of. If we can trace out a resemblance of each other's features in their own, they may consider them as marks of a relationship, and abate of that shyness which makes every one averse to whatever comes from a stranger or an alien. Perhaps, too, it may tend considerably towards shortening disputes ; for as no difference can be voided unless by premises whereto both sides will assent, the more of these can be collected, the firmer they are established, and the readier they lie at hand, there will remain the less to do afterwards towards determining matters in debate.

Now there is one tract of ground claimed by none as his peculiar property, namely, so much as lies within the province of reason. Both believer and unbeliever will admit that there are certain truths and certain duties discoverable by our own care and sagacity, that our reason is of some use to us, and that we ought to make the best use of it in our power. This therefore is what I purpose to attempt, to try what may be done by the exercise of our reason, either for the advancement of knowledge or guidance of our conduct, without pretending to determine beforehand whe-

ther we may furnish ourselves this way with everything for which we have occasion, without embracing or rejecting what other helps may be afforded us from elsewhere. Since it is allowed on all hands that reason may do something for us, let us avail ourselves of that something she is capable of, be it little or be it much; this surely will not indispose us against receiving further benefits from supernatural assistance, if any such are to be had. Such an attempt cannot justly offend either party: for if reason be sufficient, what can we do better than listen attentively to her voice? and if she be not sufficient, how can this be better evidenced than by putting her upon the trial, in order to see what she contains? If we shall find her anywhere at a nonplus, or her stores exhausted and our wants still remaining unsupplied, we shall the more readily recur to supplies afforded from another treasury.

But who is able to ransack all the stores of reason, or compute the exact amount of the riches she possesses? For my part, I am far from fancying myself equal to the task; nor do I imagine it can be performed by any single person, but must be completed, if ever, by the successive endeavors of many; and on this very plea I found my justification. For although what can be managed by a few, we choose to entrust only with consummate masters in the business, yet in works requiring numbers to execute them, an indifferent workman may be admitted to give a helping hand. It is the duty of every one to serve the public in such way for which he is best fitted, how slender soever his ability may be; and this is the only way wherein I have any chance of making myself useful. I have neither constitution nor talents for active life, neither strength nor fund of spirits for hard study, nor been bred to any profession: but my thoughts have taken a turn from my earliest youth towards searching into the foundations and measures of right and wrong; whatever nature gave me has been cultivated by a careful education, and improved further by as much application as I could bear the fatigue of; my love of retirement has furnished me with continual leisure, and the exercise of my reason has been my daily employment: the service therefore I am to do must flow from this exercise or not at all. And it must arise from the exercise not the strength of my reason: I pretend to no sagacity capable of striking out uncommon discoveries, my dependence must rest solely upon my care and vigilance, which keep me constantly upon the watch for such sparks of light as occur from time to time spontaneously: the coldness of my natural temperament inclines me to caution and suspicion, so I do not hastily embrace the most striking ideas until having turned them

again and again in my thoughts, in order to discern the genuine rays of truth from the flashy meteors of delusion: whatever of the former I can gather, I preserve diligently, laying them by in store against any further use that may be made of them. For I am a kind of miser in knowledge, attentive to every little opportunity of gain. Though my income be small, I lose nothing of what comes to hand; all I can scrape, I place out at interest, still accumulating the interest upon the principal, as well knowing that this is the only way for one of moderate talents to raise a fortune.

Let not any man expect extraordinary strokes of penetration from me: I shall present him with nothing but what he may have had within his view before: I pretend only to remind him of things that may have slipped his memory, or point out to him objects that may have escaped his notice: if I shall offer him anything new, it will be not more than he would have found naturally resulting from things he knows already, had he held them as steadily under contemplation, or placed them together in the same situation as I do. Therefore I do not presume to dictate or impose my notions upon others, nor desire any more regard or attention than one would readily give to any common person, upon matters wherein he has been constantly conversant from his childhood; nor even here do I wish my word might be taken any farther than shall appear reasonable in the judgment of the hearer.

Many efforts have been made, as well by ancients as moderns, for investigating the principles of reason and establishing a solid structure of morality; and though they have all fallen short of the end proposed, yet have they not entirely failed of success. The foundations indeed have not yet been discovered or laid open to the view and satisfaction of all men; but much of the covering that obscured them has been from time to time removed, and the hollowness of many spots whereon great labor used to be wasted has been made appear. Mr. Locke in particular has contributed not a little to facilitate the increase of knowledge, by pointing out the sources and channels from whence it must be derived, and clearing away that incumbrance of innate ideas, real essences, and such like rubbish, that obstructed the searches of the studious formerly; so that the reasonings of men are become more accurate, more solid, and if one may so say, more reasonable than they were before. I cannot expect to run such lengths as he has done; but if I may advance one little step further in the way that he leads, or suggest a single hint that may be improved by some abler hand for the real benefit of mankind, I shall not think that I have labored in vain nor lived in vain. Whatever I may

be able to do, I stand indebted to Mr. Locke for, having learned from him which way to direct my observation, and how to make use of what I observe. I should be proud of being thought to resemble him, not as a copy but an imitation, endeavoring to catch the spirit of my original, and then letting that spirit operate in its own manner. Every one has something in his air and gait peculiar to himself; and if he goes to tread scrupulously in the steps or assume the gestures of another, he will move awkwardly and make very little progress.

But how high a veneration soever I may have for Mr. Locke, it does not rise to an implicit faith, leaving me at liberty to dissent from him in some few instances; and as this happens very seldom, I am not sorry it does happen at all, because it assures me that in other particulars I am not drawn by the influence of a great name but by the force of conviction. In matters of science another may prepare the evidences and place them in their proper light and order, but the decision ought always to be a man's own. But I am never better pleased than when a difference, seemingly wide at first, lessens by degrees, and at length vanishes upon a nearer inspection and entering more thoroughly into his ideas; because then I find my judgment tallied with his, even before I knew of it myself.

And I receive the like proportionable satisfaction upon the like occasion with respect to the opinions of others; for I have so little the spirit of contradiction that I do not willingly disagree with anybody even in points of speculation, but endeavor at all possible means of reconciliation. I have too great a deference for the understandings of others, to believe they ever embrace naked error uncovered with truth: therefore presume the worst set of tenets must contain a mixture of something that is right, or else they would not have gained credit. The business then is to separate the sterling from the dross, or rather restore it to its original purity. For however chimerical the transmutation of metals may have proved, there is a transmutation of truth into falsehood: many propositions by expositions, qualifications, or restrictions, may be made either true or false: perhaps most of the impositions upon mankind have been introduced into the world by the perverse use of this art. If then I can transmute a mischievous opinion back again into its primitive innocence, and I have sometimes succeeded beyond expectation, I may lawfully use it as current coin, and reckon it as a part of my stock in knowledge. My door stands open to receive whatever valuable comes in from all quarters; and as different wares are deemed contraband by different powers, I am forced, in defence of my property, to fight by

turns on opposite sides of the same question, not as a Drawcan-sir, hewing down both friend and foe, but as a mediator laboring to reconcile jarring interests. By this practice of joining in alliance with various parties, I take a tincture of those among whom I converse; so that it will be no wonder if I shall be found hereafter adopting the sentiments or talking in the strain of an enthusiast, a bigot, a visionary, a sensualist, a freethinker, a skeptic; yet, I hope, without inconsistency or wavering of opinion.

Nor can anybody justly take scandal hereat. Those who place all in a freedom of thought, will not surely blame me for giving a latitude to my thoughts, and following whithersoever my judgment shall lead me: I will not trouble them with anything I shall judge trifling, or of no use, or that has not stood the test of my own examination. If I shall sometimes seem to shake the main pillars of morality as well as religion, it will be only when I conceive them slid off their proper basis upon the loose earth, in order to restore them: in this case it is necessary to undermine the ground whereon they stand, to make room for the levers whereby they may be raised to a bottom where they may remain forever firm and immoveable; nor shall I attempt to remove any until I have found a place fitter for their reception and support. Those who maintain an established form of doctrine can receive no injury from me. For whenever I consort with them, as they may expect from my conformable temper will frequently happen, they will have in me a competent witness to the reasonableness of their doctrines, against whom no exception can be taken for prejudice or partiality. And if I shall run into extravagances, they may draw an argument from thence to show the danger of trusting to our natural strength alone: for if one who has constantly paid his court to reason from his childhood, has had a liberal education and continual leisure, and examined everything with coolness, care, and impartiality, yet misses of his aim and bewilders himself in mazes, or lies entangled in absurdities, how can it be expected, that the common herd of mankind, without preparation, without thirst of knowledge, without command of their time, immersed in business, pleasures, or passions, and driven forcibly along by the torrent of example, should ever strike out a complete rule of conduct or system of opinion, without some better guidance than that of their own sagacity?

Since then my attempt can draw no ill consequences, and should it do no good will do no hurt, I may proceed without fear or scruple to such exercise of my reason as I am capable of making. But reason cannot work without materials, which must be fetch-

ed from nature ; and not all nature neither, for the greatest part of her stores lie beyond our reach. Of what stand within our ken, some we discern by immediate intuition, others we gather by inference and long deductions of reasoning. It seems expedient then to begin with the things lying nearest to us, these being the premises which must help us to investigate others more remote. Now what is nearer to a man than himself, his sensations, thoughts, and actions ? These, therefore, I purpose to examine in the first place, rather than hunt after abstract notions or essences of good or evil ; which can only be discovered, if ever, from a careful observation of the former. In natural philosophy, the experimental method is now universally preferred before the hypothetic, as the surer and more effectual : the like method may be practised in morality, with this only difference, that there is no occasion to make experiments on purpose ; for everything we see, or hear, or feel, or do in our ordinary converse or common occurrences of life, are so many experiments whereon to build our conclusions. From hence we may best discover our own nature, as we can best discover the nature of bodies from their operation ; and by diligently observing what we do, how we come to act in such or such manner, together with the consequences and effects of our actions, we shall be likely to lay the surest measures for our conduct, and attain the clearest knowledge of what we ought to do.

Some have supposed with Plato, that moral and other qualities have an existence of their own, distinct from that of the substances whereto they belong ; that they may be clearly apprehended independently of the subject possessing them ; that they are eternal and immutable, whereas all other things fluctuate and vary, changing their forms perpetually ; therefore that science must stand firmest which is built upon such an immoveable foundation. I shall not stay now to examine the truth of this assertion : it is enough to observe, that whatever independent existence may belong to qualities, we can only come to the knowledge of them by the substances wherein they inhere : nature exhibits nothing abstracted to our view ; the abstract must be learned from the concrete. We should never have known what whiteness was, had we not seen something white ; nor hardness, had we not felt something hard. So neither could we have known what justice or goodness were, had we not seen the actions of men, and observed how their sentiments influence their behavior. Besides, how solid a science soever may be erected on ideal qualities, it rests in speculation only, and contributes nothing to our better accommodation, unless relating to such qualities wherein mankind has some concern ; and what are of this kind can only be ascertained by experience and observation.

From these sources, therefore, we must fetch our materials, and when we have gotten competent store of them, I am so far from being an enemy to abstract reasonings, that I shall pursue them as far as can be desired, keeping an eye all along upon use, and correcting my theory from time to time by a reference to facts.— I am rather apprehensive of incurring censure by pursuing them too far, or seeming to have forgotten or lost sight of the main subject proposed; for I may probably spend a great deal of time in metaphysical disquisitions before I mention a word either of morality or religion. But the knowledge of religion and morality arises from the knowledge of ourselves; at least, in my own private meditations I have always found, that whenever I have endeavored to trace them to their first principles, they have led me to consider the nature of the mind. This then we may look upon as the groundwork and foundation; and he that would have a firm superstructure, must allow sufficient time for laying the foundation well. While this is doing, we work underground: you see we are very busy, but to what purpose is not so readily visible: nothing appears useful, nothing convenient, nothing serviceable for the purposes of life. Have but patience until we come above ground, and then perhaps you will see a plan arising that promises something habitable and commodious, and which could not have stood secure without the pains we have been taking underneath. Let it be observed further, that my architecture partakes of the military as well as the civil kind: I am not only to build houses, churches, and markets, for the accommodation of life, but fortifications too for repelling the attacks of an invader: and this must be done substantially and begun early, for it will be too late to think of making our outworks after the assailants have opened their trenches.

Perhaps I may enter deeper into metaphysical niceties than I should have deemed requisite or allowable had not others done the like before me; not that the authority of example justifies whatever we can find a precedent for, but the practice of others renders some things indispensable which were needless in themselves. The profession of arms is an honorable, useful, and necessary profession; yet if all the world would agree to live without soldiers, there would be no occasion for soldiers in the world at all: but since neighboring nations will keep their standing armies, we must do the like, or shall lie liable to perpetual insults and invasions. So likewise the common notices of our understanding might sufficiently answer all the purposes we could expect from them, would all men agree to follow them attentively: but since we shall meet with persons every now and then who will be draw-

ing us aside from the plain road of common sense into the wilds of abstraction, it is expedient for us to get acquainted with the country beforehand, to examine the turnings and windings of the labyrinth, or else they will mislead and perplex us strangely. We have but one of these two ways to secure ourselves against their artifices : either by resolving never to meddle with any subtilities at all, or by going through with them. The same rule holds good here as we find given in poetry,—Drink deep, or taste not the Castalian spring ; for a large draught will often allay the intoxication brought on by a small one. Wherefore your dabblers in metaphysics are the most dangerous creatures breathing ; they have just abstraction enough to raise doubts that never would have entered into another's head, but not enough to resolve them.

The science of abstruse learning, when completely attained, is like Achilles' spear, that healed the wounds it had made before ; so this knowledge serves to repair the damage itself had occasioned ; and this perhaps is all it is good for : it casts no additional light upon the paths of life, but disperses the clouds with which it had overspread them before : it advances not the traveller one step on his journey, but conducts him back again to the spot from whence he had wandered. Thus the land of philosophy contains partly an open champaign country, passable by every common understanding, and partly a range of woods, traversable only by the speculative, and where they too frequently delight to amuse themselves. Since then we shall be obliged to make incursions into this latter track, and shall probably find it a region of obscurity, danger, and difficulty, it behoves us to use our utmost endeavors for enlightening and smoothing the way before us.

There seems to be no likelier method of answering this purpose than that of Plato, if one could be so happy as to copy him : I mean, in his art of illustrating and exemplifying abstruse notions by the most familiar instances taken from common life, though sometimes of the lowest and basest kind. We find him indeed rebuked, particularly in the *Hippias*, or *Dialogue upon Beauty*, for introducing earthen crocks and pitchers into discourses upon philosophy : and if the plainness of ancient times could not endure such vulgar images, what quarter can we expect for them in this nice and refined age ? But when one cannot do as one would, one must be content with what one can : I shall pay so much respect to my contemporaries, as never to offend their delicacy willingly ; therefore shall choose such illustrations as may appear fashionable and courtly as well as clear and luminous, wherever I have the option ; but where I want skill to compass both, shall hope for indulgence, if I prefer clearness and aptness

before neatness and politeness, and fetch comparisons from the stable or the scullery, when none occur suitable to my purpose in the parlor or the drawing-room.

With respect to ornament of style, I would neither neglect nor principally pursue it, esteeming solidity of much higher import than elegance, and the latter valuable only as it renders the other more apparent. I pretend to but one quality of the good orator, that of being more anxious for the success of his cause than of his own reputation: but having observed that the same matter meets a different reception according to the manner wherein it is conveyed, and that ornaments properly disposed, and not overloaded, make the substance more intelligible and inviting, I am desirous of putting my arguments into the handsomest dress I can furnish, not for the sake of show, but in order to gain them a more ready and more favorable admittance; with the same view as a surgeon desires to have the finest polish upon his lancets, not for the beauty of the instruments, but that they may enter the easier and pierce the surer.

As for the laying down of my plan, and choice of the methods to be taken in pursuit of it, those of course will be left to my own management, who may be supposed better acquainted with the nature and particulars of my design than a stranger. Therefore my reader, if I have any, will please to suspend his judgment upon the several parts until he has taken a view of the whole; and even then I hope will not hastily pronounce everything superfluous, or tedious, or too refined, which he finds needless to himself; for I am to the best of my skill to accommodate every taste, and provide, not only for the quick, the reasonable, and the easy, but for the dull, the captious, and the profound.

There is the better encouragement to try the strength of reason upon the subject of morality, because many judicious persons, Mr. Locke for one, have pronounced it capable of demonstration equally with mathematics: but how much soever morality may be demonstrable in its own nature, the demonstration has hitherto been found impracticable, being prevented, I conceive, by one main obstacle Mr. Locke has pointed out, that is, because the ideas and terms belonging to it are more indistinct, unsettled, and variable, than those of number or measure. The difference between ninety-nine and a hundred is discernible to everybody, and as well known as that between a hundred and a thousand; no man calls that an inch which another calls an ell; nor does the same man sometimes conceive a yard to contain three feet and sometimes four. But the case is far otherwise in the language of ethics: if one receives contrary commands from two

persons to each of whom he owes an obligation, who can determine the preference where the obligations bear so near a proportion as ninety-nine to a hundred? What this man esteems an honor, the next accounts a disgrace; and if the same person were asked his idea of virtue, freewill, obligation, justice, or favor, it is odds but he will vary in his notions at different times, nor ever be able to fix upon a definition, himself will always abide by. Since then we see what it is that hinders our moral and metaphysical reasonings from proceeding with the same justness as our mathematical, let us endeavor to remove the impediment by fixing a steady and determinate sense to our terms; for so far as we can compass this, so near shall we approach towards the certainty of demonstration; and I am persuaded that in cases of the highest importance we may often arrive, if not at mathematical demonstration, yet at a degree of evidence that shall command as full and merit as unreserved an assent.

This persuasion will lead me now and then to bestow more time than I could wish upon the signification of words: such disquisitions, I fear, may appear tedious and irksome to many, notwithstanding that no pains in my power shall be spared to make them easy, smooth, and palatable; but I hope to find excuse in the absolute necessity of the thing. For without accuracy of language it is impossible to convey a chain of close reasoning to others, or even to be sure of carrying it on unbroken ourselves; because we must always deliver our conceptions by words, and for the most part we think in words, that is, when we would recall an idea to our minds, the word expressive of it generally occurs first to usher it in; but if the word should have shifted its meaning without our perceiving it, as too frequently happens, we shall run a hazard of drawing conclusions without a consequence.

There is not the same danger in mathematics, because the terms there employed are either peculiar to that science, or such as constantly carry the same precise idea upon all common occasions, as relating to objects under cognizance of our senses. But ethics being chiefly, and metaphysics entirely, conversant in ideas of reflection, of which we have greater multitudes than words to express them, we are necessitated to use the same mark for various significations: as in scoring at cards, where the counters stand sometimes for units, sometimes for threes, fives, tens, or fifties, according to their positions, or according to the game, be it whist, cribbage, or piquet. And yet the ideas in our reflection being fleeting and transitory, passing to and fro, present before us this moment, and gone the next, we have no other method of fixing

them than by annexing them to particular words. It is true the studious often affect to employ technical terms, hoping thereby to escape the confusion incident to the language of the vulgar : but these being all, either common words restrained to a particular sense, or else derived from words of general currency, partake in some measure of the slippery and changeable quality of their primitives : nor can even the thoughtful always agree with one another, or maintain a consistency with themselves, in the application of their terms.

Wherefore in these sciences philology must go along with philosophy, not as a partner or companion, but as an attendant or handmaid. For the knowledge of things is our principal aim, and criticism no further than shall be found expedient to secure our meditations against confusion, and our discourses against misapprehension. I may think myself entitled to the liberty others have taken of coining new words, or extending, restraining, or a little altering the signification of old ones ; but shall never use this liberty so long as I can do without it. I would rather make it my business to distinguish the various senses belonging to words already current, as they stand in different expressions, or are employed upon different occasions : if this could be sufficiently remarked and borne in mind, it would prevent mistakes as effectually as if every idea had a particular name appropriated to itself alone.

I shall need great indulgence with respect to the manner of my performance, wherein I fear will be found a degree of wildness and deviation from the ordinary rules of composition : I was the less scrupulous in adhering to them during the course of my work, as depending upon a subsequent revisal for setting matters to rights, but upon trial I perceive that correction is not my talent : I have made some few additions in the first part, as of two entire chapters, the first and the twentyfourth, the beginning sections in that of the vehicles, the visit to Stahl in the vision, and the six concluding sections of the last chapter ; but for the rest, am forced to give out the first running off with very little alteration. This disappointment falls the lighter, because what amendments I had hoped to make, would have tended only to the better look and appearance of the work, for which I am much less solicitous than for the substance. I do not pretend insensibility to reputation ; but my first and principal wish is to be of some little service to my fellow-creatures by suggesting some observations which they may improve to their advantage ; and my greatest concern to avoid doing hurt by misleading into notions of dangerous tendency. Under this caution I must warn the reader against judging too hastily

upon the last chapter of this volume, for I should be very sorry to have him take his idea of virtue from the very exceptionable figure wherein she is represented there. But he will please to observe that I proceed solely upon the view of human nature, without any consideration of Religion or another world, and will expect no completer edifice than can be erected upon such scanty bottom : and that he may not sit down with a notion of my believing the plan of morality ought to lie upon no other ground, I entreat his attention to the two concluding sections of that chapter ; from whence he may augurate that I have a larger scheme in reserve, whereon my building will make a very different appearance from what he sees it here ; and possibly it may be shown in good time that I had my reasons for drawing this imperfect sketch before I proceeded to designs more extensive.

I shall now begin to work upon my foundation, which was proposed to be laid in human nature ; and having taken the line and plummet in hand, shall look for directions in the contemplation of the mind, the manner and causes of action, the objects affecting us, and their several ways of operation.

HUMAN NATURE.

THE LIGHT OF NATURE PURSUED.

HUMAN NATURE.

CHAP. I.

FACULTIES OF THE MIND.

WHOEVER considers the frame and constitution of Man, must observe that he consists of two parts, Mind and Body. And this division holds equally good, whatever opinion we may entertain concerning the nature of the mind; for, be it an immaterial substance, be it a harmony, or be it a certain configuration of corporeal particles, at all events it does not extend to the whole of the human composition. There are several things within us which cannot belong to the mind under any notion we may conceive of it; such as the bones, the muscles, the sinews, the blood, the humors, and even the limbs and organs of sensation, because by losing some of these, we lose nothing of our mind: when an arm is cut off or an eye beat out, though the man become less perfect, the mind remains entire as before; the harmony is not dissolved, the mental compound disunited, or the spiritual substance destroyed.

How variously soever we may think of the mind, every one will readily acknowledge the body to be a very complicated machine, containing muscles, tendons, nerves, organs of motion, organs of sensation, and a multitude of other inferior parts. But with these we have no immediate concern; our purpose being principally to consider the mind, but the body with its members no further than as they concur with the mind or serve as instruments in the performance of its operations.

2. Now in pursuit of this inquiry we shall find it requisite to distinguish between the faculties of the mind and the faculties of

the man, of whom the mind is only a part. For in all compounds there are some properties belonging to the parts separately, and others resulting from the composition or joint action of the united parts. Thus he that should describe the first mover in one of those curious pieces of workmanship made to exhibit various appearances by clock-work, would speak untruly in saying it had the properties of showing the time of the day or year, rising and setting of the luminaries, courses of the planets, concert of the Muses, or dance of the beasts after Orpheus, for these are all properties of the machine: the part under consideration has no other property than to gravitate, if it be a weight, or to expand, if it be a spring; and this single quality of gravitation or elasticity produces the various movements above mentioned, according to the several works whereto at different times it is applied.

In like manner we hear of many faculties ascribed to man, such as walking, handling or speaking, hearing, seeing or feeling, which manifestly do not belong to the mind, since it can exercise none of them without aid of the body: we can neither walk without legs, handle without arms, nor speak without a tongue; neither hear without ears, see without eyes, nor touch without fingers. But though the mind has some share in the performance of all these actions, yet the faculties it exerts are not so various as the operations it produces: for it is by one and the same faculty of the mind that we walk, handle or speak, and by one and the same faculty that we hear, see or touch; which faculty produces different effects according to the different bodily organs whereto it is applied.

Nevertheless, there is this difference observable with respect to the mind itself, that upon some occasions, as in walking, handling, speaking, it affects and acts upon the body; on others as hearing, seeing, feeling, it is itself affected and acted upon by the body. Hence we reasonably gather that the mind possesses two faculties; one by which we perform whatever we do, and another by which we discern whatever presents itself to our apprehension. The former has usually been styled the Will, and the latter the Understanding.

3. Faculty is the same as Power, or rather a particular sort of power; being generally appropriated to those powers only which belong to animals. We get our idea of power, says Mr. Locke, from the changes we see made in things by one another; upon seeing gold melted by the fire, we consider a quality in the fire of changing the gold from a solid into a fluid state; and upon seeing wax blanched by the sun, we conceive the sun must have a qual-

ity to alter the color of the wax. But the same quality working upon different subjects does not always produce the like effect, therefore that it ever does, appears owing to some quality in the subject whereon it operates : thus if gold melts in the fire, not only the fire must have a quality of melting, but the gold likewise a quality of being melted ; if wax blanches in the sun, it is not enough that the sun possesses a quality of blanching, but there must be a quality of being blanched in the wax. The qualities of fire remain the same, whether you throw gold or clay into it ; yet upon casting in the latter no liquefaction will ensue, solely for want of the quality of being liquified in this latter. These qualities are called Powers in the writings of the studious, and distinguished into two kinds by the epithets of active and passive powers ; both of which must concur in producing every alteration that happens, to wit, an active power in the agent to work the change, and a passive in the recipient to undergo it.

According to this distinction it will appear that of the two faculties of the mind before spoken of, one is active and the other passive : for on every exertion of our Will, the mind causes some motion, change of situation, or alteration of the subject it acts upon ; and in every exercise of our understanding, the mind passes either from a state of insensibility to a state of discernment, or from one kind of discernment to another, as from sights to sounds, or tastes or reflections, according to the variety of objects that act upon it.

4. We readily enough conceive ourselves active in the exertions of our Will, but by the common turn of our language we seem to claim an activity in the exercises of our understanding too ; for we generally express them by active verbs, such as to discern, to see, to observe, and apply the passives of those very verbs to the objects when we say they are discerned, seen, observed ; all which carry an import of something done by ourselves and something suffered by the objects from us. Yet a very little consideration may show us, that in all sensations at least, the objects are agents and ourselves the patients. For what is sight but an impression of things visible upon our eyes and by them conveyed to the mind ? what is sound but the percussion of air upon our ears and thence transmitted through the like conveyance ? In all these cases the sensations are caused by bodies without us, and are such as the respective bodies are fitted to produce : the mind can neither excite nor avoid nor change them in any manner ; it can neither see blue in a rose nor hear the sound of a trumpet from a drum, but remains purely passive to take whatever happens to it from external objects. Nor is the case

different in hunger and thirst, the pleasant feel of health or uneasiness of distempers, though proceeding from internal causes; for nobody can doubt of these sensations being raised by the humors or some parts of our body, which though within the man yet lie without the mind, and therefore with respect to that are truly external agents.

5. Thus it appears evidently that we are passive in sensation of every kind: but the matter is not quite so plain in the business of reflection, which the mind seems to carry on entirely upon its own fund, without aid of the body, without intervention of the senses or impression of anything external, acting solely and immediately in and upon itself.

Yet supposing the mind acts in this manner, it does not prove the understanding to be active herein, it proves only that the mind is both agent and patient at once. As a man who after holding his right hand to the fire claps it upon his left, although active in the motion of one hand, is nevertheless passive in feeling warmth with the other; for whatever power he may have to move his hands, it would signify nothing if he had no feeling. So admitting that the mind furnishes its own thoughts in and from itself, although it acts in producing the thoughts, nevertheless is it passive in discerning them when produced; for whatever power it may have to generate reflections, all will avail nothing without a power of discernment.

But we may justly question whether the supposition above made be true in fact, whether the same thing ever does act wholly and solely upon itself, or whether the notion of action does not require two substances, one to act and the other to be acted upon. I know we are often said to perform actions upon ourselves, as when Cato slew himself at Utica; but he did it with a sword, therefore his action was exerted upon that, and he was passive in receiving the wound made by the sword. And if a mother, upon the loss of her child, beats her breast in despair, neither is this an acting of one thing upon itself, although she uses no instrument; for every compound is one in imagination only, in nature and reality it is as many things as the component parts it contains: because the hand which strikes and the breast which suffers are parts of the same woman, therefore we may say she beats herself; but consider them separately, and the hand will appear as individually and numerically distinct from the breast as if they had belonged to different persons. And if we transfer our expression from the whole to the parts, we shall find ourselves obliged to change the form of it: for though we may say the woman beats herself, we cannot say the same either of the hand or the breast. In short, it seems to

me difficult to frame a conception of any one individual thing acting immediately and directly upon itself, or without some instrument or medium intervening between the power exerted and effect produced thereby.

6. But this abstruse reasoning from the nature and essence of action may not satisfy everybody, as it may not be understood by some and not agreed to by others; the conceptions of men, in their abstract notions especially, being widely different. Let us therefore consider what passes in our minds in the work of reflection, in order to try whether we can gather any light towards determining the question from experience. And this will furnish us with numberless instances wherein reflections intrude upon the mind whether we will or no: a recent loss, a cruel disappointment, a sore vexation, an approaching enjoyment, a strong inclination, an unexpected success, often force themselves upon our thoughts against our utmost endeavors to keep them out. Upon all these occasions the mind shows evident marks of passiveness, the Will wherein its activity lies being strongly set a contrary way: it suffers violence, and that violence must be offered by something else, for it cannot be suspected here of acting upon itself, the action produced being directly opposite to that it would have, and the state whereinto it is thrown the very reverse of what it wishes: when it wishes content, it is overwhelmed with anxiety and disquiet like a torrent; and when it would rest in calmness, passion, expectation and impatience rush upon it like an armed giant.

7. The same experience testifies of other reflections coming upon us without though not against our Will. How many fancies, conceits, transactions, observations, and I may say, arguments, criticisms and measures of conduct, shoot into our thoughts without our seeking? If we go abroad on one errand, another suddenly occurs; visiting such a friend, buying such a trifle, seeing such a sight that lies opportunely in our way. When a man coming off from a journey throws himself carelessly into an easy chair, and being desirous of nothing but rest, falls into a reverie, what a variety of objects pass muster in his imagination! The prospects upon the road, occurrences happening to him, his acquaintance at home, their faces, characters, conversations, histories, what he has seen, what he has done, what he has thought on during his journey or at other times. His mind remaining all the while half asleep, for though the understanding wakes, the Will in a manner does, without preference of one thing before another, without attention to any particular part of the scene, but suffering all to come and go as it happens. Can the mind in this indolent posture be said to act upon itself when it does not act at all? Yet ideas in-

numerable are produced, which must necessarily proceed from the act of some other agent extrinsic to the mind and individually distinct from it.

8. Let us now consider voluntary reflection, such as recollecting, studying, meditating, reasoning, deliberating, and the like, wherein the mind from time to time calls up the thoughts it wants, and is if ever both agent and patient in the same act. Yet even here, if we examine the matter closely, we shall find that the mind does not call up all our thoughts directly by its own immediate command, but seizes on some clue whereby it draws in all the rest. In meditation, though we choose our subject, we do not choose the reflections from time to time occurring thereupon. In reasoning, we seek after some conclusion which we cannot obtain without help of the premises; or hit upon some discovery, a stranger to our thoughts before, and therefore not under our obedience. Deliberation and investigation are like the hunting of a hound; he moves and sniffs about by his own activity, but the scent he finds is not laid, nor the trail he follows drawn by himself. The mind only begins a train of thinking or keeps it in one particular track, but the thoughts introduce one another successively. I believe few persons, how well acquainted soever with Virgil, can repeat the second line of his *Æneid* without beginning with the first: we see here the second line brought to our remembrance, not by the mind, but by the first line, which therefore must be deemed a distinct agent or instrument employed by the mind in bringing the second to our memory. Whoever will carefully observe what he does when he sets himself down to study, may perceive that he produces none of the thoughts passing in his mind, not even that which he uses as the clue to bring in all the others; he first withdraws his attention from sensible objects, nor does he then instantly enter upon his work; some little time must be given for reflection to begin its play, which presently suggests the purpose of his inquiries to his remembrance and some methods of attaining it; that which appears most likely to succeed, he fixes his contemplation upon, and follows whithersoever that shall lead, or checks his thoughts from time to time when he perceives them going astray, or stops their course if he finds it ineffectual, and watches for its falling into some new train; for imagination will be always at work, and if restrained from roving in all that variety of sallies it would make of its own accord, it will strike into any passages remaining open. Therefore we may compare our student to a man who has a river running through his grounds which divides into a multitude of channels: if he dams up all the rest, the stream will flow in the one he leaves

open ; if he finds it breaking out into side branches, he can keep it within bounds by stopping up the outlets ; if he perceives the course it takes ineffectual for his purpose, he can throw a mound across and let it overflow at any gap he judges convenient. The water runs by its own strength without any impulse from the man, and whatever he does to it, will find a vent somewhere or other : he may turn, alter or direct its motion, but neither gave nor can take it away. So it is with our thoughts, which are perpetually working so long as we wake, and sometimes longer, beyond our power to restrain : we may control them, divert them into different courses, conduct them this way or that, as we deem requisite, but can never totally prevent them from moving. Which shows they have a motion of their own independent of the mind, and which they do not derive from its action, nor will lay aside upon its command.

9. We may remark further that the mind cannot always call up those thoughts which for the most part lie ready to appear at our summons. How often do we endeavor in vain to recollect a name, a transaction, a circumstance, we know extremely well ? How often do we try to study without effect, to deliberate with various success, and perplex ourselves with difficulties we have heretofore made nothing of ? Sometimes we find ourselves totally incapable of application to anything ; sometimes unapt for one kind of exercise but ready at another : mathematics, ethics, history, poetry, business, amusements, have their several seasons wherein the thoughts run more easily into each of them than any other way. Which affords a strong presumption that the mind employs some instrument, which when not at hand or unfit for service, it cannot work at all or not pursue the train of thought it attempts.

The more narrowly we examine our procedure in all exercises of the understanding, the more firmly we shall be persuaded that the mind uses a medium by whose ministry it obtains what it wants. Both in sensation and reflection of our own procuring, the mind acts upon the medium and that again acts upon the mind : for as in reading we only open the book, but the page presents the words contained in it to our sight : so in thinking we set our imagination to work, which exhibits appearances to our discernment.

10. If we go about to examine what those mediums are we find so necessary to the mind, it will presently occur that the ideas floating in our imagination are to be ranked among the mediums : and it may be worth while to bestow a little consideration upon these ideas.

We use idea sometimes for the very discernment the mind has of some object or thought passing in review before it, and sometimes more properly for the thing or appearance so discerned. It is obvious that when I speak of ideas as mediums, I must understand them in the latter sense; not as effects produced in the understanding, but as causes immediately producing them.

Idea is the same as image, and the term imagination implies a receptacle of images: but image being appropriated by common use to visible objects, could not well be extended to other things without confusion; wherefore learned men have imported the Greek word idea, signifying image or appearance, to which, being their own peculiar property, they might affix as large a signification as they pleased. For the image of a sound or of goodness would have offended our delicacy, but the idea of either goes down glibly: therefore idea is the same with respect to things in general as image with respect to objects of vision.

In order to render the notion of ideas clearer, let us begin with images. When a peacock spreads his tail in our sight, we have a full view of the creature with all his gaudy plumage before us: the bird remains at some distance, but the light reflected from him paints an image upon our eyes, and the optic nerves transmit it to the sensory. This image, when arrived at the ends of the nerves, becomes an idea and gives us our discernment of the animal; and after the bird is gone out of view, we can recal the idea of him to perform the same office as before, though in a duller and fainter manner. So when the nightingale warbles, the sound reaches our ears, and passing through the auditory nerves, exhibits an idea affecting us with the discernment of her music: and after she has given over singing, the same idea may recur to our remembrance or be raised again by us at pleasure. In like manner our other senses convey ideas of their respective kinds, which recur again to our view long after the objects first exciting them have been removed.

These ideas having entered the mind, intermingle, unite, separate, throw themselves into various combinations and postures, and thereby generate new ideas of reflection, strictly so called, such as those of comparing, dividing, distinguishing, of abstraction, relation, with many others: all which remain with us as a stock for our further use upon future occasions.

11. Here perhaps I shall be put in mind that I have before supposed two substances necessarily concurring in every action, one to act, and the other to be acted upon; and thereupon asked whether I conceive ideas to be substances. To which I answer, No: but as such answer will seem to imply a contradiction, the

only agents in the business of reflection being ideas which nevertheless are not substances, I shall be called upon to reconcile it.

For which purpose I shall have recourse again to the image employed before. When we look upon a peacock, what is that image conveyed to us considered in the several stages through which it passes? Not anything brought away by the light from the bird, and thrown in upon us through our organs, but a certain disposition of the rays striking upon our eyes, a certain configuration of parts arising in our retina, or a certain motion excited thereby in our optic nerves: which disposition, configuration, and motion, are not substances, but accidents in ancient dialect, or modifications according to modern philosophers. But accident or modification cannot exist by itself, it must have some substance to inhere in or belong to, which substance is indeed the agent upon all occasions. Nevertheless we commonly ascribe the action to the modification, because what kind it shall be of depends entirely upon that: for the same rays, the same retina, the same nerves, differently modified by the impulse of external objects, might have served to convey the image of an owl or a bear, or any other animal to our discernment. Therefore that last substance, whatever it be, which immediately gives us the sensation, is the agent acting upon our mind in all cases of vision: and in like manner that something so or so modified which presents to our discernment, is the agent in all cases of mental reflection, which modification we call our idea: but because we know nothing more of the substance than the operation it performs, therefore if we would speak to be understood, we can say no otherwise than that the idea is the thing we discern.

What those substances are whereof our ideas are the modification, whether parts of the mind as the members are of our body, or contained in it like wafers in a box, or enveloped by it like fish in water, as many expressions current in use might lead us to imagine, whether of a spiritual, corporeal, or middle nature between both, I need not now ascertain; nor indeed can I until the sequel of our enquiries in the progress of this work shall by degrees have brought us better acquainted with some particulars relating to them. All I mean at present to lay down is this. That in every exercise of the understanding, that which discerns is numerically and substantially distinct from that which is discerned: and that an act of understanding is not so much our own proper act as the act of something else operating upon us.

12. After all that has been said, I think we may look upon the passivity of the understanding as fully established. But active

power alone, says Mr. Locke, is properly power: and however men of thought and reading may suppose two powers necessary to effect every alteration, an active in the agent to work the change, and a passive in the recipient to undergo it; men of common apprehensions cannot find this power in the latter. If they see one man beat another, they readily enough discern a power in him that beats, but they cannot so easily conceive the other's defeat owing to his power of being beaten, which they rather look upon as weakness and defect of power. So when they see gold melt in the fire, they ascribe the melting to an inability in the gold to resist the force of fire, as stone or clay, or other fixed bodies might do, which have a stronger power to hold their parts together.

If Faculty be derived from Facility, it implies active power, and that in the highest degree; for if I with much ado can heave up a huge folio upon an upper shelf, my servant who can toss it up with facility must have a much greater degree of strength; and probably this term was pitched upon to denote the surprising agility and readiness shown by the mind upon most occasions, as well of acting as discerning. The term Faculty I believe has been generally applied by most men to the understanding, nor do I wonder it should, because we do not minutely consider the progress of action nor the stages through which it passes: therefore when we observe the same action beginning and ending in the same thing, and do not take notice of any medium or instrument employed to carry it on, we naturally conceive the same thing acting upon itself. But there is a distinction between an immediate and a remote effect: I never denied that the mind acts upon itself remotely, I know it does so very frequently both in procuring sensation and reflection. For what is reading, hearkening, singing, tasting a sweetmeat, warming our hands at the fire, but sensations excited in the mind from something done by itself? When we read, the opening the book, turning to the proper page, running our eyes along the lines, and fixing our attention thereupon, are our own acts; and the sight of the words and sense of the author conveyed thereby are of our own discernment. When we study, it is we ourselves who put our imagination into a posture for thinking, and the reflections, determination, or discovery resulting therefrom, are effects produced in ourselves.

Besides that the measure of our understandings gives scope to the range of our wills; men of duller apprehension cannot perform many things which those of quicker apprehensions can: perhaps the difference really lies in the instrument we have to use, but is commonly supposed in the mind itself. Therefore the ex-

tent of our active powers depending upon the sensibility of our understanding, this is deemed a part of them, and denominated by the same appellation ; for being found to have a share in the performance of our actions, because they could not be performed without it, it lays claim to the title of an active power.

Thus we see the mind invested according to common conception with two powers ; but in philosophical strictness, and in propriety of speech, if we may take Mr. Locke's judgment of that propriety, it has only one power, namely the Will, and one capacity, namely the Understanding. Yet as I find them both sometimes termed powers, as well by Mr. Locke as by other writers upon this subject, I shall comply with the prevailing custom, and make no scruple to speak of our passive power and acts of the understanding, as I see no inconvenience therein ; having already declared my opinion that they are truly passions of the mind, and acts of something else.

13. But I cannot be quite so complaisant with respect to names given the faculties, as I apprehend great mischiefs arising therefrom ; for being terms of common currency we shall find it very difficult, perhaps impossible, at all times to disjoin them from the sense generally affixed to them by custom : which frequently ascribes acts that do not belong to them, or acts of one to the other, or complicated acts wherein both concur jointly to either singly.— By which means we shall run a great hazard of perplexing ourselves, and talking unintelligibly to others, or what is worse, of making syllogisms with four terms, and thereby leading both into mistakes.

Observe how men express themselves as well in their serious discourses as in their ordinary conversation, and you will see them appropriating the term understanding to that knowledge, skill, or judgment, resulting from experience in particular things : as when they talk of understanding such a language, of a divine understanding the Scriptures, a lawyer, the statutes, a painter colors, or a mealman the different goodness of corn in a market. If any one asks, Sir, do you understand this paragraph in a book, he does not mean Can you read it, but Do you know the sense of it ? if he asks whether you understand the bell, he does not inquire whether you hear it, but whether it rings to breakfast or chapel.— Whereas seeing the letters of a paragraph and hearing the sound of a bell are acts of the faculty as much as understanding the drift of them : and the same objects convey their sensations to the novice, if his senses be perfect, as fully though not so usefully as to the man of skill. When we improve or enlarge our understanding by learning, we do nothing to our faculty, for that we must

take as nature gave it us ; nor can any application increase or diminish our natural talents ; we can only lay in a larger stock of materials for them to work upon. Like a man who cuts down a wood to extend his prospect, he does nothing to his eyes nor encreases their power of vision, but only opens a larger field for them to expatiate in.

So what we call exercises of our understanding are in reality exercises of our reason, not the single act of either, but the joint work of both faculties ; such as reading, composing, deliberating, contriving, and the like, wherein the mind employs both her powers and certain instruments besides in a series of actions tending to some end proposed. Whereas every notice of our senses, every wild imagination, every start of fancy, every transient object or thought exercises our faculty. What need divines and philosophers exhort us perpetually to use our understandings ? Their admonitions were superfluous if they meant the faculty, for this we use without ceasing while awake, nor can we choose but do so. The little master playing at pushpin uses his faculty, for that discovers to him the situation of the pins, and thereby directs his fingers how to shove one across another. When Miss Gawky lolls out at window for hours together to see what passes in the street, she uses her faculty all the while ; for by that she discerns the coaches going by, a woman wheeling potatoes in a barrow, or a butcher's apprentice with a dog carrying his empty tray before him. How oddly would it sound to say this pretty trifler makes as much use of her understanding as the laborious patriot, who spends his time and himself in contriving schemes for the public good ? Yet we cannot deny her this honor if we speak of the faculty, for both equally furnish that with constant employment. How shall we take these expressions, A man of no understanding, or That has lost his understanding ? for the veriest ideot or madman, if he can see and hear and remember and fancy, possesses the faculty of discerning objects in such manner as his senses convey them or his imagination represents them.

14. So likewise the term Will in common acceptation stands for something very different from our active power, as appears evidently by our frequently talking of doing things unwillingly or against our Wills : for the mind has one only active power whereby it brings to pass whatever it performs, nor is it possible to do any one thing without exerting that ; therefore it would be highly absurd to talk of acting without or against our Will in this sense.— But by acting against our Will we mean against the liking, against the grain, against the inclination, which being observed to set us commonly at work, for we do most of our actions because we like

them, hence the cause is mistaken for the effect, and the liking gets the name of the power operating to attain it: and if we find inclination drawing one way and obligation or some cogent necessity driving another, our compliance with the latter we call acting against our Will.

If we view this compliance separately in its own light, this also appears to us an act of our Will. Suppose a girl, living with some relation from whom she has large expectations, invited to a ball which she would go to with all her heart, but the old lady thinks it improper; therefore she stays at home, and says she does it sorely against her Will. Ask her whether anybody could have hindered if she had resolved positively upon going. No, says she, but to be sure I would not go when I knew it must have disobliterated my aunt: I should have been a great fool if I had. You see here by saying I would not go, she looks upon the staying at home as an act of her Will, and thus the Will appears to act against itself; which were impossible if Will stood for the same thing in both sentences. This leads us to another sense of the word where-in it signifies a dictate of prudence, a judgment or decision of the understanding, whose office it is, not that of the Will, to discern the expedience and propriety of measures proposed for our conduct. But because our judgment many times influences our actions, and perhaps we flatter ourselves it does so always, therefore we denominate it our Will, by a like mistake of the cause for the power working the effect.

Do not we frequently join will and pleasure together as synonymous terms? Now not to insist that pleasure is no action but a feeling of the mind, we use this expression upon occasions wherein it cannot relate to our active power. It is his Majesty's will and pleasure that the parliament should assemble: what has this to do with the faculty of the King? the members must come by their own activity; they derive no motion, nor power of motion from the crown. Oh! but the King must do some act whereby to signify his pleasure, or they will not know what to do in obedience thereto. Who doubts it? But when we speak of will and pleasure we do not understand the act of declaring, nor any power exerted to perform it, but the thing so declared; and what is that but the royal judgment that such assembling will be for his service.

When we are called upon to curb, to restrain, to deny our Wills, what are we to understand by these exhortations? or how shall we go about to practise them? Why by resolving strongly not to let our Will have its bent. But is it in our power to resolve? Yes, you may pluck up a resolution if you will take pains.

This Will then whereby we form the resolution must be different from that we control : which carries an appearance of two Wills, one counteracting the other. Hence Man has been often represented as containing two persons within him : the old man and the new, the flesh and the spirit, reason and passion, the intellectual and sensitive soul, Plato's charioteer and pair of horses ; each having a Will of its own, perpetually thwarting, contending, and struggling with each other, sometimes one getting the direction of our actions and sometimes the other. Nevertheless when we reflect that these actions are all of our own performance, we are at a nonplus to determine which of these Wills is our own, and which of these persons ourselves.

15. To get rid of the ambiguity clinging to vulgar terms, the words Volition and Velleity have been coined, and applied, one to that Will which gets the mastery, and the other to that controlled thereby. Thus the young lady who excused herself from the invitation had a velleity to go, but a volition to stay away. But velleity can scarce be called a power, for a power which never operates is no power at all: Velleity gives birth to none of our motions, it may strive and struggle a little, but volition always carries the day. Our actions constantly follow our volition, such as that is such are they, and what action of those in our power we shall perform depends solely thereupon. Yet neither can we deem volition the same as power, since the one may be where the other is not : a man who sits still may have the power to walk, but he has not the volition, and that is the only reason why he does not walk. Again, our powers, as Mr. Locke has shown, are indifferent to every action within their compass : but a perfect indifference is no volition, it produces nothing but a total indolence, nor does volition come until the mind exerts itself upon something. Therefore volition is not so much a power as the turn or direction of our power upon particular occasions : just as the turn of the wind is not a power, but only the direction the wind takes at any time. Yet the clouds constantly follow the turn of the wind, such as that is such are their courses, and it depends solely thereupon to determine whether they shall travel to the east or to the west, to the north or to the south : nevertheless, nobody can think the turn of the wind is the force or power by which the wind carries the clouds along.

16. Nor does there want room to believe that the double sense of the word understanding has given rise to many disputes. Whether the Will always follows the last act of the understanding or no. For observing that we are generally prompted to action by something we discern pleasant or expedient, and being taught,

to look upon every discernment as an exertion of the understanding faculty, we conceive our motions governed by our understanding. Then again finding that common usage, the standard of language, has appropriated understanding to knowledge, judgment, reason, the result of thought or experience from which we too frequently and notoriously swerve in our conduct, we bewilder ourselves in mazes without ever coming to an issue. And when we canvass the point with one another, whichever side of the question we take, it will be easy for an antagonist to produce expressions from authors or persons of undoubted credit proving the contrary. Nor shall we be able to satisfy our opponent or ourselves, because we cannot settle what is properly an act of the understanding, and whether it be the same with an act of the faculty.

Mr. Locke complains of the faculties being spoken of and represented as so many distinct agents: not that I suppose anybody ever seriously believed them such, but by talking frequently of the understanding, discerning, judging, representing things to the mind or determining the Will, and of the Will obeying or disobeying the understanding, or directing our active powers, we slide insensibly into an imagination or temporary persuasion of their being agents, and proceed in our reasonings upon that supposition, which must necessarily many times mislead and confound us. But neither he nor I can descry any other agent in the mind besides the mind itself: nor can I distinguish any more than two steps in the action of the mind, the discerning what is to be done, and the doing it; or any more than three substances concerned in the whole process, the object, the mind, and the subject whereon it operates. Thus when upon seeing an orange tossed at your head, you instantly hold up your hand to save your face: the orange is the object, the mind is the discernor and sole actor upon your hand, which is the subject. Or more accurately, the further end of the optic nerve, or that other substance, if any such there be, whereof the idea of the orange is the modification, we call the object; and that inner end of some nerve or other nearer substance employed by the mind in moving the arm, is the subject.

17. Perhaps I may be thought too nice in the last part of this explanation, but there are folks who push their refinements a bar's length beyond me, and draw out the process of action much farther than I can pretend to. For besides our active power, they in their great bounty give us an elective power too, without which the former cannot wag a finger; and according to their way of discoursing, the matter seems to stand thus. Understanding and passion, like two council, plead their causes on opposite sides,

while the Will, an arbitrary monarch, sits umpire between them, and by virtue of its prerogative or elective power gives the preference to either as it pleases, without regard to the weight of their arguments, or creates a new preference not suggested by either: this being done, the bill goes to the understanding, which discerning the preference so given, pronounces it good, and adds the sanction of its judgment thereto: then it returns back to the volition where it receives the royal assent, and is from thence transmitted to the active powers as officers of government in order to be carried into immediate execution.

Wherefore in hopes of escaping all these perplexities, I shall crave leave to call the faculties by other names, to wit, the active power, or simply power, activity or energy of the mind, and the passive power, perceptivity or discernment: for I think these cannot be mistaken for agents having powers of their own, nor for instruments distinct from the mind, and employed by it in the performance of its works. Nevertheless, as one is never more easily understood than when using the language current in vogue, I shall not totally discard the old terms Understanding, Will, and Volition, nor scruple applying them to the faculties as often as I can do it safely, and when the occasion introducing or context accompanying them shall ascertain their meaning beyond all danger of misapprehension.

CHAP. II.

ACTION.

I HAVE heard of a formal old gentleman who, finding his horse uneasy under the saddle, alighted and called to his servant in the following manner. Tom, take off the saddle which is upon my bay horse and lay it upon the ground, then take the saddle from thy grey horse and put it upon my bay horse; lastly, put the other saddle upon thy grey horse. The fellow gaped all the while at this long preachment, and at last cried out, Lack-a-day, Sir, could not you have said at once, Change the saddles? We see here how many actions are comprised under those three little words, Change the saddles, and yet the master, for all his exactness, did not particularize the tenth part of them; lifting up the flap of the saddle, pulling the strap, raising the tongue, drawing out the buckle, taking up the saddle, pulling it towards him, stooping to

lay it down, lifting up his body again, and so forth. But had he staid to enumerate all the steps his man must take in executing his orders, they would not have got home by dinner time. Therefore expedience recommends compendious forms of speech for common use, and puts us often upon expressing a long course of action by a single word, else we could make no dispatch in our discourses with one another: for were we to describe all the motions we make in any business transacted, we must spend more time in the narrative than we did in the performance.

But our horseman, though by far too minute and circumstantial for the fine gentleman, was not enough so for the philosopher. Whoever would penetrate into the nature of things, must not take them in the lump, but examine their several parts and operations separately. The anatomist when he would teach you the structure of the human body does not content himself with telling you it has head, limbs, body, and bowels, for this you knew before and was knowledge enough for common occasions: he lays open the muscles, injects the veins, traces the nerves, examines the glands, their strainers, vessels, and tunicles. And the naturalist goes further, he describes the little bladders whereof every fibre consists, their communication with one another, the nitro-aerious fluid pervading them, distending their coats, thereby shortening the string and producing muscular motion.

Thus to become intimately acquainted with our mind we must, as I may say, dissect it, that is, analyze action into its first constituent parts. The action of the Drama or Epopee, the critics say must be one and entire, or the performance will prove defective. To that of a play they allow the compass of a natural day; that of the Iliad takes in, I think, twentynine days, and that of the Æneid six years. We may look upon actions of this enormous bulk till we are tired without learning anything from thence concerning the structure of the mind: let us therefore consider what is truly and properly a single action, and try how far that will help us in our researches.

2. A single action I take to be so much as we can perform at once, for the present moment only lies in our power nor does our activity reach any farther. What our future actions shall be, depends upon our future volitions; we may determine and resolve long beforehand, but it is well known our resolutions frequently change, and when the time of execution comes, we shall do what is then in our minds, not what we had there before, if the two happen to differ.

I will not pretend to calculate how many actions we may perform in any given space of time, as some have computed how

many particles of air would lie in an inch; but certainly the motions of our mind are extremely quick. When upon finding yourself thirsty in a sultry day you snatch up a cup of liquor, if after you have gotten it half way up, you espy a wasp floating on the surface, you thrust it instantly from you; which shows that one volition is not sufficient to lift your hand to your mouth, for you see the mind may take a contrary turn in that little interval. How nimble are the motions of the fencer and the tennis player! the hand perpetually follows the eye and moves as fast as the objects can strike upon that; but between every impulse of the object and every motion of the hand, an entire perception and volition must intervene. How readily do our words occur to us in discourse, and as readily find utterance at the tongue the moment they present themselves! The tongue does not move mechanically like a clock, which once wound up will go for a month, but receives every motion and forms every modulation of voice by particular direction from the mind. Objects and ideas rise continually in view, they pass without ceasing before us, vary, appear and vanish; for what is so quick as thought? Yet volition keeps pace with perception and sometimes perhaps out-strips it: for in speaking the word MIND the whole idea seems to present in one perception, but there must be four several volitions to guide the tongue successively in pronouncing the four different letters. Not that volition runs more ground than perception, but follows close with unequal steps, like young Iulus after his father: for when you read you see the whole word together, and consequently the D before you pronounce the M.

3. In very nice works we lie under a necessity of spinning very fine, but though we are obliged sometimes to split the hair we need not quarter it. Therefore I shall call one action so much as passes between each perception and the next, although this action produce several cotemporary motions. And anybody may see with half an eye that our larger actions, such as we speak of in common conversation, consist of those under actions: for as days, months, years, and all measurable portions of time are made up of moments, so all our performances and transactions are made up of momentary acts. A walk consists of steps, a game at chess of moves, a description of particulars, a narration of circumstances, and discourse in general, whether serious or trifling, labored or careless, of words and syllables, each whereof must have its distinct volition to give it effect.

Nor does there need much penetration to observe how sociably the two faculties lead one another, as I may say hand in hand, not only in entering upon our works but through all the steps necessa-

ry to complete them. If you would walk to any place, it is not enough to use your understanding before you set out in choosing the nearest or most commodious way, but you must use your eyes all along to conduct your steps: for should you shut them a moment, you might chance to run against a post, or tread beside the path. If you are to discourse on any subject, when you have chosen your matter and settled your form, the business is not all done; you must consult your judgment from time to time during the delivery for proper expressions and proper tones of voice. Even your perpetual gabblers, who let their tongues run before their wits, cannot proceed with one faculty alone, for though they talk without thinking, they do not talk without perceiving: their ideas draw through their imagination in a string, though it proves indeed only a rope of sand without pertinence and without coherence.

4. But these single acts, though confined to a moment of time, may contain several coexistent parts. For we make many motions together by one and the same exertion of our activity; we may reach out our hands, step with our feet, look with our eyes, speak and think at once. And the like may be said of perception, for we can see, hear, feel, discern, remember, all at the same instant. I know not whether I may have occasion hereafter to consider the parts of action, but for the present I stick to my definition before laid down, terming the whole scene of ideas presented together to our view one perception, and the whole exertion of our activity, upon how many subjects soever operating, one volition, which though without duration may have a large scope: just as your mathematical surfaces which, though void of thickness, may extend to a very spacious circumference.

The not observing the shortness of action, has given occasion I believe to the notion mentioned at the end of the last chapter concerning distinct agents and various powers in the mind: for by help of this clue we may unravel the mystery, and discover that what was esteemed the act of several agents, was indeed successive acts of the mind exerting her two faculties at different times. When several ideas present themselves together, the mind cannot always judge immediately between them, for their colors change for a while, fading and glowing alternately, or the scales of judgment and inclination rise and fall by turns; the mind being sensible of this, sees nothing better than to hold them in her attention until the colors settle or the balance fixes; as soon as that happens she perceives which of them is the stronger, and this some people fancy done by an elective power, wherewith the Will gives a preference of its own, because the preference follows in conse-

quence of a voluntary attention. Or perhaps a new color sparkles out unperceived before, or a new weight falls into the scale : and this they call creating a preference. When the preference becomes visible, the mind instantly discerns it, and pronounces the object good whereon it alights ; and having now no further use for contemplation, she looks out for proper measures of execution, which as soon as they occur she puts immediately in practice.

5. Nor will it be useless to take notice that in common speech we confine action to outward motions and exercises of our bodily powers : as when we distinguish between an active and a sedentary life, between seasons of action and seasons of deliberation : which expressions look as if we thought ourselves totally inactive in the latter, and so indeed we naturally may at first sight because we can show no effects of our activity. But every volition produces some effect, although not always discernible ; and every production of our own, be it of a fleeting thought or a permanent work, springs from some volition. If a man retires from business into his closet, we cannot necessarily conclude he does nothing there ; for whatever indolent posture he may throw his body into, his mind may find constant employment all the while. Now the mind has only one active power to serve her upon all occasions ; therefore acting and thinking are the same with respect to the power enabling us to go through them ; they differ only in the subjects operated upon. When the mind withdraws from the world, she may roam about her own habitation ; when she ceases to act upon the limbs, she may nevertheless act upon herself, that is, raise ideas to pass in review before her.

6. There is another division of action I find made by Mr. Locke into action properly so called, and forbearance, which latter he seems to think requires the interposition of the Will as much as the former : thus if a man asks his friend to take a walk, it is equally an exertion of his Will whether he refuses or accepts the offer. But I cannot readily understand how a mere forbearance to act is any exercise of our active power at all : it seems to me rather a discernment of the other faculty that we do not like the thing proposed, which discernment or dislike we have seen before is frequently taken for our Will. What we call a forbearance I apprehend to be generally a choice of some other action. We will not walk because we had rather ride, or talk, or think, or do something else : we forbear to act because we would consider first what is proper to be done ; or we forbear to deliberate any longer because the time of action is at hand. When we make several motions together, we may forbear one and continue the rest, for while walking and discoursing with a companion we may point at

some distant object, which after he has seen we may let our hand fall to our side : but this I do not look upon as any volition of ours, it is rather a ceasing of volition with respect to the arm, which falls down by its own gravity, not by our power, and would do the same were we at that instant utterly to lose our active faculty. Nevertheless it must be owned that forbearance is sometimes the sole point we set our minds upon and take pains to effect. When Rich sits as an equestrian statue in one of his pantomimes, we take him for the very marble he represents, for he moves neither head nor body nor limbs, he wags neither eye nor finger, but continues wholly inactive ; what he thinks of all the while, whether of the audience or profits of the house, neither you nor I can tell, but if any such thoughts rove in his fancy their rovings are accidental, his mind being intent on nothing else but forbearance from all manner of motion. We cannot deny this attention to be an effort of the mind, but then it is not a forbearance, it is an actual watching of the ideas as they rise, and excluding such as would prompt him to motion. Perhaps his face itches, or the stirrup presses against his ancle, and he wants to relieve himself, but checks those desires as fast as they start up, and if by this care he can avoid every volition to move, his purpose is answered without anything further to be done. For our limbs do not move of themselves, nor unless we will to move them : therefore that they remain motionless is not owing to volition, but to the absence of volition.

Should we think the limbs do not move because we Will not to move them, this would be sliding back into the vulgar sense of the word Will, wherein it stands for inclination or judgment : for a Will not to move is an act of the other faculty, being no more than a dislike to motion, or a discernment of its impropriety, which produces no volition nor exertion of our activity at all upon the object so discerned.

7. Some immoveable postures we keep ourselves in by a continual effort of the mind. If our statue holds up a truncheon in the right hand, he must keep his arm in that position by his own strength : but this cannot, in any light, be deemed a forbearance, for if he forbears to exert himself but for a moment, the arm will fall downwards by its own weight.

If there is any such thing as a total forbearance of action, I conceive it must be in reverie after a fatigue, or when we lie down in order to sleep. Ideas run to and fro in our fancy uncalled, without attention, without preference or rejection of anything occurring, and the mind seems to remain entirely passive. But since whatever passes does not proceed from volition, where shall

we find marks of any volition at all? Were we to suppose the mind utterly divested of her active power just at her entrance upon the scene, I do not see how anything could fall out otherwise than it does.

8. But we very rarely find a necessity of considering action so minutely as to distinguish the restraining those workings of imagination, which would excite us inadvertently to motions we choose to avoid, from the forbearance consequent thereupon; and since forbearance often requires a stronger effort of the mind than action itself, for it will cost us more pains to forbear cutting faces, swearing, or any other foolish habit we have got than to practise them, therefore I shall not scruple to ascribe forbearance to volition, for so it may be remotely though not directly; and after the example of Mr. Locke, to include that together with any actual exercise of our powers under the general name of action.

9. One remark more shall conclude the chapter. In speaking of action, besides the several co-existent motions and several successive volitions before-mentioned, we ordinarily comprehend several operations of other agents acting in a series towards completing the purpose we had in view, provided we conceive them necessarily consequent upon our volition. Thus when Roger shot the hawk hovering over his master's dove-house, he only pulled the trigger, the action of the spring drove down the flint, the action of the flint struck fire into the pan, the action of the fire set the powder in a blaze, that of the powder forced out the shot, that of the shot wounded the bird, and that of gravity brought her to the ground. But all this we ascribe to Roger, for we say he brought down the felon; and if we think the shot a nice one, applaud him for having done a clever feat. So likewise we claim the actions of other persons for our own, whenever we expect they will certainly follow as we shall direct. When Squire Peremptory distrained his tenant for rent, perhaps he did no more than write his orders in a letter, this his servant carried to the post, the postman conveyed it into the country, where it was delivered to the steward, who sent his clerk to make the distress. Yet we ascribe the whole to the Squire's own doing, for we say he distrained his tenant, and call it a prudent or a cruel act, according as we think of the circumstances of the case.

Hence the law maxim, he that does a thing by another, does it himself; which though valid in Westminster-hall will not hold good in the schools of metaphysics, for there we shall find nothing an act of the mind that is not the immediate product of her volition. But for the uses of prudence and morality we must recur back again to the common language, because we cannot judge of the

merits of men's doings without taking the consequences into our idea of the action. Pulling a trigger, or drawing characters upon paper, are neither good nor bad, right nor wrong, considered in themselves : but as the trigger so pulled shall occasion the slaughter of a man, or of some vermin, or only a bounce in the air ; as the characters so drawn shall tend to the necessary security of our property, or to bring a hardship upon our neighbor, or shall carry no meaning at all, we pronounce the action prudent or idle, moral or wicked.

CHAP. III.

CAUSES OF ACTION.

PHILOSOPHERS of old have observed several causes necessary to concur in producing an effect ; and have distributed them into several classes, which they have distinguished by epithets of their own invention. Whoever will look into Seneca, may find the causes of Plato, of Aristotle and some others, amounting I think to eight or ten classes a-piece. But since those sages have given us different lists, I presume the matter of distribution to be arbitrary, being left to every one's discretion to rank his causes under such classes as he shall judge most convenient to himself in marshalling his thoughts.

I shall not set myself to study for a complete list of the causes contributing to human action, but shall name only such as occur at present ; which are the material, the formal, the ideal, the final, the instrumental and the efficient. Thus when you sit down to an entertainment, the victuals are the material cause of your eating, for you could not eat if there were none ; their wholesomeness and palatableness the formal, for if they were raw or corrupted or in any unsuitable form you would not eat them ; your sight of them and knowledge of their qualities the ideal, for without them you would not know how to proceed in eating ; the gratification of your appetite the final, for if you had not this end in view you would scarce think it worth while to eat ; your knife and fork the instrumental, for without them you could not cut your meat ; and the mind or body the efficient, for by them you perform the action of eating. I say mind or body disjunctively, with reference to the different lights in which you may regard them : for if you consider the eating as an act of the mind, then is the mind the sole efficient, and the hands and mouth only in-

strumental causes ; but if as an act of the man, then the whole compound, mind and body together, is the efficient cause.

I do not intend a dissertation upon all these causes severally in their order : some I may dwell more largely upon, others perhaps I may scarce ever mention again, nor do I give the above as a complete list to which no new articles could be added. For my aim is not mere curiosity or theory, how much soever I may seem to deal that way ; I have something useful in my eye, though it lies at a distance, and I must travel many a weary step before I can arrive at it.

But as I would not run on of my own head without regard to the sentiments of anybody else, I must observe that there are persons who deny the mind to be any efficient cause at all, and they being men of learning, probity, and reputation, it would not be civil to pass by them without exchanging a word or two.

2. Dr. Hartley gives us a very different account of sensation and muscular motion from all we ever learned before from our masters and tutors. We used to hear that the muscles and organs were so many bundles of nerves and fibres, which were little hollow pipes containing a very fine liquor called animal spirits ; that these spirits were the carriers serving us in our traffic upon all occasions, perpetually hurrying to and fro, some carrying sensation from external objects to the mind, and others bringing back motion from thence to the limbs. But he tells us the nerves are solid capilaments, having neither hollowness nor liquor within them, but surrounded on all sides with ether, which is a subtile fluid extremely moveable and elastic, intimately pervading all bodies whatever, even the most compact and solid. That the nerves lie constantly upon the stretch like the strings of a harpsichord, and like them, quiver and vibrate upon the slightest touch received at either end, which vibrating causes similar vibrations in the circumambient ether. That those vibrations of ether, which he calls sensory vibratiuncles, excite perceptions in the mind, and at the same time agitate the ether standing round the muscular fibres, which agitation, termed by him motory vibratiuncles, causes those fibres to vibrate and propagate their motion along one another quite to the finger's ends. That the sensory vibratiuncles, like waves raised in a pond upon throwing in a stone, extend to distant parts out of view, and being reverberated by the banks, recoil again at other times, or mixing together form new vibratiuncles, thereby furnishing us with ideas of reflection.

Thus the mind remains totally inactive, reduced to one faculty alone, for the Will, which he terms expressly a certain state of the vibratiuncles, belongs to the ether, not to her : she sits a spec-

tator only, and not an agent of all we perform; she may indeed discern what is doing, but has no share in what is done: like the fly upon the chariot wheel, she fancies herself raising a cloud of dust, but contributes nothing towards increasing it: she may lay mighty schemes, and rejoice in the execution, but in reality does nothing herself; she can neither move the limbs nor call ideas to her reflection, the whole being brought to pass by the action of vibrations upon one another. The mind in this case resembles a man who thrusts his hand among the works of a clock; he may feel the movements, and, by long practice, may acquire a skill in distinguishing the hours, and knowing when the clock will strike; if he perceives the hour of dinner approach, this may set his mouth watering, and raise an appetite of hunger, which he thinks influences his Will to strike, and thereby gives notice to the cook that it is time to take up dinner.

3. On the other hand, the late bishop of Cloyne goes into a contrary extreme, for he allows us neither ether, nor nerves, nor organs, nor limbs, nor external substances, nor space, nor distance. He does not deny we have perceptions of all these matters, but says, we have no communion with the things themselves, nor can penetrate into them, and therefore can know nothing of their existence, our knowledge consisting wholly of perceptions existent only in the mind: and since we find some perceptions totally dissimilar from anything in the objects exciting them, as color, sound, pain, and pleasure, how can we assure ourselves the rest are not so likewise, such as magnitude, solidity, figure, situation and motion? Therefore for aught we can tell, our perceptions may arise from other guised objects than those whereto we attribute them, or perhaps may all flow continually from one and the same source: and because they possibly may, he concludes, by an inference common among persons of lively imagination, that they certainly do. Thus the life of man turns out a mere vision and delusion. We dream of taking long journies, traversing countries, encompassing the globe, but really never stir a foot from home: we please ourselves with the thought of conversing among an infinite variety of objects, whereas in good truth we sit in perpetual solitude, having nothing but ourselves to converse with. For Hampsted Hill you stand upon, Harrow, London, Blackheath, Banstead Down, you see from thence, are not those enormous piles and masses lying miles asunder from each other, as you suppose, but only perceptions huddled together into a mathematical point in your mind; nor with your utmost stretch can you carry your eye an inch beyond yourself.

But here occurs an objection from the regularity of perceptions

arising upon the application of proper objects to excite them, which seldom frustrate our expectation. When my fingers are cold, upon holding them to the fire I shall find them grow warm : if then I have neither fingers nor fire, how comes it that I feel a real warmth from an imaginary fire? If I have neither mouth nor meat, how comes it that I taste the savor of visionary roast beef? Oh! says the right reverend, our perceptions are thrown upon us by an invisible intelligent agent, who supplies them in such regular order that they may seem to come in a chain of causes and effects. If you have a perception of cold in your fingers, and of a fire in the room, this is followed by a perception of approaching them to the fire, which again is followed by a perception of warmth. And this succession of perceptions often extends to different persons, in order to keep up our intercourse with one another. If you chance to perceive yourself thirsty, there succeeds a perception of ringing the bell, this is succeeded by a perception in your servant of hearing his master ring and running up stairs to receive his orders, next in succession comes your fancy of seeing him stand in the room, upon which, though you have neither tongue nor voice, you fancy yourself bidding him bring you some beer, then he instantly fancies he runs down and fetches up the mug, and lastly, your fancy of quenching your thirst closes the whole imaginary scene.

4. Thus these two gentlemen represent the mind as an idle insignificant thing, never acting at all, but always gaping and staring at what passes. Both equally divest her of all employment whatsoever, though in different ways : one by finding other hands to complete all her business for her, and so leaving her no work to do : and the other by sweeping away her whole stock of materials, and so leaving her nothing to work upon.

But though they seem to stand directly in my way, I have so little spirit of opposition that I shall not endeavor to push them down if I can anyhow slip by them. Wherefore to avoid dispute, I shall put myself upon the country, leaving the matter in issue to a fair trial by my neighbors, upon a full and fair examination of such evidence as their own experience shall offer. And as I find the opinions above cited have not made many converts among mankind, I need not be in much pain for the verdict.

In the mean while I shall venture to proceed upon these Postulata : That the bodies we daily see and handle, actually exist in as great variety of magnitudes, forms, and situations, as we commonly suppose, and our operations upon them are of our own performance : that Westminster-hall is bigger than a nutshell, and the Moon somewhat higher than the weather-cock : that the clothes

I wear are not the same thing with the glass window I look at; that I hold a real pen, and have a real paper before me, that my hand would not write unless I move it, that the thoughts I write down are the products of my own labor and study, and that the ideas floating in my brain would produce neither meditation nor outward action, if I forbore to exert myself. All who are willing to grant me thus much, may listen as long as they find me to their liking; the rest may turn their heads aside as from one who builds without a foundation.

5. Yet upon second thoughts I wish these latter would cast a glance or two more upon me, as they might possibly find something turning to their account. For who knows what effect the characters I draw upon paper may produce upon the ether within them? The rays of light reflected from thence, striking upon their eyes, may possibly excite sensory vibratiuncles affecting their minds with some little degree of pleasure; or rolling round their better shaped understanding, may recoil again in more improved forms, exhibiting useful measures of conduct, and at the same time raising motory vibratiuncles proper for carrying the same into practice. Or on the other system, who knows what a train of imaginations my perception of scribbling may drag after it? When we reflect how ready the mechanical members of our literary commonwealth are to entertain ideas of presenting everything they can get to the public, it will not appear unlikely that some printer may fancy himself printing off the fancies I seem to write down, and then some bookseller may fancy himself spreading open a book in his shop window; the next in succession may be some idle passenger, who, having little else to do, may fancy himself perusing the pages; this perchance may introduce a perception of something amusing, or by great good luck of some useful observation, which may possibly draw after it a perception of benefit received in the practice.

If I can light upon any little hint which may do real service to somebody or other, I care not through what channels it is conveyed: whether by the ordinary methods of persuasion, illustration and argumentation, as commonly apprehended, or by agitating the sensorial and motorial ether, or by beginning a succession of perceptions. I trouble not my head for the means, so they prove effectual to the purpose intended.

Having thus slid through the crowd without jostling anybody, which pleases me better than if I had overthrown half a dozen opponents; and gotten behind them into my former track, with an open road before me, I shall even jog on soberly and quietly in quest of whatever I can find deserving notice.

6. But notwithstanding that we have assumed the mind an effi-

cient cause, we must acknowledge she has not strength enough to do our business alone without some foreign help. Not that I pretend to limit the mind's internal efficacy, or to determine exactly how great or how small it may be: for aught I know she may have force sufficient to remove mountains, could she apply her force immediately to the whole width of their bases; but this is not her case with respect to the limbs employed in our service. The old notion of the mind's existing like the estate of a coparcener in law jargon per my and per tout, or being all in every part throughout the whole human frame, has been long since exploded: we now rest convinced that the mind does not act herself upon the limbs, but draws them to and fro by tendons, muscles, nerves, and fibres; which latter our anatomists have traced to the brain, where they find them grow smaller and smaller, till at last they quite lose them through their extreme minuteness: and though we cannot thoroughly agree where she resides, yet wherever her place of residence be, she keeps constantly there in kingly state, never making wanton excursions to the toes or fingers, but exercising her executive power upon them by the ministry of those imperceptible fibres.

Now there needs not much argument to show that if you are to act upon bodies at a distance by some string or other medium, you cannot exert more strength upon them than your medium will bear: consequently the mind, be she as mighty as a giant, can impart no more of her might to the limbs than her fibres are capable of conveying: what could Goliath or Sampson do if you allowed them only a single cobweb to work with? They would not have power to stir a silver tumbler; for if they went to push, the string would bend, if to pull, it would break. Yet when one tossed his weaver's beam and the other carried the gates of Gaza, they performed their prodigious feats by tender filaments slighter than a cobweb, undiscernable with a microscope.

7. To solve this difficulty we are put in mind that the human body is a most admirably contrived machine, and by machinery a small power may be made to perform the works of a greater: and we are shown strings of bladders representing the nerves, which upon blowing into them will shorten considerably and draw after them whatever hangs to the end of the string. But let us consider what all your writers upon the mechanical powers agree in, that no machinery whatever can lessen the momentum necessary for performing any work required, which momentum is compounded of the strength of the power and the velocity wherewith it moves: therefore, if you would lessen the power you must increase the velocity in proportion, to make the product of both

when multiplied together, equal. Thus a man by help of a lever may raise double the weight he could raise by his own strength, but then that end of the lever he holds must move double the space the weight passes through in rising. I have seen a curious engine compounded of wheels, screws, and pulleys, whereby a lady, with a single hair of her head, might raise a stone of two hundred weight: the hair was fastened to a wheel something like the flyer of a jack, and in raising the weight an inch, the wheel turned round as many inches as there would have required hairs to lift up the stone directly without any engine at all.

Let us now reflect on the greatness of our works, for great I may call them compared to those Tinder threads we have to work with, as likewise how suddenly we often perform them, and we shall scarce find time to make up for the deficiency of our strength by an increase of our velocity. I remember when I attended a course of experiments at the university, we were told a man's greatest strength lay in the muscles of his hams, and in order to try their force, an iron ring was screwed into the floor having a pretty strong cord tied to it; this one of the company wound round his waist, then standing just over the ring and raising up his body, broke the cord asunder by main strength. At the same time our professor told us that if a machine were contrived to move by weights, and act with the force exerted by all the muscles of a man of ordinary size when he jumps from the ground, it would require a weight of I think thirty thousand pounds. Now suppose a person sees a huge stone rolling directly towards him, which he did not observe till it was just ready to strike him, how nimbly will he jump out of the way! But if the mind performed this leap by an inflation of bladders with her nitro-aerious breath, she must either give so strong a puff as would burst their flimsy coats into atoms like an explosion of gunpowder, or if she breathed in such gentle manner as not to hurt them, she would want time for the length of her puff: for the current of her breath must run at least the space of a mile to throw up the whole body an inch, which cannot be conceived possible in so little an instant of time as between the discernment of the danger and springing up of the feet from the ground.

8. Wherefore it seems more than probable the mind has always some good friend at hand ready to assist her weakness, and the main of that strength she exerts upon the limbs comes from some other quarter than her own store-house. Whether this help flows from the animal spirits, ether, or that unknown pressure causing gravitation and cohesion, or what else you please, it is no matter: but that there is another force within us besides

our own, capable of acting upon the muscles, we may be convinced by convulsive motions, wherein the mind has no concern, nor volition any share, yet they sometimes imitate, and generally exceed the vigor of our voluntary actions. Perhaps there lies a mighty weight of some subtle fluid thrown from our animal circulation, and bearing constantly against the orifices of our nerves, but prevented from entering by certain little sliding valves kindly provided by nature for our use: the mind then has nothing more to do than draw aside the valves, and in rushes the torrent. The mind in this case works like the miller of an overshot mill, he shoots lying over every one of his wheels, stopped by flash-boards at their upper ends, against which the water lies bearing always ready to drive the wheels whenever it can find a passage: so the miller by drawing a little board, which any child might pull up with a finger, turns the stream upon this wheel or that as he pleases, and twirls round a massive stone which he could not stir with both his arms. But as comparisons seldom go on all four, the mill and the human machine differ in one respect: the miller, when he takes up his flashes, lays them it may be on the bank, goes whistling into his mill, and thinks no more till his grist is ground, for the water will work on forever unless he shuts it out again: but the valves used by the mind fall back again of themselves when the mind withdraws her activity. Therefore if you would point with your hand at some object for any time, you must continue to exert yourself all the while: for the moment the mind forbears her volition, the valves close, the stream ceases to flow upon the brachial muscles, and the arm no longer supported falls to your side. Then again the likeness returns upon disorders in each: for should an eel wriggle under any of the flash boards, this might give the water a passage without any act of the miller: or should some flood buoy them quite out of their places, and pour down a larger stream than usual, the wheels might turn with more violence than the miller could throw upon them at other times. So some foulness of our juices may work under the valves keeping them open whether we will or no; or the boiling of a fever may stretch them beyond their natural width, and produce convulsions stronger than anything the mind can effect by her volition.

Nevertheless, as we ascribe the grinding of our corn to an act of the miller, because he sets the mill at work when and in what manner he pleases; we may with equal justice ascribe our actions to the performance of the mind, because it depends entirely upon her of what kind they shall be. If we consider them as acts of the mind, they extend no further than to drawing back the valves,

whereof she remains the sole efficient cause : if as acts of the man, we may still deem her an efficient cause, because the other powers co-operating stand always ready in waiting for her direction, and whatever happens afterwards follows necessarily in the nerves, muscles or limbs, in consequence of the motion by her first begun.

CHAP. IV.

IDEAL CAUSES.

UNDER the class of ideal causes I comprehend all those notices of our senses and judgments of our understanding, which direct us from time to time in every step of our proceedings : which is giving a larger compass than I believe Plato allowed them, for he understood by an ideal cause only that plan or design of any work laid in our own thought before we go about it. Thus when a painter draws a picture, whether from some original or by his own fancy, he takes his idea either from the original standing before him or from some archetype of his own invention. But besides this archetype, I conceive other ideal causes necessary to finish the picture : our painter must have an idea of his canvas, his pallet, his brushes, his colors, he must know where they lie, what they will do, and how to handle them ; and must receive fresh information continually from his eyes, his hands, and his reflection, or he will make but bungling work. Nor is this archetype wanting except only for works of design and contrivance : whether Plato required an ideal cause for all our common actions I know not, but this nobody will deny me, that we cannot proceed in the least of them without repeated directions from our senses or reflection. We can neither walk nor write nor cut our victuals without using our eyes, or feeling, and applying some little degree of attention. Whatever we go about, we must have some notion of the thing we mean to do, and of the means or motions proper to perform it.

2. Yet if we consider carefully how small a part of our actions is properly our own, there will appear something very mysterious and unaccountable in them : for we shall find that strictly speaking we have no idea of any one thing we do, nor of the manner how we do it. I have shown in my last chapter that we do not move our limbs ourselves, and have supposed certain valves which open to let in the stream that moves them : I do not warrant this

for a right account of the matter, having given it for want of a better, and until a better shall be given I may find excuse for continuing to use this. In a former place, upon the subject of voluntary reflection, I have supposed certain channels, by stopping some of which, we can turn the current of our imagination into any course we like best: perhaps nature may have furnished us with valves too here to serve us for stoppers. How little share then of our mightiest performances can we justly claim to ourselves? Our own proper action, the action of our mind, extends no further than to opening the valves, nor perhaps so far neither; for she may have little imperceptible fibres to pull them by. Yet she neither sees nor feels either valve or fibre, nor has any notion or perception of them: she knows not how many they be, where they lie, nor to what they fasten.

If the master of a large family had his study hung round with bells, one reaching to the dressing-room, another to the nursery, another to the kitchen, another to the stable, and so to each of his offices: when he went to use them, besides his knowledge of the person he would call, he must know the proper bell, in what quarter of the room it hangs; common sense must direct him that he is to stretch out his hand to the handle and pull downwards rather than lift up, and his eye must guide the motion of his hand in taking hold: for were the bells newly put up, and he not instructed in their several uses, or were he left quite in the dark, he might pitch upon the wrong as well as the right, and fetch up the cook when he desired to see my lady, or wanted to speak with the coachman.

In like fashion the closet of our mind is hung round with multitudes of strings reaching to the eyes, the mouth, the hands, the feet, and every member of our body: we know not their number, their situation, nor the member to which they respectively belong; we know not which lies on the right side or the left, in the ceiling or the floor, before or behind; nor the manner in which we must proceed to work, whether by pushing or pulling, by lifting up or weighing down, by screwing, turning, or driving as with the stroke of a hammer. Yet have we all our limbs perfectly at command, we put them upon services, which they do not fail to execute according to our expectations, and all this without knowing what we do to compass our intentions. We feel a desire of helping ourselves to victuals, and strait our arm stretches out towards the dish; we want to be on the other side the room, and instantly our foot steps forward to convey us. Whence then have we this surprising dexterity in a state of utter darkness? How do we escape perpetually making egregious blunders? How comes it that

we never pull the wrong string since we cannot discern or distinguish them from one another? How comes it that we never kick about with our legs when we would handle with our arms, that we do not toss up our nose instead of turning our eyes, that we do not loll out our tongue when we go to chew our meat? To such questions as these I can give no other answer than by an exclamation. How wonderful are the works of nature! how admirable her contrivance in all parts of this our human machine! exceeding the skill of man to find out, the utmost stretch of our understanding to comprehend!

3. But here, perhaps, Dr. Hartley, if he be not gone out of hearing, may give me a Hip, and call out, Prithce, friend, do not think to slip so easily by me; I must stop you with a remark or two upon your last observation. You say the mind draws her valves without any discernment of what she does, therefore their opening is not owing to discernment, since it may be effected without any: but you require an ideal cause for every action of the mind, therefore must not we conclude that this motion of the valves is not an act of the mind but of some corporeal agent which can act by impulse without any idea at all? You admit that those discernments we have are not of the action nor of the instrument primarily employed, but of some remote consequence worked thereby. You have an idea of speaking, but none of the measures you must take to perform it: therefore you have not an adequate ideal cause, because your idea does not take in the valves opening to the muscles of your mouth and tongue, which valves you must nevertheless draw up before you can bring out your words. May not we then presume that discernment is not the cause but concomitant of action, or co-effect of the same cause, given us for our entertainment rather than use in directing our conduct; and we are led only to esteem it the cause of our motions by seeing it constantly precede them? just as we say the swallows bring us summer because they come always before it; not that they have any hand in lengthening our days, ripening our corn, or producing other effects of summer.

You may remember I have told you of a German of great repute among our brethren of the faculty, who asserts that all our automatic motions, that is, our motions purely mechanical, such as the circulation of the blood and other juices, were originally voluntary: so that the child before birth works out that whole plan of animal economy which is to support and serve him during his state of manhood, by his own industry during his state of gestation. If you will not believe this outlandish man, believe your own senses. Your breath comes and goes of its own ac-

cord when you do not think of it ; when you do, it seems your own act : for upon the lungs being full you perceive them uneasy, which puts you upon puffing out their contents ; upon their becoming empty you feel a want of fresh air, which urges you to draw in a supply. In sound sleep, fainting, or extacy, the lungs continue their play, which you must allow they do mechanically at a time when the mind remains wholly senseless and inactive : while awake and well, your lungs make their strokes at regular and equal intervals if you let them alone, yet you may lengthen, shorten, accelerate or retard their motions as often as you please to interfere. To read the long periods of Demosthenes or Cicero, you must stretch them far beyond their natural length : to make your stops rightly, to lay your accents or emphasis properly, you must break, increase or abate of their violence, from time to time, as occasion shall require. All this the young school-boy must learn to do with laborious application of mind ; but you, who have been long inured to the work, I suppose perform it so easily that, upon having attended closely to the sense of your author for a while, you cannot afterwards resolve with yourself whether it were your own particular volition or some mechanical power that accommodated the length of your breath to the length of your sentences, and the checks, the strength, and softness of that, to your various modulations of voice.

Since then we find our automatic and voluntary actions so similar as that we cannot well distinguish them asunder ; since what was once voluntary becomes afterwards automatic, and what we sometimes acknowledge mechanical appears at others an effect of design : may not we fairly conclude them both of the same kind, effected alike by the mutual action of vibratiuncles, and that our discernment is not a direction to us what we shall do, but a foresight only of what will be done ? For what needs volition to produce an event that may as well come to pass without it ? The region of our active ether extends much wider than the prospect of the mind, so that she sees a part only and not the whole of what passes there : the tides, which lie near enough to excite perception in the fœtus, may remove further off upon the growth of the body ; and those which ordinarily roll a little beyond our ken, may be brought within distance by attention. In both cases the vibratiuncles, whether near or remote, hold on their course after the same manner : the only difference is this, in one case we discern them, or as you call it, the ideas they exhibit, in the other we do not. When we see what is doing preparatory to action, we judge it voluntary ; when we know nothing of the matter, we account it automatic.

4. Now against this second attack I shall make the same defence as I did upon the former, namely, by an appeal to my neighbors, desiring them to determine the matter between us: and that they may have some particular case to judge upon, I shall offer them a feigned issue in imitation of those directed out of the court of chancery. Suppose the mind of a man separated from his body without any of those diseases, accidents, or disorders in the latter, which ordinarily bring on our dissolution: let the limbs, the muscles, the fibres, the juices, the ether, if any such there be, remain in the same state as before: how would this body behave after the separation? I in my declaration must aver that though the pulse might continue to beat, the animal secretions be carried on, and the lungs to play, it would do nothing further: its palate in some few hours might come into that state which affects us with hunger; but having no sensation, it would not call for dinner, walk down stairs, sit at table, help itself to victuals, nor converse with the company. The Doctor in his plea, to be consistent with himself, must insist that it would perform all this and everything else one might expect from a reasonable creature: and thus the point is brought to an issue.

Or if the court should think it beneath their dignity to take cognizance of a fictitious case which never actually happens, I shall present them with one that may have fallen under their own observation. Have they never seen a careless nurse sitting by candle-light with a young baby in her arms, gabbling among her gossips, without attention to her charge? The child stretches out its hand to play with the candle, and upon touching the flame instantly snatches it away, crying and squalling as if its little heart would break. Here then was a volition, that is in the Doctor's language, a certain state of the sensory vibratiuncles, proper to agitate such motory as would have continued the motion of the hand until the fingers had grasped the snuff. What then breaks off this motion and turns it to a contrary? is it solely the action of the flame, in putting the tide of vibratiuncles into a new course? or is it the smart felt by the child, which influences it to exert its activity in a different manner? But the discernment of pain belongs confessedly to the mind alone: how different notions soever we may have of color, magnitude, distance, all who have seriously thought upon the matter unanimously agree to place the sensation of pain in the mind itself, not in any objects, organs or fluids, contributing to excite it. This then is the question waiting for a determination; and if there should be hands holden up on both sides, I shall demand a division. As many as are of opinion that the soulless body above mentioned would neither eat nor drink

nor talk like other folks; or that the child, were it not for the sense of pain, would still go on to play with the candle after its fingers were burnt, come along with me: as many as are of the contrary, turn back again after the Doctor.

For I think we may go each his several way without being solicitous for the success of our cause, as we need not alter our measures according to the verdict. He well knows how strong the tide of vibratiuncles runs which sets the fingers a scribbling, and that it would be labor lost to endeavor at stopping them; and indeed why should he desire to do so unless he sees them running into dangerous current? Nor can I find reason for pursuing a different plan upon either principle: my design drives at bringing men better acquainted with their mind and that inner part of their constitution wherewith it has immediate intercourse, in hopes they may strike out some light therefrom, which may direct them to the better management of their faculties. If I shall be so happy as to succeed in any single instance of an addition to their stock of useful knowledge, it is all one whether this improves their judgment and puts them upon thinking or acting for themselves, or whether it agitates their ether into salutary vibratiuncles which shall do their business for them whether they will or no. I shall find my intention equally answered in both cases, and the service I may do will rise to the same amount in the upshot.

5. Upon a review of this whole chapter, without entering into a nice disquisition of what motions are of our own operation and what purely mechanical, we may justly conclude that in all voluntary actions the mind must have a discernment, if not of the very act she performs, yet of some bodily motion or other distant consequence effected thereby: and for the most part we take continual direction from our senses, our judgment, and our experience, shaping the manner of our proceedings according to the notices they afford us: which justifies me in ranking ideas among the causes of action.

But as it is a hard matter to please everybody, many people perhaps will chide me for staying so long to talk with the Doctor. What a pother do you make, say they, about nothing! What a deal of pains to convince us the sun shines at noon-day! Every child sees that we cannot move without the direction of our senses. Common sense and common experience inform us that we never discourse without a notion of conveying our thoughts to one another; that we never do anything without having an idea of something we would be at.

In excuse to this rebuke, I beg leave to observe, that we do not always advert to what we perfectly know, and in reasoning

upon abstruse matters often mistake, for want of reflection upon things we are extremely well acquainted with. Therefore they may look upon me, not as unveiling a secret unknown to them before, but as pointing out an observation they cannot fail of making themselves upon such notice; and desiring them to bear in mind as an axiom to be employed upon further occasion, That we have ideal causes of our proceedings, and shape our actions from time to time according to the models by them exhibited. Besides, they may please to remember I told them in my introduction, that my architecture partakes of the military kind: I must provide against attacks as well as for commodious habitation. And by another figure I compared the land of metaphysics to a wilderness abounding in by-paths and intricate mazes: while we travel the plain road of common sense, we shall meet with profound speculatists who will every now and then be drawing some of the company aside into the wood: therefore it behoves us to get acquainted with all the turnings and windings beforehand, that we may know where to look for our lost sheep and how to bring them back again. In the mean while, those who were not inveigled, may sit down upon the turf until they see us come out of the bushes again, and their good nature no doubt will pardon an excursion that was needless to them but necessary for their fellow-travellers. Such necessities may possibly occur more than once: we may be put to prove that snow is white, that we know our own houses, or remember anything happening to us yesterday: and upon these occasions we must take the method we have done already of submitting ourselves to a trial by jury. There is no more received rule in logic than this, Against persons denying principles there is no argumentation: when we have to deal with an adversary of this cast, all pleadings are vain; we must proceed directly to an issue, appealing to common sense and experience for the truth of our principle, after stripping it of all that sophism and equivocation wherewith it has been artfully overclouded, and reducing the question in dispute to a naked fact or single proposition which anybody can judge of and understand.

CHAP. V.

MOTIVES.

HAVING in my list of causes assigned a particular class to the final, I shall treat of them distinctly, though in reality they are a

species of the ideal, as the latter are of our ideas in general. For many ideas pass in review before us which have no share at all in our actions: and many serve us for a guidance in our conduct which yet did not prompt us to pursue it. While we stand talking at a window, passengers may go by without drawing our attention; we see them move along, but do nothing different nor in a different manner from what we should have done had they not appeared: the sight of our companion and our knowledge of language direct us which way to turn our head and how to express ourselves: these ideas perhaps we had before we entered upon our discourse, which we do not begin till another idea arises, probably of entertainment or of giving or receiving some information. When a man walks, he may see bushes growing by the way side, cows grazing in the field, birds flying in the air, without regarding or making any use of the notices they offer: these then are part of his ideas, but not ideal causes, which are the shape of his path and several marks whereby he knows his way; yet neither are these the final cause, but health, exercise, diversion, business, or some other end, he proposes to himself in walking.

This final cause we commonly style the Motive, by a metaphor taken from mechanical engines which cannot play without some spring or other mover to set them at work: and because we find action usually follows upon the suggestion of proper motives, therefore we conceive them moving the mind to exert herself. Thus, by a light figure, we hear her frequently compared to a balance, and the motives to weights hanging in either scale. But if we will apply this comparison to the mind, I think it suits her better in the exercises of her understanding than in her volitions; for 't is the judgment poises the motives in its scale to try which of them preponderate, nor does volition ensue until the weight be determined.

Some there are who will not allow the mind to act upon motives at all, or at least assign her a limited power which she exercises sometimes of acting against or without them or of giving them a weight which does not naturally belong to them; they say, she plays tricks with her balance, like a juggling shopkeeper who slides his little finger slyly along one side of the beam, and by pressing upon it, makes twelve ounces of plums draw up a pound of lead. It must be owned to our shame that we too frequently practise these scurvy tricks to cheat those who have dealings with us, and what is more fatal, to cheat ourselves into error and mischief: but I hope to make it appear in due time that this is done, not by a free will of indifference overpowering the force of our motives, but by privately slipping in or stealing out the weights

in either scale, which we often get a habit of doing so covertly that we are not aware of the fraud ourselves.

2. Now how shall we manage to steer safely between two opposite extremes? The doctors Hartley and Berkeley would not allow the mind an efficient cause of her own actions: the maintainers of indifference make her not only the efficient cause of her actions but of their causes too, for they will have it that her activity supplies the place of final causes, or gives force to motives.

I shall remark in the first place that they distinguish between acting and choosing, to which latter only they ascribe the privilege of indifference. Whether such distinction has any foundation in nature I have already suggested some reasons to question, and may canvass the point more thoroughly hereafter when a proper occasion shall offer. But since they admit we never proceed to action without motives, that our choice sometimes arises from the decision of our judgment without our interposition, and that motives often operate so forcibly we cannot resist them: this is going a great way, and it will be but one little step further to show that acting upon our ideas is acting as well as upon our limbs: which will entitle us to inquire upon the subject of those choices we make in consequence of something done by ourselves, whether some motive does not influence us in everything we do towards bringing on the determination.

In the next place, I would beg leave to ask them, how they become so well acquainted with their own actions beforehand as to lay schemes and plans for their future conduct, and depend upon their adherence thereto? I suppose they do not pretend to the spirit of prophecy, and without that, I do not see how we can know any future event, otherwise than by our knowledge of the causes: for an event, independent on antecedent causes, must remain absolutely contingent until it comes to pass. Yet do they lay claim to commendation for their steadiness in adhering to their plan: the mind then must remain indifferent during the whole time of such adherence, else they would forfeit their claim which they rest solely upon the right exercise of this privilege. For did not the mind retain her freewill of indifference either to keep or to break a resolution already taken, how much soever we might applaud them for resolving, we could owe them no applause for performing.

Then as to their resting the merit of actions solely upon the due use of this freedom of indifference, without which, say they, we shall have no room to praise or blame, to reward or punish: have patience, and perhaps in the sequel of these inquiries we may

find other sources of distributive justice besides this privilege. What if we should discover approbation and censure so little inconsistent with the efficacy of motives that they act themselves as such, and become due solely for the influence they are likely to have upon our behavior?

But as I find the work of improving my own knowledge much more agreeable to my taste than that of battling the opinions of others, I shall leave my antagonists in possession of their indifference for the present, if they still think fit to claim it after all the evidence produced against their title by Mr. Locke: and shall proceed in my consideration of final causes, in hopes thereby to kill two birds with one stone. For while in pursuit of my journey, minding only my own business, I may happen to discover motives for every species of action, and then indifference must quit the field of course, as having nothing to do there. Nor can we take a better method for the recovery of our right than by enclosing the whole contested ground, piece by piece, until there be not a spot left whereon the liberty of indifference may rest its foot.

3. To prevent mistakes, when I speak of the efficacy of motives and of their moving the mind to exert herself, I desire it may be understood that these are figurative expressions; and I do not mean thereby to deny the efficacy of the mind, or to assert any motion, force, or impulse imparted to her from the motives, as there is to one billiard ball from another upon their striking: but only to observe that motives give occasion to the mind to exert her endeavors in attaining whatever they invite her to, which she does by her own inherent activity, not by any power derived from them. And all mankind understand the matter so, except perhaps some few persons of uncommon sense and superfine understandings. When the poet makes Belinda ask, What mov'd my mind with youthful lords to roam? would he have you believe that vanity, pleasure, desire of conquest, hope of an advantageous match, or any other motive you can assign, made all those motions contained in the idea of roaming? No, surely, it was the lady herself by her own vigor and sprightliness. When she sits down to her toilet, unnumbered treasures ope at once. What ope the treasures? Why the maid, with her hands, not with her desire of tiffing out her mistress in a killing attire. And it is this agency of the mind which denominates an action ours, for whatever proceeds from other efficient causes does not belong to us. Therefore you see when the maid had Sylphs to work for her, he describes the performance, though done by her hands, to them instead of her, And Betty's prais'd for labors not her own.

Nobody will deny that we sometimes act upon motives, that we follow where they lead us, and that we should have acted otherwise had they not presented or had other motives appeared in the opposite scale to outweigh them. How many people flock to hear Handel play upon the organ! they follow him to the Haymarket, to Covent Garden, to the Foundling Hospital; had he not been to perform they never would have stirred from home, but if their Doctor had told them that going abroad might prove fatal to their health, they would have forborne. Therefore motives have a natural efficacy to put us upon action, and we need no other spring to move us so long as we have store of them; nor need we fear the want of a continual supply, when we consider how many occasions of life, of amusement, of business we have to provide for, and how many idle fancies to gratify.

But we run into frequent mistakes concerning the operation of motives, for want of first settling accurately with ourselves what they be. A motive I conceive is the prospect of some end actually in view of the mind at the time of action and urging to attain it: whereas we are apt to take for motives any reasons we can allege in justification of our conduct. If anybody should ask why you make your stated meals at breakfast, dinner, and supper, every day, I warrant you would answer, Why, I could not live without eating. But reflect a little with yourself. Do you think of starving every time you run down stairs to dinner? Do not you go because you are hungry, because you like the victuals, because you will not make the family wait, because it is your usual hour? How then can the preservation of life, which is the farthest of anything from your thoughts, be your motive of eating? If you would dissuade a debauchee from his courses, you tell him of the discredit he will bring upon himself from all wise and judicious persons: yet he still goes on as before, and this you call acting against a powerful motive. But is it so in fact with him? Perhaps the approbation of your musty sober fellows weighs nothing in his estimation; he feels no other weight in his scale besides the gratification of appetite; therefore he follows the only motive inclining him to action.

4. But as Hermogenes was a singer even when he did not sing; and the cobbler retains his appellation after he has shut up his stall and sits among his fellow toppers at the two-penny club; so motives still preserve their character with us while they lie dormant in the box and do not operate in the scale. If we know a man has covetousness or ambition, we impute all his actions to that motive; so that a politician cannot take an airing but we suppose him going

on some deep design, nor a miser step into his closet but we conclude him counting over his bags. But besides our general motives of conduct, we have many little desires and whimsies which come in every now and then for a share of our motions; and unless we get acquainted with these, we cannot account for a man's behavior in particular instances.

Few of us I hope are without some prudential motives in store, and those being the most creditable, we would willingly ascribe all our motions to them, not observing what other inducements may slip in unawares to weigh down the scale or so cover it as to leave no admittance for anything else: for inclination and humor so mimic the garb and gestures of reason that we take them for her very self. Sometimes two motives occur together both inciting to the same action, and in this case we cannot rightly tell to which it belongs: because we can judge the efficacy of causes no otherwise than by their effects. This last deceit is greatly promoted by that aptness of inclination to draw reason after her, not as a friend to consult with, but as an advocate to support her cause: for reason, which ought always to keep upon the bench, too often descends to the bar, and then we take her arguments for judgments of court, and applaud ourselves for having paid them a due obedience. When the minister labors to extend the prerogative which he has under his own management, he thinks himself all the while pursuing the public good: when the parson vexes his parishioners with lawsuits, he, good man, would be contented with his present income, but he must not injure his successors: when the young girl chooses her mate for black eyes, white teeth, a frolic air and sprightly prattle, she despises all mercenary views, and pays regard only to solid merit and happiness.

In short, we shall find it extremely difficult with our utmost care and circumspection to know our real motives, as well in general, what stock of them we have, as what weighed with us upon every particular occasion. For we seldom attend to our motive at the instant of its operation, and if we go to recal it afterwards to our reflection, another shall start up in its place. Nor do we know the true weight of our motives before trial. While we hold them in the scale of contemplation they feel exceeding heavy, whereupon we confidently form resolutions of bearing pain, encountering dangers and surmounting difficulties, supposing that our motive fastened thereto, like lead to a bludgeon, will give it a force that shall bear down all opposition; but when the time of action comes, they are found wanting in the balance, and lie lighter than a feather.

There is a vulgar saying, That we measure other folks' corn by

our own bushel: therefore we wonder at their proceeding when running in a different channel from our own, because we judge of their sentiments by those we feel ourselves. One is apt to cry, I should have done otherwise had I been in such an one's place, that is, had you had the same materials, abilities, or opportunities as he: but are you sure you should have acted otherwise had you had the same notions, ways of thinking, and motives too, without any mixture of those you now possess? For our desires vary as much as our faces, and what works powerfully upon one, may have no influence at all upon another. If we see a person bringing great damage upon one who has never offended him, without any inducement either of pleasure or profit to himself, we stand in astonishment that anybody can behave so absurdly without the least motive to urge him; and ascribe his procedure to mere perverseness of will. For we find no motives in our own store-house that could engage him: resentment, gratification of some appetite or self-interest, may have surprised us sometimes into unwarrantable actions, but we feel no temptation to do mischief for mischief's sake, and therefore can conceive no such in another. But there are tempers with whom mischief itself acts as a powerful motive; some dispositions there are utterly void of humanity, whose place is supplied by a love of injustice and cruelty: even freak and wantonness may do much upon a mind where there is no consideration either of benevolence or prudence to weigh against them.

5. Motives frequently introduce and give life to one another. Your coachman entered into your service for a livelihood; this led him to obey your orders, which directed him to take care of your horses; this put him upon providing hay for them, and that induced him to inquire where the best was to be had. While on his way to the market, he thinks of nothing but the shortest road to get thither; this therefore is the sole motive he has now in view: but if the prior motives had not operated, none of the subsequent would have had any influence upon him.

For the most part we portion our time into large actions tending to some distant end not presently accomplished, which consists of under parts, and admits many bye actions not belonging to the principal. He that travels to York, goes most likely upon some business: he divides his journey into several stages, and while upon each, thinks of nothing but getting well to his inn: this then is his motive for the time. On the road he finds himself weary and alights, or thirsty and stops at the door of some public house, or perhaps he enters into discourse with the passengers in going along, or stands still to look at some magnificent building.

All these have separate motives of their own ; refreshment, thirst, amusement, or curiosity, which bear no relation to his main design.

While we work, or study, or converse, we often change our posture, turn our eyes, and make many side motions having no connexion with the purpose we are about. But have we not motives for those excrescences of action ? We feel ourselves uneasy in one posture, and therefore exchange it for another ; we look out for new objects because those before us have cloyed our eyes ; we find some trifling amusement in every exercise of our activity. For employment seldom so totally engages us as to fill up all the spaces of our time, but restlessness, whimsy, or habit, come in to supply the vacancies. The busy mind of man cannot lie a moment inactive : she works incessantly with both her faculties while awake, and if her weightier motives suspend their action ever so little, some lighter will slip in to keep her in play : for she has often been compared to an exceeding fine balance, that will turn with the slightest hair when nothing lies in the opposite scale ; and she has her drawers stocked with the grains of fancy as well as the pounds of reason.

While one motive urges to action, another may model the shape of it. When a grave divine and powdered fop enter the room together, civility prompts them alike to pay their compliments to the company, but decency leads one to a sober manly deportment, and affectation drives the other into a mincing step, a fantastic air, and an over-delicacy of expression.

The designs that generate our larger actions take time in the forming, we see them grow by degrees to maturity, and have leisure to contemplate them : but the ideas causing our lesser motions, like lightning, flash, strike, and vanish ; they pass so swiftly we cannot get a look at them nor remember their existence. Besides, our weighty moments having the largest influence upon our lives, deserve our greatest regard, and we commonly apply our whole attention to them, overlooking all the rest so far as scarce to know we have any such belonging to us, or to mistake them for something else. Therefore we say, The motive of prudence, but the impulse of fancy, the force of habit, or the sally of imagination : and sometimes term the motion of these latter mechanical, supposing volition had no share in them, or at other times ascribe them to the privilege of indifference for want of discerning the motive that made a difference between one idle motion and another. But whoever desires a thorough acquaintance with the mind, ought to bestow some thoughts upon her little motives, since they have so considerable a share in our actions, and if we

are not aware of them, will so cover the scale as to prevent the weighty motive from re-entering, or slip in at improper times, thereby producing a total avocation from the business in hand, or at least an interruption of our proceedings.

6. Nor must I omit to take notice of a certain magic that seems to alter the condition of our motives: they fluctuate and very unaccountably, fading and regaining their colors, losing and retrieving their weight. An idea, that yesterday appeared vivid and strong, shall to-day show no sign of vigor at all: we still see it in the same form and position of parts as before, but it looks pale and lifeless, and feels as nothing in our hand. A thing we were extremely fond of at one time, we care not a pin for at another; what we admire this hour, we despise the next. Even virtue and pleasure have their seasons of engaging; not only as they appear or disappear to our thoughts, but when we have a full and distinct view of their features, we do not always find them strike upon us with equal allurements.

This fluctuation of our motives I believe has opened another door to the notion of a freewill of indifference; for observing that the mind does not always proceed to action instantly upon the suggestion of motives, that others of them oftener prevail than we should expect, that she resists the strongest passions and breaks through the firmest resolutions; we conclude she has an authority of her own independent of the motives, so that they cannot act until having first received her royal assent, but she can give any of them a preference without regard to their respective weights, and by taking part with inclination can give it strength to overpower judgment, or by siding with the latter enable it to master the former. But all this may as well be accounted for by the variable quality of motives: while they continue changing their colors the balance keeps nodding to and fro, the mind perceives she has not a just estimation of their weights, and this is a motive with her to suspend action until the balance settles, and then it is the preponderating weight, not the mind, that sinks down the scale. When you have formed a resolution, so long as the considerations inducing you to make it retain their original vigor, and those you rejected their original weakness, and no new matter not taken at first into consideration interferes, you will surely adhere to your resolution: but if the tables turn, if that which was strongest becomes weakest, or fresh inducements not provided against before fall into the opposite scale, you will as surely break it. And that such accidents frequently happen, every one may satisfy himself who will attend carefully to the difference there is in our ideas of a thing between the time of resolving and the time of executing.

'Tis true we do sometimes play tricks with our balance, making it incline to either side as we please ; but then this is done by art, not by strength or authority, and always brought about by the application of motives. For we have a power over our ideas, as has been remarked before, by stopping some of their channels to turn them into what other courses we like best, thereby excluding some ideas, and calling up others to our thoughts. We may close our ears against the admonitions of wisdom, or may hear them without attending, or may fill our imagination with something else that shall hinder them from entering : but it impeaches not the weight of a motive, nor shows your superior strength, that it does not operate when you will not let it come into the scale. And whoever watches himself narrowly when he practises this juggling, may always discern some motive of prejudice, favor, wilfulness, or shame of being overcome, which puts him upon the artifice : so that the mind will be found not so perfectly indifferent as she pretends in the very exercise of her indifference.

7. Here I shall take the liberty to stop a moment while I recommend it to every man to study diligently his motives of action ; to examine what stock he has, as well of the permanent as of the transient kind, as well of his grand undertakings as of his sudden motions and manners of proceeding ; what are their respective weights, either absolutely or comparatively with one another : to remark how they introduce or mutually affect each other, how they fluctuate, their seasons of vigor and faintness ; to distinguish what motive actually swayed with him upon every particular occasion. If he can do all this completely, he will discover the impositions of others, and what is better, will avoid imposing upon himself, which is the worst of all deceptions. As the world goes, we lie under the necessity sometimes of alleging specious motives which did not influence us. A man asks you to lend him money which you have reason to think he will not repay, but you dare not tell him so, then you must put him off with excuses : but you ought always to know your own real motive. If the mind ever exerts a power of willing as well as acting, she performs that work by the instrumentality of motives, for therein lies her whole strength. When she perfectly knows her tools, where they lie, what they will do, and when they are in proper order, she may take her measures surely with respect to her moral and prudential conduct, and attain what the poet calls a life unacquainted with disappointment. In short, I look upon the study of our motives as conducing more than any one thing to that most useful of all sciences, The knowledge of oneself.

8. We have seen how the same considerations do not weigh

alike with different persons, nor with the same person at different times; how they fluctuate and vary, their colors change to and fro, their weight diminishes, vanishes, and returns again, their form and parts continuing all along the same. Hence it appears that motives are compound ideas, containing something whereon the force of the whole and its title to be deemed a final cause depends, which when wanting it loses its essence: for a motive having lost its force is no motive at all, nor the cause of anything. It remains then that we turn our thoughts to seek for that ingredient which gives efficacy to the compound, and denominates it a motive.

CHAP. VI.

SATISFACTION.

PLEASURE seems at first sight to bid the fairest for being that ingredient which gives weight to our motives, and we find by experience in multitudes of instances that it proves a sufficient inducement with us to act, for we perform many of our actions because we like them. And perhaps this may be the thing according to some notions of pleasure, for the word is not always taken precisely in the same sense. But it is the safest way to settle the meaning of our words by the standard of custom, and if we understand the term as it is commonly understood, we shall find pleasure often insufficient to perform the office of a motive, for we do many things against our liking. Pleasure in vulgar estimation stands opposed to business, duty, works of use and necessity: yet in all these we feel some engagement, self-approbation or complacency of mind, that carries us through with them. Pleasures, usually so called, often lose their gust, they satiate and cloy upon repetition, and nauseate instead of inviting. Therefore Mr. Locke has fixed upon the term Satisfaction, as being more extensive, comprehending all that complacency we feel as well in business as diversion, as well in the works of prudence as in the starts of fancy. I cannot follow a better authority, especially as I find nothing within my own experience or observation to contradict it: therefore shall adopt his term Satisfaction to express that vivifying ingredient which gives life and vigor to our motives. But to prevent misapprehension, I think it necessary to subjoin a few remarks, in order to ascertain what I conceive we both understand by Satisfaction.

2. In the first place, I scarce need to take notice of what is obvious to every one, that we are not always in so happy a situation as to choose between enjoyments which we will prefer; we are sometimes reduced to the hard necessity of choosing between evils, which of them we judge the lightest. The pleuretic lying on his left side does not expect pleasure by turning to the other; he has no more in view than a diminution of pain. Mischief and displeasure seize upon us unawares, and we think of nothing but how to deliver ourselves from them: dangers threaten, and our care tends solely to escape them. Now in all these cases we are prompted to what we do by uneasiness, therefore uneasiness has an efficacy to set at work as well as satisfaction; and accordingly Mr. Locke has given them both for distinct principles of action, though I have blended them together into one. But this I do not from any variance in opinion, but for convenience and shortness sake: and I think the junction may be made without any violence, for as a penny saved is a penny gotten, and the miser looks upon it as an actual gain if he can procure the abatement of a payment, so every diminution or avoidance of uneasiness is an approach towards satisfaction. Therefore, though I may speak of them apart whenever necessity shall so require, yet for the generality I shall consider satisfaction only, and hope what I say of this will, with very little variation, be found applicable to the other.

3. In the second place, if any man desires to know what satisfaction is, he must not expect to learn it by definition from me; I can help him no further than by pointing out where he may find it himself. Let him reflect on what he feels when anything happens that pleases him, when he sits down to a well furnished table with a good appetite, when he reads a diverting book, when he receives news of some desirable event, when he looks back upon some performance for which he can applaud himself. Nor let him stop here, but carry on his contemplation to the common occurrences of life: when he applies to the business of his profession, or gives orders to his servant, or hears a newspaper, or takes his hat off the pin to go abroad, he will find that complacency in his most ordinary actions which renders life valuable. For bare existence has no other worth than as it serves for a basis to happiness, for we cannot be happy without being at all; but we all value our lives at a high rate, which we could not do, considering how thinly pleasures are scattered in the world, unless we found something satisfactory in almost everything we do upon the most trifling occasions. Some men live contentedly without pleasure, as that stands in the vulgar sense for an intense

degree of enjoyment; but your melancholic persons, after having lost that glee which others feel in every common exercise of their powers, quickly grow weary of life. Therefore we must look upon satisfaction as the general term, containing under it joy, delight, pleasure, amusement, complacence, engagement, content, as the several stages. The lowest degree of satisfaction suffices to put us in motion when no higher intervenes; in our idle hours or vacant spaces of time we turn our eyes to look at a butterfly, or put down our hands to remove the flap of our waistcoat that had gotten between us and the chair. For the mind uses a nicer balance than the master of the mint: a cobweb will draw down the scale when nothing offers to counterpoise. Her understanding indeed is liable to mistake, being ill served by its ideas, which exhibit things frequently under wrong appearances, but her volition follows exactly according to her apprehension of things.

4. When the mind has no grand purpose in view, she can fully content herself with any little trifle that presents; if she finds herself easy, and pleasure does not solicit, nor business urge, nor danger threaten, she rests perfectly satisfied with her condition, desiring nothing further. Which induced Hieronymus to place happiness in vacuity or absence of pain, that is, in mere ease; supposing the sweetest pleasures engage us no otherwise than by creating a want of themselves, which fills us with an uneasiness we cannot remove without attaining them. But I may venture to refer it to the first man you meet in the street, whether there is not a real and sensible difference between actual pleasure and the bare absence of pain: for if this were sufficient to constitute happiness, we must be happy during every sound nap or fainting fit; because while the senses are gone so that we feel nothing, we certainly do not feel pain.

The same consideration I suppose led Epicurus to maintain that all pleasures were equal in degree, and differed only in kind, for the lowest of them satisfies the mind, and the highest can do no more: therefore a man finds as complete satisfaction in pulling up the heel of his slipper in the morning, as he does in recovering his only child that had been stolen away last week by a gipsy. But this contradicts daily experience, which testifies that we find a much greater relish in some pleasures than we do in others. A man may sit picking his fingers after dinner with perfect tranquillity of mind, but this is nothing to compare with the joy he feels on hearing the voice of an intimate friend at the door. Nor is it true that the mind can satisfy herself with little pleasures, unless when greater are not to be had or not apprehended in the imagination; who would not leave his trifling

amusements upon being invited to a diversion he is extremely fond of, if no prudential or other motive withhold him? Why need the mind ever suspend her choice between two pleasures proposed until she has determined which is the greater, if either of them would answer her purpose alike? Therefore when several satisfactions offer together, that apprehended the greatest always prevails and carries away volition from the rest: nor can it be said to do so by the uneasiness of wanting it; for though we sometimes would forego an opportunity but that we fear we shall blame ourselves for having slipped it, yet this is not always the case; we frequently quit a lesser pleasure for a greater instantly upon summons, without the least thought of what we might suffer by a self-denial. There is the like difference of degree in uneasiness; when several accost us at once, we fly that which presses the hardest. So if satisfaction pulls one way and uneasiness drives another, whichever is the strongest overpowers the other and gives the turn to our motion.

Happy is it for us that we can content ourselves with a small pittance of satisfaction, for else our lives would pass most uncomfortably: poignant pleasures and high delights rarely come in our way, and we should have nothing but uneasiness to fill up the large intervals between them. How miserably would the shop-keeper and the artisan spend their days, if they could work no longer than while the dread of starving hung over them! This perhaps might drive them into their several occupations at first, but their work furnishes them with an amusement that wholly engages their thoughts, and while they content themselves with finishing their tasks, they remove the evil without having it perpetually stare them in the face. What enterprize of moment could we perform; what business requiring a length of time could we complete, if we might never stir without some very powerful incitement to spur us? How many useful acquirements should we miss, if the apprehension of their being useful were not enough to move us, without having some particular signal service they will do us under contemplation? our dearest pleasures seldom drop into our mouths, but we must do many things to prepare for their reception, and what we do preparatory thereto partakes of the nature of business. For how lively expectations soever we may entertain at our entrance upon an undertaking, they cannot keep up their vigor during the course of a long work, which we pursue with that quiet complacency accompanying our ordinary motions. It has been commonly observed that a man can never succeed in any science, art, or profession, unless he takes a liking to it, but the liking here requisite need not arise to that

high pitch as to render the fatigues of his profession an uninterrupted scene of transport or delight. Hence we find that our gentle satisfactions, taken together in their whole amount, are much more valuable than our higher enjoyments; as exceeding them greatly in number, as furnishing us principally with employment for our time, and as serving us in our most useful and important occasions.

5. In the third place I shall remark, that although I have assigned satisfaction for the active ingredient of our motive, yet, if we examine the matter strictly, it is not very satisfaction but the prospect or idea of it; for these are different: one may have the full idea of a toothache one does not feel, and of a diversion one does not partake of. Now we do not use to enter upon action but for some end, which end is some satisfactory perception attainable thereby. Even when we walk for walking sake, it is not the bare motion, but the pleasant feel of our limbs or of the air, that excites us. But this perception follows upon the action, and had no existence at the instant when the motive operated.— Therefore it is not the substance, but the prospect or expectance of satisfaction, which makes that part of the compound rendering it a motive. And this expectance, though sometimes fallacious, suffices to put us in motion: the child, that went to play with the candle, expected pleasure but found only smart; and the coward, who runs away from his own shadow, expected a mischief that would not have attacked him.

Since then expectation is not the same with the thing expected, it follows that we may pursue satisfaction without being in a state of enjoyment, and fly uneasiness without being in a state of suffering. The former does not often happen, because, being founded upon delusion, we soon discover our expectations to be delusive upon trial, which then changes our prospect, and we change our measures accordingly. Yet it does happen sometimes; for those who have made pleasures their constant employment, quickly cloy themselves with the frequent repetition of them, yet still pursue them with delusive hopes of the same relish they used to find heretofore, and run from diversion to diversion, in restless expectation of an enjoyment they cannot attain. But uneasiness exciting us to avoid it, may continue to operate without delusion: for if we find our endeavors upon trial effectual to ward off a mischief, this will encourage us to repeat them as often as the danger presents, and so long as we can keep evil aloof, we shall not fall into a state of suffering. If two old acquaintance, who had not met for some years before, were to spy one another on the opposite sides of the Haymarket, probably

they would run together into the middle of the street, if the weather were fine and the ground dry, where they would join in an agreeable conversation : in the midst of their discourse they see a coach fifty yards off driving directly towards them, I suppose they would remove out of the way to one side or other, still continuing their talk. What then is it puts them upon this action? not satisfaction, for they propose no addition to that by changing their ground : it is no other than the uneasiness of being trampled upon by the horses, which, because they can avoid without trouble, makes no interruption of their enjoyment. He that walks along Cheapside must turn and wind perpetually to avoid jostling the other passengers ; the prospect of uneasiness he would feel upon running against people, induces him to all those motions, which yet makes no abatement of any satisfaction he may have in the errand he goes upon, nor throws him into a state of suffering.

6. For my fourth remark, I shall observe that present satisfaction is the end we constantly have in view on proceeding to action. Nor does this contradict what I have just been endeavoring to prove, for by present satisfaction I would not be understood so strictly as to mean the satisfaction we actually have at the instant of acting : for this is no subject of action, nor can receive alteration thereby. We cannot unfeel the pain we feel by any effort of ours, nor does the pleasure we now have need an effort to procure it. But the satisfaction we propose in every exertion of our activity is that of the moment next immediately ensuing, and this may be called present satisfaction without any impropriety of speech. For we are constantly told the present time only is in our power, the past being gone and the future lying out of our reach : but this present time is in reality the next succeeding instant, that alone being the subject of our power, for we do not act in order to obtain what we have already. Perceptions flow in upon us without intermission, and we generally have a foresight of them before they come, as also a power many times to alter their course by the proper application of objects or management of our organs : therefore we keep constantly upon the look out ; while we see that such perceptions as we like will rise of their own accord, we have nothing to do, when they will not, we use our activity to procure them. In all action there are three things to be considered, the prospect or expectation, the action itself, and the perception to be introduced thereby : the first has no other value than as it directs us what action to pursue, nor the second than as it tends to procure the third, so that our business lies in helping ourselves to procure satisfactory or escape uneasy

perceptions. But as we must every instant have some perception or other, we must provide for the next ensuing perception, and as soon as that is had, another to follow immediately after furnishes us with the like employment; so that our wants, starting up successively without intermission, require a continual supply; which confines our cares to the present moment, leaving the provision for future moments to our subsequent endeavors.

This accounts for what Mr. Locke has fully proved to be fact, that good, the greater good acknowledged and apprehended to be such, does not always determine the Will: and I may add, it never does, unless by means of the satisfaction we feel in making advances towards it; for if any distant advantage can raise in us a desire of attaining it, the gratification of this desire will afford a present satisfaction. And that remote good and evil have such effect upon us daily experience bears witness: we flatter ourselves often with distant hopes, and shudder at future dangers; we contemplate with pleasure the prospect of enjoyments afar off, and look with horror upon misfortunes before they come. Suppose a person, in whose knowledge and veracity you could fully confide, should say to you, Sir, you shall continue in plenty and the possession of everything you can desire to-day and to-morrow, but the third day your estate shall be seized, your children carried into bondage, and your body afflicted with painful distempers: would not the news fill you with a cruel anxiety? On the other hand, had you been tormented with the gout for a long while, and after having tried many remedies to no purpose had lost all hopes of relief, should you receive the like assurance that in two days time you should be set at ease and perfectly cured: should not you feel an exhilarating joy that would overpower the pangs of your distemper? And the like happens proportionably upon the prospect of anything useful or detrimental, pleasurable or troublesome, in a lower degree.

7. This presentiment of the future makes the great privilege of human nature; for were we void of it we should have nothing but appetite to follow, like the brute creatures: but our concern for the morrow creates another appetite which prompts us to escape mischiefs that must be guarded against beforehand, and pursue great advantages that require much time and labor to attain. It likewise lengthens our pleasures beyond their natural measure, for enjoyment generally holds only for a little moment, but expectation, hope, and successful pursuit, often supply us with a constant fund of delight for a long season. But on the other hand, it is attended with some inconveniences, by tormenting us sometimes with unavoidable evils before they come near us, and mak-

ing us tremble at imaginary dangers that would never have fallen upon us.

And these derivative satisfactions fluctuate as much as the original: for we do not always find equal relish in the same enjoyment, nor does the prospect of it always appear in colors equally vivid. Neither can we observe any other rule in this change of colors than that they generally heighten upon the nearer approach of the enjoyment. But the very prospect of an attainable good, or an avoidable evil, commonly proves satisfactory; therefore, however it may sometimes happen otherwise, for the most part we continue in a state of enjoyment, in some degree or other, during the pursuit of a benefit we hope to acquire, or avoidance of a mischief we can easily ward off. Whence comes the saying, Hope makes the heart glad.

8. Fifthly, I shall take notice that satisfaction always attracts, and uneasiness always repels; and either of them operates according to the present occasion. If some advantage invites, we set ourselves instantly to pursue it; if a greater starts up in view, we quit the former and run after the latter: if mischief approaches, we set ourselves to prevent it; and while it continues to hang over us, we continue our efforts to keep it aloof. Therefore to me it seems that both satisfaction and uneasiness have a like efficacy to make us either change or adhere to our measures, as occasion shall require. But Mr. Locke ascribes the change of action solely to uneasiness, and the continuance of it to satisfaction; it behoves me to give my reasons for departing from so great an authority.

I shall allege first, that, properly speaking, there is no such thing as a continuance of action, all our perceptions and all our volitions being transient and momentary. What we term a continuance is indeed only a repetition of successive perceptions and volitions of the same kind: just as a spout continues to run while it pours forth innumerable drops without any interval between. So if you stare at the same picture for half an hour together, the sight comes by successive rays of light affecting your eyes in the same manner, and the perceptions raised thereby, although exactly similar, are individually distinct. And if you keep pointing with a stick for the same time, successive volitions hold up your hand, for should you forbear to repeat them, your arm would fall instantly to your side.

But waving this nicety, let us consider a series of motions, all proceeding upon one plan and with the same design, as a continuance of action: yet I think one may produce instances wherein we depart from our design, and change our measures without be-

ing driven by the lash of uneasiness. Suppose a man sitting down to his harpsichord intending to play through an opera of Corelli: in the midst of his diversion enters a messenger to tell him, that, if he will come away directly to the minister, he may be instated in a considerable preferment he had long wished and ardently sought for. Is it uneasiness or joy that makes him leave his music and run to catch up his hat? Suppose a company of young folks agreeably entertained in dancing; somebody tells them of a fine fire-work just going to be played off in a neighboring garden: I will not ensure they shall not all run instantly to the window. When their curiosity a little abates and before the sight begins to cloy, some one puts them in mind of their dancing, perhaps the rest take the admonition and they run back to their sport as hastily as they quitted it. Surely this is a change of action and a departure from the plan laid down for the employment of the night: yet I appeal to any gentleman or lady, who may have experienced such an incident, whether they feel the least spice of uneasiness either in breaking off their diversion or returning to it again. On the other hand, suppose a man travelling through a lonely forest infested with a gang of desperate villains, who murder all they meet; he sees them coming towards him, and has but just time to jump into a stinking bog, where he can hide his head behind a little bush: the rogues halt at a small distance from him, where they sit chattering perhaps an hour or two, all which time I suppose he will hardly quit his lurking hole. Now what is it holds him to this continuance of action? is it satisfaction? He sees none and expects none by sticking up to the shoulders in dirt and nastiness. Is it any other than the uneasy dread of falling into their hands, where he can expect nothing but misery and destruction?

9. But I am so averse to differing from Mr. Locke, that whenever I cannot bring my notions to tally with his, I hunt about for all expedients to reconcile them, so that I may hold my own consistently with those he entertains. And such expedient is most likely to be found by observing upon the unsteadiness and variability of language. The most careful, as well as the giddy, use their words in various significations. Your men of close application, though taking their terms from the common language, find themselves under a necessity of recasting them in a mould of their own, to fit them for purposes that were not wanted in the usual intercourses of life: and sometimes the moulds they severally use differ from one another in some little particular. What if this should be the case between Mr. Locke and myself? Might we not then think the same at bottom, while we express ourselves

by opposite sides of a contradiction? Perhaps, what he calls a continuance of action I should call a continuance of courses; and so there is no repugnance, because we are not talking of the same thing.

Now in order to understand what I mean by courses, please to take notice that we have each of us a set of views, aims, and desires, leading us into those courses of behavior which fill up the employment of our lives; and though we may frequently step aside out of one track into another, we still continue to pursue courses of the same set. The word carries this sense in common conversation when we speak of virtuous or vicious courses: nor is a man reckoned to alter his courses because he quits the exercise of one virtue, or gratification of one vicious appetite, for that of another, as opportunity occurs. Neither does every turning after other pursuits at intervals make a discontinuance of the first: for some are of such a nature as not to be completed but by returning to the work at distant seasons with large gaps and spaces intervening. Thus a man may continue a course of physic though he dispatches business, takes diversions, and does many things between whiles. Therefore Mr. Locke would probably say of the man that left his harpsichord to get a place, that he had two desires directing his courses, the love of music, and of money or honor, and when the latter drew him away from the former, here was no change of measures, but the continuance of a pursuit he had long since been engaged in. The dancers were following a course of pleasure which kept them on in the same road, how much soever particular objects might vary. That the poor traveller was held in his quagmire by self-preservation, which is a main principle influencing us in the course of our lives, and which we never throw aside until some hard pressure of fortune shall make us uneasy with our being.

And that Mr. Locke had these courses in view appears manifest from the instances he makes use of in support of his assertion; which are that of "an idle fellow whom you shall not move to industry, convince him never so much of the advantage plenty has over poverty, make him see and own never so plainly that the handsome conveniences of life are better than nasty penury, so long as he can content himself with the latter and finds no uneasiness in it. And of a worldling, who, though never so well persuaded of the advantages of virtue, that it is as necessary to a man who has any great aims, as food to life, yet enters not upon any action in pursuit of this confessed greater good until he hungers and thirsts after righteousness, and feels an uneasiness in the want of it."

Now I shall not deny that we seldom, if ever, fail to continue our courses of action so long as they prove satisfactory, nor change them until they become insipid and cloy, or lead into inconveniences that gives us a disgust of them. Neither can you well reclaim a man from vicious courses by the offer of satisfaction, for you have none to propose that will be such to him: the pleasure and ease of virtue arise from the practice of it, and he who has never practised it will see nothing inviting in it. Therefore you must begin with him by representing the mischievous tendency of his evil doings, and if you can bring him to a dread and abhorrence of them, which shall make him uneasy under the apprehension of them, you may prevail upon him to change his measures. There are indeed, besides the satisfaction your proficients in virtue feel in every exercise of it, certain rewards and fruits that any man would desire, but these operate at first by the uneasiness they create in the want of them. For when a man has taken a resolution of purchasing those rewards, the solicitations of old habits will frequently draw him back into his old courses, upon which the uneasiness and vexation of having failed in his resolution may drive him to renew it again, and while he adheres, the uneasiness of denying his other desires still torments him: so that he must remain in a state of uneasiness while the change is making, and until it be completed by the old habits entirely losing their vigor. Which makes good the observation of ancient and modern ages, that the paths of virtue are thorny and rugged at their entrance but lead into a pleasant and delightful country.

10. Thus, though I have represented action in a different light from Mr. Locke, we must not therefore be thought to differ in substance, but in our manner of handling it. For though I do not pretend to a clearer, perhaps I may to a more microscopic eye: I consider action more minutely, endeavoring to analyze it into its primary parts. Now the shape and other circumstances belonging to the parts may vary greatly from those of the whole. Look upon your table, and you see it round or square, or of some other regular form: hold your eye near the wood, and you will perceive it waving in veins, or running in longitudinal fibres: the little particles composing it attract and cohere strongly to one another, but the table neither attracts nor coheres to the paper, the ink-bottle, nor the penknife you lay upon it. So if a habit of drinking be taken as one action, it may always be continued so long as a man can satisfy himself in the practice, and always broken off as soon as the uneasiness of a gout, or other mischief brought upon him thereby, shall exceed his fondness for the liquor: and yet the single acts whereof that large action consists may

spring from satisfaction or uneasiness, indifferently, as either happens to present. For he may change his bottle either because he dislikes that standing before him, or because he pleases himself with the thought of tasting another sort; and he may stay some time at the tavern for the pleasure of the company, and continue there after that pleasure ceases, to avoid the uneasiness of going home, where he will not know what to do with himself.

Since then nature has furnished me with a microscope, why should I not accept her favor, for she bestows not the slightest of her gifts in vain? The Temple of Knowledge cannot be built without the concurrent labors of many artificers working with various qualifications. Who then shall blame me for making such use as I can of my little talent in pursuing minute discoveries that persons of larger views overlook? Should I fail of doing any good service myself, somebody else may turn them to better advantage: for it is no uncommon thing in the sciences, as well as arts and manufactures, to see one man prepare materials for another to work up. However, if my health and spirits hold, I shall strive hard but I will make some texture out of my materials that a man shall find convenient for his service, without sending it to another operator to be finished.

11. I hope matters are pretty well accommodated with Mr. Locke in regard to the difficulty before mentioned: but I do not know how I shall come off with him upon another point, where he speaks of the uneasiness of desire, and makes desire constantly accompanied with uneasiness. I can go with him half way, so far as to admit that desire often creates us cruel uneasinesses, and that the smart of their wounds rises in proportion to the intenseness of our desire. But this happens only when desire meets with a disappointment; when two incompatible desires urge strongly at once, both of which cannot be gratified; when some hindrance checks or at least retards desire. For while desire runs on smoothly in its course towards attainment, while we want nothing besides the object we pursue, while no bar stands across the way, nor difficulty occurs to check our speed, for my part I can see nothing but continual satisfaction accompanying the progress.

I may say with Mr. Dryden, "Old as I am, for lady's love unfit, The power of beauty I remember yet." I still bear in mind the days of my courtship, which in the language of all men is called a season of desire; yet, unless I strangely forget myself, it proved to me a season of satisfaction too. But, says Mr. Locke, it is better to marry than to burn, where we may see what it is that chiefly drives men into a conjugal life. This, for aught I know, might be the motive with some men, who, being of an unsociable

and undomestic turn, can see nothing good in matrimony, but submit to it as a lesser evil delivering them from a greater. And I can excuse an old batchelor for entertaining so despicable a notion of a state he never experienced the pleasures of himself. Others it may be make their engagements too hastily, and then would break them off again through the shame of doing a foolish thing, till the smart of their burnings becomes intolerable, and drives them headlong into the matrimonial net. But this, thanks to my stars, was not my case : my own judgment, upon mature deliberation, and the approbation of my friends, gave leave for desire to take its course. I might feel some scorplings in my youthful days when it would have been imprudent to quench them, and while the object of desire lay at an undiscernible distance : but as the prospect drew nearer, and desire had license to begin its career, it had no more the fierceness of a furnace, but became a gentle flame, casting forth a pleasing exhilarating warmth. Perhaps I might meet with some little rubs in the way, that gave me disturbance : if my fair one spake a civil word to any tall, well-bred young fellow, I might entertain some idle apprehensions lest he should supplant me. When I took a hackney coach to visit her, if we were jammed in between the carts, perhaps I might fret and fume, and utter many an uneasy Pish ; but as soon as we got through the stop, though desire abated not, every shadow of uneasiness fled away. As near as I can remember, during the whole scene, desire, close attended by satisfaction, directed all my steps, and occupied all my moments : it awaked with me in the morning, and was the last idea swept away by sleep : it invigorated me in business, it heightened my diversions, it gave me life when in company, and entertained me with delightful reflections when alone. Nor did it fail of accompanying me to the altar, where, laying aside its sprightliness and gaiety, as unsuitable to the solemnity of the occasion, it became more calm and decent, exhibiting the prospect of an agreeable companion, who should double the enjoyments and alleviate the troubles of life ; who should ease me from the burthen of household cares, and assist me in bringing up a rising family ; whose conversation should be a credit to me abroad, and a continual feast to me at home. Nor yet did possession put an end to desire, which found fresh fuel to keep it alive from time to time, in mutual intercourses of kindness and hearty friendship, in communication of interests, counsels and sentiments ; and could often feed upon the merest trifles. How often, having picked up some little piece of news abroad, has desire quickend my pace to prattle over it at home ! how often, upon hearing of something curious in the shops, have I gone to buy

it with more pleasure than the keenest sportsman goes after his game! Thus desire, leading delight hand in hand, attended us for many years, still retaining its first vigor, although a little altered in shape and complexion; until my other half was torn from me. Then indeed desire left me, for it had nothing now to rest upon, and with it fled joy, delight, content, and all those under desires that used to put me upon the common actions of the day; for I could like nothing, find amusement in nothing, and care for nothing: and in their stead succeeded melancholy, tastelessness, and perpetual restlessness. And though I called in all my philosophy to rescue me from this disconsolate condition, it could not relieve me presently, but had a long struggle before it could get the better of nature.

12. I doubt not there are many persons in the world, who, having been as happily paired, could read the account here given of myself as feelingly as ever I wrote it. As for your determined bachelors or injudicious husbands who have married only for money, or for beauty, or for a frolic, or for a bedfellow, or for they did not well know why, though they may think me romantic, yet I suppose they have had desires of their own of some sort or other; either of raising a fortune, or of preferment, or of building, or of gardening, or of sports, or of dress, or of acquisitions in learning, which have engaged them in long pursuits. And I believe we shall all give in our verdict unanimously upon the positive evidence of our own several experience, That our desires have furnished us with the greatest part of our enjoyments in life; and that desire, so long as it can move unsuccessfully without rub or disappointment, without wanting fuel to feed it, and without pain or unlucky accidents intervening, has supplied us with a continual fund of satisfaction. But when desire grows languid for want of fresh matter to work upon, when it cannot, like a wanton bird, hop about from twig to twig, from bush to bush, continuing its play, then the time hangs heavy upon our hands: when it meets with crosses or delays, when it rises to impatience, or is of such a nature as to require an immediate gratification that cannot be had; then indeed vexation and uneasiness find a ready entrance.

That the uneasiness Mr. Locke found in desire, proceeds from some of those causes, may appear by the examples he produces in proof of it. Desire, says he, deferred, makes the heart sick. Leave out the participle Deferred, and the rest of the sentence will not hold true. Change it for another, and we may lay down the contrary as a maxim; for desire promoted makes the heart glad. Therefore desire is not in its own nature a state of uneasiness, nor unless rendered so by disappointment or delay. Give me

children, says Rachel, or I die ; but this was not till after a long course of barrenness she began to despair of having any ; when Joseph was coming, we hear no more of such exclamations, yet I suppose she still continued to desire it might prove a boy. Where he speaks of the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, surely he must have in his thoughts the cravings of a person almost dying with either, rather than the common returns of appetite at stated seasons during health. I speak only for myself : when I sit down to dinner I feel no uneasiness in being hungry, but rather rejoice at having a good appetite, from whence I expect a better relish to my victuals than any sauces could give them. How do other people fare upon the like occasion ? If on coming home from a journey in hot weather, you find yourself faintish and drougthy, and call for a glass of wine and water, have you not a pleasure in seeing the wine pour from the bottle or sparkle in the glass, even before you bring it to your mouth ? And does not this pleasure arise from your desire ? for you would feel it no longer on the like prospect after having fully quenched your thirst. Pretty bottle, says Sganarelle,^a how sweet are thy little glug glugs ! how envied would be my lot wert thou to keep always full for all my pourings ! Desire then gave the glugs their sweetness, for Sganarelle was in a state of desire, not of fruition, when he solaced himself with their music, the liquor having not yet entered his lips : nor was there I suppose anything very harmonious in the sound, or any other charm besides the assurance of his bottle being full, and the means of accomplishing his desire abundantly at hand.

Could uneasiness alone determine the Will, how wretched must the condition of mankind appear ! For the Will never ceases working from morning till night : we are always a doing, but should have nothing to do unless to deliver ourselves from uneasinesses following close upon one another's heels. Human life from beginning to end would be nothing but a restless endeavor to throw off an evil we could never totally remove, and would exhibit one continued scene of uninterrupted uneasiness. But, kind nature be praised ! our condition is not quite so forlorn and comfortless. We have our hours, and those of activity too, wherein we can employ ourselves with satisfaction and delight : and since in those pleasurable seasons we do not stand idle, there must be something else besides uneasiness capable of urging us to action.

13. Mr. Locke it seems once held that ancient, and till his time universally received opinion, That good, the greater good, understood and apprehended to be such, determined the Will : he first discovered that it was always something present, and no distant good, that gave the turn to our activity ; for which I ac-

knowledge myself and the world greatly obliged to him ; for an important and leading discovery it was, as it has let us more than anything into the secret springs of human action. But since new discoveries are seldom perfected at once, may I be permitted to offer at an improvement, and add, that present satisfaction, as well as present uneasiness, is capable of performing the office. I know that distant good does often operate by the uneasy want we have of it, by the shame, the vexation, the regret, we feel in slipping our opportunity of gaining it, but it has likewise a quality of throwing a sensible satisfaction upon every step we take in advancing towards it. Which latter I conceive wants not efficacy, especially in those who have a strong attachment to virtue and prudence, or, as Mr. Locke expresses it, who hunger and thirst after righteousness, any more than the former, to determine volition : and according as the one or the other actuates our motions, we pursue the object of our desire through the flowery meads of delight, or the thorny paths of trouble and self-denial.

14. But it may be said that, according to my own doctrine (§ 8), satisfaction and uneasiness are not so incompatible but the one may move us while the other possesses us : therefore why may not uneasiness be the sole incitement constantly spurring to action, without necessarily rendering our motions uneasy, while we can keep it aloof by continual efforts to escape it? I do not forget what I have there laid down, that one may fly uneasiness without being in a state of suffering ; for the prospect of the next ensuing moment moves us to action, but the feel of the present denominates our condition : now one may have the prospect of a very different sort of ground from that one stands upon. Delightful is it, says Lucretius, to stand upon firm land and see the mariners tossing and toiling in a tempestuous sea. Delightful to behold the bloody scenes of war spread over a spacious field without sharing in the danger yourself. Not because there is any pleasure in seeing others tormented, but because the prospect of evils from which yourself are exempt is delightful. Nor I suppose would your delight be the less if you were to do something towards escaping the danger, provided you had certain and easy means at hand for effecting your escape : were you on board the fleet, but stepping into a boat that should land you safe before the storm began to rage ; or in the army, and mounting an easy pad that should carry you far enough out of harm's way before the battle joined. But where Locke treats of the uneasiness giving birth to our actions, I cannot understand him of the prospect but of very uneasiness itself ; which to my thinking cannot consist with a state of enjoyment, but must necessarily, according to the degree of it, throw the mind into a

state of suffering so long as it continues and as often as it returns. For to the question, What determines the Will? he answers, Some uneasiness a man is at present under. So that it is not timely caution against an approaching mischief, but the pressure of uneasiness actually felt, that alone suffices to set us at work : and this equally the same, whether the avoidance of evil or attainment of distant good be the object of our endeavors. For, says he, there is a desire of ease from pain, and another of absent positive good, in which latter also the desire and uneasiness is equal : as much as we desire any absent good, so much we are in pain for it. Now whether the prospect of absent attainable good does always fill us with a painful want and uneasiness, I have some reasons to doubt : but shall defer giving them until I have gone through my next observation, which may render what I have to say upon this point more easily intelligible.

15. For my sixth remark I shall lay down, That satisfaction and uneasiness often beget and introduce each other : the bare escape from pain gives a sensible pleasure, and the loss of any great pleasure grieves us : whatever affects us strongly, of either kind, generally leaves its contrary behind. In time to come, says Eneas, we shall find entertainment in reflecting on the hardships we now undergo. For past sufferings, not likely to return, are often a feast to the mind ; and past pleasures we can no longer enjoy, remembered with regret. A man just recovered from a fever, finds enjoyment in the very deliverance from his disease ; he can pass the day agreeably, though with his servants only about him, in a manner he would have thought insipid, lonely, and irksome, at another time ; for he satisfies himself with ease, and wants nothing further to divert him. Thus a great deal of our good springs out of evil ; we should often rust in idleness, and feel the time heavy upon our hands, were it not for pain, difficulty, and danger, which rouse us to action ; and though they make us smart for the present, repay us abundantly afterwards by affording a greater satisfaction in having surmounted them, than they gave us trouble in surmounting.

On the other hand, suppose a man provided with plenty of all conveniences, and means of ordinary amusement, and fully contented with his present situation : yet tell him of some high diversion going forward in the neighborhood which he must not partake of, and you may perhaps raise a want in him that shall vitiate all his other enjoyments, and throw him into a state of disquiet and uneasiness. For I shall never deny that strong desires do frequently raise an uneasy want of the object they fasten upon ; nor that this does sometimes prevail where the satisfaction of ad-

vancing towards the object would not : but I conceive this is not always the case, but that desire sometimes operates by the satisfaction of pursuing, and sometimes by the uneasiness of wanting, the thing desired. If a lazy fellow has some acquisition greatly to his liking proposed, he may make a few faint motions at first, and please himself with the prospect of possessing it, but his indolence puts him off from day to day from using any significant endeavors ; he then begins to reflect with himself, finds the completion of his wishes no nearer than at first setting out ; this raises an uneasy want of them, which grows greater and greater by degrees, till at last it overpowers his slothfulness, and makes him set his hand in good earnest to the plough.

16. That uneasiness is the motive in most of those instances mentioned by Mr. Locke I shall readily agree, and might produce others wherein uneasiness does the work, although pleasure in the eye of the world runs away with the credit of it ; for many times it is not easy to discern which of the two determined the Will. Your debauchees, your triflers, and very fashionable people, who make pleasure their sole employment, I doubt not find delight in it at first ; but pleasure too often repeated abates of its relish, and at length becomes wholly insipid : yet still they run on the same round of diversions, thinking they follow pleasure all the while, and so indeed they do, though not with satisfaction, but for want of something else to amuse them, or through the cravings of an unnatural appetite brought upon them by custom. Follow them to their clubs, and you may hear them sing without joy, laugh without being pleased, and thrum over the same jests till they grow threadbare. View them in their routs, and they run on the same roll of compliments and common expressions, talking incessantly without having anything to say. Peep upon them at their toilets, and you will perceive dress to be a labor undergone to avoid appearing hideous and out of mode among company. Some real satisfactions they may have when anything new or unexpected engages their fancy : but chiefly I believe in going on the way to their parties, which is a kind of business, being an action undertaken not for its own sake, but for some end : they may then rejoice at having thrown off the insupportable burden of time, and escaped the misery of staying at home alone, or may flatter themselves with the same relish in their diversions they used formerly to enjoy ; for delusive expectations will satisfy the mind so long as the delusion holds. Thus the cloven-footed tyrant inveigles the unwary with exorbitant wages at first, but having once bound them to his service, by rendering them unfit for any other, he shortens their allowance, giving them no more than just enough to persuade

them they earn something, and for the most part lashes them through his drudgery with scourges, or pinches them with his iron claws.

Now let us do justice on all sides, and confess honestly that the virtuous man does not always find delight in the practice of his virtues. There is a joy, a complacency of mind which I hope every one of us feels upon acting right: but there is likewise a shame, a vexation, a compunction, upon acting wrong: and this latter often serves to keep us steady in our good courses when the other would have failed. Could we behold virtue naked, says Plato, we should find her so divinely charming that we could never like anything else: but virtue is a modest virgin, she will not let you see her naked until you are wedded to her; she displays a hand, an arm, a cheek, at a time, as you get further into her familiarity. Therefore how much soever young admirers may be smitten with her at first sight, while covered with her veil, this like all sudden desires cannot hold its vigor: but the solicitations of passion or old vicious habits will draw them from their pursuit, unless the general persuasion of her being a consummate beauty shall raise a want of her acquaintance that may overpoise all uneasiness beside. As for those who are become intimate with the lovely creature, they may see so much of her beauties, and retain such a taste of her sweetness, as shall fill them with a warm and steady delight, sufficient to make them surmount difficulties and troubles with pleasure, and if I may so say, render uneasiness itself perfectly easy. I can imagine it possible in theory, that a man may have so strong a relish for the practice of virtue, as may make his condition happy under the greatest pain; that he may look upon all present sufferings as nothing for the exceeding weight of glory that lies in store hereafter. For I know any strong desire has power sometimes to pluck out the sting of pain; I have experienced it myself in little complaints, such as an aching corn or a grumbling tooth, which though I have felt, I have despised and not wished to remove when eager in the pursuit of something greatly to my fancy. But I much question whether the acquisition of so strong a desire as shall keep a man easy in Phalaris's bull, be practicable among the sons of Adam: it is a great matter if we can raise inclination enough to carry us through common difficulties and troubles without being hurt by them. Therefore, unless we had an abhorrence of vice, and felt a want of virtue when absent, as well as a delight in her company when present, we should make very little advance in our progress towards her.

Thus the lives of all men, the virtuous and the vicious alike, though not in equal proportion, are chequered; not only with re-

spect to the vicissitudes of health and distemper, success and disappointment, favors and frowns of fortune attending them, but also to the motives of joy or vexation, content or disquiet, spurring on alternately to action. Desire, like a smiling angel, and its bastard offspring Want, like the knight of the ill-flavored face, direct our conduct by turns. While some idle passion passing by holds desire in chat, the other jumps into the box; as soon as the intruder can be got rid of, the rightful coachman resumes his seat. While he holds the reins we roll smoothly and currently along, feasting our eyes upon the gladsome prospect before us; but when his deputy drives, clouds of noisome dust obstruct our view, we feel the carriage jolt and hobble, tossing us to and fro, and knocking our joints perpetually against the sides. For according as desire or want actuate our motions, we are in a state of enjoyment or a state of suffering: and this whether our object be some distant good, or the removal from approaching evil.

17. Now after what has been laid down under this sixth remark, nobody will expect me to controvert with Mr. Locke, that desire often begets uneasiness, and how much we desire an absent positive good, so much we are in pain for it: but this I apprehend never happens until something obstructs our advances towards the good desired. Want does not come before, nor does the child use to be older than the parent. We cannot be said to want what we may have when we please, or are in the ready way to obtain, yet we desire it, or else we should not proceed in the way. Some desires do not tend to immediate gratification: if a man, fond of hunting, meets with friends who propose a match for the next day, he may desire to make one among them, and give orders to his servant relative thereto, without any want of the diversion, which, were it offered, he would not choose to go upon directly, nor until he had prepared himself by a good night's rest for the fatigue. What we possess we cannot be thought to want, though we may desire the continuance of it; but that is for our future occasions, not to remove any present uneasiness. Every man having just received his last year's income, desires I suppose to receive his next also, but he does not want it, nor, had he it in hand, and were a prudent man, would he make use of it for his expenses of the current year. We all desire life and health, and do many things for their preservation; but while in vigor, peace, and plenty, what want do we feel of either? Can we never choose a food because it is wholesome, nor take an agreeable exercise to mend our constitution, unless driven by approaching sickness, or affrighted by the king of terrors staring us in the face? We all desire the fresh air we breathe, but must we never

walk into the fields to enjoy a purer draught, until almost suffocated by the smoke of town?

18. Besides, although every considerable desire may have its opposite want, and either of them be capable of inciting us to action, when we seek for the motive we must consider what actually operated. For the mind may have many motives in store which do not always enter the scale, and when they do not, have no share in weighing down the balance. Whatever other folks might do, Mr. Locke, I dare say, would agree with me, that an action can be ascribed to no motive that was not present in the thought or imagination at the time of acting. A man goes to the playhouse thinking only to see the play, and there meets with an intimate acquaintance, in whose conversation he takes great delight. Perhaps he did not know the other would be there; perhaps he had heard it last week, but utterly forgot it again: amusement then was his motive; the meeting his friend had no share in his motion; although, had that occurred to his thoughts, he would have gone ten times more readily. Therefore, to discover the true spring of action, it is not enough to know that want is capable of performing the office of a spring, but we must examine whether we had such want in view at the instant of bestirring ourselves. The hard student, says Mr. Locke, will not leave his studies for the pleasures of appetite, but when hunger begins to make him uneasy, then away he goes to remove it. But is this the case with every student? When I have been staring all the morning at the light of nature, till I have stared myself almost blind, I find my spirits want recreation: I then throw aside my papers sometime before dinner; the veriest trifle suits my purpose best: the philosopher can loll out at window like Miss Gawkey, to see the wheelbarrow trundle, or the butcher's dog carry the tray, and is perfectly contented with his situation as being fittest for the present occasion. Presently the bell rings, and down run I into the parlor. Now did Whitefield and Westley endeavor to stop me, bellowing out their exhortations to abstinence, self-denial, and mortification, possibly I might fret a good deal, and the uneasiness of wanting my dinner urge me to exert all my might in brushing by them. But by good luck they do not honor me with their acquaintance, nor have I any of their revelations commanding me to austerities: so that the thought of starving, or of what I should suffer by missing a meal, never once enters into my head, and therefore cannot be the motive actuating my motions.

But neither does it appear to me universally true, that how much we desire absent good so much we are in pain for it. There are many little goods weighty enough to turn the mental scale, but

not strong enough to give us pain. We have numberless gentle desires continually prompting us to common actions, yet too feeble to beget any offspring. When these prompt us, if the object can be readily come at, it is very well: if not, we give ourselves no further concern, nor think it worth any trouble to procure; we feel no want, no pain, nor disappointment, in the miss of it. Sometimes I walk to and fro in my garden in the country, intending only to ruminate on some trifle or other; perhaps I espy a peach that looks ripe and inviting, and I reach out my hand to pluck it. Should my gardener tell me, Sir, I thought to have reserved that for the company you expect to-morrow, or should any other little reason occur to stop me, I should forbear; but if nothing intervenes, I go on to complete my purpose. Now, when I reflect on the state of my mind on such occasions, and examine mine ideas with the closest application of the microscope, as well when I gratify my fancy as when I restrain it, I cannot discern the least pain, or want, or uneasiness imaginable: and therefore crave leave to conclude that something else, besides want and uneasiness, is capable of determining me to the use of my powers.

19. Whence then comes it that Mr. Locke and I entertain so different notions concerning desire? For we are both careful plodding folks; not used to do things hastily, but sifting our thoughts, and weighing our words before we deal them out. Is the difference owing to the microscopic make of mine eye, that sees minuter goods, smaller actions, slenderer desires, than other people? or is there some fallacy, some equivocation, some various use of language, that keeps us asunder? Perhaps what I take for desire, while successful in its career, he may call joy or hope, or by some other name. Perhaps all that we do in pursuit of the same object, though I should think it a series of distinct actions, and distinct volitions, he may consider as one action, and one determination of the Will, which, while retaining its full vigor, and the purpose not completed, we do not depart from to make a new determination until pressed by some urgent want or uneasiness. Thus if your hard student determines at breakfast to study so many hours, and then take an airing abroad, while he turns over his books, or when he throws them aside, here is no determination made of the Will, for that was done once for all in the morning; nor can you draw him from his plan before the determined time by any solicitations of pleasure; but should his head ache, or his stomach cry cupboard, the uneasiness of that might drive him into a new course of action different from that he had determined upon before. I wish somebody would help us to a clue to guide through this labyrinth, and bring us together again; for I am never

better satisfied with myself than when travelling in his company. In the mean while, though I reverence his authority beyond that of all others, whether ancient or modern, in matters relating to human nature, yet he will excuse me for adhering to my own judgment until it shall be altered by better information; for he, I am sure, would be the last man in the world to impose an authority upon anybody, or desire to draw followers by any other force than the conviction of their own judgment. Yet I still hope the difference is not a variance of sentiment, but of expression, or of the manner wherein we consider the same subject; and that we travel the same road, though by different branches. But as one cannot go on currently in any other way than that one is acquainted with, I shall continue to proceed in my own track, trusting that we shall quickly be found walking hand in hand again, and speaking almost the same language.

20. In the seventh place, let it be noted, that neither satisfaction nor uneasiness ever enter the mind without some other sensation or idea to introduce them. For as you cannot have the pleasure of sweetness without putting something sweet into your mouth, nor the delight of a prospect without having some delightful prospect to look upon, so neither can you procure satisfaction without seeing or hearing, or contemplating or reflecting, on something satisfactory. And that the satisfaction is something distinct from the concomitant ideas, appears manifest, because it may be separated from them: for the same object, presenting in the same shape and features, affects us variously, being sometimes alluring and at other times insipid. One may be extremely desirous of seeing a particular play, but being disappointed this week, may not care a farthing for it the next, according as one happens to be differently disposed: the play is the same, the actors the same, and the opportunities the same with those you wished for before, nor can you find any other difference than only the relish. This makes good what I observed before, that all motives are compound ideas, for though satisfaction be the only ingredient weighing in the scale, others are necessary to serve as a vehicle for conveying it to the mind.

21. The eighth particular relating to satisfaction follows naturally from the last: for if we cannot have satisfaction but by applying some vehicle to convey it, it behoves us to look out for the proper vehicles containing the desired ingredient within them. Nature makes up the mixtures herself, nor have we any hand in the composition: sugar has its sweetness, gall its bitterness, success its joy, and disappointment its vexation, by her provision: we can neither alter nor diminish the relish of things by our own

power. Sometimes she shifts her ingredients, taking out satisfaction and leaving the vehicle insipid, or substituting uneasiness in its room : but even these changes of taste are of her making, being effected by the variable nature of our palates disposed to different viands at different times, nor can we help ourselves to restore them at pleasure to their former state, but must take objects as we find them, according to the pressing disposition either of our body or mind. This nobody will deny, nor say that when salt has lost its savor we have wherewith to salt it ; or that we can always raise the same fondness we had for a particular diversion the other day, or make nothing of a fatigue we used to undergo with cheerfulness.

22. Thus far we go on currently, without opponent or contradiction ; but in this divided disputatious world one must not expect to travel any road long without a check. There are people, namely, your sticklers for indifferency of Will, who pretend that nature has left some of her vehicles empty, indifferent to receive either satisfaction or uneasiness as we please to sprinkle it upon them, or mingled up others so loosely that we can pick out the vivifying ingredient, and throw in its opposite, thus changing the quality of a motive, and rendering that satisfactory which was naturally distasteful. Not that they deny volition always follows the last act of the understanding ; but, say they, we have a certain degree of power to give colors to our ideas, and control the understanding, so as to make it pronounce sentence against the clearest decision of judgment, or strongest solicitation of passion.

Here I have the pleasure of returning into my old alliance again, and joining forces with Mr. Locke, whom I find as little inclined to this notion of indifferency as myself. Those he had to deal with, it seems, had delivered themselves so obscurely concerning this antecedent indifferency, as they called it, that he could not tell where they placed it : whether between the thought and judgment of the understanding, and the decree of the Will, where there appears no room for anything, or before the former, which is a state of darkness exhibiting no object whereon to exercise our power. But by a book not extant in his time, Dr. King upon the Origin of Evil, and his profound commentator, I can discern where they place this supposed indifferency, to wit, between the thought and judgment of the understanding ; that is, between the action being proposed, and the preference of that action, or its forbearance : and the matter according to their representation stands thus. The mind sits in judgment between several objects offered to her option ; arguments occur in favor of either, and unexceptionable evidences are produced ; she sees plainly which has the strongest

cause, yet gives judgment for the weakest, by virtue of her arbitrary power. Or some council makes a motion of course, which never used to be denied, and which there is no reason for denying; nevertheless she will reject it, merely because she will. So the province of indifference lies between the trial and the judgment, which the understanding pronounces by particular direction from the Will, annexing the idea of best to that which had it not before, and this the understanding having discerned, gives judgment accordingly: and that idea the Will annexes by her own sole authority, after full cognizance of the cause, without regard to the merits, and uninfluenced by any motive at all. But there is really no motive inducing the mind to annex this idea, if any such power she has; for acting upon our ideas is an act, as well as acting upon our limbs, and she does not use to enter upon action of any kind, unless for some end proposed, or to obtain some effect she conceives will prove satisfactory. Nor must we take understanding here in the vulgar sense for the judgment of reason, but for every discernment of the perceptive faculty, including the suggestions of fancy, and impulses of passion; which may start up unawares, and whisper the judge in the ear, just before giving sentence, although they had not spoken a word during the whole course of the trial.

Your abettors of indifference, being solemn folks, deal altogether in general terms and abstract reasonings: but to my thinking, the abstract is seen clearest in the concrete, for ideas fluctuate in our reflection, nor can we hold them long in the same state. If you would judge between two oranges you have seen a little while ago, which is the deeper colored, you will think sometimes the one, and sometimes the other: but set them close together and fix your eye upon them, this will keep your idea of both steady, so that you may quickly perceive which is the redder and which the paler. Therefore I wish they had given us instances of some particular actions, wherein they apprehended this privilege of indifference is exerted; but since they have thought it below their dignity, or unbecoming their gravity, I shall attempt to do it for them, and if I can hit upon proper samples to their mind, we shall not rest in speculation alone, but shall see by experience whether, in actions esteemed the most indifferent, there is not some motive actually prevailing upon us to perform them.

23. But I must observe by the way, that the trial above described, is a very complex action, consisting of many single acts, each of which must have its several volition and several end in view, following one another so close, that there is nowhere room for the power of indifference to interfere. But as the gentlemen

we have to deal with seem unprovided with a microscope, I shall not trouble them with minute objects nor such as cannot be discerned with the naked eye; and therefore shall present them with larger actions, suitable to their organs, and consider the whole compound as one body.

Since then, they place the merit of their behavior in the right use of this power of indifferency, one may expect to find the effects of it most apparent in the most arduous exercises of virtue. Suppose then a good man, solicited by temptations, attacked by threatenings, urged by tortures, to betray his country, yet he bravely resists all opposition: but has he not a thorough persuasion of the advantages of well doing? has he not a strong desire of fulfilling his duty, and a vehement abhorrence of treachery? These must move him to take up his resolution, and support him in going through with it: for another who had not such motives, or had them in a lower degree, would undoubtedly decline the task, or fail upon trial. If they should urge that all men have the like motives, would they but listen to them: those who allege this, must have a different idea of motives from that we have given before, and overlook the distinction between a motive and a good reason for doing a thing. For how reasonable soever it may be to act right, yet to him who does not discern the expedience, or can satisfy himself in the foregoing it, and feel no uneasiness in the want of it, it is no motive at all.

What will they say of the perfect wise man, would not he, if there were any such, adhere to the dictates of his judgment without deviating in a single instance? Yet he, I suppose, proceeds in all his measures upon the motive of their rectitude. So long as the matter remained doubtful, he would remain indifferent to either side, and would all that while suspend his action: but the moment expedience became manifest, his indifference would vanish, nor would he delay the determination of his Will. What will they say of those imperfect wise men we have upon earth? Have they not a quick sense of honor, and love of right conduct? And are they not therefore good and deserving because this motive influences the greatest part of their actions, and because they cannot behold villany and meanness with indifference? Do the judicious and the worthy less enjoy or less use this most noble privilege of human nature than the gay, the giddy, and the thoughtless, whose conduct is much more unaccountable, who frequently act upon no visible motive at all, or run counter to the weightiest?

Why do they ever exhort us to this or that kind of behavior, or to make a right use of our privilege? Does not this imply an opinion that they may prevail upon us thereby to give a right

turn to our indifference? Therefore indifference it seems may be operated upon by exhortation, and may as well be carried on by the same through the execution of its purpose. But what are exhortations besides the suggestion of motives to do a thing? which were needless if we might do the same without any motive at all; and useless if actions performed upon motives had no morality in them, nor any action were valuable unless for so much of it as proceeded from our power of indifference.

Most probably the notion of this power took rise from an inaccuracy of thought occasioned by an inaccuracy of language. Desire, says Mr. Locke, so constantly accompanies our actions that it is frequently taken for Will, and confounded with it in our discourses. I have observed in a former place, that Will and pleasure are reputed synonymous terms, nor would it be thought a different question should one ask, Will you have such a thing? or Do you desire or please to have it? The preference of one thing above another, either in our judgment or inclination, is often styled the choice of our Will: and when some authority or obligation compels us to do the thing we dislike, we call it acting unwillingly, or against our Will. It would be hard to produce an instance of any man going through with an arduous undertaking, without having it strongly at heart, without a desire of the work to be completed thereby, or without feeling a want of it, upon being obstructed in his progress. I would ask the champions for indifference, whether, when they have made a wrong use of their power, (for possibly they may trip once in a while,) they do not feel a shame, a vexation, a disappointment, in reflecting thereupon; which could not well happen, if they had no desire of improving their opportunities. But this desire, which often has an efficacy to overpower the strongest motives, they confound with the Will, and finding nothing previous in the thought that should give birth to it, they suppose it self-begotten, and thence wisely conclude the Will has a power of determining itself, and of infusing satisfaction into that, which nature had mingled up with uneasiness. There is a desire, having no other object than the restraint of desire: for men virtuously inclined find their passions and appetites perpetually drawing them aside out of their road: this gives them a jealousy of such intruders, and when desires solicit strongly, although not urging to anything mischievous or improper, yet they will not comply merely because they will not let their passions get the mastery over them, nor acquire a strength too great to be resisted at other times. Now this desire of restraining desire, our profound speculatists mistake again for the Will, to which, therefore they attribute a power of controlling desire, with-

out aid of any counter-weight whatsoever, and of making an election, like the King by a *congé d'elire*, in virtue of its royal prerogative.

24. Let us next turn to the abusers of their privilege. A man is urged to some useful attainment : you make him sensible, of the good fruits dependant upon it, so as to raise in him some desire of gathering them : you convince him there is nothing difficult in the pursuit, nothing irksome, nothing thwarting his other inclinations, yet you cannot get him to stir. But is there not some secret passion, some habit, some humor, some averseness to trouble, that lies in the way ? If you cannot presently discover the rub, it does not follow there is none ; for the heart of man is deceitful above all things, containing many springs unknown, even to the owner. But if you have any knowledge of human nature and intimacy with the person, it is ten to one but you may discern the obstacle, which you find to be something that acts as a powerful motive upon him, though it might weigh nothing with yourself. Since then, upon closer examination, you can generally distinguish a motive where there appeared none before, it may be presumed there is one when it escapes your search : therefore those instances of wrong management are too uncertain a foundation to build the doctrine of indifference upon.

But now and then you shall meet with persons, who being recommended to do something advantageous to themselves, which they would have liked well enough, and been fond of, had it first occurred to their own thoughts, yet reject it out of mere crossness : the more you urge them with motives, the stronger they set themselves against it. But consider whether the bare having of their Will is not an engaging motive with most men. Liberty of itself is sweet, and to have the command of our motions without control, what we all in some measure desire. This desire, when excessive, is thought owing to a perverseness of Will, which can run contrary to all motives, either of expedience or inclination ; but it may generally be traced to another source : for obstinate people are either such as have been constantly humored by those about them, or else persons of shallow understanding. Fools are credulous at first, till having been frequently deceived, they contract a jealousy of all mankind, and see no chance of obtaining anything they like, unless by rejecting whatever shall be proposed by another. Besides, there is a kind of honor in doing as we will : and honor operates as a mighty incentive to action. But you will ask, do I conceive there is any honor in persisting obstinately to do just as we will, without regard to motives dissuading us from it ? Truly I cannot answer the question so general-

ly proposed, but must give my opinion disjunctively. When done in opposition to passion, danger, fatigue, or pain, which we will not suffer to drive us from anything we have a mind to, I applaud it highly : when in contradiction to good advice or the suggestions of reason, I censure it as highly. For tenaciousness, even of a resolution taken for opposition sake, serves either to good or bad purposes : when to the former, it is called steadiness and bravery ; when to the latter, perverseness and obstinacy. But whether you, or I, or the world, allow it to be honor, or no, there are those who certainly esteem it such ; like the miser in Horace, who, being hissed by the populace, applauded himself at home in counting over his bags ; as appears manifestly by the shame and vexation they feel upon failing of their Will, and the triumph and exultation they express upon prevailing.

Were the Will indifferent to all motives, and could give itself the turn without any previous cause influencing it thereto, all our actions, those of them at least that are moral, must remain absolutely contingent. How then can we depend upon any man that he will keep this or that tenor of conduct ? Yet we daily repose a full confidence in one man, because we know he will deal honestly by us, and refuse it to another who we know would betray us. Oh ! say they, the one has acquired a rectitude, and the other a perverseness of Will. What do they mean by this rectitude and perverseness of Will ? A perverseness of mind I can understand, when satisfaction or desire fixes upon pernicious or deceitful views, and continually moves the Will to pursue them. If they will allow this to be a perverseness of will, I have no objection : but then this depends upon a quality in the Will to follow desire starting up perpetually to the thought, and he who has this desire stronger than any other, cannot remain indifferent whether he shall gratify it, or no. Other perverseness, I know none, but were there any other it must equally destroy indifference, for we see this perverseness once contracted determines the Will afterwards to act perversely as often as opportunity shall offer : so the Will remains no longer at liberty to follow or reject the instigations of perverseness, nor is it the less bound for having brought the thralldom upon itself ; as a man who sells himself to the plantations is no less a servant, than the felon transported thither by judgment of law.

25. Thus the doctrine of indifference, canvassed narrowly, contradicts and overthrows itself : for if indifference be a privilege inherent in human nature, it can never depart from us, for we cannot lose our nature while we continue to be men. Then, although the Will should have given itself a perverseness, it might

as well give itself a rectitude again, and vice versa, as often as it pleased without any previous cause or motive : and the behaviour of men would be totally uncertain and unsteady, for we should act right or wrong, prudently or foolishly, just as indifference happened to take the turn. But if indifference, by I know not what magic, can control itself and persevere in the turn it has once taken, then we have our independency on prior causes only upon some few occasions, that is, when we are to enter upon a new course of action, which having once determined, we proceed therein mechanically, like a ball put in motion, by virtue of the impulse first imparted. If this be the case, and merit or demerit extend no further than while the Will can act independently, why do your indifferencists ever punish for acts done in consequence of a perverseness already contracted? As soon as the perverseness appears, they ought to examine the degree of it, and appoint a punishment adequate thereto, which the party having suffered, has paid his penalty, and remains no longer obnoxious to the law : his independency is now gone, and nothing happening during its absence, can upon their principles be imputed to his account. Nevertheless, we find them forward enough to punish again for subsequent offences, proceeding from a perverse turn of Will, visible many years before. Will they plead that the power of indifference is a limited power, and that the Will may give itself so strong a determination, as it cannot afterwards resist by its own strength, therefore they throw in the terrors of punishment in counterbalance, to bring the weights so nearly equal, that the power of indifference may suffice to turn the scale? Let them have a care how they allege this, because it will tear up the main foundation whereon they build their doctrine of indifference, namely, that without it there could be no demerit, and consequently no room for punishment : for here we see there is room for punishment, which may be lawfully inflicted, not solely with reference to past offences, but also as a necessary remedy to prevent the commission of them for the future. If they give us this inch, perhaps we may take an ell, and show by parity of reason, that the justice of rewards and punishments may remain in full extent, although there should be no such power as that of indifference.

What do they mean by a determination of the Will carrying us through a long course of behaviour? Do they conceive volition a permanent act, extending to a long series of performances? Surely they never reflected with themselves upon the operation of their own Wills, nor the manner of their own motions. We have it upon Mr. Locke's authority that the mind is capable of

but one determination to one action at once : and his judgment stands confirmed by daily experience. Successive volitions keep us incessantly in play ; each performs its several act, and has the sole direction of our powers for the present moment, both themselves and their effects being instantaneous and transitory, nor does one operate by any force received from a former. Whatever we may will to-day to do to-morrow, we shall perform or omit, according as we shall then be in the mind : for the actions of to-morrow depend upon the morrow's volitions, which are determined either by some motive occurring at the time, or else by the power of indifferency then exerted. Therefore, to talk of the Will by a single act giving birth to many successive motions, and casting a perverseness upon itself that shall continue for days, months, and years, is talking unintelligibly : the continuance of a thing in its own nature momentary, being a contradiction in terms.

Were indifferency a privilege appendant to human nature, one would think all men should possess it in equal degree : but we see the same temptations overcome some men which others can resist, although both strive equally against them. Must we not then ascribe their different success either to the variety of colors wherein the same objects appear to different minds, or to the various strength of other motives they have to oppose against them ? I knew an old gentleman, who, being pressed by his physicians to go out in his chariot every day, as the only thing capable of relieving him in his infirmities, acknowledged the expedience of their advice, and wished to follow it, yet could never muster up resolution enough to do as he desired. What now was become of his power of indifferency, which was supposed able to control any motives, but could not here act in concurrence with the weightiest ? Yet he could choose for himself upon other occasions, and act rightly when tempted to the contrary : and could even go out when he fancied something of moment called him. May we not then look out for some secret motive to account for this difference of behavior ? He had been a man of business, unused to stir, unless upon some affair of importance, and had contracted an aversion to your idle jaunts, taken for amusement only, as fit for none but women and triflers ; therefore could not brook his mind to descend to them, although they were become matters of moment, by being necessary to his health.

26. Hitherto we have considered important actions, such as are undertaken with deliberation and design, or upon some distant purpose in prospect. We will now take a view of sudden and trifling motions, which scarce seem to have any motive in-

ducing us to them, and therefore may be thought to proceed from the sole power of the Will. But there needs no great sagacity to observe, that, the very want of employment creates an uneasiness, and almost every exertion of our activity affords a small degree of satisfaction, which, whatever first starts up to the fancy, prompts us to pursue. Whoever will take the trouble to watch men in their idle hours, will find a certain regularity in things done without regard to any rule: some habit acting uniformly sets them for the most part at work. For though different persons amuse themselves differently in an infinite variety of ways, each adheres steadily to his own kind of amusement, and acts most in character when he thinks of it least. Therefore, one man whistles, another sings, another dances, another plays with his fingers, when he has nothing else to do. Which shows that the Will has not an indifference, even with regard to trifles, but catches, from time to time, at such little motives as custom has taught to rise most readily in the imagination. One may discern the like causes in those bye motions which fill up the vacant spaces of time during our engagement in some earnest pursuit; when we set ourselves to think intently, few of us leave our limbs entirely at rest, but give them various employment for every little interval while thought stops, and until it can find an issue; some play with their buttons, some twist their knee strings, or rub the table, or kick their leg to and fro, or practise some innocent trick they have fallen into by accident, or caught by imitation from somebody else. Now in times of study or business, the determination of the Will tends solely towards the principal end we labor to attain; the power of indifference is all exerted that way: yet we see any idle habit can give a motion of its own to the Will, which, like a cord drawn to the stretch by a mighty force, may notwithstanding be bent to this side, or that, by the slightest lateral pressure.

Even in cases where the objects proposed to our option appear indifferent, as well to judgment as inclination, and the Will seems to determine by arbitrary power, because there is nothing else to give the preference; yet a prying eye may discover some latent motive that escaped the general notice. Suppose you call upon a friend just after dinner, before the bottles and glasses are removed. He asks, Will you take a glass of wine with us? Thank you, Sir, I do not care if I do. Shall I help you to red or white? Any that you have upon the table. Here are both. That that stands next your hand. See both bottles stand equally near. Why, then, white if you please. This little dialogue, happening frequently between friends, exhibits as much indifference as the mind of man can well be in: for we suppose neither wine disagreeing

with your stomach, or displeasing to your palate, you had drank as much as you cared for before you came out, but a glass extraordinary will do you no harm, yet you are willing to be sociable, and therefore accept his offer; but civility makes you refer the choice of your wine to him, and the same civility prompts you afterwards to choose that which will give him the least trouble: but finding this will not do, and perceiving that further compliments would be troublesome, you take the first that occurs; for you cannot pronounce the words White and Red together, and as you want to end the dispute, whichever comes quickest to the tongue's end, is therefore fittest to relieve you from this want.

Why should choice be deemed an act of the Will, when the understanding many times presents a choice ready made, without staying for the Will to assist in the production? An ambassador, making his public entry, throws out money among the populace: a porter, scrambling among the crowd, spies a half-crown and a sixpence lying upon the ground: he can get either, but has not time for both, so he takes up the half-crown, not for any preference thrown upon it by his Will, but from his knowledge that this piece will go five times as far at market as the other. Many times the Will acts without any choice at all: a man hears a sudden cry of fire; he starts up instantly from his seat, and runs to see what is the matter. The alarm banishes all other ideas; he has not a thought of anything else he would not choose to do, nor even of forbearance from all kind of action. The wanton sallies of fancy proceed more from thoughtlessness than wrong election: ideas come in one by one without a competitor, and the mind follows the present whimsey, for want of seeing the inexpediency or impropriety attending it. Can this be called a choice? which in the very nature of it implies a judgment between several things, and a preference of one above another: but when one object only lies in view, there can be no preference, nor can one choose, but take that which alone is presented.

27. But I find there are persons of all characters in the interests of indifference. Those of a humorous turn, not being good at argument, endeavor to ridicule our doctrine of motives, by putting the case of an ass placed between two bundles of excellent hay, both equally alluring to his sense, who, they say, must starve in the midst of plenty, for want of being able to prefer either. It is no uncommon thing for wit to outrun discretion; therefore I would caution these jokers to beware how they anger their solemn friends of their own persuasion. For if the beasts cannot live without a power of indifferency, what becomes of the noble privilege peculiar to human nature? It is rather a bene-

fit we share in common with our brother asses, who, by the right use of it, may merit as glorious rewards as ourselves. But we contemplative folks are not to be jested out of our notions; nor shall I scruple to own that their supposition is true in theory: and so it would have been, had they put the case of a sharpened pole, ten feet long, set upright upon a marble pavement, with the centre of gravity directly over the point, which would remain forever in that posture, if nothing meddled with it. But I question whether such experiments be practicable: let them try, if they can, to place the ass, the pole, or their own mind, in such a situation. Should the beast shake his head ever so little, this may bring it nearer to one bundle, which will make the scent of that become the stronger: the least breath of air, or brush of a fly's wing is enough to throw down the pole: and imagination continually supplies us with motives, either great or small, either of judgment or fancy, sufficient to put the mental balance in motion.

Of the two, I believe instances of such an inability to act for want of motives, more likely to be met with in men than asses: I myself have met with them in my time. I remember once calling upon a friend in the Temple, to take a walk: we came down stairs presently, and then began to talk of the course we should steer. I found him irresolute, but would not interpose, having a curiosity to see the event: the business was whether we should go to the Park, or to Islington: we had no particular call to either, and both appeared equally agreeable. I believe we stood a full quarter of an hour in the court, before he could determine; for he was a man of gravity, used to weigh his motives carefully, and had rejected the impulses of fancy, until they had entirely lost their force: so he had nothing to sway with him, for you may suppose there could be no weighty reasons for preferring one tour before the other. Where now was his power of indifferency, which had he possessed in the lowest degree, might have helped him out at this dead lift?

Such hesitations as these are weeds of the richest soils, being most frequently found in serious, considerate, and industrious tempers: but they will grow in more barren grounds. I have been pestered with them upon my own estate in former days, till I found out the secret of nourishing a crop of fancies, in those spots which judgment would not cover. I endeavor first to take direction from my reason; but if that has no commands, I give up the reins to fancy; if fancy presents me with double objects, I toss up, cross, or pile, rather than lose time in hesitating: for employment upon any motive, the best to be had, is better than no employment at all. I never could reap any service in those cases

from indifference, for, so long as that lasts, I can do nothing at all: nor could I ever remove it unless by suggesting something expedient, or amusing to my imagination, which might urge me to bestir myself.

28. Thus have we examined every species of action, trifling and momentous, sudden and deliberate, fantastic and judicious, in search of an indifference to the preponderancy of motives, but in vain: nor is indifference anywhere to be found, unless in a suspension of action, while the motives hang doubtful, and the mind waits until some of them shall preponderate. I think now we may fairly conclude the mind enjoys no such privilege as this boasted power of indifference. Nor would it be a valuable privilege if we had it: for as the turns it takes must be absolutely contingent, depending upon no prior cause, there is an even chance it might turn as well to our detriment as our advantage: nor could we ever pursue a plan, or lay our measures surely, or complete any long work, for want of a sufficient dependence upon our own behavior, or that of other persons; for the hazard of wrong elections disconcerting our schemes, would discourage us from attempting anything. Should you send for a surgeon to bleed you to-morrow, you could never depend upon his attendance; profit, credit, duty, his adherence to his profession, may urge him to come, but these operate only as motives, and neither you nor he can tell but his Will to-morrow, by virtue of its arbitrary power, may annex the idea of Best to the refusal of his assistance. Nobody can pretend here that the motives are so strong as to exceed the power of his Will to control them: for certainly he may stay at home if he will, nor will his legs or his chariot bring him without some act of his Will to order their motion.

29. But is it never in a man's power to change the pleasantness or unpleasantness, that is, the satisfaction or uneasiness accompanying any sort of action? Yes, says Mr. Locke, it is plain in many cases he can. One may change the displeasingness or indifference in actions into pleasure and desire, by doing what lies in one's power towards effecting it. A due consideration will do it in some cases, and practice, application, and custom in most.— But he nowhere says it may be done by mere dint of volition, or otherwise than by the use of proper means, which means must lie within our reach, or we cannot procure the change. Is your tea bitter? You may sweeten it by putting in a knob of sugar: but not if there be no sugar in the dish. Does your meat taste insipid? You may give it a relish by sprinkling a little salt: but not if the salt have lost its savor. So, should you feel an averseness to labor, you may conquer it by contemplating the credit of

industry, or, shame of idleness; or the good fruits expected from your labors: but not if you have no value for reputation, nor desire of any particular benefit, attainable by diligence greater than your love of indolence. For I look upon it as an invariable rule, that you can never bring a man into the liking of anything disagreeable, unless by means of something he already likes appearing connected therewith, or attainable solely thereby. Bread or tobacco, says Mr. Locke, may be neglected, when shown useful to health, because of an indifference or disrelish to them: reason and consideration at first recommends and begins their trial, and use finds, or custom makes them pleasant. That this is so in virtue too, is very certain. Thus in his opinion, our very virtues derive from other sources than the power of indifference. But if bread appears insipid, tobacco nauseous, or virtue disagreeable to the present taste, no man can render them otherwise or suddenly alter his palate, solely by willing it.

With respect to ourselves, indeed, we have another expedient for changing the state of our motives, by that command we have in some measure over our organs both of sensation and reflection. For as we can turn our eyes upon any object of the scene before us, and shut them against the light, or wink when it strikes too strongly upon them; so we can close the organs of reflection, bringing particular ideas to our notice, and thereby throw the course of thought into another channel: or, where we cannot entirely dam up the passage, we may sometimes obstruct it, thereby reducing the current to a smaller stream. This way we can, and very frequently do, alter the color of our motives, by throwing a stronger attention upon them, or by removing, or obscuring their competitors. But when we take the latter method, it is no impeachment of the efficacy of motives that they do not strike when you shut your eyes upon them, or discern them faintly; nor mark of absolute power in the Will that it is forced to thrust out of sight, a motive which it could not resist: and when the former, it is the reflection, not the Will, that adds color to the motive. For, as when you put sugar into your mouth, it is the sugar, not yourself, that affects your palate with sweetness, notwithstanding you put it in yourself: so when you throw a strong attention upon some particular idea, it is the state of your organs, not your Will, that heightens its colors, although you put them into that state by an act of your Will. Certain it is, we do sometimes pluck up a resolution to surmount a pain, a labor, a danger, without suggesting fresh reasons to encourage us; and this I take to be done by some such method as that above spoken of; for earnest, eager resolution is a kind of temporary passion, brought

upon us by our own procurement, and it is well known we may work ourselves up by degrees into almost any passion, by dwelling upon ideas, fomenting it without admission of others. Upon these occasions, I conceive the mind raises an extraordinary motion in some parts of the animal circulation, which then runs more rapidly than while under command in the service of our ordinary purposes. For it seems apparent from the quick violent starts of motion, the ferment of spirits, the solicitous turn of countenance, usual in times of vigorous resolution, that the body bears no inconsiderable share in the business.

30. This power over the organs I take to be indeed the grand privilege of human nature, for I can discern nothing of it in the brute creation. It is true our notions concerning them amount at most only to conjecture, for we know not certainly what passes within them, nor in what manner they proceed to action. Remembrance, fancy, and some degree of knowledge, cannot well be denied them; unless you suppose them mere machines, which, though perhaps it cannot be demonstratively disproved, there is not the least shadow of positive evidence to prove that they are: but their ideas come up uncalled, being occasioned, for the most part, either by sensible objects, or the motions of their animal juices, or particular state of their bodies: nor can I discern any such thing as voluntary reflection, or any control of fancy belonging to them; which therefore remains the peculiar property of man. From hence spring all our virtues, all our rules of prudence, all our measures of conduct; and upon this principally, though not entirely, stands the justice of reward and punishment; for we reward and punish the beasts, to bring them thereby to do something we like, or deter them from something we dislike. If our opponents will accept of this power in lieu of their indifferency, as equally serviceable to all useful purposes, they are heartily welcome, but I cannot allow them that both are the same thing. For indifferency implies a power in the will, or furnishing the idea of Best out of its own store and by its own sole authority, without recourse to any contrivance or artifice to obtain it. And because a man may give the preference between two objects proposed to his option, either by suggesting considerations, recommending the one and dissuading the other, or by throwing a stronger attention upon one and withholding it from the other, it no more shows an indifferency of the Will, or a power of annexing Best to what appears Worst in the judgment, than because one may make a pebble outshine a diamond, either by covering them with different kinds of paint; or, by diminishing the light falling upon the latter, and increasing that upon the former, it

shows an indifferency in the eye, or a power of annexing lustre to objects naturally obscure.

31. Besides, whoever will diligently examine the state of his mind, when he gives this supposed arbitrary preference, will always find opposite desires accosting him at those times, to one of which he harbors a secret prepossession or favor; therefore practises every art to make that prevail in his imagination: and this alike in the right or the wrong exercises of his power. If pleasure, profit, or resentment, solicit to act, and the still voice of conscience whispers to forbear: one man has a love of virtue which he cannot easily forego, therefore he suppresses all instigations of passion that might draw him aside, for he will not suffer his beloved and valued object to be wrested from him; or fortifies himself in his desire, by considerations proper for that purpose, or the earnest contemplation of what he used always to behold with delight; another man has a favorite inclination which he longs to gratify, but reason puts in her negative: therefore he stifles the cries of reason, or turns a deaf ear against them, lest they should importune him too much; or hunts for any excuses or palliations he can muster up; or casts a wistful look upon his darling, whom he is unwilling to leave, and contemplates so long until all other ideas are banished out of his thought. Thus, in reality, the preference is already given, before we enter upon the act, whereby we fancy ourselves conferring it; nor was the mind indifferent whether such act should be performed or no: and the subsequent determination or idea of Best thrown into the doubtful scale, comes from the means used to effect it, not from the Will. But if you ascribe it to the Will because that applies the means, you might with better reason ascribe it to the predominant inclination, because that puts the Will upon making such application. For whatever the Will does towards annexing the idea of Best, even supposing it to do the business without employing any other means than its own inherent power; nevertheless, it acts herein ministerially, not authoritatively, but in service of the favorite desire, to which therefore the credit and merit of the performance belongs.

32. What has been said concerning the methods and organs employed in bringing about a determination of the mind, accounts for the limitation of that power, and the difficulty attending the exercise of it: for our organs can perform their office for a certain time, but no longer. A man may walk a mile with pleasure, but when he has walked five, he may find it fatiguing; nor perhaps can he walk twenty at all, because his legs tire long before. So he may hold up a weight at arm's length for some time; but

cannot keep in that posture forever, for the muscles of his arm will grow weary. The same may be said of satiety, which proceeds from an alteration in our organs, as weariness does from an alteration in the state of our muscles. We may like venison prodigiously for a day or two, but should be terribly cloyed had we nothing else to feed upon during the whole season : for the palate being over-clogged, no longer receives the flavor in the same manner as before. This of course limits our power to that proportion of labor the instruments we have to serve us are capable of bearing, and confines our activity to that compass of time whereto the relish of things may extend. But I know of no labor, no difficulty, no satiety, in pure acts of the mind : we are never tired of commanding so long as our limbs and organs are not tired of executing : we will from morning to night without intermission, and without trouble ; and though our employments often fatigue and nauseate, let but some new desire give play to a quite different set of organs, and the mind runs after it with as much freshness and eagerness as if it had never done anything. Upon coming home quite wearied down with a long journey, a man may give orders for his conveniences and refreshments to be brought him, perhaps with more ease and relish than he had in first mounting his horse. After a long morning spent in hard study, we could easily find volition enough to continue the work, but that our head aches, our spirits fail, and nature can no longer bear the fatigue : wherefore labor of mind is as often called labor of brain, and more truly belongs to the latter than the former. Even at night, when all kind of action becomes irksome, it is not the Will but the eye that draws straws, for the mind does not desire to sleep so long as the body can hold awake. What then should limit our power with respect to anything we can do by barely willing it? Why do we ever strive to exert such power and fail in the attempt? or why do we succeed at one time and fail at another? A man may as easily will to walk a hundred miles as one, or to lift up the house as to take up his slipper, if he can believe himself able ; every one sees why he cannot do either, namely, from the deficiency of his strength : but what the Will has once performed, it then had strength to perform ; what then is become of this strength, that it cannot perform the same again? Does the Will grow feeble and vigorous by turns, like the muscles, upon labor or rest? If we assign for cause, that the Will used some medium before which now is wanting, the difference may be accounted for much better than by any variation of strength in the Will itself.

History informs us that Mutius Scævola held his hand in the

fire till it was burnt to the bone ; therefore burning was susceptible of the idea of Best : why then could not you and I pluck up the like resolution ? But perhaps we can annex the idea to some objects he could not. One man can restrain his appetite of meats and drinks, but cannot refuse the offers of ambition : another can reject all temptations of unlawful gain, but cannot resist the impulses of anger. Is there then a strong and a weak side in the Will ? or are the Wills of men cast in different moulds ? One may readily conceive how the various degrees of resolution may arise from the strength of spirits, texture of brain, habit, education, or turn of imagination, but from the constitution or mould of the Will it seems inexplicable. When we take up a strong resolution, we find pains and difficulty in keeping it, and often faint in the midway after having made a very good beginning. A pain or trouble that a man has borne patiently for a while, shall sometimes fairly overcome him without growing stronger, merely by tiring him out. This, not to repeat what I have said before of the effects visible upon the body, shows that there are organs or nerves employed upon those occasions which require labor to keep them upon the stretch, and can serve us no longer than to a certain period, but may acquire strength, like our limbs, by constant use and practice.

33. After all, the very expression of a power belonging to the Will, when used in philosophical discourses, will not bear a strict examination. Will, in the vulgar sense, stands for a pressing inclination, or strong conviction of judgment, to which we may properly enough ascribe the power of making labor pleasant and difficulties easy. But if we go into the land of abstraction and study the language current there, what must we understand by Will but the turn of the mind's activity ? The mind has power to move our limbs and organs of reflection, but none of them will move by the bare possession of this power unless it be directed some particular way, and this direction we call our Will : therefore our actions all depend upon the Will : such as our volitions are, such will they be. So the wind has power to drive the clouds or ships along, but there being such a force in winds avails nothing unless it be turned to some particular point of the compass : therefore the courses of the vessel depend upon the turn of the wind, for it cannot get into port while the wind sets a contrary way. Now to talk of a power of the turn of the power of the wind would be accounted mere jargon : and how much better is it to contend for a power of the turn of the power of the mind ? Yet have we been talking and arguing all along in that style, nor could do otherwise : for one must speak like other folks, if one would

speak to be understood, and this may plead our excuse. For custom has a despotic authority in matters of language, so far as to render even nonsense and absurdity reputable by turning them into propriety of speech.

34. Is there then no liberty at all in human action? no freedom of Will? Are we under a constant necessity, and our motions all brought upon us by the cogency of causes, without our intervention or power to control? By no means: neither Mr. Locke nor I ever dreamt of such a notion. As for necessity, I cannot be suspected of inclining to that, since the little conference I had with doctor Hartley upon the road. For freedom of action, Mr. Locke strongly asserts it; but we both apprehend it to consist in our being so circumstanced as that action will follow or not upon our willing to do it or forbear: nor will our present opposers I believe controvert this point with us. When upon using our endeavors towards something lying within the compass of our natural powers, some obstacle would prevent their taking effect, then is our liberty gone: when no such hindrance intervenes but that we shall effect our purpose, or not, according as we try for it or forbear, then are we free; and never the less so for being influenced thereto by consideration of judgment or instigation of fancy. He that relieves a family in distress gives his money freely, although he does it upon motives of charity or compassion or particular kindness, and would have kept his money in his pocket had he not had those or any other inducements whatever to part with it. He that goes to stir his fire is not at liberty while anybody holds back his hand, but the moment they let him alone, his liberty returns, and he acts freely, though he falls a poking for the sake of warming himself: and even though he should resolve to bear the cold in his toes till he can bear it no longer, still when he puts forth his hand to relieve himself it, is his own free act, for the poker would not have stirred of itself had not he meddled with it, neither would the muscles of his arm have operated to extend it without some act of the mind to begin their motion.

35. As to freedom of Will, how much soever Mr. Locke may seem to reject it in words, where he declares liberty as little applicable to Will as swiftness to sleep or squareness to virtue, yet I do not apprehend him denying it in substance, nor that he would count me heterodox for holding what I take to be generally understood by freewill. For I conceive the exercise of this to be only a particular species of action performed in raising up ideas or fixing them in the mind, which shall determine us to such volitions as we want. And this we may and do practise every day of our lives: we determine upon things beforehand and execute

them punctually, we form resolutions for difficult undertakings, we collect reasons to support us in them, we fortify ourselves with motives, we inculcate them deep in our imagination, and afterwards find they produce the effect we expected. Thus we have a power over our future volitions, and in respect of that power, are capable either of liberty or restraint. For if any obligation or compulsion prevents us from exerting this power, or any prevailing dread or inclination obstructs so that it cannot take effect, though we still remain at liberty to act, we are not at liberty to will as we desire: if no such obstruction or hindrance lies in the way, we are perfectly free both to will and to do. And after the determination made, our liberty still remains to change it by the like methods whereby we established it at first, though we shall never employ them unless we happen to view the matter in a different light from that we saw it in before. Nor is liberty the less for our being prompted to use it this way or that by reasons or motives inducing us thereto. But here we must distinguish between want of liberty and want of power: for our title to freedom accruing to us only in respect of our power, we can be capable either of liberty or restraint no further than our power extends. He that goes to push down a stone wall, fails in his attempt through a defect of strength, not of liberty, provided you do not restrain him from thrusting and shoving against it as long as he pleases. So we may attempt in vain to overcome the terror of any great pain or danger, without an impeachment of our free will. None of us but may, if he will, thrust his hand into burning coals like Scevola, for the hand will undoubtedly obey the orders of the mind, should she so direct; but we cannot bring our mind to such a pitch of resolution, because we have not command enough over our imagination, nor motives in store sufficient to overbalance the smart of the fire. Yet nothing hinders us from trying, therefore we are at liberty to exert such power over our Will as we have; and if any strong desire incite us, we shall employ our organs of imagination however inadequate to the task, so long as we can retain any hope of prevailing, there being no encouragement to try where we are sure to fail of success. For there is a manifest difference between the two cases; where some secret reluctance prevents us from using our best endeavors to bring the mind into a right temper, and where we set about it heartily, and in good earnest, but want strength to compass our design.

Therefore I am not for expunging the term freewill out of our vocabulary, nor against exhorting men to raise their Wills to a proper pitch, when some laborious enterprise is to be gone upon.

But there is no occasion to trouble them with niceties concerning their manner of going to work, for though they have not the power of indifferency to determine their Will without the use of means, yet if you can once stir up in them an unreserved desire of exerting themselves, they will hit upon the proper means, without knowing what they be: just as we move our limbs by touching the nerve leading to each particular muscle, without knowing what nerves we have, or where they lie. The common notions of liberty serve well enough for the common uses of life; and were it possible totally to eradicate them, there must ensue a total stagnation of business and cessation of all activity whatever: for nobody would stir a finger, or resolve upon any future measures of conduct, if he conceived himself not at liberty either to act or will otherwise than necessity should urge him. They may contain some inconsistencies which men of plain sense do not see, and so never perplex themselves therewith, nor yet suffer any inconveniences from this their want of discernment. The young lady spoken of some time ago, who staid away from the ball because her aunt disapproved of it, could say she had a good Will to go, and forbore much against her Will, yet declare in the next breath that she might have gone if she would, but chose to stay at home, because she would not disoblige the old gentlewoman. She saw no contradiction in these expressions, nevertheless appears to have been a sensible girl by this instance of self-denial, and I doubt not had discretion enough to gratify her inclinations, or restrain them, whenever either were most proper: and this perhaps without having ever heard of the terms Velleity and Volition; nor had anybody done her a kindness that had taught her them, for she could not have conducted herself better, had she known them ever so well.

36. But when we would penetrate into the depths of philosophy, we cannot proceed to any good purpose, without a philosophical microscope: therefore before we begin the attempt, we ought to examine whether nature has furnished us with a good one, and whether we have brought it into due order by care and application. How much soever people may make themselves merry with me for talking of my microscope, I shall not be laughed out of it while I find it so necessary for discovering the secrets of human nature. And I can comfort myself the easier, because I observe our reprovers themselves very fond of using something like it: but they have only a common magnifying glass, such as we give children to play with, which just enables them to discern objects not obvious to the naked eye, but does not exhibit a perfect view of their shape and color; therefore they see distinctions

without a difference, and perplex instead of instructing mankind. But the possessors of a good microscope see the difference too, which they either find immaterial or turn to some useful service : it is observable they never unsettle the minds of men, nor combat with received opinions, and though they may seem to oppose them for a while, it is only in order to establish them upon a more solid foundation, to render them more clearly intelligible, or purify them from error and extravagance. They have many things to discourse of, not cognizable by the vulgar, for which they must find names and phrases not current in ordinary traffic : hence it comes that philosophy has a language peculiar to herself, a little different from that of common conversation, from which nevertheless it ought to vary as little as possible. But your half-reasoners, getting a smattering of the language, without a thorough knowledge, lose their mother tongue, and acquire no other in lieu, so they are fit to converse neither with the vulgar nor the learned : for they puzzle the former with their shrewd observations, and stand in the way of the latter with their cavils and blunders. They add nothing to the public stock of knowledge, but deal altogether in objections, without knowing how to solve them, or being able to understand a solution when given : and if they take up an opinion at hap-hazard, they fortify themselves in it by throwing a cloud of dust over whatever shall be offered to undeceive them, and thus if they can escape conviction by confounding themselves, they look upon it as a complete victory.

Enough has been said, and perhaps more than enough, upon indifference ; but I have still a long chapter in reserve for human liberty, together with those three concomitants which never fail to enter the thoughts when contemplating freedom of Will, Necessity, Certainty, and Fatality. But this I must postpone until I have gathered sufficient materials, which I hope to pick up here and there in the progress of my search : and when I have gotten matters together preparatory for the task, I have such confidence in the microscope, having already found it serviceable upon many occasions, that I doubt not to follow, without losing or breaking the threads, all the twistings and crossings, and entanglements in those intricate subjects that have hitherto perplexed the learned world ; for men of plain understandings would never trouble their heads about them were they let alone by the others. All my concern is where to get a good pencil to delineate exactly what I see, so as to make it apparent to another. I wish it were invariably true what I find laid done by many, That clear conception produces clear expression ; but I have often experienced the contrary myself, and Tully, that great master of language, main-

tains there is a particular art of conveying one's thoughts without dropping by the way anything of that precision and color belonging to them in our own minds. When the time comes, I shall try to do my best, than which nobody can desire more; and in the mean while shall return back to the course wherein I was proceeding.

37. The ninth and last remark I have to make upon satisfaction and uneasiness is this, That they are perceptions of a kind peculiar to themselves, analogous to none others we have, yet capable of joining company with any others. We neither hear, nor see, nor taste, nor imagine them, yet find some degree or other of them in almost everything we hear, or see, or taste, or reflect upon. But though they often change their companions, they never change their nature: the same thing may become uneasy that before was satisfactory, but satisfaction never cloy, and uneasiness never loses its sting. Sometimes nature assigns them their places on her original constitution of the subjects, and sometimes custom, practice or accident introduce them. To some sensations and reflections they adhere strongly, not to be removed at all or not without much labor, time, and difficulty; and upon others they sit so lightly that the least breath of air can blow them away. They have their seasons of absence and residence, lasting longer or shorter as it happens, and often trip nimbly from object to object without tarrying a moment upon any: and when separated make no other difference in the idea they leave, than that of their being gone. For in a picture that you looked upon at first with delight and afterwards with indifference, you shall perceive no alteration of form or color or other circumstance than that it once gave you pleasure, but now affords you none. Sometimes they propagate their own likeness upon different subjects; at others, they come into one another's places successively in the same. One while they come and go unaccountably; at another, one may discern the causes of their migration: for an idea, whereto satisfaction was annexed, entering into a compound which is afterwards divided again, the satisfaction shall rest upon a different part from that whereto it was at first united; and a satisfactory end shall render the means conducive thereto satisfactory, after the end is removed out of view. Some things please by their novelty, and others displease from their strangeness: custom brings the latter to be pleasant, but repetition makes the former nauseous.

All which seems to indicate that there is some particular spring or nerve appropriated to affect us with satisfaction or uneasiness, which never moves unless touched by some of the nerves

bringing us our other ideas : and that the body, being a very complicated machine, as well in the grosser as the finer of its organs, they delight or disturb us in various degrees according as in the variety of their play they approach nearer or remove further from the springs of satisfaction or uneasiness. For as the difference of our ideas depends probably upon the form, or magnitude, or motion, or force of the organs exhibiting them, one cannot suppose the same organ by the variations of its play affecting us either with pleasure or pain without producing an alteration in our ideas. Now what those springs are, where they lie, or by what kind of motion they operate upon us either way, I shall not attempt to describe : nor is it necessary we should know so much ; for if we can learn what will give us pleasure or pain, and how to procure the one and avoid the other, we ought to rest fully contented, without knowing the manner in which they produce their effect. And in order to attain so much knowledge as we want, I shall endeavor to examine how our ideas form into compounds, and how satisfaction becomes united to them, or is transferred from one to another.

CHAP. VII.

SENSATION.

SENSATION, as we learn from Mr. Locke, and may find by our own observation, is the first inlet and grand source of knowledge, supplying us with all our ideas of sensible qualities ; which, together with other ideas arising from them, after their entrance into the mind, complete our stores of knowledge and materials of reason.

Sensations come to us from external objects striking upon our senses. When I say external, I mean with respect to the mind ; for many of them lie within the body, and for the most part reach us by our sense of feeling. Hunger and thirst, weariness, drowsiness, the pain of diseases, repletion after a good meal, the pleasure of exercise and of a good flow of spirits, are all of this kind. But sometimes we receive sensations by our other senses too, coming from no object without us : as in the visions and noises frequent in high fevers ; the nauseous tastes accompanying other distempers, and the noisome smell remaining many days with some persons after catching an infection of the small-pox. For whatever in our composition affects our senses in the same manner as

external objects used to do, excites a sensation of the same kind in the mind.

I shall not go about to describe what are to be understood by external objects, for any man may know them better by his own common sense than by any explanation of mine : but I think it worth while to observe that they are not always either the original or immediate causes giving birth to our sensations. When we look upon a picture, the sun or candle shining upon it primarily, and the rays reflected from it and image penciled upon our retina subsequently, produce the idea in our mind ; yet we never talk of seeing them, but the picture, which we account the sole object of our vision. So when Miss Curteous entertains you with a lesson upon her harpsichord, both she and the instrument are causes operating to your delight, for you thank her for the favor, and may speak indifferently of hearing the one or the other : but when you consider what is the object of your hearing, you will not call it either the lady or the harpsichord, but the music.

2. It is remarkable that although both visible and sonorous bodies act equally by mediums, one of light and the other of air, vibrating upon our organs, yet in the former case we reckon the body the object, but in the latter the sound of the air : I suppose because we can more readily and frequently distinguish the place, figure, and other qualities, of bodies we see than of those affecting our other senses. We have smells in our noses, but cannot tell what occasioned them ; tastes remain in our mouths after spitting out the nauseous thing that offended us : we may feel warmth without knowing from whence it proceeds ; and the blow of a stick, after the stick itself has been thrown into the fire and consumed. And that this distinction of bodies denominates them objects of vision, appears further, because some, having in a course of experiments been shown a calf's eye whereon they see the miniature of a landscape lying before it delineated, very learnedly insist that the image penciled on the backside of our eye, and not the body therein represented, is the object we behold. But unless like Aristotle they hold the mind to be existing in every part of our frame, they must allow that neither is this image the immediate object of our discernment, but some motion or configuration of the optic nerves, propagated from thence to the sensory. Therefore it is the safest way to take that for the object which men generally esteem to be such : for should we run into a nice investigation of the causes successively operating to vision, we shall never be able to settle whether the object of our lucubrations be the candle, or the light flowing thence, or the letters of our book, or the light reflected from thence, or the print of them

upon our eye, or the motion of our nerves. If we once depart from the common construction of language, and will not agree with others, that we see the lines we read, we may as well insist that we see the candle, or the optic nerves, as the image in our retina.

But with regard to the sense of hearing there is no such difficulty started, because you cannot, by dissecting a calf's ear, exhibit anything therein to your scholars similar to the lowings of a cow which the calf heard when alive. Wherefore learned and simple agree in calling sound the object of hearing: nevertheless, every one knows that it must proceed from the cry of some animal, play of some instrument, collision, or other action of some body making the sound. When imagination works without anything external to strike upon the senses, we call our ideas the objects of our thought, because we cannot discern anything else from whose action they should arise: yet this does not hinder but that such of them at least, as come upon us involuntarily, may proceed from something in our humors, or animal circulation, conveying them to the mind; and were we as familiarly acquainted with these as we are with visible bodies, we should call them the objects.

3. Our manner of talking, that the senses convey ideas from objects without us, implies as if ideas were something brought from thence to the mind: but whether they really be so, is more than we know, or whether there be any resemblance between them and the bodies exhibiting them. The sense of hearing bids the fairest for such conveyance; for when you strike upon a bell, you put it thereby into a tremulous motion, which agitates the air with the like tremors; and those again generate similar vibrations in the auditory nerves, and perhaps propagate the same onward to that fibre, or last substance, whose modification is the idea affecting us with sound.

Colors seem agreed on all hands to be not existing in bodies after the same manner as they appear to our apprehension. The learned tell you they are nothing but a certain configuration in the surfaces of objects, adapted to reflect some particular rays of light and absorb the rest: and though the unlearned speak of colors as being in the bodies exhibiting them, I take this to proceed only from the equivocal sense of the word color, which stands indifferently either for the sensation, or the quality of exciting it. For if you question the most illiterate person breathing, you will always find him ascribing the sensation to the mind alone, and the quality of raising it to the object alone, though perhaps he might call both by the name of color: but he will never fancy the rose has any sensation of its own redness, nor, could your mind and

sensory be laid open to his view when you look upon a rose, would he ever expect to find any redness there. The like may be said of heat and cold, which signify as well our sensations as the modifications of bodies occasioning them: therefore, though we say the fire is hot, and makes us hot, we do not mean the same thing by the same word in both places. When nurse sets her child's pannikin upon the fire to warm, she does not imagine the fire will infuse a sensation of heat into the pap, but only will communicate a like quality of raising warmth in her, should she thrust her finger or the tip of her tongue into it: and when she feels herself warmed by the fire, she never dreams that this feeling will impart its likeness to the child, without application of her warm hands, or a double clout having received the like quality of warming from the fire. When we talk of fire melting metals, or burning combustibles by the intenseness of its heat, we mean the quality it has of producing the alterations we see made in those bodies; and this we denominate heat, from that best known effect we find it have upon ourselves, in raising a burning smart on our flesh, whenever we approach near enough. Therefore, those, who would find fault with us for attributing color, heat, and cold, to inanimate bodies, take us up before we were down; for by such expressions we do not understand the sensations, but the qualities giving rise to them, which qualities really belong to the bodies: so that I shall stand by my plain neighbors in maintaining snow to be white, fire hot, ice cold, lilies sweet, poppies stinking, pork savory, wormwood bitter, and the like, which they may justly do, without offence either to propriety of speech, or to sound philosophy.

4. We are not troubled with the like shrewd objections against pleasure and pain, satisfaction and uneasiness, because those are commonly appropriated to the perceptions of the mind, and not spoken of as residing in bodies without us. Yet we lay ourselves open to criticism here too, as often as we talk of a pain in our toes, or a tickling in the palms of our hands, for it might be alleged the limbs are incapable of feeling either, and can only raise sensations of them in the mind. And we might as justly be charged with incorrectness, in complaining of our mind being uneasy, and our bed being uneasy; but our defence shall be, that the term carries a different force in the two parts of this sentence; for every child knows that if the bed becomes uneasy by the feathers clotting together into hard knobs, it is not because the lumps give uneasiness to the bed itself, but because they will make any one uneasy that shall lie upon them. But though pleasure and pain be perceptions, yet we may have an idea of them in their

absence, or even in the presence of their contraries : for we often remember past pleasures, when gone from us, with regret, and think of an evil we have escaped with joy at the deliverance ; and this regret, or joy increases in proportion to the strength and clearness we have of the enjoyment or suffering, we now expect to feel no more.

Magnitude, figure, and motion, are reputed both by learned and vulgar to reside in the bodies wherein we observe them : yet it cannot be denied, that they suffer alterations in their conveyance to the mind, whether that be made through the sight, or the touch ; they being all motion in the rays of light, the organs or other channels wherealong they pass, and that a different kind of motion from any in the bodies themselves. Nor, on arriving at the seat of the mind, can we say they reassume the same form they had at first setting out : magnitude assuredly does not, for when we look upon the cupola of St. Paul's, we cannot suppose anything within us of equal size with the object it represents ; nor do we know whether there be anything of similar figure : and when we see a chariot drive swiftly before us, it is hardly probable, that the ends of our fibres imitate that whirling motion we discern in the wheels. But since it is the received opinion that magnitude, figure, and motion, are in the bodies such as we apprehend them to be, I shall take it for granted, nor shall I urge the changes they may receive in their passage to the mind as an argument to the contrary, because I know that in other cases, ideas may be conveyed by mediums very dissimilar to themselves : when we read, or hear read, the description of a palace, or a garden, a battle, or a procession, there is nothing in the letters we look upon, or the sounds we hear uttered, at all resembling the scenes they describe ; nevertheless, we have a full and clear conception of all the circumstances relating to them, conveyed either way to our understanding. As for solidity, when distinguished from hardness, I apprehend we have no direct sensation of that, but gather it from our observation of the resistance of bodies against one another, and of their constantly thrusting them away before they can enter into their places.

5. Sensations from external objects come to us ordinarily through certain mediums, either of light, air, or effluvia, feeling only excepted, which, for the most part, requires that the substance exciting it should lie in contact with some part of our body ; yet, things intensely hot, or cold, we can feel at a distance. But, when the causes of sensation have reached the surface of our body, we must not think they have done their business there, for perception lies not at the eyes, or the ears, or the

nose, or the tongue, or the finger ends; therefore, the influences of objects, after entering the body, have several stages to pass through in their progress towards the seat of perception. How many of these stages there may be, I shall not pretend to reckon up, but I suspect them to be very numerous, and that the parts of our machine, like the wheels of a clock, transmit their influence to one another successively, through a long series of motions. But it seems convenient to divide them into two classes, which I shall call the bodily, and the mental organs, as this division tallies well enough with our usual manner of expressing ourselves, concerning what passes within us. For we have many ideas arising involuntarily to our imagination, besides others we call up to our remembrance by our own activity; and upon all these occasions, the whole transaction is esteemed to be carried on by the mind alone, without intervention of the body, without impulse of external objects, and by the sole working of our thoughts. But we have shown in a former place, that the idea perceived, must be something numerically distinct from the thing perceiving it, and that there are certain mediums employed in exhibiting it to our view, as well when it comes of its own accord, as upon call; for which reason, we find particular ideas more or less easily introduced, according as our mind stands disposed to entertain them. Whence it follows that there is an organization in the mind itself, which throws up objects to our thought, or, which we use to bring them there, when nothing external interferes, and the senses remain inactive: and this is what I understand by the mental organs.

6. But since I have spoken of mental organs, and extended the machinery of our frame quite into the mind itself, it is necessary, for avoiding the scandal that might be taken thereat, to observe that the word *Mind*, as used in our ordinary discourses, is an equivocal term: for we suppose our knowledge of all kinds to be contained in the mind, and yet speak of incidents bringing particular things to our mind which we knew before: but if *Mind* were the same in both places, it were absurd to talk of bringing a thing to mind which was there already. Therefore, *Mind* sometimes stands, in the philosophical sense, for that part of us which acts and perceives, or as Tully expresses it, which wills, which lives, which has vigor; and to this *Mind* I ascribe no organization: for I conceive perception to be what it is at once, unchangeable and momentary, having no progress from one place to another, like the influence of objects transmitted from channel to channel, along our organs. In like manner I apprehend action, while exerted by the mind, to be instantaneous and invariable.

ble, until reaching the first subject whereon the mind acts, where it becomes impulse, and continues such during its passage to the extremities of our limbs, in the same manner as motion propagated from body to body impelling one another. Now whether this philosophical mind be still a compound, or a pure and simple substance, whether material or immaterial, I have hitherto forbore to examine: I may, one time or other, do my best towards discussing this very point fully, when, whatever I may prove to others, my own opinion thereon will appear sufficiently manifested; though at present I choose to leave the question undecided, as being too early to take in hand.

But we frequently use Mind, in the vulgar sense, for the repository of our ideas, as when we talk of storing up knowledge in the mind, of enriching her with learning, or adorning her with accomplishments: for those stores and treasures are certainly not in the mind spoken of in the former paragraph, because then we must actually perceive them all, so long as they remain in our possession; but I defy any man, with his utmost efforts, to call to mind the thousandth part of all the knowledge he has in store. Where then is that stock of knowledge which lies dormant and unperceived? If you understand something of mathematics and something of agriculture; while busy in giving orders to your bailiff for the management of your grounds, your mind continues wholly intent upon the latter, nor do you perceive any one mathematical truth. What then is become of your mathematical knowledge in the interim? You have not lost it, you still retain it in possession, but where shall we seek for its residence? It is not in your closet, it is not in your hand, yet it lies somewhere within your custody: and where else can we place it, with any propriety of speech, unless in your mind, which you have improved with the acquisition of that science? But this mind, which discerns not what it possesses, must be something different from that whereby you perceive whatever you have under immediate contemplation. Now concerning the vulgar mind, I shall not scruple to pronounce, because I may do it without offence to anybody, that it is a compound consisting of parts; one vigorous and percipient, which is strictly the mind, the other inert and insensible, furnishing objects for the former to perceive: which latter I would call the repository of ideas, containing under parts in all probability of a coporeal nature, distributed into channels, filaments, or organs; and that our knowledge, that is, our ideas, or the causes of them, lie here ready for use, and proceed mechanically from organ to organ, until their last operation, whereby they raise in us perceptions. In short, I take the ambiguity of

the word Mind to arise from the grossness of our conceptions : for though the mind alone be properly ourselves, and all else of the man an adjunct or instrument employed thereby, yet in our ordinary conversation we consider the body, the limbs, the flesh, and the skin, as parts of ourselves ; nay, sometimes even our clothes, it being usual to say, You have dirted me, or have wetted me, when somebody has happened to splash either upon one's coat. And when we go to distinguish between the body and the mind, we do not separate them carefully enough in our thoughts, but take some of the finer parts of the former into our idea of the latter.

7. This imperfect division of man into his two constituent parts, has introduced an inaccuracy and contrariety into our expressions, which whoever shall try to escape in discoursing upon human nature, will perhaps find it impracticable : for though we may model our thoughts for ourselves, we must take our language from other people. I had intended at first setting out to appropriate Mind to the percipient part, but have found myself insensibly drawn in to employ it in another signification upon several occasions : nor could I avoid doing so without coining new terms and new phrases, which might have looked uncouth, abstruse, and obscure, and formed a language not current in any country upon earth. But to deliver oneself intelligibly, one must adopt the conception and idioms common among mankind : and we find talents, qualifications, and accomplishments, generally ascribed to the mind, which I conceive depend upon the difference of our organization. This led me into the notion of mental organs, which I beg leave still to pursue, and to speak indifferently of mind in the philosophical or vulgar sense, as either shall best suit my purpose. If anybody shall think me worth a little careful attention, he may quickly perceive, by the context or occasion, in which signification I employ the term at any particular time : but it was necessary to warn him of the double meaning, because without such caution I might have been grossly misunderstood, and thought to advance doctrines the farthest in the world from my sentiments,

Sensations from bodies we are conversant with come to us mostly through external mediums first, then through our bodily, and lastly through our mental organs ; and the workings of our thoughts require no other conveyance than the latter : therefore, these, in all cases, are the immediate causes exhibiting ideas to our perception. For the mind sits retired in kingly state, nothing external, nothing bodily being admitted to her presence : and though in sensation, the notice be received from things without

us, they only deliver their message to the mental organs, which by them is carried into the royal cabinet. Thus, whether we see and hear, or whether we remember what we have formerly seen and heard, the mind receives her perception directly by the same hand: and how much soever sensible objects may give us information remotely, the pictures of them in our imagination, are what we immediately discern, as well as when they arise there without any apparent external cause; nor do we ordinarily distinguish them any otherwise, than by finding the former more lively and vigorous than the latter: for which reason, in dreams and strong impressions of fancy, we sometimes mistake them for real sensations.

CHAP. VIII.

REFLECTION.

As we have all been children before we were men, we have, I doubt not, amused ourselves at that season with many childish diversions; one of which, we may remember, was that of burning a small stick at the end to a live coal, and whisking it round to make gold lace, as we called it. We little thought then of making experiments in philosophy, but we may turn this innocent amusement to that use in our riper years, by gathering from thence, that our organs can continue sensation after the impulse of objects exciting it is over. For the coal is in one point only at one instant of time, and can be seen nowhere else than where it is; yet there appears an entire circle of fire, which could not happen, unless the light, coming from it at every point, put the optic nerves into a motion, that lasted until the object returned unto the same point again, nor unless this motion raised the same perception in the mind, as it did upon the first striking of the light. For if the stick be not twirled swiftly enough, so as that it cannot make a second impression from the same point, before the motion excited in the optics by the first is over, you will not see a whole fiery ring, but a lucid spot passing successively through every part of the circle. He that has been in a great mob, and dinned with incessant noise, clamor, and shouting, if he can get suddenly into a close place, and shut himself up from their hearing, will still have the sound ring for a while in his ears. So likewise upon receiving the blow of a stick, we feel the stroke when the stick touches us no more. From all which instances it is manifest that our organs, being once put in

motion by external objects, can excite sensations of the same kind, for some little time after the objects have ceased to act.

2. But beyond this little time, and after all sensation is quite over, there will often remain an idea of what we have seen, or heard, or felt, and this I call an idea of reflection. From hence it appears, that our mental organs have a like quality with the bodily, of conveying perception to the mind, when the causes setting them at work no longer operate. For what the impulse of objects is to the optic or auditory nerves, that the impulse of these latter is to the mental organs: yet we see the idea of an object may be retained after both those impulses are over. How long these mental organs may continue their play by themselves I shall not pretend to ascertain, but certainly much longer than the bodily, and probably until thrown into a new course by fresh impulses, or until quieted by sleep. But we know from experience that objects sometimes make so strong an impression upon our senses, that the idea of them will remain a considerable while beyond the power of all other ideas to efface, or of our utmost endeavors to exclude it. Which to me seems a sufficient evidence to prove the existence of these mental organs, and to show that whatever throws our ideas of reflection upon us, has a force and motion of its own, independent of the mind.

Let any man look steadfastly against the window when there is a bright sky behind it, and then, shutting his eyes, clap his hand close over them: I would not have him repeat the experiment often, it being hurtful to the eyes, but he may try for once without any great damage; and he will still see an image of the window distinguished into frame and panes. This image will grow languid by degrees, and then vivid again at intervals, the glass will change into various colors, red, yellow, blue, and green, succeeding one another; the bars of the sash will encroach upon the panes, throwing them out of their square, into an irregular form; sometimes the frame will appear luminous, and the glass dark, and after the whole image has vanished, it will return again several times before it takes its final leave.

In like manner, any scene we have beheld earnestly for a while, will hang afterwards upon the fancy, and while we contemplate it there, we shall find the objects varying their forms, their colors fading and glowing by turns; from whence proceeds that fluctuation of ideas I have often spoken of before: and after having been quite gone out of our thoughts, they will frequently return again with the same vigor as at first. But there is this difference between the play of our sensitive and our reflective organs, that in a few minutes, the image above mentioned will totally fly off,

never to appear more, unless you renew it, by taking another look at the window : but an object we have once seen, may recur again to our reflection after days, months, and years, without any fresh application to the senses ; and that the ideas of things we are frequently conversant with, thereby grow gradually more fixed and steady. Were one to mark out the space of a yard, from the edge of a long table, he would touch some particular spot with his pencil, then he would shift it to another farther off, or nearer, and then perhaps to one between both ; nor would he be able to satisfy himself presently, because his idea of a yard would lengthen, shorten, and dance to and fro ; and when at last he had made his mark, it is ten to one but upon applying his rule he would find himself mistaken. Or were he to match a silk for a lady, without carrying a pattern to the shop, when he had several pieces of different hues spread before him upon the counter, he would be a good while before he could fix upon the right : for his idea of the color would fluctuate in his imagination, corresponding sometimes with those of a darker shade, and sometimes with those of a lighter, or appearing by turns to have more of the green mixture, or of the red ; and after all his care, he would run a great hazard of being chid when he came home, for bringing a color that would not suit. But the mercer, who does nothing all day long but measure and tumble about his silks, upon seeing the lady's gown, can run home and fetch a piece that shall match it exactly, and can cut off her quantity by guess, without the trouble of taking his ell to measure it.

3. Reflection then, as hitherto considered, is only a continuation or repetition of sensations ; and thus it is that our senses furnish us with the first stock of materials we have to work upon, in the absence of external objects. For we conceive ourselves as having these ideas in store, deposited somewhere in what is vulgarly called the mind, even when we do not actually perceive them. We commonly say a blind man has no knowledge of colors, but a man with his eye-sight perfect has, although perhaps at the time of speaking, he has no color under contemplation ; and we esteem it a part of the stock of knowledge he possesses : but this knowledge, while lying dormant and unperceived, I take to be nothing else besides the disposition of his internal organs to receive such forms and motions from other causes, as they have been first put into by visible objects striking upon the optics.

I have before declared that by the term ideas, I do not understand the very perceptions of the mind, but the figure, motion, or other modification, of some interior fibres, animal spirits, or other substances, immediately causing perception ; which substances I

have since called the mental organs. Now, I do not apprehend that from our seeing any strange creature, as an elephant, or rhinoceros, to our reflecting on it again a year afterwards the same modification remains within us during the whole interval: for then our internal organs must be as numerous as the ideas we possess, which, considering the prodigious multitude of them we have in store, seems inconceivable. But one substance may be susceptible of various modifications, at different times, and as the same optic nerves serve to convey red, yellow, or green, according to the rays striking upon them, so the same internal organs may exhibit various ideas, according to the impulse they receive from elsewhere. Therefore it was, that I ascribed our whole stock of dormant knowledge to the disposition of the latter. For the ideas composing that stock, strictly speaking, exist nowhere, but our possession of them is none other than our having a disposition in the mental organs to fall readily into them; which disposition they first acquired from the action of the senses: for Mr. Locke has sufficiently proved that no color or other simple sensible idea ever occurs to the thought, until it has been once introduced by sensation.

4. But those ideas before mentioned having gained admittance through the avenues of sensation, do, by their mutual action upon one another, and by their operation upon the mind, or of the mind upon them, generate new ideas, which the senses were not capable of conveying: such as willing, discerning, remembering, comparison, relation, power, and innumerable others. And this proves a second fund for supplying us with materials for our knowledge, which materials so stored up in the understanding, as well as those of the former sort, I conceive to be, when appearing to view, none other than modifications of our internal organs, and when dormant, dispositions of the same organs. Not that I look upon actual volition or perception as nothing else besides the motion, figure, or other modification of some organ, but the ideas of those acts are different from the acts themselves, as remaining with us often in their absence. One may have the idea of comparing without actually making comparisons, of remembering what one has now forgot, and of willing or discerning things one does not at present will or discern. And one may have the idea of the operations of another person's mind, the original whereof we certainly cannot immediately perceive, but apprehend them by representations of them formed in our own imagination. So, on the other hand, we sometimes act and discern without reflecting or perceiving that we do so; and it often costs great pains to

carry with us an idea of our operations, even at the time of performing them.

5. If any one shall desire me to explain how the play of an organ can affect us with the perception of remembrance, volition, discernment, and the like, let him first explain how external objects, which he must acknowledge to act by their figure, motion, and impulse, excite perceptions of color, sound, taste, and other sensations; and when he has given a thorough and clear account of this matter, I shall not despair from the lights he shall therein suggest, as clearly to explain the other: but while such lights are wanting, I must own them both inexplicable. Nevertheless, the fact is too notorious to be denied, how little soever we may be able to account for it: continual experience testifying that nature has established such a connexion between the motions of matter and perceptions of mind, that one frequently begets the other. We reason and discourse, every day, of the past and future operations of our own mind, and those of other people, and when we do so, we must undoubtedly perceive the terms concerning which we affirm or deny anything: but there can be no perceiving without an object to be perceived numerically and substantially distinct from that which perceives, and what is more likely to be this object than some modification of our internal organs? But when sound sleep, or a fainting fit, has cut off the communication between our animal motions and the mind, we can no more raise ideas of our own acts than we can of sensations. Both sorts start up involuntarily, as well in dreams as in our waking hours; both occur more or less readily, according to the health, fullness or emptiness, or other disposition of the body; and both sometimes force themselves upon us against our strongest endeavors to remove them. From whence it seems undeniably to follow, that whatever throws up ideas of all kinds to our reflection, has a force of its own, independent of the mind, and belonging to something else: and therefore their repository is not in the mind, unless understood in that vulgar sense wherein it comprehends a mixture and organization of corporeal parts. At least this approaches nearer towards an explication than what men generally satisfy themselves with, to wit, That by reason of our vital union, there is so close a connexion between the mind and the body, that according as the latter stands disposed, she can more or less easily perform those acts which they esteem her to perform by herself alone, without aid or instrumentality of the body.

6. This second class of ideas alone is what Mr. Locke understands by ideas of reflection, but I have extended the term to the other class too, which we receive originally by the senses, as judg-

ing it most convenient for my purpose so to do. For I may have frequent occasion to speak of ideas of all kinds, not coming immediately from sensation, by one general name, and could not find a properer for them than that of reflection. If I use the term a little differently from what has been done before me, it is no more than common among persons who treat on these subjects: for every man has a way of modelling his thoughts peculiar to himself, and must necessarily accommodate his language to his manner of thinking. Nor can any uncertainty or perplexity ensue from such liberty, provided it be taken sparingly, and proper warning given whenever it is taken. And I have the better excuse in the present instance, because Mr. Locke himself has a little departed from the common language. For Reflection in ordinary discourse denotes a voluntary act, whereby we turn back our thoughts upon some past occurrence, or hold something under contemplation in the mind, or draw consequences from what has been so contemplated; whereas ideas of reflection many times start up of themselves and vanish, without our reflecting on them at all, or doing anything to introduce or procure them.

CHAP. IX.

COMBINATION OF IDEAS.

FROM the ideas thus received by sensation and reflection, there grows a new stock, framed up of these as of so many materials, by their uniting together in various assemblages and connections. This their junction I choose to call by the name of Combination, as being more comprehensive than Composition, the term usually employed. For our ideas combine together in two several manners: one by composition, when they so mix, and as I may say melt together as to form one single complex idea, generally denoted by one name, as a man, a table, a dozen; the other by association, when they appear in couples strongly adhering to each other, but not blended into the same mass, as darkness and apparitions, the burst of a cannon or push of a drawn sword, and the dread of mischief accompanying them. For when we think of a man we conceive him to be one thing, and his body, limbs, rationality, with other ingredients of his essence, as parts of the same whole: but when we reflect on a naked sword, we do not consider that and the terror occasioned thereby as parts of any

compound, although the one constantly attends the other, beyond all possibility of separating them in the mind of a fearful person.

2. To begin with composition, wherein I shall not attempt to reckon up how many sorts of complex ideas we have, that having been done already by Mr. Locke much better than I can pretend to, but shall examine how composition itself is effected, which it did not fall in his way directly to consider: though if it had, I am apt to think he would have ascribed more to the ministry and organization of our corporeal parts than has usually been done, as one may gather from the hint he gives in his chapter of association, (§ 6), where he says, "That habits of thinking in the understanding, as well as of determining in the Will, seem to be but trains of motion in the animal spirits, which once set a going, continue in the same steps they have been used to, which by often treading are worn into a smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy, and as it were natural. As far as we can comprehend thinking, thus ideas seem to be produced in our minds."

3. Composition, I apprehend, is preceded by a selection of some ideas from the rest, exhibited at the same time to our view, as a necessary preparative thereto. For as a lady, who would make a curious piece of shell-work, must first pick out the proper shells from the drawers wherein they lie, before she can dispose them into figures, so there can be no compound formed in the imagination until the particular ideas whereof it is to consist be disengaged from all others presented in company with them. This separation is partly made by the objects themselves striking more strongly upon the senses, and appearing eminently above their fellows; but I conceive the mind has a principal share in the business, by turning her notice upon some particular objects, preferably to others standing together before her.

Nature at first presents her objects in a chaos, or confused multitude, wherein there is nothing distinct, nothing connected. When the new-born babe comes into the world, the sight of things in the chamber, the gabblings and handlings of the gossips, and perhaps some smells and tastes, rush in at all the five avenues of sensation, and accost the mind in one act of perception. The nurse's arms appear no more belonging to her body, than the wainscot seen on each side of them: and the midwife's voice has no more relation to her person, than to the bed-post. But as objects do not strike with equal force, the more glaring and striking give a stronger impulse to the organs, which continue the motion imparted therefrom, after that of the feebler impulses have entirely ceased; and thus the former become selected in the reflection out of the rest entering in company with them.

And as our organs acquire a disposition of falling more readily into modifications they have been thrown into before, hence frequency of appearance produces the same effect with vigor of impression, and sensations continually repeated, become distinguished from others received more rarely.

4. Both those causes, strength of impression and frequency of appearance are greatly assisted by the operation of the mind: for some objects affecting us agreeably, and others appearing indifferent, she fixes her notice upon the former, for sake of the satisfaction received therefrom which gives them an advantage above their fellows. Every one remarks how constantly the eyes of a young child follow the candle about the room whithersoever you carry it: and when we come to man's estate, we often pursue particular objects through all the motions and turnings they make before us. We have not indeed quite the same command over our ears, and other senses, yet among variety of sounds, smells, tastes, or touches, accosting us at the same time, we can pick out some in disregard to the rest; and we can do the like with respect to different senses. A man who reads in a room where there is company talking, may mind his book without taking notice of anything they say, or may listen to their discourse, without minding a word of what he reads.

This culling of particular objects from the whole number exhibited to view, I call turning the mental eye or directing the notice, by which I would not be understood as exactly describing the operation of the mind herein, (for I do not ascribe to her a blind side and a light, nor suppose her actually turning to the right or the left by a loco-motion,) but as using a figurative expression borrowed from the motion of the bodily eye producing the same effect. For how wide soever the circle of our vision may extend, whatever lies in the centre against which the eye is levelled directly, affects the sense more strongly than other things equally lucid lying nearer the circumference. Wherefore the notice we take of particular objects not only occasions their leaving a stronger impression, but their agreeableness makes this application of the notice to be more frequently repeated upon them than upon others less engaging. But when I speak of the notice which conduces so much to the first selection of our ideas, I do not mean that thought and reflection we apply in our riper years to things we contemplate, for such a careful exercise of the faculties little children can scarce be supposed capable of; but that transient and cursory observation the mind makes upon certain conspicuous or pleasing objects passing in review before her, without designing it a moment beforehand, or reflecting on it a moment afterwards.

5. But objects that shine eminently above their fellows, or on which the notice fixes, are not always single objects; for two or more may appear equally conspicuous, or may give a pleasure jointly which each of them separately could not have afforded: this happening often, cements them together and makes them coalesce into one assemblage. Another cause of coalescence arises from objects constantly presenting themselves together: most of the bodies we are conversant amongst being compound bodies, the parts of them preserve their contiguity to one another while they move from place to place, although they change their situation with respect to other bodies surrounding them; hence the ideas of those parts uniting together form an assemblage. When nurse walks about the room, she carries her arms along with her, but not the wainscot, seen on each side of them: when she goes out, every part of her disappears, and when she returns, the whole of her figure presents again to the eye, and by frequent use becomes apprehended by the child in one complex idea. Nor can it be doubted what efficacy the consorting of objects has towards compounding them, when we reflect that we scarce know our own acquaintance in an unusual dress, and how surprising an alteration a different colored wig makes in a man's person: so that the clothes we have been accustomed to see worn seem to enter into our complex idea of the wearer. So likewise ideas that use or conveniency has led us to consider frequently together become a compound, as a yoke of oxen, a flock of sheep, a city, a country.

We have seen how sensations, after their disappearance, leave ideas of themselves behind in the reflection, and if other sensations follow immediately and constantly while those ideas are fresh, they unite into an assemblage. Thus the taste of sugar in our mouths joins with the color we saw before putting it in, and the hardness we felt while we held it in our hands, and the ideas of a certain color, consistency, and sweetness, make the complex of sugar. By degrees we add more ingredients to the compound, further experience informing us of other qualities constantly attending what we have already comprehended under the idea of sugar whenever they have an opportunity of showing themselves; and hence we learn that sugar is brittle, dissolvable, clammy, and astringent. For the complex or essence of bodies is made up of the qualities we find them have of affecting us in several manners, or of working changes in other bodies, or of undergoing changes from them.

6. Composition makes us esteem the things united therein as one; for how many soever present themselves to our thought in one assemblage we look upon as one thing, and that although

they may be actually disunited. Thus if a bed be taken to pieces for conveniency of carriage, upon being asked where it is, we say in the great chest, and if the chest contain nothing else, we conclude it was filled with that one piece of furniture. But having frequent occasion to consider things so compounded separately, we then see them different and distinct from one another, as the curtains, the tester, the headboard, and so forth: at other times, we view them under both considerations at once, and thence get the idea of whole and parts, for we call the several things forming an assemblage parts of the same compound; thus by a kind of contradiction conceiving them at the same time as one and many.

With regard to the species of things, we are greatly determined in our notions by the names affixed to them: for ice, although nothing but water congealed, is esteemed a different kind of thing from water; but lead, whether cold or melted, still retains its name, and is reckoned the same metal. Were we to define lead or water, I suppose we should call one a solid and the other a fluid substance, esteeming these their natural states, although we may have seen them put into the contrary by violence: but when we reflect that cold is no more than a privation of heat, I do not know why we should look upon fluidity as the natural state of water, which, unless acted upon by a certain degree of warmth, will of itself form into a consistency. But we call that the natural state which falls most commonly under our observation; therefore, if we had lived in Saturn, we should doubtless have given but one name to ice and water, and defined it a solid body, although we might now and then have seen it liquefied in a furnace: as on the other hand, had we been born in Mercury, we should have deemed lead a fluid body, although by keeping it a long while at the bottom of a deep well, we might have found it sometimes coagulate.

7. We get a stock of ideas of the second class pretty early, those I mean strictly called ideas of reflection: and they run into assemblages in the same manner, and from the same causes already spoken of; sometimes with one another only, but more commonly in conjunction with those of the other class derived originally from sensation: being often either thrown upon the notice by the workings of imagination, or the mind being invited to turn her notice upon them by use and convenience, which always carries some degree of satisfaction.

Few of our assemblages are without some reflective ideas of the one sort or the other, not excepting those which are reckoned to come immediately by sensation. We talk of seeing cubes

and globes, but in reality our sense exhibits no such objects to the mind: we can at most see only three sides of the former, and one hemisphere of the latter, but imagination supplies what is wanting to complete their figures. It has been said that all things strike upon the eyes in a flat surface, and that our former acquaintance with the objects makes them appear standing out one before another: thus much is certain, that the figures lie level in a picture, wherefore the roundness and protuberance we discern in them cannot come from the sense, but must be drawn from our internal fund. Whenever we hear a noise, there enters instantly with it an idea of some instrument, or string, or animal, or clashing bodies, we apprehend making the sound. We can scarce look a stranger in the face without entertaining some notion of his character and temper of mind, which we conceive conveyed by sensation; for we think he looks morose or heavy, or courteous or sensible: it is true, we are often out in our guess, and change it upon further observation, but some conjecture constantly occurs at first sight, and together with his outward figure forms our complex idea of his person. And though the characters of our familiar acquaintance are too well known to depend upon a single view, yet their present disposition may appear visible upon their countenance; and we may see them dejected or joyful, serious or frolicsome, in the same glance wherewith we behold their features.

8. In process of time, when we become capable of care and attention, we join many ideas that would not have consorted of themselves, nor occurred to that common notice we are led to take of things by their present agreeableness. And our conversation and intercourse with other people daily furnish us with new assemblages; for by perpetually communicating our ideas to one another, we become possessed of multitudes that our own experience would never have exhibited, nor our own sagacity worked out. In short, whatever cause occupies the mind strongly or frequently with any set of ideas, thereby joins them into one compound.

Here we see the benefit of industry and society, as they tend greatly to enlarge our stock of complex ideas, which are the principal basis of knowledge: for were it confined to simple ideas alone, it would be very scanty, and of little service to us in the conduct of life. We could not tell what to apply for satisfying our appetites of hunger and thirst, were not the sight of aliments connected with the idea of their palatableness: and in general, our ideal causes of action perhaps are all of them compounds; as are undoubtedly all our final causes, they containing

an idea of satisfactory joined to whatever we apprehend possessing that quality.

9. There being multitudes of the same things subservient to us all for our uses and pleasures, causes a great similitude in the assemblages of all men. The common complex ideas of a chair, a table, of fire, water, victuals, drink, of honesty, gratitude, obligation, and other things we have frequent occasion to take notice of in the daily course of our lives, are much the same in every one. But as we divide into various professions, and fall upon different ways of observation, there is likewise a great diversity in men's ideas; so that the same collection of materials, presented to several imaginations, shall run surprisingly into various assortments, according as they have been respectively accustomed. Carry a number of persons equally clear-sighted upon a hill, from whence they have an extensive prospect with a variety of objects before them: the farmer sees turnip and corn grounds, meadow, pasture, and copice; the soldier observes eminences, valleys, morasses, and defiles; the mathematician descries parallelograms, triangles, and scalenums, in the fields and hedges; the country attorney distinguishes parishes, hamlets, manors and boundaries of estates; the poet beholds shady groves, sportful flocks and verdant lawns; the painter discerns variety of colors, contrast of light and shades; the religious man discovers materials for building, provisions for eating, for drinking, for clothing, for the necessities and conveniences of life, accompanied with a thought of the Giver of those blessings, and all this instantly without any endeavor of their own; on the contrary, were they to try to form one another's compositions they would find great trouble and difficulty in the undertaking, and perhaps could not do it completely at last.

10. As our acquaintance with objects increases, we add fresh ingredients to the compounds formed of them in our imagination; therefore those we have occasion the most frequently and carefully to consider become the most comprehensive assemblages. By this means, manufacturers, artisans, scholars, and others following any particular occupation, have a fuller idea of the things belonging to their respective trades or sciences than other persons. The idea of the Iliad in the vulgar, perhaps contains no more than an old story of a siege wrote in Greek verse: but together with this, there arises in the mind of the poet or critic, ideas of the fable, the characters, the sentiments, the figures, the diction, any of which being altered, they would not acknowledge it to be the work of Homer. Yellowness, hardness, and valuableness, in commerce, seem to constitute the whole complex of gold in com-

mon persons, to which the goldsmith, refiner, and naturalist, add malleability, ductility, specific gravity, dissolubility in aqua regia, and indissolubility in all other menstruums, besides other qualities, which never enter into the head of an ordinary man.

By thus adding daily to our compositions, they grow so bulky, that we cannot take them in at one glance, but are forced to turn them about, as we would some very complicated piece of workmanship, in order to view them a side at a time. He that knows the properties of gold most completely, cannot bring them all into his thought at once; he may run through them successively in a very short space of time, but can never make them all appear together at the same instant: nay, should he go to give a full and accurate definition, it is odds but another person may suggest something that he has overlooked. But however this be admitted or not, certain it is, we do not always think of every particular belonging to the compounds under our consideration: nor can it be supposed, that every time we tell over a few guineas we have a thought of ductility, and many other qualities we know residing in them. Yet upon every idea being excited, some part at least of the assemblage whereto it belongs almost constantly occurs: we cannot see the face of a man, hear the barking of a dog, or smell the sweetness of a rose, without thought of something more than the bare sight, or sound, or smell: and how many soever ideas thus start up in company, we find them closely connected together, and apprehend them as component parts of one complex.

11. This partial appearance of our compounds suits extremely well with the narrowness of our conception. The ideas of things most familiar to us, contain a multitude of particulars, and were the whole tribe to rush in upon us at once, they would so fill the mind as to leave room for nothing else, at least we should find them too unwieldy and unmanageable to do us any service. For a single idea, how complicated soever, can at most afford us only a present amusement; it is necessary for use, that we should have two or more together in view: without this we could neither compare nor distinguish them, could discern neither their resemblance, nor difference, nor relations, nor effects, neither could we affirm, deny, or reason, concerning them; wherein the whole benefit we may expect to reap from them consist.

On the other hand, no small inconvenience arises from their not presenting before us entire: for by this means our ideas continually fluctuate, not only by their colors fading and glowing alternately, but by varying their shapes; our assemblages turning about perpetually, and presenting different faces, or their compo-

ment parts slipping away, and others supplying their places, so that we can scarce ever hold anything steady in our contemplation. Hence we are led to reason erroneously, or misunderstand one another, to discern resemblances, and draw consequences upon one view, of the same things which we do not find holding good upon another.

To remedy this mischief, logicians take the method of definition, but then if the definition descend too minutely into particulars, it will perplex instead of helping: therefore, when we would settle the idea of an object, we need bear in mind only so much of what belongs to it as may be sufficient for the occasion.—What good would it do the gold-beater to think of the fusibility of his gold, or that it will not evaporate in the furnace, like lead or mercury? the color, malleability, weight, and thickness, are all that he has any concern with. Rhetoricians and poets employ figures and copiousness of expression, to bring that side of objects forward, which they would have to strike fullest upon our notice: they often use epithets contained in the things whereto they are applied, as just properties, verdant lawns, living men; not that such epithets add anything to the signification, but because they strike that part of the assemblage more strongly upon the mental eye, which might otherwise have been unobserved.

12. The circumstance, or situation things appear in, joins to make a temporary assemblage together with the things, but does not coalesce so as to remain always in their company. A man running exhibits one complex idea, wherein his motion is contained; the same man standing, or sitting, presents another: yet if we were to describe him to a stranger, we should hardly take his running, or sitting, into our description of his person. Nevertheless, we cannot call these circumstances, whenever they occur, distinct ideas from the man, but parts of the same compound, because they present instantly in the same glance, and may be suggested where they are not: as in statues and drawings of animals in a moving posture, which strike us with ideas of motion in figures really quiescent. Much less can we suppose them distinct, when joined by that main bond of composition, a name, as in the terms, wind, rain, a river, a torrent, a horse race, which severally express one complex idea, whereof motion is a necessary ingredient; for, strike that out, and the remainder will be esteemed another thing, and deserving another appellation.

13. I shall have the less to say upon Association, because of the near affinity it bears to Composition, depending upon the same causes and subject to the same variations: and perhaps composition is nothing more than an association of the several ideas en-

tering into a complex. What shall be the one or the other, seems to depend generally upon the use of language: for if things arising to the thought constantly in company, have a name given them, we deem them compounded, if none, we can only call them associated. Names being a receptacle, in great measure necessary for gathering our ideas, and holding them together in a complex: like those cushions your gossips stick with pins in hearts, lozenges, and various forms, against a lying-in; the cushion is no part of the figure, yet if that should chance to fall into the fire and be consumed, the pins must all tumble down in disorder, and the figures composed of them vanish. It is not always easy to determine when ideas combined together belong to the class of compounds or associates: perhaps the connection between the looks and sentiments of persons, which I have mentioned under composition, others might call association: nor is it very material to ascertain the limits between the two classes exactly. But since there are combinations which cannot with any propriety be styled complex ideas, I thought proper to take some notice of them apart.

The principal of these, because the most universally prevailing, and having the greatest influence upon our thoughts and transactions, is the associations between words and their signification. Nobody will deny that sounds and characters are mere arbitrary signs bearing no relation in nature to the things they express, yet they become so strongly connected by custom with our ideas of the things, that they constantly start up in the mind together, and mutually introduce one another. For words, heard or read, instantly convey the meaning couched under them, and our thoughts, upon common occasions, find a ready utterance when we would communicate them either by speaking or writing. Nor does the junction between words and their meaning depend upon the Will, whether it shall take place or no. Were a man unluckily obliged to sit and hear himself abused, he would be glad, I suppose, to dissociate the grating words from the scandal they contain, and reduce them to their primitive state of empty sounds, but will find it impracticable: whence it appears that the seat of association lies in the organs, which seem to conspire in this case to throw a displeasure upon the mind, that she would exert all her power, if she had any, to escape.

14. And as our most compounded ideas turn different sides of themselves to view, so ideas, linked to a variety of others, usher in different associates, according to the occasion introducing them. For besides the combination, there is likewise a kind of attraction between our ideas, so that those preceding generally determine

what associates shall make their appearance ; because our organs fall more easily into motions, nearly the same with those they have been already put into, than they can strike out different ones. Hence it comes to pass that many words, having various significations, always suggest that sense which the context requires.—The word *Man* is used for one of the human species, for a male, for a full grown person, a corpse, a statue, a picture, or a piece of wood upon a chess-board, yet we never mistake the meaning, being directed thereto by what gave occasion for its being employed. Nor do single words only carry a different force, according to the sentence wherein they stand, but whole expressions to cast a lustre upon one another, and the very structure of the phrase gives a different aspect to the contents from what they would have had if placed in another order : in the due management of all which consists a great part of the arts of oratory and poetry.

I do not know how it is with other people, but I find that upon coming home after an absence of some months, I have a fuller and clearer idea of the scenes, persons, and places in the neighborhood, immediately upon coming into the house, and before I have seen any of them again, than I could have raised in the morning while at a distance : as if the bare removal from place to place gave a turn to the imagination, like the stop of an organ, that brings another set of pipes into play.

15. Upon this quality of cohering in our ideas was founded that art of memory mentioned by Cicero, and as he tells us generally ascribed to the invention of Simonides, who hit upon it by an accident. For being at an entertainment where there was a great number of guests, a message came that somebody wanted earnestly to speak with him in the street : in the interim, while he was gone out, the house fell down, and so crushed the company within, that when their relations came to bury them, they could not possibly distinguish the bodies from one another, until Simonides pointed them out by remembering exactly where every man had sat. From hence, observing the connection between objects and their stations, he took the hint of his artificial memory, wherein he taught his scholars to choose some spacious place as a town, a park or large garden, with which, and all the turnings, corners, plan, buildings, and parts belonging to it they should be perfectly familiar, and then to fancy certain images resembling the things they would remember, disposed regularly in the several parts of that place. Having done this carefully, when afterwards they cast their thoughts upon the place, it would appear replete with the images, each in its proper order and situation wherein it had been disposed. But the same place was to be employed upon all oc-

casions ; for the figures might be wiped away at pleasure ; by substituting a new set in their room, which would remain there so long as were wanting, or until displaced by having successors assigned them. Thus the association between images and their stations was only temporary, not perpetual like that of man and wife, but occasional, like that of travellers in a stage coach, who look upon themselves as one society during their journey, but when that is ended, separate, perhaps never to meet again : their places being supplied the next day by another company, and the same coach serving successively as a cement for different societies. Something like this artificial memory our ladies practise every day ; for when they are afraid of forgetting anything they purpose to do by and by, they put their ring upon the wrong finger, or pin a scrap of ribbon upon their stomacher : when afterwards they chance to cast their eye upon the ring or ribbon, they find the purpose for which they put it there associated therewith, and occurring instantly to their memory.

16. There are many other sorts of association, which whoever desires to know, may consult Mr. Locke's chapter upon that article, to which he may add others from his own observation, if he thinks it worth while to take the pains. But though our ideas are often made to cement by our bringing them together, yet the association once formed, they continue joined without any act of ours to preserve their coherence. Like the diamonds which a jeweller sticks in wax, in order to show you the form he proposes to set them in : they are held together by the tenacity of wax ; that is, by the properties of matter, though it were the act of a man that pressed them down so as to make them fasten.

CHAP. X.

TRAINS.

OUR combinations being most of them too large to be taken in at one glance, turn up their different sides, or introduce their several associates successively to the thought, exhibiting so much at a time as can easily find entrance. Thus, when we think of man, there occurs first perhaps the whole outward human figure ; then the inward composition of bowels, muscles, bones, and veins ; then the faculties of digestion, loco-motion, sense, and reason. Or if we read a passage in Virgil, the plain meaning of the words starts up foremost to view ; afterwards the turn of phrase, the grammar, the

elegance of diction, sentiment, figures, and harmony. And as some of the same materials obtain a place in several combinations, one complex idea gives rise to another, by means of some particular ingredient possessed in common by them both. Thus it often happens that two things, very different in themselves, introduce one another by the intervention of some medium bearing an affinity to both, though in different respects, which serves as a link by which the former draws in the latter. On hearing the report of a gun, one's thoughts may run upon soldiers, upon their exercises, upon battles, particularly that before Quebec: this may put one in mind of Canada, of the fur trade, of surprising stories told of the beavers, their contrivance in building themselves houses, of the sagacity of animals, of the difference between instinct and reason, and abundance of other speculations widely remote from the sound of a gun.

2. Nobody but must have observed an aptness in the fancy, and even the tongue, in common chit-chat, to roam and ramble when left to itself without control. Yet in our most incoherent sallies there is generally a coherence between single ideas and the next immediately preceding and following, although these two contain nothing similar to one another. Perhaps our imagination would rove always in this desultory manner, were it to contain only one combination at a time without a mixture of anything else: but an idea, on being displaced by another, does not wholly vanish, but leaves a spice and tincture of itself behind, by which it operates with a kind of attraction upon the subsequent ideas, determining which of their associates they shall introduce, namely, such as carry some conformity with itself. Thus, if on going to market to buy oats for your horse, you meet a wagon on the way, it might suggest the idea of other carriages, of turnpike roads, of commerce; or of the axis in peritrochio and five mechanical powers; or of the materials composing it, of the several sorts of timber, the principles of vegetation: but that your horse's wants being already in your thoughts, confine them to take a course relative thereto: so the wagon puts you in mind of the owner being a considerable farmer, who may supply you more conveniently and cheaper than the market, the idea of the man suggests not that of his wife and children, nor of the country he came from, which have nothing to do with your first thought, but that of his house, of the way thither, what you shall say to him, whether he shall deliver the corn home, or you shall fetch it. This regular succession of ideas, all bearing a reference to some one purpose retained in view, is what we call a train; and daily experience testifies how readily they follow one another in this

manner of themselves, without any pains or endeavor of ours to introduce them.

3. What first links ideas into trains, I take to be the succession of objects causing or leading to our satisfactions: for having observed that things agreeable come to us through several steps, whenever the first of them is made, it carries the thought on to all the rest, and having perceived that our desires cannot be gratified without using some means to obtain them, imagination runs back to all that is necessary to be done for that purpose. The sight or smell of victuals, putting into the child's mouth, constantly preceding the taste of them, excites an idea of that taste before the palate can convey it; in a little while the sight of the nurse coming in to bring the pap becomes another link in the chain, to which is afterwards added the sound of her steps on entering the room, and the creaking of the door when she opens it. In process of time, the child, making various noises, perceives that some of them have an influence upon the nurse's motions: hence it gets an imperfect notion of language, of cause, and effect; and when hunger presses, the little imagination runs backward to the ministry of the nurse, and the sounds using to procure it, which the child accordingly makes in order to obtain a relief of its wants.

Desire, curiosity, amusement, voluntary attention, or whatever else carries the notice frequently through a number of ideas always in the same series, links them into a train. When we would learn anything by heart, we read it over and over again, and find the words fixed thereby in our memory, in the same order as they lay in the page: but if we had read inattentively, so that the notice had rambled elsewhere, we should never have got our lesson. Were the same scrap of a song to be chanted in our ears for a month together, I suppose we could not fail of learning it exactly without any desire or endeavor so to do: but if when the singer came it always happened that we were so earnestly intent upon something else as to take no notice of him, he would not work the like effect.

4. But though the mind by her notice begins the formation of a train, there is something in our internal mechanism that strengthens and completes the concatenation. It has been generally remarked by schoolboys, that after having labored the whole evening before a repetition day to get their lesson by heart, but to very little purpose, when they rise in the morning, they shall have it current at their tongue's end without any further trouble. Nor is it unusual with persons of riper years, upon being asked for a determination which they cannot form, without a

number of things to be previously considered, to desire time to sleep upon it : because with all their care to digest their materials, they cannot do it completely, but after a night's rest, or some recreation, or the mind being turned for a while into a different course of thinking, upon her return to the former ideas, she finds they have ranged themselves anew during her absence, and in such manner, as exhibits almost at one view all their mutual relations, dependences, and consequences. Which shows that our organs do not stand idle the moment we cease to employ them, but continue the motions we put them into, after they have gone out of our sight, thereby working themselves to a glibness and smoothness, and falling into a more regular and orderly posture, than we could have placed them in with all our skill and industry.

Our trains once well formed, whatever suggests the first link, the rest follow readily of their own accord : but as practice joins them more firmly, so you find them hanging closer or looser together, according to the degree of strength they have acquired. There are some, who, having gotten a thing by rote, can go through it currently, at any time, without mistake or hesitation, but if you interrupt them, they cannot go on, without repeating what they had recited before from the beginning. Generally, when we are out, a single word prompted will draw up the remainder of the chain, and set us in our career again : but what we are extremely perfect in, we can leave off and resume of ourselves, begin in the middle, or take up any part at pleasure. There have been persons, who have acquired a surprising perfectness of this kind : I remember formerly to have seen a poor fellow, in Moorfields, who used to stand there all the day long, and get his living by repeating the Bible : whoever gave him a halfpenny, might name a text anywhere in the old or new Testament, which he would repeat directly, and proceed to the next verse, the next chapter, the next book, and so on without stopping, until another customer gave him another cue.

5. But trains of this enormous length are few, and wanted only upon extraordinary occasions ; those which serve us for common use, are innumerable, and extremely short, nor should we find them commodious if they were not so. For objects continually changing before us, and sensations of various kinds accosting us incessantly, there is very little scope for reflection to range in, before the notice is engaged by something else : and the purposes directing our observation from time to time being various, if our trains were not very numerous, we should not so readily as we do, find enow of them suited for carrying on the course of thought we desire. By continual use, our trains multiply and

open into one another, which gives a facility to our motions, and makes the imagination like a wilderness, cut into a multitude of short alleys, communicating together by gentle and almost imperceptible windings, where one may pursue an object seen at a distance, without much deviating from the straight line, or take a compass without losing our way. Besides, the smallness of our trains, and their being mutually interwoven, furnishes more play for the fancy; for a thread stretched out lengthways, you can view only two ways, either backward or forward, but the same being worked up into a curious cypher presents an abundance of mazes, wherein the eye can wander with an endless variety.

How helpful these little involuntary trains are to us, upon all occasions, may appear manifest, without much consideration. What is the difference between a number of words as they lie in a dictionary, or in some well wrote page? for in both we know their several meaning, but in the former, they represent a succession of loose incoherent assemblages, whereas in the latter, they appear linked in trains familiar to our imagination. Nor let it be objected, that the author may lead us into a course of thinking we never travelled in before; for though the course may be new, the component parts of it, that is, the phrases, the structure, and idiom of language, must be of our old acquaintance, or we shall not understand him.

The learned languages are taught at school by rules, but we may remember how tediously we proceeded, while forced to have recourse every foot to our rules, either in construing or composing: wherefore their use is only to bring our ideas of words into trains corresponding with the concords, and other rules of grammar: when this is done completely, by long practice we may forget our rules, as I believe most of us do, and yet without them we find the nominative or the adjective, at the beginning of a sentence, lead naturally and of its own accord to the verb, or substantive at the further end. And though we learn our mother tongue without rule, only by hearing it continually chimed in our ears, yet until it, be sufficiently formed into trains, we find the child express itself imperfectly, and in broken sentences. In a language we are masters of, while we read currently on, the sense of what we read seems wholly to occupy the imagination, yet, for all that, the mind can find room for something of her own: how quick soever the eye may pass along, the thought flies still quicker, and will make little excursions between one word and the next, or pursue reflections of its own, at the same time it attends to the reading. Hence arises the difference, so necessary to be taken notice of, between the letter and the spirit,

for whoever stops at the former, will be very little the better for what he reads: but this spirit must be drawn from our trains, which the author excites, but does not infuse. It has been remarked as one quality of the sublime and of fine humor, that they convey a great deal more than they express, but this More must be something the mind has already in store, and they only draw it up to view: therefore, sublimity of style and delicacy of wit are lost upon the vulgar, who having no proper trains to be excited, descry nothing beyond the obvious meaning of the words, and for that reason, are more taken with plain language, and broad jokes, as leading into trains of thought, to which they have been accustomed. Wit depends chiefly upon allusion for its supplies, and metaphor and many other figures of speech derive from the same source: but what is allusion, besides the suggesting ideas already familiar to the imagination? Transition is the art of leading the mind by gentle and easy turnings, so that she finds herself unawares in a new field, without perceiving when she quitted that she was engaged in before.

6. What has been remarked just now concerning the manner of learning languages, may as justly be applied to all the arts and sciences in general, and to the common actions of life: for in our first attempts upon them, while we are forced to dig up everything by dint of application, how slowly, and awkwardly, and imperfectly do we proceed! but when we have furnished ourselves with proper trains, that will spring up of their own accord, upon touching a link of them, then we can go on expeditiously, readily, and perfectly. For it has been shown in the chapter of Action, that those commonly called so, consist of many single acts, each of which must have its idea directing to perform it: but our thought and care reach no further than to the main action, the particular parts of it must be thrown up by imagination. Therefore the machinery of our organs bears at least an equal share with the mind, in all our transactions, for she only chooses what shall be done next, but the several means, and minute steps necessary for executing it, occur without our seeking. Nor yet would they so occur, unless they had been inured by practice to follow one another successively: from whence it appears, that the disposition of our organs to fall into little series of motions spontaneously, is the thing that gives us all our dexterity and expertness in every kind of action.

Trains are most commonly taken notice of in the memory, because there are the longest, and consequently the most visible: and those little trains, which serve us upon ordinary occasions, depend upon the same disposition of our organs, though we do not usually

call them Remembrance, unless they occur with that additional circumstance of their having been in our thought before. Yet we can often discern their reference to memory, as appears from our usually justifying ourselves upon being criticised at any time for speaking or acting improperly, by alleging that we remember others saying or doing the same upon the like occasion. Wherefore, the ancients made Mnemosyne the mother of the Muses, supposing memory the ground-work and foundation of all skill and learning: nor is it improbable that the structure of a man's organs, which enables him to remember well, may render him equally capable of any other accomplishment, with proper cultivation.

7. As much a paradox as it may seem, I shall not scruple to assert, that if it were not for our trains, we could not have that entertainment we receive from novelty: for things so far out of the way of all former experience, as that we cannot tell what to think of them, appear strange and uncouth; but there is a difference between strangeness and novelty: the latter belongs to objects that work new openings into old trains, and so give them a play that was not common to them before: or else renew a former course of thought, that has been long intermitted. For we may observe that a new play, a new pattern of flowered silk, or a new anything, does not please, if it does not in any respect resemble what we have seen of the kind before, or does not suggest some little trains of reflection, besides the bare sight: and after we have forgotten it for a time, it may give us the pleasure of novelty again. If objects engage us in trains that will not readily coincide, they raise our wonder: but the trains, by being often brought together, open into another at last, whence comes the vulgar saying, that a wonder lasts but nine days. I shall leave it to the critics to settle the precise limits between wonder, admiration, amazement, and astonishment; and only observe that in all of them there is a stoppage of the thought, which being unable to remain entirely motionless, makes little excursions, but finds the trains abrupt, and crossing one another, being perpetually checked and diverted from its usual courses by the object that holds it engaged.

As letters united together compose words, words compose sentences, and sentences discourses, so our ideas run into assemblages and associations; these link in trains, and a texture of trains makes larger trains or courses of thinking; and each species of junction opens a wider field for the mind to expatiate in, for composition greatly increases variety: eight bells tolled singly can give only eight sounds, but above forty thousand changes may be rung upon them. But as the occasions of life and objects surrounding us perpetually require us to alter our course of attention, our

trains branch out into several others, and we are easily diverted into a new track, provided it be done by gentle turnings, and through openings to which we have been accustomed.

8. This disposal of ideas into trains, and their being interwoven together in a manner suitable to our occasions, gives birth to Order ; which consists not in any number or species of ideas, but in their introducing one another in such successions as shall readily answer our purposes. There are persons who have laid in vast heaps of knowledge, which lie confusedly, and are of no service to them, for want of proper clues to guide into every spot and corner of their imagination : but when a man has worked up his ideas into trains, and taught them by custom to communicate easily with one another, then arises order, and then he may reap all the benefit they are capable of conveying ; for he may travel over any series of them without losing his thread, and find anything he wants without difficulty. Nor is it material for his own private use in what manner his trains lie, provided they be wrought into some uniform plan : but with respect to his intercourse amongst other people, it is very material that he should range his ideas in a manner conformable to their ways of thinking, or they will find nothing regular in them. Were the methodical schoolman and polite pretty fellow to mix in the same company, the discourses of each would appear easy, clear, and pertinent, to those of his own class, but perplexed, dry, and unengaging, to those of the opposite ; for your close deductions of reason seem a heap of rubbish to the man of the world ; and the conversations of the latter, while he keeps up the ball of discourse for a whole evening with smart expressions that come in always pat upon the occasion, are a mere volubility of words, with no more coherence than a rope of sand to one that has immured himself in a college. The discourses of either present the same succession of ideas to the hearer that was in the mind of the speaker, but that succession exhibits nothing regular or coherent to the former, because it does not run in trains familiar to his apprehension. For what is regularity to one man may be all confusion to another : which proves order to be relative, and to derive its existence from the cast of our imagination.

Objects stand in order when their situation corresponds with that of our ideas : and as the moulds of all imaginations are similar in some respects, hence we term things regular or irregular as they tally or not with the trains which the ideas of mankind most generally fall into. Straight lines and easy curves the notice can readily run along, and by travelling frequently in those tracts they become familiar : wherefore figures consisting of them, such as squares, triangles, circles, spirals, serpentine lines, paral-

lel rows, and rays diverging at equal angles from one centre, are esteemed regular, because objects placed in them, link of their own accord into lines, and the mind has but a few parts to put together, in order to form the whole figure, and can range over them by paths to which it has been accustomed: whereas the same objects being jumbled together promiscuously, each of them becomes a separate part unconnected with the rest, and the whole is too numerous for the mind to manage; nor can she find any passage leading to them successively one after another. For the same reason, symmetry and proportion contribute greatly to order, because the one gives dispatch to the eye, by enabling it to take in objects by pairs, and the other smooths the passage over them by the mutual dependence of parts. But the mind must have been enured to observe proportion, or it will lose the benefit resulting therefrom; therefore we see that common persons do not discern half the regularity in a fine building, or other piece of well-proportioned workmanship, that is obvious to connoisseurs; and that they do discern any, is owing to the degree of skill in proportion, which few men are without.

9. Order may be produced without changing the position of things, only by removing whatever would obstruct the eye in its passage along them. When a young lady cuts a curious figure out of paper, she gives no new position to the several parts of her figure, for they had the same situation with respect to one another while they lay in the whole paper as after they have passed through her hands. And indeed every sheet of paper contains all the figures that any clean-fingered damsel can cut out of it: therefore the operatrix is so far from creating the figure, that she spoils all others that might have been formed out of the same sheet, so that for one she seems to make she really destroys a thousand. Nevertheless, she produces order and regularity where there was none before, only by snipping away the superfluities of the paper from her figure, and thereby leading the eye along all the mazes and windings comprehended therein.

As order consists in the correspondence of objects with our ideas, it is all one whether the former be placed in figures familiar to our apprehension, or whether the latter be worked into trains conformable to the position of things we behold: order will ensue alike in both cases. New prospects generally appear irregular, until by frequent contemplating they grow into form without any real alteration in the scenes: nor is there anything so irregular but by pains and long acquaintance may be brought to lie in order in our imagination. What can be more a wilderness than the great town of London to strangers? they can scarce stir a hun-

dred yards without losing themselves. But the penny-postman finds no perplexity in his walks to any part of it : he reads only the name of the street, or court, or alley in his superscription, and instantly the way thither occurs to his thought. Were some fairy while he sleeps to dispose the houses into straight lines, crossing each other at right angles like the streets of Babylon, he might not perhaps, at first, find his way about the town so readily as he does at present.

10. Whatever situation men have accustomed themselves to place things in, is order to them, though perhaps nothing like it to anybody else. When one steps into the shop of a country chandler, or haberdasher of small wares, one is apt to wonder how they find everything so readily as they do : but custom has brought their ideas into a conformity with the position of their wares, so that upon any particular thing being asked for, their thought runs in train to the proper drawer ; and were we to place their goods otherwise, though in a manner we should think more regular, they might justly complain we had put them out of order. We studious folks generally have each of us a way of placing our implements peculiar to ourselves, the ink-glass must stand just in this spot, the penknife in that, the pens in another, and the books and papers have their several stations allotted them, so that we may presently reach what we want without loss of time or interruption of our studies. As soon as our back is turned, in comes the maid to clean the room : she cannot dust the table while it remains covered, so she removes all our things, and never replaces them as they were before. Not but that the wench is careful enough to set all to rights again, but her ideas of order being different from ours, she lays the folio underneath, then the papers upon it, blank or written as they come to hand, and the smaller things on top of all : so that on our return we find everything at the same time in the neatest order and the utmost confusion, for we are forced to tumble over the whole parcel to come at any individual we want.

Thus order often respects convenience ; for we say things are in their places when they lie handy for our purposes, so that we can execute them without interrupting or deviating from the plan of action we had laid down. Nor does use give occasion to order less frequently than convenience : when things stand in such a situation as to produce some advantage that would not have accrued from them in any other, we say they are in order, and the want of that situation we call disorder. Thus, disorders of the body, of the air, or the elements, are nothing but such commixtures of their parts as destroy the soundness of health, disturb the animal

functions, or stop the progress of vegetation; and without a reference to some such consequences as these, we should not term them disorders. And this kind of order, resulting from use and convenience, refers either to the disposition of things we have usually beheld them in, or to the train of thought of some agent placing them in that manner. For though chance might once in a while dispose matters very cleverly for our purpose, we should not conceive them the more orderly upon that account. If a traveller, upon perceiving himself thirsty, should immediately espy a bough of ripe apples hanging over his head, and wanting a stone to beat them down, should find one lying just before him, and a little further a knife to pare them, dropped by some careless passenger; all this would suggest nothing of order, unless he supposed them laid there on purpose.

What we call the order of nature does not consist only in the position of things considered in themselves, but either in their being so disposed as to produce the uses derived from them, or their moving in rotation by constant returns of the same changes. Under the former view, we see the bodies of this vast fabric of the world, minute and large, the fibres of plants, the vessels of animals, the luminaries of heaven, contributing in their several stations to the support and conveniences of life, and other purposes, in a manner we could not in any degree imitate in things under our own management, without design and contrivance: which, therefore, leads our thoughts into trains composing the plan exhibited thereby. Under the latter view, we observe the stated successions of night and day, the vicissitudes of seasons, the progress of vegetation from the seed to the blade, the bud, the flower, and the seed again, the stages of growth in animals, the circumvolutions of the firmament; and having joined our observations into a system, there springs up order therefrom, which increases in proportion as we can add new branches to our scheme. In ancient times, the fixed stars, only, were esteemed regular, as rising and setting always at equal intervals, and keeping their positions with respect to one another, while the other seven, being thought reducible to no certain rule, were styled Planets or Wanderers: but later discoveries having brought their motions too into a system, we now admire the wonderful regularity of their courses.

Nor let it be said there was an order in all these particulars, before men took notice of it; for if we place order in the position of things taken absolutely without reference to our ideas, there will be no such thing as disorder in nature. Every number of things, not excepting the wildest productions of chance, must lie in some position or other; and were there an understanding

pliable, and comprehensive enough to strike out trains immediately among any collection of objects, and discern their respective situations, as clearly as we do in scenes the most familiar to our acquaintance, it would not know what irregularity was. Therefore, if we make a distinction between orderly and disorderly, or the latter term has any meaning in language, it must belong to such positions of things, as do not correspond in their parts with any courses our ideas usually fall into, nor are reducible to any system in our imagination.

11. Did order exist in things, there could not be an order of time and of causes : for there exists no more than one point of time, and one step of causation in every moment : but this single object is not capable of order, unless in conjunction with the series of events preceding, or to follow after, which being never existent together, cannot be the residence of any quality. Therefore it is the ideas of past and future occurrences brought together in the mind, that renders them capable of order, which they then receive, when she can discern their connections and dependencies upon one another. If we consider objects co-existing together in the same scene, we shall find that though they can have no more than one position at once, they may contain a variety of orders. The spots of a chess-board lie in eight equal rows, with their flat sides turned towards each other : they lie likewise in fifteen unequal rows of lozenges, touching at the angles; the middlemost having eight spots in length, the next on each side seven a piece, and so falling off until you come to single ones at the corners : and they lie also in squares inclosed within one another, the innermost consisting of four spots, the next of twelve, or four on a side ; the third of twenty, or six on a side ; and the outermost of twenty-eight, or eight on a side. These three forms of order, besides others that might be traced out, are generated in the imagination, and may be changed, or cast into one another at pleasure, successively, without making any alteration in the chess-board, only by the eye compounding its objects variously, and running along in different courses of observation.

12. But those courses, or the component parts of them, must be such as were familiar to us before, or we must render them familiar by practice and application. And what is more remarkable, after we have brought our thoughts to run currently along a train of ideas, they cannot always run back again the contrary way, although in the same track. Take a sheet of paper written on one side in a fair legible hand, an easy style, and familiar language, turn it upside down, or hold it against a strong light, with the back part towards you, and though you have a full and clear view of

the writing, you see nothing but perplexity and confusion : you must pick out letter by letter, and spell every word as you go along. If any particular form of objects, or their situation, with respect to one another, constituted the essence of order, this could not happen, for the form of things does not depend upon their postures : a man does not lose his human shape by being set upon his head, nor does a horse undergo a metamorphosis every time he rolls upon his back, neither do the words lose their places, nor the letters their joinings, by a different manner of holding the paper : but the mind has always been used to read them from left to right, and therefore cannot follow in any other course. What then, is there a right hand and a left in the mind itself? or have her perceptions a loco-motion, which can proceed only in one particular direction? Let us rather attribute the cause to the motion of our internal organs, running mechanically in the courses to which they have been accustomed. For as the blood circulates from the heart to the arteries, and returns back again through the veins, but cannot take a contrary round, beginning first at the veins, and thence proceeding to the arteries ; so the channels of our ideas give them a free passage in that course they have been used to, but close against them upon their return. Our mental organs, indeed, are of so soft and pliable temper, as that they may be brought to admit trains passing through them either way, for there are some figures we comprehend presently, whichever part of them first catches the eye : but then this must be effected by long practice, by frequently running them over, backwards and forwards in our thoughts, or, by having been used to see them in all aspects wherein they can be placed.

But though order subsists only in the conformity of our trains, with the position of objects, yet is it not produced by a voluntary act of the mind : for we cannot see order wherever we please, nor can we avoid seeing it in some subjects, if we will contemplate them at all : which I suppose has made it be imagined that things were essentially and absolutely regular or irregular in themselves. The mind, as we have shown before, may, by painful application, bring any set of objects, how confused soever, to lie in trains, or the same may be brought to pass without industry, by long and intimate acquaintance : but when the organs have once acquired a habit of throwing up ideas in that manner, corresponding with the situation of objects, they will afterwards exhibit order upon sight of them without aid of the mind, and solely by virtue of their own machinery.

13. I have but one or two observations more to make upon trains, which are, that they grow quicker by continual use, and if

short, unite at last into combinations, or if long, the middle links frequently drop out, or pass so swiftly as not to touch the notice. When children learn to read, they join the letters and syllables in trains to form words, and the words to form sentences. By degrees they do this faster, and in process of time the whole word or sentence arises to their view in one assemblage. When we would recollect the members of a family, where we are tolerably well acquainted, we find the ideas of them introduce one another in trains, but after having lived, or conversed daily among them for some time, upon hearing the name of the house, the whole association of persons belonging to it starts up instantly to our fancy. And when the channels of our ideas are worn smooth by constant use, the current runs too rapid for the notice to keep pace with it. I have met with persons who could understand more of what they read in Latin or French, than in English, because their mother tongue affording too easy a passage to their thoughts, they skim lightly over the surface, and never touch the greater part lying at the bottom.

CHAP. XI.

JUDGMENT.

NARROW as we must acknowledge our capacities to be, they can nevertheless give harbor to several ideas, and several combinations at the same time. External objects continually pour a variety of sensations upon us, which do not so fill the imagination, but that reflection still finds room to throw in other ideas from her own store. And when the notice touches upon two or more ideas together, there generally arises another, not compounded or extracted from them, but generated by them, to wit, an idea of comparison, resemblance, identity, difference, relation, distance, number, situation, or other circumstance belonging to them: all which, in metaphysical language, are comprehended under the general term of Judgment, which, in common speech, we distribute into several species, as knowledge, discernment, opinion, and appearance, not indeed very accurately, as not always adhering inviolably to that division, but often using them promiscuously for one another.

2. Single ideas may be expressed by single words, as a man, a color, motion, gratitude; for upon hearing the sound, the whole idea associated therewith starts up instantly to the thought: but to

express a judgment, you must employ a proposition, which always contains three parts at least, namely, the terms, and the judgment, passed upon them; as, man is an animal, fire consumes wood, one egg resembles another. For though we have sentences consisting only of two words, as, Peter lives, Thomas sleeps, the earth moves, which therefore seem to contain no more than one term, yet that there is another implied appears manifest, because we may express that other, without adding anything to the sense: for Peter is alive, Thomas asleep, the earth in motion, convey not a whit more than was conveyed by the shorter sentences above cited. And though many times one of the terms be comprehended within the other, as being an ingredient of the assemblage, expressed thereby, yet must it be taken out from the assemblage, and stand apart, before we can judge anything concerning it. The idea of man includes that of life, activity, reason, and several other particulars; but this idea, contemplated ever so long, will make no proposition, nor produce any judgment, unless some of those particulars be considered in the abstract, and beheld in the same view as it were by the side of the concrete; and then we can discern that man is a living, an active, or a rational creature. But this abstract is as much a complete idea, when compared with assemblages comprehending it within them, as when compared with others that do not: the idea of sweetness being as distinct from that of sugar whereof it is affirmed, as from that of gall whereof it is denied: and he that thinks of the former, has no fewer ideas in his mind, than he that thinks of the latter.

3. That judgment likewise, although the production of the terms, for we cannot judge without something in our thoughts to judge upon, is nevertheless a distinct idea from the roots whereout it grows, cannot be doubted when we reflect, that many things occur to our view, and affect our notice in some degree, without our passing any judgment upon them. We may see leaves falling from the trees, birds flying in the air, or cattle grazing upon the ground, without affirming, or denying, or thinking anything concerning them: and yet perhaps we had taken so much notice of them, that, upon being asked a minute afterwards, we could remember what we had seen. A man may have beheld a field from his window a hundred times, without ever observing whether it were square, or pentangular, and yet the figure was exhibited to his view every time he looked upon it: and we have observations suggested to us sometimes, upon things extremely familiar to our acquaintance, which we acknowledge very obvious, when put in mind of them, although we never hit upon

them ourselves. It is notorious that men judge variously of the same objects, and so do the several faculties of the same man upon many occasions ; Appearance, which is the judgment of sense, being opposite to Opinion, or the judgment of understanding. For we believe the sun to be an immense globe, much larger than all the countries we ever travelled over, while it appears at the same time to our eyes, but as a little ball, that one might roll about in a bushel. And though the apparent magnitude of objects is supposed to depend upon the angle they subtend at our eye, nevertheless our familiarity with them changes our estimation of their bulk. Why does the sun look smaller than the house, and yet a man at twenty yards distance, does not look smaller than your hand, although you might quite cover him from your sight by holding it up at arms-length before you? Unless because we continually see men close by our side, whereas we never saw the sun so near as to subtend a greater angle than the house.

4. Hence it follows incontestably, that judgment is an act of reflection, never thrown upon us by external objects, but something done upon the ideas after their entrance. Therefore the schoolmen reckon it a second act of the mind, distinct from the first, called simple apprehension, whereby we receive the ideas conveyed by sensation, or turned up by the workings of imagination. But if it be an act of the mind, it is, as well as apprehension, an act of her perceptive faculty, wherein the mind remains purely passive, and only receives what some other agent strikes upon her. For judgment is not a voluntary act, any further than that in many cases we may choose whether we will consider things attentively enough to discern their relations or resemblances : but this we have not always in our option, for sometimes they force upon us, whether we will or no ; and when we fix our attention voluntarily, the judgment formed thereupon is not the work of the mind, for she cannot discern snow to be green, nor twenty to be less than fifteen, but must take such estimation as results of its own accord, from the subject she contemplates. It is true we sometimes judge amiss through the fault of our Will, when we had materials before us for doing better, but this we do by the power we have over our ideas to overlook, or as it were, squint upon some, and hold others in a steadier view ; but what is done by the instrumentality of ideas, although remotely our own act, and therefore justly chargeable at our door, is nevertheless the immediate operation of the instrument ; just as an impression is made by the seal, although we press it down upon the wax ourselves.

5. Since then the mind is purely passive in the act of judg-

ing, as well as of apprehending, we must seek for some agent to produce that effect upon her : and what can this be besides the mental organs ? I shall not pretend to explain by what particular figure or motion they do their work : for we cannot pry into a man's sensory while he thinks, to discern what disposition of the fibres in any case either of sensation or reflection, affects him with this or that perception ; but it seems undeniable that they must have a different modification, when they enable us to pass a judgment, from that whereby they exhibit the ideas whereon we judge. For else why do not all objects, when clearly discerned, suggest all the relations they stand in to one another, or all the comparisons that may be drawn between them, or why do men judge so variously upon the same subject ? The papist thinks persecution a duty, the protestant thinks it none ; they both have the same terms in their thought, and therefore so far their organs are modified alike, but they judge of them differently, and that judgment is not of their own making, but something they discern in their view of the objects they contemplate ; consequently the modification exhibiting this part of their view, being different in one from what it was in the other, cannot be the same with that which was alike in both. One may read the words, Persecution, Duty, without any connecting verb between them, and in that state they convey the ideas of the things expressed by them complete ; if we proceed to affirm or deny the one or the other, we may perceive our prospect enlarged beyond the bare sense of those two disjointed terms ; but there can be no increase of prospect, without the accession of another object to behold, which must be some new modification superadded to the former, or generated thereby.

6. As judgment seems an act subsequent to the apprehension of the subject whereon it is pronounced, one would expect there should be some time intervening between the one and the other, and so in fact we often find there is, for we sometimes hold objects a considerable while in contemplation before we can decide concerning them : but in things familiar to our knowledge, the judgment rises instantaneously, and in the same view with the objects, by that quality we have observed belonging to ideas following in train, of quickening their pace by degrees, until at last they coincide into one combination. A man knows his own horse, his own house, his bosom friend, immediately upon sight, without waiting for any further operation to be made upon the ideas presented by his optics. And this is what we call the evidence of sense, which we abuse, without reason, for perpetually deceiving us ; whereas the senses cannot well deceive, because, strictly

speaking, they never inform us of anything, they throw in their ideas, but the opinion entertained thereupon is generated by the reflection. At least, we make them depose things of which they cannot give us sufficient information. Is it not thought vouching the testimony of the senses, when, upon being asked how you know that Alderman Punctual sits in Guildhall, you answer, Because I see him there? That John is in the kitchen, Because I hear him talking? That there is such a passage in Virgil, Because I read it there? An utter stranger to John and the Alderman, or one who had not learned to read, would know this never the more for anything he should see or hear, but if his senses are as acute as yours, they throw in the very same sensations upon him as they do upon you : therefore if they furnish you with an evidence he has not, they must fetch that evidence from some other quarter than the eyes or the ears. When we talk of seeing tables, chairs, and such like common objects, we ascribe more to the senses than properly belongs to them ; for we see only colors, it is our former knowledge of things that informs us what they are. Nor let it be said, that though we may attribute too much to the senses, yet something remains justly their due, because upon being shown a thing we never saw before, though we cannot tell particularly what it is, nor what name to call it by, we may nevertheless see that it is made of wood or steel, that it is soft or hard, stiff or limber : for this partial knowledge arises from the former acquaintance we have had with wood or steel, or the usual look of things, upon their hardening or softening, or the posture they fall into by their flexibility. Therefore if a statue of exquisite workmanship has the same look in the limbs and drapery, that we have never used to see in stone, but see continually in flesh and garments, we say it looks soft and pliant.

7. Even distance and figure, which seem to bid the fairest for being judgments of sense, do not come solely from thence ; for we find people judge very differently of distances anything remote, according as they have used themselves to observe them : and though we judge a little better of things near us, because we have perpetual occasion to take notice of their situation, yet there are few persons who can always tell whether two shelves of a book case, standing just before them, lie further apart than any other two, until they measure them. I have read a printed account of a boy, who being born blind, was brought to his sight by couching, at the age of fourteen : after being permitted to go abroad some time, one evening he was lost, and upon searching, they found him upon the leads of the house. It seems he had been in the street, and upon seeing the Moon peep a little over

the roof, he was going to climb up the tiles in order to catch her : which shows he had no idea of the remoteness either of the Moon, or of the pavement from the gutter where he stood, or else he would have been afraid, as much as any of us, of venturing for fear of breaking his neck. I will not vouch for the truth of this story, but it seems very probable, if we may believe what has been held by many learned men, that a person on coming to the use of his sight, would imagine everything lying close to his eye ; and that our knowledge of distance is an art we acquire by degrees, as we grow more and more familiar with objects surrounding us ; and therefore cannot be infused by our optics, which transmit no fewer nor other rays of light from objects the first time we behold them, than the thousandth.

8. Neither does the idea of figure come entirely from the senses. Three of them have no pretence to make the conveyance, and one of the two claiming that privilege, I mean the touch, cannot be applied at once to bodies of any magnitude ; but we must run our finger over the surface and judge of them by piece-meal, not only upon what we feel, but upon what we have felt the moment before ; so that our evidence results from the joint testimony of sense and memory. And for things that we may grasp within our hands, we turn them round and round before we determine, nor then can do it exactly if they be a little irregular. Clap a flat iron sensibly hot or cold upon a man's naked back, and let him describe, if he can, the exact shape of the piece, or whether the angles be obtuse or acute : perhaps he might guess nearer if laid upon his hand, because the hand has been more exercised in judgments of this kind, not that it has a quicker sense of feeling than many other parts of our flesh. Nobody can tell the shape of the gout or cholic he feels, which yet he might be expected to do, if the figure were included in the sensation of feeling : neither can one determine the shape of a bruise by the smart, though one may by pressing the parts of it successively with a finger. And that we gather the form of things from sight as well as touch, seems to indicate that they are not ideas of sensation, for the senses all have their distinct provinces allotted them, sensations entering at one avenue, cannot find a passage through the others. But waving this argument, if the two senses gave evidence of figure, they ought always to agree in their testimony immediately upon examination, which, whether they do or no, let the works of painting and sculpture determine. In the letters between Locke and Molyneux we find both those gentlemen, and they tell us, all others upon maturely considering the question, agreed that a blind man perfectly well acquainted with globes and cubes, would not,

upon being suddenly endued with sight, be able to distinguish thereby, which was the globe, and which the cube. And I may propose another question, whether a man having often seen globes and cubes, but never touched anything of either form, would not be as much puzzled to know them apart, upon being put into his hands in the dark. Whoever resolves these questions in the negative, must acknowledge that neither sense, without some previous acquaintance, can give evidence of figures very well known to us by the other : and they cannot be said to agree in their testimony, when the old sense, prompted by experience, deposes positively, while the new, although conveying all that mere sensation can convey, professes to know nothing of the matter.

9. Did the eyes transmit the idea of figure by immediate sensation, they would exhibit one and the same in all prospects, to wit, the circle or ellipsis bounding the scene before us, for all objects lying within that compass strike upon the optics promiscuously, the chairs together with the wainscot around them, and the floor seen between their frames, the books close to one another, and touching the shelves whereon they stand : wherefore it is the notice, not the eye, that runs the lines of separation between one thing and another, without which their figures could not be ascertained. We have shown in speaking of order, how fancy may cast objects into various forms, while the sensations excited by them remain exactly the same : the marshalling the spots of a chessboard into parallel rows, or lozenges, or enveloping squares, still holding the board in one position, was not the work of our optics, but of some more internal cause. Even colors, although conveyed directly by vision, are not distinguished from one another by the sight alone, for we may see cattle in the fields without regarding their difference of color ; and when we do regard it afterwards, it is by an act of reflection, no new sensation being obtained upon the second view which we had not in the former. From whence we may conclude, that sensation operates no further than to throw materials into the imagination to be worked up there : and that the business of selection, composition, association, comparison, distinction, and judgment, belongs to other powers operating after the senses have done their office.

10. Nevertheless, the evidence of sense being an expression current among mankind, I am very far from desiring to discard it, on the contrary, I shall employ, and may lay great stress upon it myself, as occasion shall offer : all I meant by the foregoing observations was to explain my sentiments of what is to be understood by the expression, which I conceive to denote, not anything thrown in upon us from external objects, but that judgment

occurring to the thought instantly and involuntarily, without deduction of reason, or chain of consequences, upon ideas being exhibited by our senses. And I so little undervalue this evidence, that, in my present opinion, I think it never ought to be, and perhaps never is, rejected, unless when overpowered by other evidence of the same kind, or by reasonings grounded thereupon.— Why do we believe a stick to be straight, although appearing crooked in water, but because upon drawing it out we see the crookedness vanish, or running our finger along, we feel no bend where there seemed to be one? Why do we believe the sun an immense body, notwithstanding its apparent smallness, but for reasons drawn from the phenomena of that and other objects we have seen at various distances, and from various situations?

11. Our internal sense or reflection furnishes us with an evidence of the like kind; for we judge as commonly, as instantaneously, and as necessarily, upon objects we remember, as upon those we have before our eyes. These judgments are often weaker and less steady than those of immediate sensation, our ideas continually fluctuating, and varying both in color and shape: but if we can fix them by contemplation or habitude, the judgments resulting from them strike as vigorously as those of the senses.— And even in their unsettled state, although we cannot judge critically and fully, yet we may discern something clearly concerning them, because their fluctuation keeps within certain limits sufficient to answer our purpose. The idea of an elephant never contracts so small as to come within the compass of that of a mouse, therefore we can always tell which has the greater bulk: yet perhaps our ideas of both are so variable, that we could not determine between two elephants or two mice upon the pictures of them in our memory, without seeing the creatures stand together side by side. Nor are confused ideas utterly incapable of suggesting any clear conception concerning them. Mr. Locke says we have a very confused idea of substance; yet who does not know the difference between substance and shadow? which latter too seems to lie a little confused in the minds of many learned men, for they think they have done notably when they define shadow the absence of light: but the words of this definition contain an idea of light, for you must have the thing in your thought whereof you predicate the absence; and I appeal to every man, whether he finds the idea either of light or absence occur whenever he looks upon a shadow: nevertheless we can think currently and talk intelligibly of shadows, their figures, magnitudes, and motions, and so we can of substances, their qualities, and modifica-

tions, without perhaps having a quite clear and adequate idea of either.

12. Ideas of reflection, strictly so called, generate judgments no less than those derived originally from sensation: justice, mercy, approbation, virtue, duty, and other abstracted ideas, being as frequently made the terms of a proposition, both in our thoughts and discourses, as colors, sounds, or touches, and their relations, similitudes, and differences, as obviously discerned when we are gotten as well acquainted with them. For let us observe, that the internal sense, as well as the external, only exhibits objects to our apprehension, and they generate the judgments: now though the child be born some time after the first entrance of the father, yet when grown to strength and maturity, it may accompany him hand in hand, and come together into our presence. Wherefore the faculty of judging, both in the mental sense and the bodily, is an art acquired by time and practice, not an essential quality of the objects to make an impression of conformity or disagreement upon us as soon as apprehended.

13. The schoolmen make a third act of the mind, which they call Ratiocination, and we may style the generation of a judgment from others actually in our understanding: for what is reasoning but discerning the agreement of two ideas between themselves by their agreement with some third? and what is the fruit of reasoning but to beget an assent to some proposition we were ignorant of before? While assent depends upon our view of the premises, the new judgment is yet in embryo; but when perfectly formed, when it can stand alone, and still adhere to the conclusion after the premises drop out of sight, then it becomes of the same nature and has the same force upon us with the evidence of sense. For we hold many things assuredly for truth, and that perhaps upon very good foundation, although we have absolutely forgotten the reasons first inducing us to believe them. And this assurance, we gain sometimes very quickly; if we did not, we could make but little dispatch in business, it being impossible to retain the whole chain of reasoning in our thoughts when it runs to any considerable length: therefore, if we could not rest satisfied in the conviction left by the premises upon a short view of them, we should never arrive at the conclusion desired.

14. There are various degrees of strength in judgments, from the lowest surmise to notion, opinion, persuasion, and the highest assurance, which we call certainty: for we do not believe what weather it will be to-morrow, or what we read in a newspaper, with the same force of conviction as what objects we see before

our eyes, or what we have done ourselves a quarter of an hour ago. If our premises are uncertain, they can throw no stronger light upon the conclusion than they had themselves, or rather than belonged to the weaker, if they happen to differ in lustre: nevertheless, where there are many conspiring to illustrate one point, they may supply by number what they want in vigor; as one may make a prodigious glare with rush candles provided one lights up enow of them. This we commonly find the case in public rumors, which, though perhaps little heeded the first time we hear them, yet when current in everybody's mouth, seldom fail of gaining our assent. So likewise experiments made for discovering the properties of bodies do not always satisfy immediately, until by repeated trials we find them constantly producing the same effect. Repetition likewise of the same evidence sometimes will answer the purpose equally with multitude of witnesses: many people taking up an opinion, slender at first, and upon slight grounds, have by mere habitude of assenting, worked it up at last into a firm persuasion, without any additional proof. Nay, a bare assertion, frequently reiterated, may supply the place of evidence: scarce anybody but has found occasion to remark how the tenets of a sect or party, continually chimed in men's ears without any argument to support them, have been at length received as articles of faith, sometimes even in spite of the most opposite sentiments entertained before. And Archbishop Tillotson assures us, there have been persons who have told a lie so often till they have actually believed it themselves.

15. And as opinions generate, so they die away again by degrees; not only by the force of opposite evidence overpowering them, but by a kind of natural decay. Facts we have read in history, problems we have seen demonstrated in Euclid, having been long out of our thoughts, sink into slight opinions; we think they are so as we conceive, but we are not sure; and upon further disuse the evidence of them may be actually forgot, so that though the terms be suggested, or we remember such matters have been treated of, we can give no assent to them at all. Besides, any one who will take pains may observe that his judgment upon the same point is not always steady, but varies according to the humor or disposition of his spirits: nay, if he holds the same proposition under contemplation a considerable time, he will find the judgment fluctuate while the terms remain unaltered; it will strike sometimes fuller, and sometimes fainter, by intervals, without any apparent cause or argument occurring to occasion the change. A man in liquor judges diversely from what he does in his sober senses: passion notoriously perverts the judgment,

warping it this way or that, according as best suits its purposes, and giving a stronger or a weaker bias, in proportion to the violence whereto it rises : when we wish a thing to be true, we therefore believe it so, desire performing the office of evidence. I grant this most frequently happens through a partial consideration, the notice fixing upon such ideas as make for the favorite opinion, and turning away from all others that might overthrow it ; but one may perceive that inclination sometimes operates upon the judgment alone, without making any alteration either in the number or color of the terms whereon it is passed. The very same arguments, attended to carefully and impartially, do not always make an equal impression in times of joy or melancholy, in vigorous health, or upon a death bed, when relating to things near or remote, in laying a plan of future operations, or entering upon the execution : and this not only by new thoughts occurring, which we had overlooked before, but by a new estimation of the same objects casting a different light upon one another.

16. Let us now look back upon the several changes a judgment may pass through, according as time or other causes increase or abate, or suspend its vigor. A man's own thoughts may suggest, or he may have suggested by another person, a matter of fact, a theorem of mathematics, an axiom of natural philosophy, or a maxim of morality, whereof he may clearly apprehend the terms without giving any assent to it ; he may then be brought to a full conviction of it by setting proper proofs before him, which conviction may remain after the proofs are quite slipped out of his memory : if he thinks no more of it for a considerable while, his persuasion may dwindle into a vague opinion, and in further time wholly vanish away, so that he may now view the same terms with no spark of assent more than he did at the beginning. At all these times the mind does no more than observe the ideas in her thoughts, and if she judges variously, that diversity is not owing to any act of hers, but to the different state of her imagination : she plays the spectator only, discerning the prospect before her, and whether she shall see a full or a faint evidence, or none at all, depends upon what her organs of reflection shall exhibit. This we readily acknowledge in memory, which is one species of judgment ; for what is remembering, but having the idea of a thing we know we had seen before ? everybody will allow that we remember past events according to the traces of them remaining in our memory, and when those traces sometimes happen to be altered, we remember wrong : nor has remembrance been unfrequently compared to reading a written memorandum,

which being obliterated gives us imperfect information, or none at all; or being erased or interlined in our absence, leads us into mistakes. And one might as aptly apply the comparison to all other kinds of knowledge, which being nothing but the perception of what lies in our understanding, may be called reading the characters exhibited by our mental organs, and whatever changes the inscription there must of course produce a like alteration in our perceptions.

17. From hence arises a curious question, Whether, if it were possible for two men to transport their minds suddenly into one another's seats, each would not instantly lose his own ideas and acquire those of the other. I think it cannot be doubted the exchange would be complete with respect to sensation, for the senses must convey all their notices to the present inhabitant, not being able to reach the former occupier now removed to a distance. It seems probable that each would be able to repeat whatever the other had learned by heart, and remember occurrences happening to him: and if arts and sciences have their foundation in memory, he would slide at once into possession of all the other's accomplishments. Perhaps it may be thought going too far to suppose they would adopt each other's sentiments, opinions and consciousness, but it would be hard to demonstrate there would not be a thorough exchange in these respects too: so that the Papist might laugh at all revealed religion as being a thing ridiculous in itself, and the freethinker contend tooth and nail for the pope's infallibility: the methodist might clearly discern at one glance the absolute impossibility of miracles, and the rationalist hear revelations conveyed in a whisper, with an evidence greater than that of sense: the philosopher might see there is no enjoyment but in the hurry of company, or a round of fashionable diversions, and the giddy girl discern the vanity of all sensual gratifications, and find herself never less alone than when alone: the saint might tremble at the dread of punishment, being conscious of villainies he never committed, and the murderer look back with joy upon a life of innocence, and feel the comforts of a conscience void of offence.

18. These and such like speculations have put some persons quite out of conceit with their understandings, which they say are incapable of certainty, having no mark to distinguish between that and full assurance, representing the same things variously at different times, and therefore not to be depended upon: for who would credit a witness that should contradict in one breath what he had deposed in another? And indeed if we will consider the matter impartially, we must needs lay aside all claim to absolute

certainty of external objects, of past occurrences, or the success of our most common endeavors: for our knowledge of all these depends upon sense, memory, or experience, which we have sometimes found fallacious, and this fixes such a blemish upon their characters, that we can never be certain they are not so. The utmost that we can know of them is, that in some instances they have constantly agreed in the same story; but for this we must trust our memory: and yet even this amounts no higher than to a negative evidence that we have never been able to detect them, though what we may do in time to come remains still unknown. Even mathematical demonstration depends upon the faithfulness of our memory, to preserve the evidence thrown from the principles in every step of our progress. Therefore it is possible there may be no pictures in the room, though I see them before mine eyes; that I never was in my garden, though I remember walking there this morning; that sugar will not melt in warm water, though I have seen it melted a thousand times; that the angles of a triangle are not equal to two right angles, though I have read it demonstrated in Euclid. For who has seen through all the compass of nature, so as to know without possibility of a mistake what powers there are, yet undiscovered by any man, which may alter the properties of bodies, and vary their operations upon one another, make impressions upon our senses in the manner of external objects, work traces in our memory, draw pictures in our imagination, or stamp judgments upon our understanding, without any of those causes to which we currently ascribe them.

19. Our knowledge never surpasses the degree of assurance we have in our minds, and constantly keeps even pace with it: for whatever other folks may think of us, we always think ourselves that we know for certain what we are firmly persuaded of. The highest pitch to which assurance ever rises is, when we can form no conception how things can possibly be otherwise than as we apprehend them: thus we rest assured the fruit grows out of the earth through the tree, because we cannot conceive how it should come there any other way: but do we certainly know there are no possibilities of which we cannot form any conception? Nor does assurance mount to a less height when we do not than when we cannot conceive anything to bring it lower: we often persuade ourselves things must be so and so, because we cannot account for their phenomena otherwise, yet perhaps another person may suggest an account that shall satisfy us of the contrary. A man in his sleep, entertains as full persuasion of the reality of his dreams, as he does of anything else at other times:

when he wakes, he sees they are mere delusion, not by discovering any defect in the persuasion itself, but by other knowledge derived from former experience; and when this is withdrawn by the return of sleep, he falls into the like delusion again. If you convince a man of an error he was strongly possessed of, you do it, not by showing the insufficiency of his former appearances to beget assent, but by suggesting new ones from arguments not occurring to him before. Nobody will deny we have some assurances that are fallacious, others that are true; but we can see no difference in the countenance of the one or the other while they remain our persuasion: when they have been driven out by opposite evidence, like servants whose faults you seldom hear of till they are turned away, then indeed we may discover their delusiveness, but then they are no longer our judgment; every judgment, while it is our present judgment, carries the same face of veracity. For let us remember that a judgment is a different modification of the organs from those which represented the bare terms whereon it was passed to our apprehension; therefore if I believed a thing yesterday, but am convinced of the contrary to day, though I may recall at pleasure the ideas of the terms, I shall not find the same character of judgment with them that accompanied them then: so I see my mistake by having a different representation of the matter now in my mind, but whatever characters of a judgment we read in the understanding, we have no test to try whether it be genuine or counterfeit. Therefore for aught I can demonstrate to the contrary, Bishop Berkeley may be in the right, and that infinite variety of objects nature seems to present us, may be purely imaginary, and life one continued scene of delusion from the cradle to the grave.

20. But then have we no certainty of the judgments we pass upon ideas in our own minds, though we should have none of external objects? What though our senses, our memory, our experience, may deceive us, yet surely we may know what their representations are, and judge of their similitude or diversity, without any possibility of mistake: for the ideas present before us we see directly and intuitively, not through any medium which might falsify their appearance, nor by footsteps of them left behind, which might alter in shape. If I hold no real pen in my hand, nor see any real table before me, have I not an absolute knowledge of the appearance of both being in my imagination? and may not I pass an unerring judgment upon those appearances? Cannot I discern certainly that my idea of the pen differs from that of the table in color, shape, position, contexture of parts, flexibility, and other particulars? If I never learned my mother tongue but had it inspired

into me just now by the organs of my reflection being made to fall suddenly into their present modifications, do not I understand the meaning of words now in my thought, and see clearly what sense is associated respectively to each of them? Though there should be neither lines nor angles in nature, have we not distinct notions of either, and may we not pronounce safely, that a line drawn between two others from their point of contact, forms two angles, both together equal to the angle formed by the two outermost lines? Thus while the judgment keeps within the compass of ideas immediately exhibited, it seems possessed of absolute certainty: but when confined to these narrow limits, it can be of little use to us, more than bare amusement, not answer any of our purposes in life. How unerring judgments soever we may pass upon our ideas of the pen and the ink-glass, yet if those ideas happen not to correspond with the things themselves, we may puddle about forever without getting up a drop of ink to write with. And if experience has deceived us in the properties of wood and fire, though we reason ever so justly upon the ideas we have of them, we shall never be able to warm ourselves by throwing a load of billets upon the hearth.

21. But our present inquiry regards only the certainty, not the usefulness, of our knowledge: let us, therefore, examine whether we have that absolute certainty we are in quest of, even in our judgments upon ideas actually in our thoughts. In the first place, let us call to mind that the judgment, even in this case as well as in all others, is something distinct from the terms whereon it is passed; therefore there is one step at least between our apprehension of the terms and the judgment resulting from them, and who can ever tell what causes may possibly intervene to give that step a wrong direction, or create a judgment which we suppose to be the genuine offspring of the terms? In the next place, if we had absolute certainty in our ideas, we must be so well acquainted with it as to know perfectly what it is, and should have a standard in our minds whereby to try all other judgments, nor ever after repose an entire confidence in any where the proper characteristic were wanting. In the third place, our knowledge here too rises no higher than to the fullest assurance built upon this foundation, that we cannot conceive any possibility how we should mistake concerning ideas actually before us; but we have shown before that inability of conception is not an unexceptionable evidence. But lastly, the judgments we make upon our ideas sometimes contradict and overthrow one another, nor can we always satisfy ourselves whether we really have those ideas in our minds upon which we reason very currently. After the discredit I have brought upon

our senses, I must not say that we have seen two billiard balls lying close to one another, and upon pushing one of them with a stick they have both moved along; but be it a mere delusion, nobody will deny we have had an idea of seeing such an event in our time. Let us consider what judgments occur upon this little phenomenon, that the hindmost ball moves the foremost, that it cannot give motion before it has any, that it cannot have motion before the other ball has moved away to make room for it. These are judgments made upon ideas actually in our understanding, yet we see how inconsistent they are with each other: therefore there must be some false brother among them, though we know not how to discover him, for they all appear with an equal air of certainty. Let us now examine the terms of our mental propositions, and satisfy ourselves whether we have an idea of mathematical points and mathematical lines, before we presume to determine anything for certain concerning them: for if we can form no conception of a line without thickness, nor a point without any dimensions, what certainty can we have of things whereof we can form no conception? An angle does not lie where we commonly measure it by applying a graduated circle, but at the very point of contact between the two lines, and therefore is itself a point, and all points being destitute of dimensions we cannot conceive one greater or less than another: yet when we affirm a difference in size between two angles, the terms of our proposition are a larger and a smaller point, which we confidently pass our judgment upon without having an idea of them in our imagination. Thus upon the whole I believe we had best not pretend to be wiser than Socrates, and quit claim to all certain knowledge except of one thing, which is, that we know nothing. But then again when we reflect that these arguments against our having an absolute knowledge of anything must necessarily destroy themselves, we can lay no more stress upon them than they have taught us to lay upon those they overthrow: for if our judgments upon ideas present in our imagination may deceive us, the proofs of this very lialeness to deceive, being drawn from ideas in our imagination, may deceive us too; so there still remains a possibility that we may certainly know some things, notwithstanding all the evidence that can be produced to the contrary. Thus we find that single certain truth left us a little before, to wit, that we know nothing, now wrested out of our hands, and ourselves driven into arrant pyrrhonism, as being wholly uncertain whether we know anything or not.

22. We now find ourselves reduced to a state of utter darkness and confusion, the most uncomfortable and mortifying imaginable; therefore it is no wonder if we are willing to try all means

for extricating ourselves out of it : and for that purpose let us review the thesis proposed at first entering upon this question, which was, That our understandings are incapable of absolute certainty, and therefore not to be depended upon. I fear we must admit the assumption, but I think we may deny the consequence : for though our knowledge never rise to certainty, it does not therefore follow that we may never depend upon such knowledge as we have. Nor indeed could we avoid it if we had a mind ; the active powers of man cannot stand idle ; we must be doing something or other every moment of our waking hours, at least, upon every action proposed we must resolve either to do or forbear it : but all the determinations of the Will contain a judgment that the action or forbearance will prove beneficial or satisfactory, and this upon less information in cases requiring haste than we might have had if there had been time to consider ; which kind of judgments prevail upon us all, without exception, the thoughtful and the giddy, the wise and the foolish. Therefore I can by no means agree with those of the ancients who laid down that the perfect wise men would never assent without absolute certainty ; for I suppose they would not have him a lumpish indolent creature : one should rather expect to find him more active and busy than other people ; but without assent there can be no action ; and a certain knowledge in the expedience of measures is not always to be had where nevertheless it is necessary to pursue some measures or other. If the wise man upon a journey inquires the road of a stranger, will he never assent to what is told him until he can assuredly know the character of the informant ? or must he not believe he shall get home in good time while there remains a possibility that an earthquake, an inundation or an insurrection, may have barred up all the passages ? Besides, there are some cases wherein the fulness of assent conduces much to the success of an enterprize : we may remember what Virgil said, They can, because they think they can : a soldier fights the better for believing he shall conquer, and any man might walk on top of a wall as safely as along a board in his chamber floor, if he could persuade himself he was in no danger of falling. Therefore in these cases the wise man, who disposes all things, even the ideas in his own imagination for the best, would exert himself, or at least recommend to others as the wisest thing they could do, to banish all thoughts that might abate the fulness of their persuasion, though he might see at the same time there were very good grounds for them.

23. If we examine into the nature of the mind, we shall find that all evidence begets a proportionable assent where there is no contrary evidence to oppose it : we may observe children ex-

tremely credulous, and trusting to the representations of their senses : if they grow more diffident afterwards, it is because experience informs them of the fallaciousness of men and deceitfulness of the senses. And when we come to riper years, we proceed upon the same rule, yielding to any evidence where we see no reason drawn from our former experience to the contrary ; nor do I imagine the wisest among us would do otherwise. It is a stated maxim, both in law and common practice, that we should esteem every man honest and sincere until something appears to impeach his character, and our judgments are entitled to the same candid presumption : if the first person we meet in the street tells us of something happening in the next, we believe him without reserve, unless the thing appear unlikely, or contradict some other information, or that we discern an archness in his look that raises a suspicion he meant to banter us.

24. It seems almost a self-evident proposition that there must be assurance where there is no doubt ; but dubitation in the nature of it implies an assent to something, if not to the thing doubted of, at least to the reasons occurring for and against it : for if you see none on one side, what can you doubt about ? Hence we find ourselves sometimes wavering in our doubts ; for as ideas fluctuate in our imagination, if the evidence on one side drops out of our thought or loses its brightness for a moment, we find a temporary persuasion of the other, and vice versa ; which shows that even uncertain evidence (for both cannot be true) naturally gains credit upon the mind when appearing without a competitor. Doubts indeed may sometimes seem to arise from the weakness of evidence without needing an antagonist to overthrow it : as upon seeing a person at some distance in the dusk of evening, you doubt whether it be your friend or somebody else, merely from the imperfection of the appearance, without having any particular reason to think it cannot be him. But let us examine whether there be not an opposition of evidence even in cases of this kind : if you were upon a desert island, inhabited only by you two, and could just distinguish something walking upright, I suppose you would make no doubt what it was : therefore this imperfect appearance is sufficient alone to work assurance when it has nothing to stand in competition with it. Perhaps you will say that your reflection of there being no other inhabitant corroborates the testimony of your sight, and both together do the business by their united strength : but should you always stay for that reflection before you gave your assent ? nay, do not you give it sometimes when you have no such reflection to make ? For let us now change the scene to the crowded streets of London : when you see some-

thing in Cheapside that looks like a particular person, you take it to be him at first glance, nor do you begin to doubt until a second thought suggests that hundreds of people pass along there, many of whom may resemble as much as you can see of him by such an imperfect light. Sometimes indeed this suggestion occurs with the first thought, and then the doubt will be as early as the appearance: but this takes nothing from what I have been saying, for it is no proof that an appearance is not sufficient alone to work assurance, because it fails of working it when not alone, but confronted with something else. Nor is the case different in our most careful deliberations from what we have found it in sudden and temporary assents: for what avails consideration unless to discover the evidences on each side the question, and weigh the merits between them? Let a man consider ever so long, he will never reject the first judgment of sense, until he finds it inconsistent with some other appearance, or with his former observations, or with some judgment of his understanding: even when we suspend our assent only to think further of the matter, though we may not have any particular reason occurring to create a doubt, we have that general reason of having experienced the danger of hasty determination; so that we trust our understanding or our experience in the very act of distrusting our senses.

25. Much the same may be said of probability that has been spoken above concerning doubt, for we reckon a thing probable when we discern reasons why it should be, and others why it should not be: but if we lose our assent to the reasons on one side, the other will no longer remain a probability, but will gain our fullest assurance. And even when we seem to deem it probable only for want of better evidence, still it is because we have had experience of things being otherwise under the like appearances. Perhaps there is no other difference between doubt and probability than that in the former our ideas fluctuate, whereas in the latter they continue steady: therefore we cannot estimate the quantity of our doubts, at least only in the gross, as when we talk of doubting much, or doubting a little of a thing, but how much, or how little we can never ascertain exactly; but we can often calculate probabilities, as in chances upon cards and dice, with a mathematical nicety. And though we cannot do this with equal precision in matters of morality, yet many times we can discern clearly on which side the probability lies: when we have once gotten this discernment, after having satisfied ourselves that we had examined all the lights in our power relative to the matter in hand, we generally dismiss those hanging on the weaker side out of our thoughts, as being of no further service, but tending

rather to disturb us in the vigorous pursuit of our measures, and thereby turn the probability into an unreserved assurance; until some new light occurring, or some change of circumstances happening, shall make us judge it expedient to resume the consultation afresh. Nor can you ever unsettle a man in a determination he has fixed upon, without at least suggesting some suspicion that he may have determined wrong, to which suspicion he must assent, or he will never hearken to your remonstrance. Thus we find the mind never totally without an assent to some judgment, either of her senses or understanding, as well in times of doubt and probability, as in those of firm persuasion, as well in contrariety as uniformity of evidence, as well at the beginning and throughout the course of an inquiry as upon the final determination.

26. How idle then is it to talk of the wise man's forbearing to do what all men must do continually? For though wisdom may perfect our nature, it cannot change it, nor transform us into other creatures: therefore the wise man, as a man, must always assent to something, and if so, must assent sometimes to uncertainties, unless you will suppose him to have a full view of all the lights that can fall upon every subject the instant it starts up in his thoughts. Does he never alter his judgment upon better information? Does he never profit by consideration, so as to discern things otherwise than he apprehended them? Do no arguments ever raise a scruple in him upon matters he had no doubt of before? If any of these cases happen, then he once assented to an uncertainty, or, which is as bad, he afterwards doubts or dissents from a certainty. I suppose he may be allowed to dream sometimes in his sleep, and to take his dreams for realities, as much as the rest of us half-witted mortals: therefore that noted liar Fancy gains undoubted credit with him when the judgments of his understanding are shut out from his sight. Thus we see the giving or withholding assent does not depend upon the mind itself, but upon the ideas she has to read in the organization: she cannot lose her perceptive faculty, though she may lose the use of it for want of objects to exercise it upon; nor does her eye grow dim and strong alternately by night and by day: it may be obscured, not impaired, by darkness, nor do the vapors of sleep make any change in the sight, but only in the prospect, and it is in the nature of the mind to assent to whatever appearances that exhibit when all other evidence that might correct them is removed out of her reach. Therefore the difference between a sleeping and a waking man does not lie in the mind, unless understood in that vulgar sense of the term comprehending a corporeal organization, that which pre-

sents ideas being differently disposed, not that which perceives them. And the same causes make the difference between one man and another ; the wise man having many judgments in his understanding which the foolish wants, and being exempt from many appearances which mislead the other : nor does this derogate at all from his merit, provided he have brought his understanding into a better state by his own good management and industry.

27. What then are we to understand when we hear it asserted that the wise man never assents to things uncertain? Is it that he will not assent without absolute certainty? This we have proved to be false in fact. Is it that he will not assent where he discerns their uncertainty? This is saying nothing, for no man assents to a thing at the same time while it appears doubtful to him. The expression then can mean nothing more than that he will not assent rashly, like the common herd of mankind, before he has examined the matter as fully as opportunity will permit, or the lights of his understanding enable him. If he has canvassed the point to his satisfaction formerly, he will still rest satisfied in the consciousness of having done so, unless some fresh information or suggestion not thought of before should require a re-hearing. By following this practice often, he will become acquainted with the degrees of evidence, so as to measure them almost upon inspection, and judge of the weight or frivolousness of objections, and will lay up a stock of principles in his understanding which he may trust to, so as to be able to make his decisions quicker and surer, though less hastily, than other people.

28. Look into Tully's Academics, and other skeptical treatises, and you will find arguments to invalidate the judgment of the senses and understanding, drawn from examples wherein they have deceived us : but how shall we know the truth of those instances, unless we give credit to our experience informing us of them? or what conclusion can we draw from the facts, if we may not depend upon any judgment of our understanding? If those who produce the arguments, and cite the examples, do not assent to the force of the one, or truth of the other, they trifle with us, and deserve no regard ; if they do assent, they practise the very thing they labor to prove unreasonable. What their real sentiments may be I shall not pretend to guess, for they are an unfathomable sort of people, but I think it impossible that one of these two should not be the case with them : either they assent without reserve to the judgments they dispute against, only to show their skill in disputation, or if they really doubt, they assent with as little reserve to the grounds they have for their doubting.

Therefore we need not make a scruple of assenting, after having found that the wise man assents who knows best what is proper, and the sceptic assents in spite of all the pains he can take, or contrivances he can devise to avoid it.

29. Thus this disquisition upon the fallibility of our judgment, which at the beginning perhaps might seem an attempt to unsettle the minds of men, will, I hope, upon taking the whole together, appear to have a direct contrary tendency, and in that prospect I entered upon it; for I look upon this as one of those sources of disputation which must not be dabbled with: we must drink deep, or had better not taste at all, for we shall find at bottom what may remedy any disorder brought upon us by the surface. Men commonly please themselves with a notion of absolute certainty, and may enjoy that pleasure so long as they remain unmolested in the notion: but when a subtle enemy approaches, they will find it an untenable post, and must inevitably be ruined unless they have another fortress to retire to behind. Therefore I conceive nothing conduces more to ensure a tranquillity of mind against all attacks than establishing these two maxims, that knowledge, that is, absolute certainty, was not made for man, but that man is so constituted as to do very well without it. The former may mortify or disturb us a little at first, but the other will set all to rights again, and put us upon a firmer footing than we stood on before: for while placing our dependence solely upon certainty, we could never be secure that our own imagination in some melancholy mood, or the arts of an adversary, might not start objections to wrest our idea of certainty from us, and then we should be left in a state of doubt and despondency, as having nothing to trust to: but being possessed of these maxims, we may allow the objections their full weight, without abating of our confidence in the measures we proceed upon.

30. Hence arises that so much-used distinction between absolute and moral certainty: it is not in the nature of the latter to exclude all possibility of mistake, and therefore it is not destroyed by the suggestion of such a possibility; but it is in the nature of man to repose an entire acquiescence in it to the exclusion of all doubt. And for the attainableness of such certainty I appeal to every man's experience, excepting those who set all their wits at work to undervalue it; nor should I except them, could they be depended upon to give an honest answer: but I refer it to all others, whether they believe them entertaining the least doubt of the force of those arguments they bring to persuade us out of our senses. I shall not undertake to give an exact definition of moral certainty, which may comprise everything belonging to

the term, but I think a man may be said to possess it when he is conscious of having had all opportunities of examining a thing, has considered it thoroughly and impartially, and upon the issue finds a clear judgment remaining in his understanding of its being true, with no probability of the contrary. This I believe all men confide in, and I do not see what the wisest of us can have better to rest his assurance upon. It is true, every man is liable to mistakes, notwithstanding all his care to escape them; but if the error be invincible, you will not blame him for assenting to it as a truth, because nobody could have avoided doing so under the like circumstances; and if it were owing to prejudice or hastiness, still the fault does not lie in his adhering to what appears to him as a certainty, but in his negligence or partiality, while he had the matter under examination.

31. Constant and uniform experience produces the like certainty, and this gives us confidence in the evidence of sense, of memory, and in the judgments of our understanding, upon having found them testify the same thing upon repeated trials. Nor will any man distrust his senses, unless in those instances wherein he has experienced their giving fallacious appearances, as in a stick seen crooked in water, or a square tower seen round at a distance. Neither will he distrust his memory or his understanding, when clear and positive, without some very strong reasons suggested to the contrary, which his understanding must approve of, and his senses, or his memory bear witness to the facts whereon they are grounded. Therefore we may, without imputation of folly, rest assured that the tables, chairs, and other objects, really exist in such figures and places as we see them, that stone is hard, and wood combustible, that occurrences have really happened to us as we remember, that two and two make four, that a part cannot contain the whole, that the principles of arts and sciences are true, the conclusions appearing necessarily to flow from them just, and our established rules of conduct, and argumentation right, until we shall find sufficient cause to doubt of them.

32. For everything, that may seem to contradict an opinion, is not a sufficient cause for doubting: the mind, though compared to an exceeding fine balance, in that it will turn with the slightest hair when nothing lies in counterpoise, yet does not resemble it in all respects; for where the weights are greatly disproportionate, the heavy scale will press down with as strong a force of assurance as if the opposite scale had been absolutely empty. Were a man, whom you know little of, to relate a fact not improbable in itself, you would believe him; therefore he has some weight with you: but if twenty persons of undoubted veracity should assert

the contrary, you would not give a jot the less credit to them, than if the first man had said nothing. So upon hearing a thing reported that we judge utterly improbable, we give no heed the first time, nor the second, but if repeated in many companies, we begin to doubt whether it may not be true: then each report must have some weight singly, for a multitude of nothings can make nothing, yet these small weights have no effect at all until they consolidate, and by their number grow into a great one.

33. The vulgar are commonly very positive, thinking themselves possessed of absolute certainty in almost everything they know: this happens from their weighing their evidences singly, which will naturally produce that effect; for we can judge of weights only by their opposition, because any one thrown in alone drives down the scale forcibly. But the contemplative use themselves to compare the judgments, as well of their senses, as of their understanding, which they frequently find contradictory; therefore they abound in doubts that never enter the head of a common man, which has occasioned doubting to be reckoned the avenue to philosophy: but if it be the avenue, it is no more, nor can one arrive at the thing itself until one has passed it, and he that sticks in the passage had better not have attempted it. The use of doubting is to prevent hasty decisions, and lead to something more sure and certain than we could have attained without it: for the first notices of our understanding direct to many things for our benefit, therefore we suffer damage by parting with them, unless we supply their places by something else more effectual for the purpose.

There is a moderation in all things: a man may as well doubt too much as too little: nor let us run away with a notion that a propensity to doubting shows a sagacity of parts, for it may as well proceed from the contrary quality. We have shown already that in every doubt there is an assent to the validity of opposite evidences, for if the evidence on either side appear invalid, the doubt vanishes; and we have observed that our assent is according to the character we read of the judgment engraven upon the understanding: but the understanding is most perfect when it represents the characters of judgments in the truest colors, neither stronger nor weaker than they deserve. If it be faulty, it may show the thing doubted of in too faint and the cause of doubting in too glaring a light, in which case the doubt will be owing to the dulness not the quickness of the organs. Perhaps a man of more sagacity may have discerned the objection as soon as the doubter, but discerned at the same time that there was nothing in it. He whose views are confined to one narrow point of evi-

dence, will think himself certain because he sees nothing to oppose it; if he can widen them a little, he may discover something to stagger his confidence; but if he can open them still further, he may discern what will bring him again to a fixed determination: and in the clearness and extensiveness of our views sagacity chiefly consists, which gives stronger marks of itself in a quickness of resolving doubts than a readiness of starting them. We can measure evidences no otherwise than by the weight we feel them have upon us; while the weights bear a near proportion to one another, the doubtful beam still nods from side to side; but the excellency of a balance lies, not in having large scales that will hold a number of weights, but in turning upon the smallest difference. Therefore there is a common sense or discretion infinitely preferable to brightness of parts, which indeed has no other value than to furnish weights for it to examine. Whoever is possessed of this quality will steer equally clear of doubt and positiveness; though his scale may be small it will weigh things exactly, he will distinguish the glare of tinsel from the ponderancy of gold, he will reject whatever makes nothing to the purpose, and take into consideration everything pertinent that he has room for, and will be steady in his opinions but not tenacious. Whereas your men of large capacities, if wanting in this quality, get rid of vulgar errors only in exchange for others peculiar to themselves; they are quick at seeing things, but not at comparing them; they argue strongly, but cannot determine justly, and amidst all their caution and reserve you may find them obstinate in some absurdity that everybody else clearly discerns to be such with half an eye.

34. When we reflect on our utter incapacity of attaining to absolute certainty, this is enough, though not to make us doubt of the clear judgments of our understanding, yet to make us acknowledge a possibility of their being erroneous: and this, if not overlooked, must prevent every man from being so wedded to an opinion as to turn a deaf ear upon all evidence that can be offered against it. Wherefore I must look upon those bigots in religion or reason, for there are of both sorts, as very little skilled in human nature, who lay so great a stress upon one kind of evidence as to think no other worth regarding in competition with it. Some ascribe so much to faith, built nevertheless upon human testimony and tradition, as to set it above the strongest contradiction of the senses or the understanding; others, conceiving a thing impossible in itself according to their abstract notions, reject all evidence that can be brought in support of it without hearing. Whereas, if we consult experience, it will testify

that all species of evidence have their turns in prevailing upon us: generally we accommodate our theory to the success we find it have upon trial, but sometimes we correct our senses by our theory, as in the seeming annihilation of water over a fire, in the beginning of motion by matter upon attraction, repulsion, explosion of gunpowder, fermentation, and the like. Sometimes we discover the falsehood of a currently received opinion by reason, at others are convinced of things we thought impossible in nature, by concurrence of testimony. Why then should we reject any means of information put into our power? For no channel can pour it in so fully, but that another may convey more of a kind we could not have expected.

A prudent man indeed will decline inquiry when he has room to think there is design and ability to impose upon him by sophistry, or on the other hand when the motives alleged for entering upon it appear trifling; and it must be left to his discretion to determine when either of these is or is not the case: but he will never think himself so sure of any point as to render all further examination needless upon whatever grounds or by whatever persons recommended. For my part, as well persuaded as I am that two and two make four, if I were to meet with a person of credit, candor, and understanding, who should seriously call it in question, I would give him the hearing: for I am not more certain of that than of the whole being greater than a part, and yet I could myself suggest some considerations that might seem to controvert this point. The time that has passed from all eternity before building the tower of Belus, was but a part of that time which has passed to this day, and that still to come is a part only of that which was to come in the days of Nimrod: and the time before and after any moment you can assign, are component parts of all time: yet one cannot say whether either of these parts be less than their wholes. Yet for all this, and notwithstanding my acknowledging the fallibility of our clearest judgments, I cannot find the least shadow of doubt in my mind whether two and two make four, nor whether the whole be greater than a part, but build anything I can upon them as upon sure and certain principles. Nor am I singular in this respect, for I observe that other-people as well of great as small capacities do the same, and sometimes give an unreserved assent to things, even in cases where they themselves acknowledge a possibility of mistake. For we all acknowledge the uncertainty of life, and that a man under the strongest appearances of health, may be cut off in a moment by an apoplexy or other sudden disorder, yet we depend without reserve upon our common actions of the day, and upon other persons keep-

ing their appointments: much more do we hold, without scruple, such maxims as the two above mentioned, whereof we cannot conceive any possibility how they can be otherwise than true, although there may be possibilities which we cannot conceive.

35. This moral certainty then, which is the portion of man, we must be understood to mean when we speak of knowledge: for whoever has all the information the nature of the thing will admit of, with a clear judgment of its being true, and no scruple of doubt to the contrary, may be said in propriety of speech to know it. Therefore those who would prove that we know nothing, because we have no absolute certainty, are guilty of a gross abuse of language, ascribing another sense to the term, than the general consent of mankind has allotted it. For no man who asks whether you know that Mr. Such an one is in town, means to inquire whether he may not be dropped down dead since you saw him, or sent for away upon some pressing occasion, which you could not foresee: nor if he asks any other point of knowledge, will he understand any more by your answer, than that you have a reasonable assurance, without any mixture of doubt of the truth of what you tell him. And he that should say he does not know where he breakfasted this morning, what it is he holds in his hand, what he shall do this afternoon, or when the moon will be at the full, when he has this reasonable assurance, would speak an untruth, because he would convey other ideas to the hearer, than the expressions carry in his own mind.

Therefore we may lawfully claim to know, or be certain of some things, for the common use and propriety of language will justify us in so speaking; and may place a full reliance on those deductions which appear to flow necessarily from them, after examining every corner that might contain a latent fallacy, for it is in our nature so to do. All sound reasoning must rest upon this basis, and what has this basis to rest upon will never fail to satisfy: this entire acquiescence then is the utmost I aim at in the course of my present inquiries, for I pretend not to absolute certainty. I endeavor to collect such particular exercises of the faculties as I conceive every man's experience will bear witness to be fact when put in mind of them, and suggest such observations as appear naturally resulting therefrom. I make no new weights, nor expect to be helpful any otherwise than by handing those into the scale that lay neglected, or sorting them together in a manner not done before; but I leave it to every one who shall vouchsafe me the hearing, to hold the balance himself: if I should be so

fortunate as to procure a moral certainty; it is all I desire, and all I need, for I do not fear its having a proper effect.

One inconvenience happens from acquiescence being our only mark of certainty, for it gives us an unlucky bias, and makes us partial in our judgment, because when evidence offers in support of the thing we wish to be true, the mind receives it with pleasure, and mistakes that complacency for an acquiescence in the weight of the evidence. And perhaps we should always labor under this infirmity, if the mischiefs, frequently consequent upon such mistakes, did not teach us better caution. Therefore we see children and persons of little consideration very apt to judge according to their desires, until experience and proper observation upon that experience in some measure remedy the evil: but we can never get rid of it entirely, wherefore the laws will not allow a man to be judge or witness in his own cause, nor can the most judicious persons ever trust their judgment so securely as in matters wherein their own interest or inclination have no concern.

36. It has been currently held, that there were certain truths imprinted upon the mind by nature, but since Mr. Locke has fully refuted the doctrine of innate ideas, another opinion has been taken up, of the mind having a particular faculty to judge between her ideas, distinct from that whereby she apprehends them: therefore we find three kinds of operation ascribed to her, simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Ratiocination, and it is supposed there are some truths and conclusions necessarily obvious to every man, as soon as the ideas or the premises are clearly apprehended. But for my part, I can see no foundation for such a triple capacity, the single faculty of perception seeming to me sufficient for all those operations, according to the prospect lying before us in the understanding. Nobody will deny that we acquire the knowledge of some truths long after being made acquainted with the terms whereof they are affirmed, and learn rules of argumentation by which we can make a use of premises that we could not do before; and in process of time we retain those truths and practise that manner of reasoning, after having utterly forgotten the evidences and rules that taught us them. Wherein then lies the difference between a man before and after he has attained this knowledge? Is it in his faculty which receives an additional strength? or is it only in the objects he has to behold? He could look back upon his thoughts before and clearly discern whatever they represented, but found there only the naked terms: and now he does no more than look back in the same manner, but finds, besides the terms, a judgment concerning them, which he does not create by any act of his, but discerns by inspection upon the tra-

ces of his understanding. Even the most obvious truths may be overlooked, while the ideas they belong to are in our thoughts; a man may see two pair of horses without ever considering that they make four: but if the mind had several faculties which were severally affected by the same ideas, since they must all be passive faculties, one would expect that whatever is present, and operates upon the mind, should equally affect them all. If it be said we overlook the judgment for want of reflecting, I would ask what else is reflecting besides turning the mental eye inwards, which is the same act in looking for judgments as for naked ideas of terms, and differs only in being directed to different objects. Therefore while we speak of the mind, and not of the man, comprehending his body or finer organization, I can see no more reason to suppose one faculty for apprehending, another for judging, and another for reasoning, than to suppose one faculty for seeing blue, another for yellow, and another for scarlet.

37. When I make judgment a distinct idea from that of the terms, I do not mean that it may be separated from them so as to be discerned apart by itself, for one cannot judge without some ideas to judge upon, but this does not hinder its adding to the prospect exhibited by the terms alone: for there are ideas received by sensation, which cannot subsist without others, and nevertheless are really distinct from those whereon their subsistence depends. We cannot see motion without seeing somebody move, yet none will pretend our idea of motion is contained in that of the body, which we had complete while we saw it at rest; but when put in motion it presents a new idea it did not before, and we discern this new circumstance of motion by the same sense of vision wherewith we discern the body itself. So we may reflect on a cow and a sheep, without thinking whether one be larger than the other, and when we make this second reflection, though it cannot subsist without the former, it has something more for its object, nor does there need any other faculty to apprehend this additional object of the judgment, than that whereby we apprehend the subjects whereon it is passed.

38. But improvements in knowledge, as well by reason as experience, arise from the transferable nature of judgment: for the premises transfer their certainty to the conclusion, and particular facts transfer their degree of evidence to the opinion they tend to establish, until they grow into a certain experience. I do not reckon the translation made while we cannot assent to the conclusion, without contemplating the proofs: but when we can use it as a principle, and whenever we reflect upon it find the characteristic of truth associated with it in the same combination. This we

very frequently do, for we have many judgments to which we give an unreserved assent; we are sensible we learned them, though we cannot tell where, or when, or how we learned them. Nay, sometimes when we cannot recollect who told us of a thing, we know we must have heard it, somewhere and not dreamed it, by the strength of persuasion we find accompanying our idea.

Yet our judgment cannot all come to us this way, because we must have had some previously to our entering upon it; experience must have a beginning, and reason must have some principles to build upon, already known and assented to, before she goes to work upon them. We begin to judge very early, as early or rather a moment earlier than we begin to act, for we never act without an apprehension of expedience in the action: therefore the first judgment we ever made must precede the first action we ever performed, and consequently must precede all experience we could have of our own power or the effects of it. The child does not try to throw off its swaddling clothes without a judgment that the pressure it feels comes from them, and that it may remove them by struggling. I do not propose this as the very earliest act of human life, but whatever you will suppose the earliest, was done for some end which the fancy represented as desirable and attainable. This first judgment, then, arose without any manner of proof, not even of prior experience, but was owing to the ideas springing up spontaneously in the infant fancy. Thus we see that that state of our finer organization, or whatever else one can assign for the mind to look upon in the suggestions of fancy, has a natural efficacy to excite a perception of judgments as well as of other ideas. One modification affects us with colors, another with sounds, another with remembrance, another with assent: and whatever, whether mechanical or other causes, bring the organs into this disposition, they will have the like effect.—Wherefore there is no absurdity in conceiving it possible in theory, that a man, by an immediate operation upon his organs disposing them into a proper state, may be brought to understand what he never learned, to remember what he never saw, to perceive truths instantaneously discoverable only by long investigations of reason, and to discern others clearly which no reason can investigate.

39. But how consistent soever this may appear in speculation, the possibility of a thing does not prove it actually true, and if we consult experience we shall find the contrary to be fact; all our knowledge being derived from those sources to which we commonly ascribe it, our senses, our memory, our reason, or the testimony and instruction of others. Therefore I am so far from imagining our judgments to proceed from any sudden irregular configura-

tion of our organs, that perhaps I may be blamed for running into an opposite extreme ; for I conceive that all our stores of knowledge, and skill in discerning between one thing and another, was acquired, not born with us, but learned by practice : if we had judgments any other way than those above mentioned in our infancy, we have lost them, and possess nothing now which was not once a new acquisition. I have already declared my opinion concerning the judgment of the senses, that a grown person, on first coming to the use of any of them, would not receive the same information therefrom that we do ; and that we attain our ideas of magnitude, figure, distance, and many other particulars, by having frequent intercourse among objects. And for judgments of the understanding, besides that they cannot be had before we arrive at the use of understanding, they for the most part consist in generals, which can be known only by experience of particulars founded on the evidence of the senses. There are some truths esteemed self-evident, because supposed to be assented to as soon as proposed : but I question the fact, for I fancy one might meet with children who do not know that two and two make four, or that the whole cannot be contained in a part, after they clearly understand the meaning of the terms. We call them self-evident, because we discern them upon inspection, but so we do the figures and distances of bodies, which has been shown the effect of a skill attained by use. There is as necessary a connection between nine times four and thirtysix, as between twice two and four ; and we find that butchers or market women, who have constantly used themselves to reckon by groats, judge of their several amounts upon inspection without staying to compute : therefore those ideas operate upon them in the manner of self-evident truths, which speak for themselves as soon as admitted into the reflection. They do not the like upon other persons who have not accustomed themselves to the like train of thinking : but all men have had some experience, and made some observation upon things daily occurring to their senses or reflection, from whence they gather that knowledge we style self-evident, because we know not its original, nor remember the time when we were without it.

40. From what has been observed above, it may be justly doubted whether, strictly speaking, we have any such thing as first principles of reason, but what we deem so are accessions of knowledge derived from some channel whose source we cannot discover. I do not remark this with a view to depreciate such knowledge or lessen our dependence upon it in all the uses of life : for I think where we find a thing command our assent as soon as proposed, agreed to by mankind in general, and we can see nothing

in all our stores of experience suggesting a possibility of its being untrue, we may build upon it as upon a sure foundation as well of our conduct as of our reasonings. But my design tends to show that nothing is above being made the subject of examination when an opening offers: for those commonly esteemed first principles may be often traced to some higher origin, and several of them not unfrequently to one and the same. Therefore the more a man thinks, especially upon points of morality, he will find his principles the fewer, but of more extensive influence; for many of those he looked upon as such at first, will resolve themselves into conclusions from the few that remain. By this means his reasonings will grow more clear and uniform, and his improvements greater, for by tracing points of knowledge, generally received, up their channels, he may discern how they came to prevail with mankind, and thence learn to deduce others from the same stream with equal effect and certainty. May I then be permitted, in the sequel of these inquiries, to question whether several things be evident in themselves, or good or right in themselves, which are commonly reputed such? Not with an intention to overthrow them, but with an endeavor to discover why they are evident, and why they are good or right: nor shall I do this wantonly, or unless I apprehend some advantage will accrue from the attempt. But as I do not pretend always to penetrate quite to the fountain head, shall content myself with stopping at postulata, which I apprehend nobody will deny me, whenever finding it impracticable or needless to go further.

CHAP. XII.

IMAGINATION AND UNDERSTANDING.

WE have observed at our entrance upon these inquiries, that a compound may have properties resulting from the composition which do not belong to the parts singly whereof it consists. Therefore, though the mind, taken in the strict and philosophical sense, possesses only two faculties, the active and the perceptive, this does not hinder but that the mind, in the vulgar and grosser acceptation, may possess a greater variety of faculties, such as discerning, remembering, thinking, studying, contemplating, and a multitude of others: which are but different modes or species of perception, varying according to the state of the ideas there are to be perceived, and are all reducible under two general classes,

Imagination and Understanding; neither of them born with us, but acquired by use and practice, and the latter growing out of the former. We come into the world a mere blank, void of all inscription whatsoever. Sensation first begins the writing, and our internal sense or reflection increases the stock, which runs into various assortments, and produces other ideas different from the root whereout they spring; whence we quickly become provided with store of assemblages, associations, trains, and judgments.

These stores, together with the repository containing them, we may style the imagination, the very word implying so much; for being derived from image, which is the same as idea, it imports the receptacle of ideas. And whatever number of them is excited by external objects, or presented by the mechanical workings of our animal spirits, or other causes, I call an act of imagination or scene exhibited thereby. I know that imagination is applied in common discourse to ideas purely imaginary, having no existence in truth and nature, such as a Cyclops, a Chimera, the enchanted island of Circe, or whimsical Adventures of Pantagruel. But we find rhetoricians and critics extending the term to pictures of real originals drawn in the mind by descriptions of scenes actually existing, or occurrences actually happening. Mr. Addison, in his essay on the pleasures of imagination, treats of those conveyed by the works of art and nature. Therefore I shall not offend against propriety, by taking the word in the largest sense, as comprehending every representation to the mind, whether of things real or fantastical, either brought into view by some sensation, or starting up of their own accord.

Among these ideas, some being more engaging than the rest, attract the notice particularly to themselves: the mental eye singles them out from the whole scene exhibited before it, sees them in a stronger light, holds them longer in view, and thereby gives occasion to their introducing more of their own associates than they could have done in the rapidity of their natural course. This operation of the notice being frequently repeated, at length becomes itself an object of our observation, and thus we discover a power we have of heightening the color of our ideas, of changing or directing their course by the application of our notice: and the exercise of this power I take to be what is commonly meant by an act of the Understanding.

2. Thus there are three ways in which ideas are made to affect us; by mechanical causes, when either sensible objects excite them, or the working of our animal spirits throws them up; by the notice being drawn to fix upon some appearing eminently

inviting above their fellows; and by exerting this power of the notice purposely, in order to discern them more fully, or bring in others that do not occur of themselves. The two first belong to imagination, and the last to understanding.

To render my notion of this division the clearer, I shall endeavor to illustrate it by an example. Suppose a servant wench in London, after being fatigued with several hours hard labor, can get up stairs to repose herself awhile in indolence. She squats down upon a chair, shuts her eyes, and falls into a state between sleeping and waking; but her fancy roves upon the work she has been doing, the utensils employed therein, and the chit-chat of her fellow-servants. If the cat mews at the door, this changes the scene to puss's exploits in catching mice, or her fondling tricks while she lay purring in somebody's lap; until some other sensation or turn of fancy leads on a new train of ideas. Hitherto all proceeds mechanically: volition remains wholly inactive, there being nothing alluring enough to raise a desire of retaining it in view; but the images pass lightly and nimbly along, according to the impulse received from the causes exciting them, without leaving any trace of themselves behind. Presently there arises a great noise and hubbub in the street. This rouses up the girl, and carries her in all haste to the window. She sees a crowd of people, and in the midst of them my Lord Mayor going by in procession. She minds nothing of the houses before her, nor the mob jostling one another below, for the prancing horses with their gorgeous trappings engage her whole attention, until drawn from them by the great coach all glorious with sculpture, gold, and paintings, which she follows with her eye as far as it can be discerned distinctly. Then the sheriffs, and whatever else appear remarkable in the train, have their share in her notice: which impresses the objects whereon it fixes so strongly, that the traces of them remain in her reflection after the objects themselves have been removed, and perhaps raise a curiosity of knowing what could be the occasion of this parade. Thus far imagination only is employed: but curiosity puts her upon searching for the means of gratifying it, which not occurring readily, she must use her understanding to discover and pursue them. So she examines the sheet almanack pasted up behind the door, to see what holiday it might be; but finding none, she casts about in her thoughts for some other way of accounting for the coach of state being brought out; when at last it may be she recollects that somebody had told her there was to be an address presented to-day to his majesty.

3. Although in the second article of the division above men-

tioned, our active power be employed as well as in the third, yet it is manifest we proceed in a different manner. In the former we act inadvertently, heedlessly, and without thinking, drawn only to pursue certain objects that happen to strike upon our fancy: in the other, we act knowingly and designedly with a view to introduce some other idea not already within our prospect, and with a consciousness and reflection upon what we are doing. For there is a reflex act whereby the mind turns inward upon herself to observe what ideas arise in her view, or what effect her activity has upon them, or the bodily members, distinct from that whereby she produces those effects. The one is commonly called reflecting, and the other acting, and both may be performed at the same time, or the latter singly without the former. The beginning of our lives I apprehend passes wholly without this reflection, which we acquire in time, and by degrees. When we have discovered our power of directing the notice, and attained some expertness in the management of that power, we may be said to have arrived at the use of our understanding.

The degrees of exertion in both faculties are very various, from the intensest study down to that common reflection we make in the ordinary transactions of life; and from the steady attention given to very engaging scenes to that transient notice we take of objects moderately alluring, when they pass swiftly in succession before us. All strong efforts of the understanding are laborious and fatiguing, visibly wasting the spirits, and affecting the head and stomach, if continued long; nor have the most abstracted reasonings less of that effect than others: which seems an undeniable evidence, that when the mind is thought to be most retired, and to converse solely with herself, she nevertheless uses some instrument or organ, and employs the bodily forces in carrying on her work.

It is common to style those actions mechanical that are performed without thought or forecast, especially if we cannot discover any inducement that led us into them; for we ascribe them to the force of habit or impulse, of passion or fancy: but how much soever habit or fancy may have thrown up the ideas, the motions ensuing thereupon could not have been produced without the agency of the mind. This was proper to be remarked, because, if we take the microscope and examine the minute constituent parts of action, we shall find that far the greater number of them, although certainly performed by our active power, are yet directed by sudden transient ideas starting up from time to time spontaneously. But those ideas skim so lightly as to leave no print of their foot in the memory; therefore, if we look for them

the moment after, we cannot find them, and so persuade ourselves there were none. When a man walks, he moves his legs himself, yet they seem to move habitually and involuntarily, without any care of his to make them step right and left, alternately, or to ascertain the length of their paces: nor is it an easy matter for him, with his utmost attention, to discern the ideas that occasion this regularity of their motions.

4. To this inadvertent action of the mind we owe that dexterity in the use of our powers, which is supposed to be an immediate gift of nature: for we are not born with the faculty of walking, or handling, or speaking. When little children go to put their coral into their mouths, they do not know how to get it thither, but hit it against their chin, or rub it about their cheek: when you would set them to walk, they jump with both legs at once, or lift up their foot as if they were to step over a stile: and the first sounds they make are none other than those of grunting and crying. But the ideas formed daily in their imagination lead them on, step by step, to the management of their limbs, and first rudiments of speech, before they are capable of anything that can be called learning or application. And afterwards we catch many little habits by accident or imitation, or fall into ways of acting by the force of example, or grow more perfect in our manner of proceeding merely by dint of practice. Nor does imagination stand idle even in those seasons wherein we most employ our understanding, but makes many bye motions of her own, or acts an under part, assisting to execute the plan laid by her partner.

For understanding endeavors to extend her prospect as far and wide as she can stretch: she aims at distant ends, considers remote consequences, joins the past and future with the present, and contemplates imperfect ideas, in order to strike out from thence something that may be a surer ground of our proceeding. Therefore she can direct only our larger actions, drawing the outlines of them, or giving the main turns to our courses of behavior, but leaves the intermediate spaces to be filled up by habit, or the transient ideas starting up in train to our notice. She moves too slowly to give constant employment to our active power, which while she is deliberating must take its directions elsewhere.

5. Thus it appears that imagination actuates most of our motions, and serves us perpetually in all the purposes of life, which understanding recommends, but the habitual and spontaneous rising of ideas prompts and directs us to complete. To this belongs all that expertness we have in any art or business or accom-

plishment whatsoever : nor can even science proceed to good effect without it, as containing something of art in the due management of our thoughts, and proper application of our inquiries. We have observed above, that many useful attainments are made in our infancy, and afterwards, without any thought or pains of ours : and even those we acquire by care and industry will stand in little stead until the trains we have hammered out by long labor have gotten a facility of springing up upon touch of a single link. Herein lies the difference between theory and practice : for there are many things we cannot do long after we know well enough how they are to be done, not because our active powers are insufficient for the work, but because the ideas, necessary for conducting them along the minute parts of it, are not enured to rise currently and in their proper order.

The beginner in music must learn his notes one by one ; then he must associate them with the keys or stops of his instrument, and these again with their correspondent sounds : next he must join the notes into bars, and by a proper composition of these form a tune. All this he must work out at first with painful application, and while such application is necessary, he proceeds slowly and awkwardly, making frequent mistakes, and taking up an hour to go through his tune, with much trouble to himself, and very little entertainment to the hearer. But when by long practice he has taught imagination to throw up her associations and trains spontaneously, he has no other use for thought than just to choose the tune, and give some slight directions now and then as they may be wanted : for his eye will run along the lines, and his fingers along the keys, mechanically ; and it would require more attention to put them out of their course than to suffer them to proceed.

6. Hence we may judge of how great importance it is to have a well regulated and well exercised imagination ; which, if we could possess completely, it would answer all our occasions better, with more ease and dispatch, than we could compass them in any other way. But as nature has not given us this faculty in perfection, nor will it grow up to full stature of its own accord, she has endued us with the privilege of understanding, to form and improve it. Therefore it is our business to range our ideas into such assortments and trains as are best adapted to our purposes ; to bring them under command, so as that they may be ready for any services to be required of them ; and continually to keep a watchful eye over them while at work, to prevent their deviating into wrong channels.

Nor would understanding herself find so constant employment

as she does, were it not for some principles and views laid up in store which start up occasionally to set her at work. For who would consider, or study, or contrive, unless to attain some purpose suggested to his reflection? Thus understanding often begins and terminates in imagination, which nevertheless does not derogate from its excellency, because very few of our most necessary and useful purposes could ever be attained without it. And indeed understanding may justly claim the merit of those very exploits performed by habit or expertness, when it was owing to her care and diligence that they were acquired, or to her command and contrivance that they had their proper cues given, and proper tasks assigned them.

7. For the most part, both faculties go hand in hand co-operating in the same work, one sketching out the design, and the other executing the performance: but sometimes we find them acting at once in different employments. When two persons engage earnestly together in discourse as they walk, their thoughts are wholly intent upon the subject of their conversation: but the transient notices of their senses, and their habitual dexterity in the management of their limbs, guide them in the mean while through all the turnings of their path. And thus they may go currently on while the path lies smooth and open: but should anything unusual happen in the way, and attention be so fully taken up as not to spare a glance away from the object that holds it, they may chance to run against a post or stumble over a stone. Your profound thinkers are sometimes absent in company, and commit strange mistakes for want of attending to the objects around them; or perhaps set out for one place and strike into the way leading to another. Which shows that the slightest and most common matters cannot be carried on safely, without some degree of thought and observation: not that habit and imagination cannot find employment for our active powers of themselves, but it is a great chance they wander from the plan assigned them, unless kept in order by frequent directions from understanding.

Thus the mind may be said to have two eyes, in their situation rather resembling those of a hare or a bird, than a human creature, as being placed on opposite sides, and pointed towards different sets of objects. Or may be more aptly compared to a man looking at a common field through a telescope, with one eye, still holding the other open: with the naked eye he sees the several lands, their length and shape, and the crops growing on each; with the glass he sees only one little spot, but in that he distinguishes the ears of corn, discerns butterflies fluttering about, and swallows shooting athwart him. Sometimes both eyes turn upon

the same prospect, one tracing the larger, and the other the minuter parts : at other times they take different courses, one pursuing a train of little objects that have no relation to the scenes contemplated by the other.

8. Whatever knowledge we receive from sensation, or fall upon by experience, or grow into by habit and custom, may be counted the produce of imagination : and to this we may refer the evidence of the senses, the notices of appetite, our common notions and conceptions of things, and all that rises up spontaneously in our memory. Whatever has been infused into us by careful instruction or worked out by thought and industry, or gained by attentive observation, may be styled the attainments of understanding : among which may be reckoned what skill we have in any art or science, or in language, or in conducting the common affairs of life, or what we bring to our remembrance by recollection. Our tastes, sentiments, opinions, and moral senses, I apprehend, belong partly to one class and partly to the other : their seat lies in the imagination, but they are introduced there sometimes by an industrious use of the understanding, and sometimes by the mechanical influence of example and custom.

Understanding commonly draws imagination after it, but not always, nor immediately. Men seen from a great height look no bigger than pigmies, though we judge them to be of ordinary stature ; but seen at the same distance upon a level, they appear as they should do, because we see them continually in the latter situation, and but rarely in the former. Then again, objects beheld over water, or other uniform surface, which deceives us in the distance, seem smaller than their real dimensions, because the scenes we are commonly conversant with, contain a variety of distinguishable parts. For imagination gets her appearances by use, but use must come by time and degrees. A discovery that we have worked out by a consideration of various particulars, often loses its force as soon as the proofs whereon it depended have slipped out of our sight : the next time we employ our thoughts upon it we arrive at the conclusion sooner, and upon every repeated trial, our process grows shorter and shorter, until in time we learn to discern the thing so discovered to be true upon a very little reflection, without the suggestion of any proof : upon further acquaintance it takes the nature of a self-evident truth, the judgment arising instantaneously in the same assemblage with the terms, and then becomes a property of imagination. Thus these two faculties contribute to enlarge one another's stores : imagination suggests principles and inducements to set understanding in motion, or furnishes her with materials to work upon ; and the

judgments of the latter, either by the strong glare of their evidence, or more commonly by long familiarity, grow into appearances of the former.

9. From this last consideration it appears that understanding may transfer over some part of her treasures to imagination, that is, by making us so completely masters of them as that they shall always lie ready at hand, without requiring any time or trouble to rummage for them: the other part which she reserves to herself is such as will not occur without seeking, but must be drawn up into view by thought and voluntary reflection. For how perfect soever any person may be in architecture, sculpture, or painting, though upon the bare inspection of things belonging to those arts, he will discern more than the ignorant, yet by considering them attentively, he will strike out further observations that had escaped him at the first view. This then is the distinction I would make between the stores of knowledge contained in our mind. Those that have an aptness to rise up spontaneously, or be introduced instantly by sensation, whether originally deposited by custom, experience, or our own industry, I would assign to imagination; and their rising in such manner I should deem a movement of imagination. On the other hand, those which lie below the surface, and require some thought and reflection, be it ever so little, to fetch them up, I conceive belonging to the understanding; and that operation whereby they are so brought to light, I call an act of understanding.

Perhaps this allotment of the boundaries between the two faculties may be thought arbitrary, and not warranted by any lawful authority, but I do not apprehend authority has yet interfered in the case: for though we often distinguish between understanding and imagination in our discourses, yet we as often use them promiscuously, and assign the same territories and operations to the one or the other, according to the humor we are in, or according to the light in which we happen to take things. Therefore in a matter so unsettled, every one is at liberty to do as he pleases, and I have chosen that partition which I think will be most convenient for the course I am following in bringing ourselves acquainted with the nature of the human mind.

10. It is customary with most persons in handling this subject, to throw in some conjectures concerning the capacity of brute creatures; and indeed all we can say of them amounts to little more than conjecture, for we cannot penetrate into their sensories, nor receive information of anything passing there from themselves, but can only guess at their ideas, by observing their motions. It seems generally agreed among learned and simple, to exclude

them from all share of reason and understanding, which is esteemed the peculiar privilege of man, and thought to constitute the essential difference between him and his fellow animals. But many judicious persons look upon this as a vulgar error, and hold that several other creatures possess a degree of understanding of the same kind with our own.

Now the determination of this point seems to depend greatly upon what notion we entertain of understanding: if the description I have endeavored to give of that faculty be admitted, I do not conceive the brutes have any portion of it belonging to them. For I cannot discover in them anything of thinking, or observing, or meditating, or what is called labor of brain. Ideas of reflection cannot well be denied them, nor assemblages, associations, trains, and judgments, but such only as are impressed by external objects, or formed by accident, not by their own care and application. They remember, but do not recollect, nor seem capable of that reflex act whereby we turn inwards upon ourselves, to call up any thoughts we want, but are continually employed by such ideas as their senses or their fancy suggest. They fix a strong attention upon things, but it is of the mechanical kind described before, where the notice is drawn by the glare of present objects, and not directed for the discovery of something unknown. They sometimes persevere a long while in pursuit of one design, as in hunting for their prey, which they prosecute by motions of their limbs and application of their senses, not their reflection, and retain no longer than while appetite continues to solicit: for though the hound when at fault, may take as much pains to recover the scent, as the huntsman to put him upon it, yet when returned home after the chase is over, he does not, like his master, ruminate upon the transactions of the day, endeavoring to find out his miscarriages, and draw rules from thence to conduct him better for the future. Their views seem confined to the present, without reflection upon yesterday, or regard for to-morrow; and though some of them lay in provision for a distant time, it will appear upon examination, that they are led into what they do by a present impulse. For the knowledge of future wants can arise only from experience of the past: but ants, bees, and squirrels, hatched in the spring, who never knew the scarcities of winter, do not fail to lay up their stores of corn, or honey, or nuts, the first summer of their lives. Or, if without any evidence you will suppose them instructed herein by their elders, what will you say to canary birds, taken young from their parents, and kept in a separate cage by themselves? who yet, if you supply them with

suitable materials, will build a nest as dexterously as the most experienced of their species.

11. This sagacity, in many instances surpassing the contrivance of man, and discerning things undiscoverable by human reason, is usually styled instinct; of which the world seems to have a very confused idea, esteeming it a kind of sixth sense, or a particular species of understanding different from our own. But I do not see why it may not be ascribed to the five senses, or to that internal feeling called appetite, which we find variously affected by objects in different creatures, and which may prompt them to take prudent measures unknowingly, and without foresight of the good effects resulting therefrom. Nor shall we be so much at a loss to know what instinct is, when we are shown some footsteps of it, or at least something very like it in ourselves. If cattle, ants, and other animals, prognosticate the changes of weather, a shooting corn, or an old strain will enable a man to do the like: the same cause producing the same effect operates upon both, namely, the various degrees of moisture in the air exciting a particular feel in their flesh. What shall we say to the nausea preceding fevers, or those longings one now and then hears of in sick persons, pointing out to them an effectual cure for their distempers, after having been given over by their physicians? I knew a person troubled with indigestion, for which he had three several remedies, each of which would give him relief at times, when the others would not; and he used always to know which of them to apply, only by the strong appetite and propensity he found in himself towards that particular thing. Now why may not this be called instinct, as well as that which every one has observed inclines a dog to gnaw the grass by way of medicine, when he finds himself out of order? Perhaps I should not aim much beside the mark if I were to define instinct those notices of sensation, or appetite, and those untaught arts of exercising the active powers which we do not usually experience in ourselves.

12. According to the division made in this chapter, sense, appetite, and instinct, fall under the class of imagination, as so many different species contained within that general term. Nor need we wonder that imagination in brutes, should have the advantage of ours in many respects, since there may be several causes assigned why it should be so. In the first place, nature makes greater haste in the perfecting their limbs, which are the instruments employed by the mind in the exercise of her active powers. The chicken breaks forth from the egg completely formed with beak, and legs, and other members, fitted for immediate use: but man comes into the world the most unfinished creature

breathing, and arrives the latest to maturity, therefore cannot acquire expertness in the use of his limbs, while they continue imperfect and unsuited for action. In the next place, many animals have acuter senses, and more distinguishing appetites to direct them in their choice between things noxious and wholesome. Then as they have nothing beside imagination to employ them, they attend constantly to that; which of course therefore must strike out longer trains, and connect them stronger, and work them smoother than it can be expected to do in us, where it is perpetually disturbed and interrupted by being called off to assist in the services of reason. For the fewer ways we have to practise in, we shall grow the more perfect in them: thus persons deprived of any one sense, make a greater proficiency in improving the others, and he that should be obliged to walk in the dark, would do wisely to take a blind man for his guide. Besides this, we corrupt imagination by the perverse use of our understanding: for we contract depraved appetites, immoderate cravings, vitiated tastes, and pernicious fancies, which stifle many salutary admonitions we might have received from sense and instinct, if preserved in their natural state.

But on the other hand, understanding, as we have already observed; makes over a part of her purchases to imagination, who thereby becomes seized of territories she could not have acquired herself. Among these I think may be reckoned principally the faculty of speech, which by constant practice we grow so current in, that we exercise it like Peter, when he proposed making the three tabernacles, while we wist not what we say. But the use of speech, although universal among mankind, is not to be found elsewhere, notwithstanding that the apprehensions of some men seem duller, and their stores of knowledge scantier upon the whole, than those of some animals; which one would think an evidence that the human faculties differ from all others in kind as well as in degree. And I apprehend the difference lies in this, that other creatures have fewer mental organs, being particularly void of those whereby we turn our attention inwards, or call up ideas to our reflection, so that we may be said to have two mental eyes, and they only one: by which means their circle of vision must necessarily be smaller than ours, although the objects within it may shine as clear or clearer than they do to us.

Upon the whole, the dispute concerning this matter seems to turn upon words more than upon things. For if anybody shall look upon every deduction of consequences, how spontaneously soever occurring, to be reason; and every portion of knowledge, through what channel soever flowing in, that man could not attain

without thought and application, to be understanding ; I shall not refuse either of them to many birds, and beasts, and insects. And if he shall think them entitled still to further privileges, I will not contend with him ; conceiving it enough just to offer my conjecture and pass on ; for my business lies with the human mind, not the brutal.

CHAP. XIII.

CONVICTION AND PERSUASION.

THESE are commonly used as synonymous terms ; or if any difference be made between them, it lies in this, that conviction denotes the beginning, and persuasion the continuance, of assent : for we are said to be convinced, when brought by fresh evidence to the belief of a proposition we did not hold for truth before, but remain persuaded of what we have formerly seen sufficient grounds to gain our credit. I shall here take the liberty to employ them in a sense not exactly the same with that wherein they are ordinarily understood, using them as appellations of two things really distinct in themselves ; one for those decisions made by our reason, and the other for those notions starting up in our fancy or reflection ; wherein I shall not depart much from the distinctions above mentioned : for as understanding requires some little consideration to bring up her judgments to the thought, this may be regarded in the nature of a new conviction which we had not the moment before ; and imagination always follows the train that former custom has led her into.

Nor let it be thought I am only resuming the subjects already treated of in the two last chapters under the names of Judgment and Appearance : for we do not always fully confide even in the judgments of our understanding, but many times suspect some latent error where we cannot discern any, or opposite evidences occur which gain a momentary assent by turns, as each can catch the mental eye : but I do not call it conviction, until we fix upon some one determination of which we rest satisfied with a full assurance. So likewise appearance sometimes varies from persuasion, for when we see a stick thrust into water, we do not imagine it really bent because it seems to be so : nor does a man, who looks at his friend through an inverted telescope, fancy him even for an instant to be of that diminutive size to which he appears contracted : nor does he persuade himself he has two and twenty

hands, when by holding up one of his own behind a multiplying glass he sees so many exhibited to his view.

There is sometimes a temporary persuasion we can lay aside at any time, as in reading a poem or a novel, where imagination enters fully into all the scenes of action described, and receives them as real facts recorded in some authentic history. Therefore fictions must be probable to give entertainment, for whatever carries a glaring absurdity, or is repugnant to our common notions of things, we cannot even fancy to be true. What are the changes of scene upon the stage, but contrivances to transport the audience in imagination into distant countries or companies? What are lively descriptions but representations to the mind, which make us ready to cry out that we actually see the things described, or hear the discourses related? In all these cases there is no conviction worked, for a very little reflection will make us sensible that all is pure invention: but understanding purposely nods, that she may not by her unseasonable reflections interrupt the pleasure received from the soothing deception. Nay, she sometimes assists in the delusion; for a man by taking pains may work himself up into an imagination of being in places where he is not, and beholding objects nowhere existent. Tully, the great master of rhetoric, teaches that an orator cannot do justice effectually to his cause unless he makes the case his own, enters thoroughly into the interests of his client, and places himself in his situation. And Horace lays down the like rule: If, says he, you will draw tears from me, you must first be grieved yourself: which one cannot well be without imagining oneself interested in the misfortune. But these temporary persuasions may become permanent ones where the organs happen to be weak or disordered: and this I take to be the case of madness, which being a distemper often removable by medicines, seems another proof that the judgments of the mind depend upon the disposition of the bodily organs.

2. Conviction and persuasion influence one another reciprocally; the latter often following the former instantaneously, but more commonly in time and by degrees. Where we can have ocular or other sensible demonstration of a mistake we are generally cured of it once for all, but where such evidence is not to be had it will not presently yield, and after being once driven out, will many times steal upon us again at unawares. Therefore if we see sufficient reasons to work a complete conviction, but still find a reluctance in the mind to lay aside an inveterate error, we shall be more likely to succeed by frequently contemplating the proofs already suggested, than by accumulating new ones: for importu-

nity and assiduity prevail more upon imagination than strength of argument, because our judgments as well as other ideas run in train, and require repeated efforts to turn them out of the course to which they have been habituated; like a distorted limb that must be brought to rights by continual application, not by violence. On the other hand, notions riveted in the fancy too often debauch the understanding, and even overpower the direct evidence of sense; and that among the greatest scholars as well as among the vulgar. For having found the Latin words *LEVIS*, light, and *LEVIS*, smooth, *VENIT*, he comes, and *VENIT*, he came, marked with different quantities in their gradus, they adjudge them one short and the other long, and would be horribly shocked at the inharmoniousness of a verse wherein they should be introduced in each other's places: but as our modern Latinists pronounce those words, it would puzzle the nicest ear to distinguish any difference in the sounds. On the contrary, they insist upon the first syllables in *TENEO*, *LEVIA*, having the same quantity with those in *TENUI*, *LEVIBUS*, though anybody except themselves may discern they pronounce them quicker and shorter in the two latter than the former. And the like cause operates upon their judgment in our own language, where we place the particle *A* before a consonant, and *AN* before a vowel, for the better sounding of our words, not for their better appearance upon paper: but your very learned folks determine the sound by the spelling; for I suppose they would not for the world say *An* youthful sally, or *A* useful accomplishment, though both words begin exactly with the same initial sound. The same may be said with respect to the rule of *H* being no letter, which seems a notion peculiar to the schools, and not admitted elsewhere; for one may converse seven years among the politest companies, provided they be not deeply versed in Latin and Greek, without hearing anybody talk of buying *AN* horse, or taking *AN* house.

3. Probably conviction would operate more effectually and constantly if we were capable of absolute certainty, for the force of that, one would think, must bear down all opposition at a single stroke: but there being always a possibility that our clearest reasonings may deceive us, this lessens the authority of reason, and leaves room for a lurking suspicion of its fallibility in particular instances.

But however this be, certain it is we cannot with our utmost endeavors always bend imagination to that ply which judgment would direct. If you desire your friend to take something out of your eye that troubles you, with a feather, how much soever you may be convinced of his tenderness and dexterity, yet when

the feather approaches close to your eye, you cannot help winking, because you cannot exclude the sudden apprehension that he will hurt you. All the arguments in the world avail nothing in this case: yet I doubt not but by repeated trials a man might bring himself to stand such an operation without flinching. Why can bricklayers walk safely along the gutters of a high building, but because they have gained a confidence in their security? Any of us who has the perfect command of his limbs might do the same, if he could once totally throw aside the persuasion of danger. Low ceilings, swagging beams appearing below the plaster, and walls standing out of the perpendicular, threaten a downfall: set twenty the most experienced workmen to examine the building, and though they unanimously assure you all is safe, this will not entirely remove your apprehensions, until, by constant habitation in the house, the persuasion dies away of itself. Fear cannot subsist without an apprehension of mischief; but it is well known that the strongest demonstration will not always dissipate our fears. Let a woman take a gun into her hand, examine the barrel and pan as long as she pleases, until she is fully convinced there is neither charge nor priming, yet if you present the muzzle against her head with threatening gestures and expressions, you will raise in her a sudden persuasion of danger. Some apprehensions, as of seeing spirits or apparitions, being grounded early in our childhood, can never be totally eradicated afterwards, neither by reason, nor example, nor ridicule, nor time, that cureth all things. Nor are the other passions void of their several persuasions, which they frequently retain against evidence. Hope and expectation will continue beyond all probability of success: and love sometimes flatters with an opinion of reciprocal kindness, notwithstanding the grossest repeated ill usage. The tenets of a sect or party, deeply inculcated betimes, keep their hold in spite of the strongest conviction: whence the saying applied to persons obstinately attached to their notions, You shall not persuade them even though you do persuade them: or, as I would rather phrase the sentence, you shall not persuade them even though you convince them.

4. We have observed before, that imagination actuates most of our motions, and serves us perpetually in all the purposes of life: it often holds the reins of action alone, or at least guides them in those intermediate spaces while understanding looks forward towards the general plan. So that our behavior depends for the most part upon what persuasions we have, and upon conviction little further than as that may draw the other after it. For how well soever we may be convinced of the reasonableness of our

measures, we shall never pursue them heartily and currently while there remains a latent mistrust in their disfavor : nor can we be sure of accomplishing an enterprise so long as any cross apprehensions may rise to interrupt it. Besides, we cannot constantly keep a watchful eye upon our thoughts, but such notions as start up in the fancy will take direction of our active powers, while reflection is attentive to something else : and upon sudden emergencies, or in the hurry of business, we have not time to reflect, but must follow such persuasions as occur instantaneously. Add to this, that in our most careful deliberations understanding works upon materials supplied her from the storehouse of imagination ; nor is it possible to examine the credit of every evidence giving testimony in the course of a long argumentation.

Hence appears the mighty import of habituating imagination to run in the track marked out by reason ; for when we have made any useful discovery, and fully satisfied our judgment of its truth and expedience, the business is but half done ; it as yet remains only a matter of speculation, and will not serve us as a principle either of our reasonings or behavior : but when inculcated into a firm persuasion, so that it will arise upon every occasion in full vigor without waiting to be called up by consideration, then it becomes a practical rule, and will never fail to influence our conduct.

5. As much a paradox as it may seem, certain it is that people do not always know their own real sentiments, for they are apt to mistake conviction for persuasion. In time of deliberation they are mighty confident of their resolves, and think they will continue in full force beyond all possibility of change : but if imagination has not been brought under due subjection to reason, they will find them fail, and give place to other notions at the time of execution. Hence proceeds an inconsistency in men's behavior according as understanding or imagination gains the ascendant, which could never happen if the latter were inured to follow the former. Such deceits as these are taught us in our earliest youth : boys are made to say they love their book, or love to go to church, when in reality they cannot endure either ; and after we grow up, it is no unprecedented thing for men to think they believe or disbelieve certain points in religion, philosophy, or morality, when in good truth they do not, because they esteem the contrary blameable or ridiculous. This deception may be sometimes practised upon other persons with good effect ; for one may chance to bring a man into an useful persuasion, by persuading him he has it already, but it is very dangerous to be practised upon ourselves : for perhaps what we fancy blameable or ridiculous may

be found otherwise upon a fair examination ; or if we have any wrong turn in our mind, how shall we ever apply a proper remedy, or even attempt to rectify it unless we know what it is? It is a false and mischievous sharae that would prompt us to conceal ourselves from ourselves : nor does anything better show a true freedom and courage of thought than to search out the closest recesses of our heart impartially, and know all the persuasions, good or bad, that find harbor there.

CHAP. XIV.

KNOWLEDGE AND CONCEPTION.

ALTHOUGH our knowledge all arises from our conception of things, and generally is more full and complete according as that is clearer, yet we know some things assuredly for true of which we cannot form any adequate conception. Different persons conceive variously of the same things, of which they all equally acknowledge the existence. Common people cannot easily conceive of opinions, tastes, sentiments, or inclinations, opposite to their own, though they see them exemplified in others : nor can they conceive the masterly performances of art or science, nor tricks of jugglers, nor anything out of the usual course of their experience : but such as have severally applied themselves to penetrate into those matters, find nothing surprising in them. For it is the repugnancy of objects to what we have ordinarily seen or known that renders them inconceivable, and therefore familiarity may make them easy to our apprehension. The savage cannot comprehend how men convey their thoughts to one another by writing, and the communication of them by sounds would appear as wonderful, but that mankind fall into that method before they know what wonder is, that is, before they have gained any experience, to which new appearances may seem repugnant.

The studious familiarize themselves to trains of observation peculiar to themselves ; therefore, as they can clearly apprehend what remains a mystery to others, so on the other hand they find difficulties that nobody else can discern. The plain man makes no boggle at the ideas of creation, annihilation, or vacuity : for he thinks he sees instances of them every day, in the production of plants from the ground, the consumption of fuel in the fire, and the emptiness of his pot every time he drinks out the liquor. But the naturalist considers that the materials composing the tree were

existing either in the earth, the air or the vapors, before it grew up, that the fire only divides the billet into imperceptible particles, and that after the liquor is all poured out of the pot it may yet remain full of light, or air, or ether : therefore he conceives no powers in nature that can either give or destroy existence, and disputes incessantly concerning the reality of a vacuum.

2. There are perhaps few more inexplicable ideas than that of force, whereby bodies act upon one another, and which may be divided into two sorts, impulse and resistance. The wheelwright, the millwright, and the gunner, can reason about it accurately and effectually to serve the purposes of their several arts ; but the philosopher knows not what to make of it. It is neither substance, nor form, nor quality : as impulse, it is something imparted by external agents ; as resistance, it is a property inherent in the body itself ; yet resistance cannot subsist without an impulse received from some other body. It is the immediate cause of motion, nevertheless this cause may operate without producing its effect : for if you lay a dozen huge folios upon the table, they will press it strongly downwards with their weight, but the floor by its resistance presses it as strongly upwards ; so the table, though receiving continual supplies of force remains immoveable.

Some things generally admitted for realities exceed the comprehensions of all men ; as the velocity of light, travelling fifteen thousand miles in the swing of a clock pendulum, the greater velocity in the vibrations of ether, which we learn from Sir Isaac Newton overtake the rays of light, the minuteness of vessels carrying circulation, and performing secretion in the bodies of scarce visible insects, the eternity of time, immensity of space, and all infinities in general.

As imagination takes her first impression from sensation, therefore I think we cannot form a clear conception of sensible objects whereof we have not had an idea conveyed by the senses. We have not any direct notion of very swift or very slow motions, because properly speaking we do not see either, but only gather them from the change of position in the objects moving, which in the former case seem at once to fill the whole space taken up in their passage, and in the latter appear stationary ; nor can we frame an idea of very small or very great magnitudes, otherwise than by enlarging the one in our fancy to a discernible size, and supposing the other removed to a distance that will lessen them within the compass of our vision. Neither perhaps can we conceive ideas of reflection whereof we have not experienced something similar passing in our own minds.

3. Things surpass our comprehension upon two accounts, either

when they are so unmanageable in themselves as that we cannot form any likeness of them in our imagination, which is the case of all infinitudes; or when we cannot conceive the manner in which they should be effected. I can easily conceive Dedalus flying in the air, for I have seen a print of him in Garth's *Metamorphosis*; but when I consider the weight of a man's body, the unwieldiness of wings sufficiently large to buoy him up, and the inability of his arms to flutter them fast enough, I cannot conceive the possibility of his ever practising that manner of travelling. Yet when we consider the small degree of force in rays of light, together with the solidity of glass, it seems as hard to conceive a possibility of their finding their way through so compact a body, as of Dedalus's flying: nevertheless constant experience convinces us of the fact.

When we have not an adequate conception of things themselves, nevertheless we may clearly affirm or deny something concerning them. Mr. Locke says we have a very confused idea of substance, and perhaps not a much better of form considered in the abstract; yet we may rest assured that form is not substance, nor substance form, and pronounce many other things concerning them without hesitation. And as imperfect notions as we have of force and impulse, or the manner of propagating motion, still we may easily apprehend a difference between the manner of imparting it from body to body, and from mind to body: for bodies only transmit the force they have received from elsewhere, nor can communicate more than they have themselves, and their re-action is always equal and opposite to action; but the mind produces an impulse she has not herself, nor does she ever feel the limbs re-act against her when she moves them: on the other hand, she receives a perception from the organs of sensation which had it not themselves, and returns not their impulse by a re-action, whenever they act upon her. Both those productions, of perception by body, and of motion by mind, appear alike incomprehensible, when we attempt to penetrate into the manner how they are effected.

4. But in order to understand ourselves the better, when we would go about to explain the manner in which causes produce their effects, let us consider what we generally mean by explanation. He that would explain the contrivance of a clock being made to strike the hours, begins with showing how the weights pull round the main wheel, how that by its teeth catches hold of the next wheel, and so he points out all the movements successively till he comes to the hammer and the bell. Or if he would explain the manner of nutrition, he tells you of the digestion of

the stomach, the secretion of chyle, its passage into the heart, the circulation of the blood, and thereby its dispersion throughout all parts of the flesh. Here we see that explaining is no more than enumerating the several parts of an operation, and tracing all the steps of its progress through intermediate causes and effects: therefore the manner of a remote effect being produced may be explained, but to call for an explanation of any cause operating immediately is absurd, because it is calling for an account of intermediate steps where there are none. In this case, we can only satisfy ourselves from experience, that such and such effects do constantly follow, upon the application of particular causes: all we can do further, is by remarking some difference in operations seemingly similar, as was attempted just now with respect to the action of mind and body, to prevent our mistaking one thing for another, not with an intent to give that as an explanation of either. To endeavor extending our idea beyond the cause operating, and the effect produced, would be to aim at apprehending more than the object really contains.

The quality we find in subjects of producing immediate effects, we call a primary property, but we cannot trace every phenomenon to this first source: there are many properties observable in bodies, which we are well satisfied result from the action of other bodies upon them, though we cannot investigate their operations. Such as the four kinds of attraction, namely, gravity, cohesion, magnetism, and electricity, the violence of fire, the sudden hardening of water by intense cold, the fusion of metals by intense heat, the vital circulation and secretion of humors in animals, and a multitude of the like sort, which a little reflection will easily suggest.

5. Number itself, whereon we can reason with the greatest accuracy and certainty of any subject, quickly exceeds our comprehension: it is a question with me whether we have a direct idea of any more than four, because beyond that little number we cannot tell how many objects lie before us upon inspection, without counting. Higher numbers we cannot ascertain, unless when by ranging them in order, which compounds the individuals into parcels, and thereby reduces them to fewer ideas, we can bring them within the compass of our apprehension: therefore we can presently reckon nine disposed into three equal rows, because then we need only consider them as three threes. The regular position of figures in numeration, and the contrivance of expressing the largest numbers by various combinations of a few numerals enables us to run those lengths we do in arithmetic. We talk currently of millions, and compute them with the utmost ex-

actness, but our knowledge of two millions being double one million, is no more than the knowledge of two being the double of one : and we know the value of figures only by the number of places they stand removed to the left. When we cast up the largest accounts, we have only three or four names or characters in our view at a time : and by this compendious artifice of drawing multitudes into so narrow a compass, we find means easily to manage objects that would be too cumbersome and extensive for us to conceive of themselves.

Nature abounds in mysteries, of which we may have a certain knowledge, but no clear conception : some are too large for imagination to grasp, some too minute for it to discern, others too obscure to be seen distinctly, and others, though plainly discernible in themselves, yet remain inexplicable in the manner of production, or appear incompatible with one another. Therefore, though conception be the groundwork of knowledge, and the inconceivableness of a thing a good argument against its reality, yet is it not an irrefragable one ; for it may be overpowered by other proofs drawn from premises, whereof we have a clear conception and undoubted knowledge. I suppose it will be allowed that a man born blind can form no conception of light, nor how people can have sensations of objects at a vast distance, so as to determine thereby their magnitudes and situations : yet by conversing daily among mankind, he may find abundant reason to be satisfied of their possessing such a faculty. And as we proceed further in our investigation of nature, we shall find effects that cannot proceed from causes whereof we have had any experience, therefore must ascribe them to powers of which we can know nothing more than their being adequate to those effects ; and what we know so imperfectly, we may justly pronounce inconceivable.

6. It is one of the most useful points of knowledge to distinguish, when the repugnancy of things to our common notions ought to make us reject them, and when not : for men have fallen into gross mistakes both ways. Some have been made to swallow the most palpable absurdities, under pretence that sense and reason are not to be trusted ; others have denied facts verified by daily experience, because they could not conceive the manner wherein they were effected. There have been those who have disputed the reality of motion, of distance, of space, of bodies, of human action, upon account of some difficulties they could not reconcile to their ideas. I know of no other rule to go by in this point than that the strongest evidence ought always to prevail : wherefore nothing inconceivable in philosophy deserves credit, unless it

necessarily follows from some premises assuredly known and clearly conceived.

But though in some instances we may and must admit things our imagination cannot comprehend, yet it is well worth our care and study to render them as familiar to our comprehension as we can: for we shall find them gain easier persuasion with us, and become more serviceable both in our reasonings and practice. For there is a difficulty in the management of inconceivable ideas: wherefore we sometimes suffer conception to run contrary to knowledge, where it can be done without hazard. Everybody now agrees that the Sun constantly keeps his station, and the earth circles round him as an attendant planet: yet we commonly think and speak of his diurnal and annual courses through the heavens, as being more convenient for our ordinary occasions. We may hereafter find it necessary to accommodate our language to the conceptions of mankind, though we should herein a little depart from our real sentiments: this necessity gave rise to the distinction between the esoteric and exoteric doctrine of the philosophers, the meat for men and milk for babes of Saint Paul, and the parabolical and plain, or direct and figurative styles. And we may meet with cases wherein it would be pernicious to entertain conceptions of things ourselves, of whose truth we have abundant reason to be satisfied; the rules of decency require this sometimes, and a regard to higher considerations at others.

CHAP. XV.

COMPOSITION OF MOTIVES.

If one were set to take an account of any of those vast woods in America, scarce ever trodden by human foot, he could not be expected to proceed with much regularity at first: he must follow wherever he should find an opening, and his observations upon the first trial would direct him to take another method of proceeding in making a second: when he had examined one quarter, he must return back to where he set out in order to examine another, and would often find occasion to take fresh notices of things that he thought he had sufficiently observed before. So in this, my investigation of that wilderness, the human mind, I am forced to work my passage where I find it practicable; for I have no preconceived plan, nor any favorite point, which I am determined to make good at all events: and though not without

some general idea of the end to which my inquiries will lead me, yet have I not a full prospect of the track they will take. I am not to be considered as a professor instructing others in the science he is completely master of, but as a learner seeking after an improvement of my own knowledge: therefore strike into whatever turnings appear most likely to advance me forward on my way, and after having pursued them awhile, sometimes discover a necessity of returning back to take a fuller review of subjects I had considered before. This is at present my case with respect to Motives, and that vivifying ingredient which give them their vigor and activity, Satisfaction, which I thought to have dismissed long ago, but now find myself unable to proceed further without taking them under examination afresh. If I do not perform my work with the regularity I wish, yet as charity covers a multitude of sins, so I hope an earnest desire of producing something that carries the appearance of benefit, will cover a multitude of defects in the performance. But because I would not neglect method where I can attain it, shall divide what I have next to offer under four general heads; the composition of motives, the several species of them, their production, and the causes introducing them to operate. We have observed before that motives, strictly such, are always something actually present in the thought, but they usually retain the name while remaining in the repository of our ideas, and not directly occurring to view; and I have distinguished them by the figurative expression of motives operating in the scale, or lying dormant in the box. Under the first head I shall consider them in their active state, under the two next in their quiescent, and the fourth will relate to their passage from the box into the scale.

2. By the composition of motives, I mean the matter whereof they are made, which consists of three principal parts: some action apprehended possible, some consequence, perception, or end, to be attained, which we have heretofore styled the Vehicle, and the satisfaction expected therein. Hence it appears that motives always contain a judgment of the action being possible, of its producing the effect, and of the satisfactoriness of that effect.

Were you privately to unlock the doors of a prison unknown to those within, they would never try to get out so long as they remained persuaded their endeavors would prove ineffectual. Indeed, a bare possibility of succeeding will often suffice to set us at work: you shall see men endeavoring to open doors that they believe to be made fast, but then it is with an apprehension of some chance that they may find means of opening them. Sometimes impatience will raise a temporary persuasion, which the mind eagerly admits against evidence, because it soothes her uneasiness

for a moment; while this lasts, it will make men strive to push through stone walls, but the instant it subsides, they give over their efforts. Nor can you instance any one action of our lives wherein there is not a momentary apprehension, either well or ill grounded, either suggested by understanding or fancy, of something we can do. This seems a strong argument against Hartley's vibrations, since in every exertion of our activity, there must be a perception in the mind of its efficacy. Or if his doctrine were true, it would be of most pernicious consequence to prevail amongst mankind: for were it possible once totally to banish all opinion of power, nobody would ever stir a finger to help themselves. We see this now and then exemplified in persons deeply affected with hypochondriac disorders, who, while they fancy themselves under an utter inability of action, you can never bring them to move either hand or foot, until by some sudden alarm or pungent smart you can dissipate their ideas, and turn imagination into her ordinary channels.

3. But the practicability of an action alone will not incite us to undertake it, for we have many ways wherein we might exert our power continually occurring to our thoughts, which yet we forbear to pursue: and when we do act, it is not merely for the sake of acting, but for some end conceived attainable thereby, which our judgment or our fancy recommends. And this end I take to be always some perception the mind desires to have: if we put sugar into our mouths, it is for the sweetness of the taste; if we aim at things useful, it is for the thought of having them in our possession; if at things laudable, it is for the consciousness of having acted right. Even when we go abroad merely upon being tired of sitting, or while away the time in some trifling amusement, it is either to remove the uneasiness of idleness, or for the sensation our exercise will give us, or for some engagement we expect to find in what we do. Nor can one well conceive a man to make any movement, without a notion at the instant, of something to be effected thereby.

4. Neither will the idea of action and its event suffice, without an expectance of satisfaction in the attainment: for we pursue and reject the same things at times, according as we find ourselves in the humor. It is not barely the taste, nor the sight, nor the reflection of objects, but the satisfaction expected therein, that urges us to pursue them: those who have not a palate for sweet things, will never be tempted by the sweetness of sugar, nor will a man take pains to obtain things useful, if he have no concern for the future, nor things laudable, if he have no relish in the consciousness of having performed them. But as we cannot procure

satisfaction without the application of something satisfactory, therefore other perceptions are regarded only as the vehicle necessary for conveyance, but that alone gives weight to the motive. If we search throughout all the actions of men, we shall find them always preferring that wherein they for the present apprehend the greatest satisfaction : even when they forego pleasures, or submit to pains, or undergo labors, they do it for the sake of something they conceive to be more satisfactory ; and when they neglect the known greater good for some paltry appetite, it is because they find more satisfaction in present gratification than in the prospect of distant advantage. Nor if we consider the matter rightly, is this denied by those who ascribe the greatest power of self-moving to the mind : for though they contend for her having the privilege of annexing the idea of Best to whatever object she pleases, yet they admit that this idea so annexed, influences the active powers to pursue it.

5. For the most part we proceed upon some design more or less remote, and then our motive contains several ends of action one within another ; understanding retaining the principal purpose in view, and imagination suggesting the means from time to time in their proper order. Thus a motive appears to be a very complicated idea, containing a variety of judgments, together with the subjects whereon they are passed. Besides this, we cannot go on currently without ideal causes to conduct us on our way, nor instruments to assist us, of which we must have a competent idea or we shall mistake in the use of them. But by long custom and familiarity, our compounds coalesce into one idea, and so, as I may say, take up no more room in the mind than if they were single and uniform : and by habituating ourselves to fix our notice upon a variety of objects in the scenes passing before us, such of them as may serve to prompt or shape our actions, occur at one glance, and as it were in one complex ; which gives us our readiness and dexterity in all those exercises of our powers to which we have been frequently accustomed.

CHAP. XVI.

SPECIES OF MOTIVES.

SATISFACTION is always one and the same in kind, how much soever it may vary in degree, for it is that state the mind is thrown into upon the application of things agreeable ; and what-

ever possesses that quality in equal degree, whether meats and drinks, or diversion, or gain, or acquisition of power, or reflection on past performances, fills it with the same content and complacence : wherefore the various species of motives must be distinguished by the variety of vehicles containing satisfaction.

Innumerable are the ways men find at different times to satisfy themselves ; to enumerate them all would be endless and needless : therefore I shall endeavor, what is usually practised in such cases, to distinguish them into classes, and I think them reducible to these four, Pleasure, Use, Honor, and Necessity. For I cannot recollect anything we undertake unless it be either for some amusement we hope to find in it, or for some service we expect it will do us, or for the credit that will redound from it in the estimation of others or ourselves, or because compelled thereto by the urgency of our situation. Sometimes two or more of these join forces to move us, and sometimes we have them all four in view at once : a man on bespeaking a suit of clothes, may do it because his old ones are worn out, and he must have something to put upon his back : he may choose his piece of cloth for the closeness and strength that will render it most serviceable ; he directs the cut and make so as to appear fashionable, and perhaps orders a dab of gold or silver lace to please his own fancy.

2. There is another division running through all the classes above mentioned, which distinguishes them into motives of reason and motives of fancy : the one giving birth to our considerate, and the other to our inadvertent actions ; and both of these for the most part find room to operate without interrupting each other ; when two persons walk together to some place on business, they may swing their arms, or whistle, or discourse, or practise some other little amusement, which neither retards nor forwards them on their way. Nor are we scarce ever so totally engaged in the prosecution of any design as not to make many motions that do not directly tend to the furtherance of it. Or fancy may alter the shape of our actions without turning them aside from their purpose : a man may go on tiptoe for a whim, and make as much speed that way for a while as he desires, but when he finds it grow tiresome, he will return to his ordinary gait.

Our larger undertakings contain many ends, subordinate to one another, and all conducive to the principal ; each of which in turn wholly occupies the thought, but the principal all along lies dormant in the mind, ready to operate as occasion shall offer. Thus a traveller, going on a long journey, has the next baiting

place for the object of his pursuit during every particular stage; but if anything happens suggesting an alteration or addition to his plan, then the main purpose of his journey presently occurs and weighs with him in his deliberations. Most of us have a few leading aims that shape the general course of our lives, such as the attainment of some art or science, advancement of our fortune, engagement to a profession or favorite diversion: and these branch out into divisions which again contain inferior views; like the governors of provinces or generals of armies, who have their subaltern officers commanding the private men. In some persons there is one predominant purpose, usually styled the ruling passion, as wealth, power, or fame, that like Aaron's serpent, swallows up all the rest, and will suffer nothing to weigh that does not coincide with its interests.

3. We observed a little while ago how understanding and imagination influence each other: there are few of our purposes to be attained at a single stroke, but judgment recommends the thing to be done, and the trains of imagination, or that habitual expertness we have acquired in works of the like nature, successively suggests the means of performing it; which must be looked upon as ideal causes, having no satisfaction of their own, but taking a tincture of that belonging to the design they tend to promote.

On the other hand, imagination often sets understanding at work. How many people employ all their sagacity and contrivance to compass some sudden whim they take into their heads without ever considering whether it be worth the while! And indeed in our most prudent proceedings we generally set out on some motive arising involuntarily to our view: for when sense, appetite, or a train of reflection instigates to an undertaking, and nothing occurs to render the expedience of it doubtful, what has understanding to do but concert proper measures for completing it?

4. Wherefore as the motives deposited in our imagination bear so great a sway in our proceedings, it is well worth the pains to examine what kinds of them we are capable of, in order to store up such as may serve us best and most effectually: but this is no easy matter, as well by reason of their smallness as of their obscurity. The satisfactions urging to our by-motions, while attention fixes on something else, are of the evanescent kind, as Hartly calls them, by an epithet taken from the mathematicians, who term those angles evanescent that lie between a perpendicular and the foot of an hyperbola: yet these little angles are sufficient to begin an opening between the two lines, and so are the little satisfactions suffi-

cient to produce sudden and short actions, and afford us that complacency we feel in the common transactions of life. But there are other satisfactions, which, though strong enough of themselves to strike the eye, yet are covered from our sight whenever we endeavor to look upon them by other objects intervening. When we attempt to recollect the inducements of our conduct, there commonly occurs, instead of them, specious reasons serving to justify it to ourselves or the world. How many people ascribe their actions to disinterestedness, or benevolence, or virtue, when they were prompted by fear, or resentment, or profit, or reputation? They fancy themselves possessed of those motives, but really have no such thing in their composition, or have them so feeble as never to weigh against anything else lying in counterbalance. For it must be noted, that when we reflect on our past behavior, we have not in view before us that state of mind we were actually in at the time of acting, which is gone and over, but its representative idea; and our ideas being perpetually upon the float, leave room for another representation to slip in such aims as bear an unfavorable aspect, hiding themselves, or taking shelter under others more reputable, which renders it extremely difficult to discover what real motives we have belonging to us, without continually keeping a watchful eye and fixing our attention upon them at the very instant of their operating.

5. The want of knowing what motives lie in the storehouse of imagination, has probably given rise to the notion of an arbitrary power which some attribute to the Will: for being acquainted only with the motives of understanding, and those strong instigations of passion which can escape nobody's observation, and yet finding that those incitements do not operate with equal effect upon all occasions, but sometimes one prevails, and sometimes the other, they can assign no cause of the difference besides an inherent authority in the Will to determine its own motions. But if one could discern all the various turns imagination is apt to take, it might not be difficult from thence to account for the turns of volition: and whenever the dictates of reason appear to act with more or less weight than was expected, one might always discover some secret inclination, or wilfulness, or persuasion, or moral sense at bottom that casts the balance. Therefore I shall endeavor, as far as I am able, to trace out the minute and obscure motives, as well as the more observable, when I come to consider each of my four classes particularly.

CHAP. XVII.

PRODUCTION OF MOTIVES.

FOR reasons before given, it seems probable there is some particular organ or fibre, which I have called the spring, that affects us with satisfaction and uneasiness. Whether there be a several spring for either, or that one affects us differently according to its different motions, I shall not pretend to determine: but this spring never plays, unless touched by some of those organs which excite our other perceptions. Hence proceeds the necessity of a vehicle, because we cannot obtain satisfaction without the ministry of some idea that shall prove satisfactory, nor fall under uneasiness without the feeling or thought of something that shall render us uneasy.

But in what manner sever our ideas operate either way, certain it is that nature, in the formation of our bodies, first gives them their respective qualities; for many sensations from our birth give us pain, and others afford us pleasure, and those sensations are not of our own procuring, but excited in us by external objects wherewith volition has no concern: therefore nature does not furnish us with motives, which must be worked out by experience of what hurts or delights us; for we can have no inducement for action before we know what to choose or reject. Our senses each of them respectively convey pleasure from certain objects, and pain from others; but those sensations do not discover the means of procuring them, therefore they cannot generate a motive; which must arise from the remembrance of what exercises of our power have used to bring the objects to our organs, or to remove them. Even appetite, as given by nature, is no more than a pleasing or irksome feel, according to the several degrees of its intenseness; nor does it grow into desire until we have learned what will satisfy it. One may observe that little children, when uneasy through-hunger or sleepiness, do not know what is the matter with them, and are so far from being moved by appetite towards the gratification of it, that they fight against their victuals and other methods of relief when applied to them.

We have observed before, that every motive contains a judgment, and that the first judgment we ever passed must precede the first act we ever performed. How we attain this first judgment, whether by participation of the mother's ideas, or by the mental organs being thrown mechanically into a modification that

shall excite a perception of judgment, I am not able to explain : but thus much we may conclude for certain, that little children come into the world with a general notion of action, though they know very little how to apply their powers for particular purposes. When anything affects them with pleasure or pain, they put themselves into violent agitations, throwing about their arms and legs, and working with every muscle of their body : and at other times you see them very full of motion continually while awake. By thus perpetually exerting their powers, they light upon such motions as happen to relieve them in their wants or please them with the sensation they feel in the exercise : the idea of those motions and their effect in time sinking into their reflection, urges them to repeat the like upon other occasions, and thus instructed by accident they gradually rise to the more perfect management of their limbs and organs.

2. As motives have their foundation in the knowledge of things satisfactory, or the contrary, of course they will follow the quality found in certain sensations of affecting us either way, and consequently will depend upon that which gives them their respective qualities : therefore many of our propensities and aversions, and our appetites, may be termed natural, although not innate ; because unavoidably fallen into by experience of those properties of affecting us, which nature has given to several sensations. But the matter of our composition, whereon our sensations depend, being extremely soft and pliable, is susceptible of change from alterations in the grosser parts of our frame : therefore nature does not entirely preserve the texture she had given us originally, but in the growth of our bodies brings other wheels of the machine to catch the spring of satisfaction. Children, boys, young men and old, have their different sources of enjoyment ; and it has been observed of our tastes, that they vary every seven years. Custom likewise, commonly styled a second nature, varies the position of our mechanism, so as to produce an affection from the same touches, different from that they produced originally. What parts of our flesh are tenderer at first than the soles of our feet ? yet continual use brings them to be callous, and enables them to bear our weight without trouble. Bitters or tobacco offend the taste or smell of those who never tried them before ; but use reconciles men to them, then renders them pleasant, and afterwards indifferent again. Nor have particular accidents, or the dispositions of our body less effect to change the quality of objects : a surfeit will give an antipathy to things we were fond of before ; a fever makes us nauseate our ordinary food ; fulness, emptiness, or drowsiness, renders those

motions of our limbs irksome that used to delight us. Nature has so constructed our muscles, that they remove from one spring to the other in the course of their play : after long sitting we find our legs stiff, a few steps make their movement pleasant, a long walk renders it laborious, and a longer fatigues us. The same is notorious with respect to the other senses, wherein weariness takes the name of satiety : uncouth motions or sensations we find troublesome, familiar ones generally agreeable, but continued too long they become tiresome ; whence comes the observation, that variety makes the pleasure of life. As the sources of our enjoyment vary we quickly perceive it, and our motives vary accordingly ; for those objects we conceive in our present circumstances agreeable, move us to pursue them.

3. It may be presumed, that nature gives our mental organs an aptness to affect us agreeably with their motion, though this quality cannot operate till there have been a competent number of trains worked in the imagination to give them play : for I think we may perceive an amusement in every easy motion of our thoughts, though upon matters indifferent, when they are not strained by intense application, nor stopped by difficulties, nor run upon melancholy subjects ; and so we may in every motion of our limbs and exercise of our senses, unless prevented by some such hindrances as those above mentioned, or by the notice being drawn off upon something else.

But imagination derives most of her affecting quality from sensation ; for the first ideas of reflection being only sensations repeated though in a fainter degree, they return with some portion of the satisfaction accompanying them at their first entrance. For the remembrance of past enjoyments generally fills us with delight, if it be not destroyed by another reflection of their being to be had no more ; and this delight increases upon the prospect of their being repeated, for whatever we apprehend will please us when attained, gives actual pleasure in the approach towards it. Which adds strength to our motives, or rather gives them their whole vigor, for present satisfaction being our constant pursuit, nothing remote could ever move us if it did not afford an immediate enjoyment in the expectation, or there were no uneasiness in the thought of missing it.

4. Thus far our motives may be styled natural, for though nature does not directly infuse them, she supplies us with sensations that cannot fail to attract our notice, and thereby informs us what to choose, and what to refuse. But we receive a considerable accession to our stock of motives from other sources. Our situation and circumstances in life, and variety of accidents falling

out, furnish us with many ; our intercourse among mankind with many more, some of them thrown upon us designedly by education and instruction, and others formed insensibly by custom and example ; some we fall into by habit without intending it, and others we work out for ourselves by our own care and industry. But the principal supply of our stores comes from Translation : upon which, though perhaps I may not have a great deal to say, yet because we shall find frequent occasion to mention it hereafter, therefore I shall make a chapter of it by itself.

CHAP. XVIII.

TRANSLATION.

WE have taken notice in the chapter on judgment (§ 38) of the transferable nature of assent, and how it passes from the premises to the conclusion ; I do not mean while we retain the whole process of argumentation in view, for then assent does not adhere directly to the point concluded on, but only connects with it remotely, by the intervening evidence. But daily experience testifies that conviction will often remain after the grounds of it have slipped out of our thought : whenever we reflect on the thing proved, there occurs a judgment of its being true, united in the same assemblage without aid of any proof to support it ; and this many times after the proofs are so far gone out of our memory that we cannot possibly recal them. By this channel we are supplied with many truths, commonly reputed self-evident, because though we know them assuredly for truths, we cannot discover how we came by that knowledge. In like manner we have store of propensities, generally esteemed natural, because we cannot readily trace them to any other origin than that quality of affecting us, assigned by nature to certain ideas. But having shown how translation prevails in satisfaction, as well as assent, there will appear reason to conclude, that we derive our inclinations and moral senses through the same channel as our knowledge, without having them interwoven originally into our constitution.

As every motive contains an opinion of the object moving us being satisfactory, whatever appears conducive to procure it we must necessarily judge expedient : but this does not complete the translation, for there requires something more to transfer satisfaction than assent. If a man wishes to see some fine house and

gardens, but the way lies along very dirty roads, the circumstance of slouching through mire does not immediately become a motive of action with him : but if he had frequent occasion to ride along bad roads upon very desirable errands, though he might never come to like the exercise, they would grow much more tolerable to him than he found them at first. For the perpetual tendency of measures to what will please us greatly, alters their quality of affecting us, and in many cases renders them pleasant of themselves : and when this happens they become motives, the translation being perfectly made.

2. Imagination is not so scanty but that it can exhibit several objects to our notice at once, and this I may say in longitude as well as latitude presenting a chain of causes and effects lying beyond one another. As few of our desires can be accomplished by a single effort, there occurs together with the object of our wishes, several means tending successively to compass it ; which means have no satisfaction of their own, but take a tincture from that whereto they conduce : under this prospect, the object lying at the end of the line only is our motive ; but as whatever we apprehend will please gives actual pleasure in the approach, therefore we pursue the intermediate steps for the satisfaction of that approach.

But the line of our pursuit frequently runs to a greater length than imagination has room to contain, and some of the means necessary to attain our end, require our whole attention to compass them ; in this case, so much of the line as lies beyond those means, drops out of our thought for a time, but leaves that tincture of satisfaction it had given them behind : the means then become motives for the present, for our motive upon every occasion, is always that furthest point we have in view at the instant of acting ; whatever inducements we might have had to fix upon that point, are not motives while absent from our thought. Thus, if a man, being to ride a long journey, wants to buy a horse, which he does not know readily where to procure, the inquiries necessary to be made, and steps to be taken for that purpose, occupy him entirely, until he has gotten one to his liking : all this while the acquisition of a horse actuates his motions, and he will assign that for his motive to anybody who shall ask why he bestirs himself, unless they recal another idea into his head, by asking further what he wants the horse for. But these are only temporary motives, which borrow satisfaction for a time from another hand, and have it not of their own property, therefore are not to be reckoned among our stock of motives repositied in the storehouse.

But many times it happens that we find the same means con-

ducive to our enjoyments of various kinds, and upon repeated occasions, which gives them the tincture so often, that at last it becomes their natural color : they then move us of themselves, without needing any further inducement to recommend them ; and then the translation is perfectly completed. Sometimes they receive their quality by one strong impression : a burnt child dreads the fire, and some persons having received hurt by a sword can never endure the sight of one afterwards. But oftener the quality comes gradually by use : boys are driven by fear to their lessons until they take a liking to them ; and many find amusement in professions they first entered into much against the grain. Nor is it uncommon for this quality to adhere so strongly, that no change of circumstances can disengage it : old people retain a fondness for their youthful sports after they have lost all sensation of pleasure in the exercise ; and your hard students continue to plod on without prospect of any good to come of it, and after it appears manifestly prejudicial to their health.

3. Translation takes place solely in the mental organs, yet seems to bear some resemblance in the manner of it with those changes made in our bodies by custom. Sailors bring their hands to a hardness by continually handling the ropes, so that they lose a great deal of the sensibility belonging to them. Nature perhaps at first designed us for quadrupeds, but the continual cares of our nurses enure us to an erect posture, so that we should now find it extremely troublesome to go upon all four. In these cases there is an alteration made in the texture of our flesh, or disposition of our muscles, whereby the same motions and objects give us different sensations from what they formerly did. In like manner when inclination passes from the end to the means, though there be no change in the grosser parts, nor difference of sensation effected, yet we may suppose some variation in the posture of our internal organs, those which did not affect us at all before, being brought to fasten on the spring of satisfaction by frequent application thereto.

But in what manner soever translation be effected, nobody can deny that we often acquire a liking to things from their having frequently promoted our other desires, where no alteration in our muscles or animal œconomy can be suspected. I need instance only in one very common propensity, whose derivation from prior inclinations will not be controverted. Everybody will acknowledge that the value of money arises solely from the use of it : if we had not found it commanding the pleasures and conveniences of life, we should never have thought it worth our regard. Nature gave us no such desire, but we are forced to take pains in

teaching children to be careful, and those with whom such pains have proved unsuccessful, cannot rest till they get rid of their money, or, as we say, it burns in their pockets. Nevertheless, the continual experience we find of money supplying our wants and fancies, gives it a general estimation among mankind, so that the desire of gain becomes a powerful motive of action. Few of us being suggested an acquisition of fortune by some honest, creditable, and easy method, but would feel an immediate pleasure in the pursuit, without looking forward to the many pretty things he could purchase: nor would he be thought a prudent man who should hesitate to receive a sum until he could find out some particular uses whereto he might apply it. And in some persons the love of riches rises to such an exorbitant pitch, as to overwhelm all those desires which first made them valuable: a covetous man will deny himself the pleasures, the conveniences, even the necessaries of life, for the sake of hoarding up his pelf, and seems to retain no other motive in his storehouse than that of dying worth a plumb. What shall we say then? is there a different structure of parts between the miser, the generous œconomist, and the spendthrift? Their organs of sensation continue the same, there is no hardness of flesh, no stiffness or flexibility of muscles, in the one more than the other: but their imagination has received a different cast, and the mental organs, exhibiting their ideas of reflection, been made to communicate differently with the spring of satisfaction. For though the niggard may possibly be prevailed on to do a generous deed once in his life, yet even then he feels a secret reluctance in parting with his cash: which reluctance is involuntary, therefore forced upon him by the act of some other agent distinct from himself, for we may suppose he would give cheerfully if he could; but this agent can be none other than the internal and finer parts of his mechanism, which, being differently connected, affect him in a different manner from what they would another person.

One might produce many other instances to show that our motives generate one another; that the children survive after their parents are dead and forgotten; and sometimes, like the viper's brood, destroy those that gave them birth. Many of these descendant motives gain the credit of being coeval with ourselves, and that even among the considerate and studious: they are currently reputed to have been, like Melchizedech, without father or mother, because we find no mention in our records of any they had. But upon a strict and impartial scrutiny it may be not impossible to trace out their origin, and perhaps make it appear that all the motives actuating us in our riper years, except sensations of

pleasure and pain, or our natural and acquired appetites, are of the translated kind. Through this channel we derive most of our tastes, inclinations, sentiments, moral senses, checks of conscience, obligations, impulses of fancy, attachments to professions, fondness for diversions, regard to reputation, views of prudence, virtues and vices, and in general all those pursuits, whether of distant or present aims, that render the occupations of men different from the amusements of children.

CHAP. XIX.

SYMPATHY.

This title may perhaps give occasion to expect a dissertation upon those sympathetic cures spoken of by Sir Kenelm Digby, who tells you that wounds have been healed by applying salves and plaisters to the instrument that made them. Or of that similitude supposed to be in the constitution of two persons, so that any good or evil befalling one of them shall instantly affect the other at a great distance, by means of certain cognate effluvia passing to and fro between them. But I deal in no such wonders; common experience is my guide, and that must have informed everybody how much we continually sympathise with the sentiments and affections of the company among whom we converse. As this quality contributes greatly to introduce our motives into act, and by frequently introducing them to produce new ones, it seems properly to claim a place between those two subjects.

2. We are not long in the world from our first entrance before we perceive that our pleasures and pains depend much upon the actions of those about us: on a little further progress, we discover that their actions follow their disposition of mind, and afterwards learn to distinguish those dispositions by certain marks of them in their looks and gestures. This makes children perpetually attentive to the motions and countenance of persons into whose hands they fall: nor does there want another cause to render them more so, for having but few stores in their own imagination, they catch the ideas of other people to supply themselves with employment. And in our advanced years we cannot well carry on any business or argument, or enjoy the pleasures of conversation, without entering into the thoughts and notions of one another. When we arrive at the use of understanding, the judgment of others weighs with us as a just and natural evidence, inducing us to judge accor-

dingly ; but we have seen how the judgment of expedience, frequently reiterated, transfers satisfaction upon the measures so conceived expedient : and we purposely imitate the ways and manners of our teachers, or other persons whom we esteem more expert and knowing in any matter than ourselves. Thus we acquire much of our sympathy by inadvertent notice, and add more by design and industry ; until custom in both ways has worked out trains wherein imagination learns to run involuntarily and mechanically. This appears most evident in compassion, for we cannot help sympathizing with distress, though we feel it painful to ourselves, and know it can afford no relief to the party suffering.

3. But we catch our other affections, too, from the prospect of them exhibited before us : a sprightly countenance makes us cheerful, and a face of melancholy damps our spirits ; we pursue other people's hopes, and take alarm at their terrors ; we grow to love things we perceive them fond of, and contract aversions from their dislike. Nor is immediate sensation the only thing that can work this effect upon us ; for we find the same produced by stories of accidents befalling persons at a distance ; we receive impression from facts recorded in history, and feel ourselves affected with the affections of those who have been dead a thousand years ago. Nay, we find ourselves interested in imaginary scenes, partaking the pleasures and pains of fictitious characters in a play or a novel : and as we take a tincture of the affections, so we imbibe the opinions, and insensibly adopt the views of those with whom we have continual intercourse, which gives example the prevalence over precept, and enables evil communications to corrupt good manners. Even sensations may undergo a change by the effect we see them have upon others : we may get a relish to a dish upon observing the company eat eagerly of it, and nauseate a joint of meat because somebody at table fancies it to have an unsavory smell. How many people take their taste of music from the applauses of connoisseurs ? How hideous does a once admired pattern of silk become in the ladies' eyes upon being grown out of fashion ? What change do imbibed notions make in the ears of great scholars, as we have remarked in Chap. XIII. § 2, so that they cannot distinguish between a long sound and a short, a vowel and a consonant ? None can have avoided observing how apt we are to mimic the gestures, fall into the habits, and copy the imperfections we see continually before us : and it has been observed a thousand times, that laughing and yawning generally go round the company. We participate in some measure the ideas of all men, but more with those of whom we have a good opinion or frequent converse, than with strangers ; for the

judgment of the former carries greater weight upon us for our estimation of their persons, and that of the latter makes up by repetition for what it wanted in strength.

4. But were we to give a full latitude to sympathy, we should whiffle about with every wind, nor could ever keep steady to one tenor of conduct, because we should perpetually meet with somebody or other leading us by their example to swerve from it. This teaches us a reserve and caution against taking impressions too hastily, and confines our propensity to imitation within due bounds. Yet where there are not urgent reasons to the contrary, I do not see why we may not let sympathy take its course, as it gives an easier flow to our thoughts, renders us more sociable, and assists us in making many improvements.

There are some who carry this reserve to extremities, so far as to throw their mind into a disposition contrary to that they see exhibited: this temper whoever pleases may call Antipathy, as being the opposite to sympathy. It generally takes its rise or terminates in ill nature, rendering the possessors morose, contemptuous, and intractable: they repine at others' successes, and rejoice at the sight of disappointment; if you talk seriously to them, they fall to joking; and if you would make them merry, they put on a more than ordinary solemnity of countenance. There are those who affect this contrariety of humor towards mankind in general, but it is more usually practised with respect only to such against whom we have conceived some great prejudice. And, indeed, if ever allowable, it is so when we fall under a necessity of consorting with persons of whose errors or evil principles we have just cause for suspicion, to prevent our taking contagion from them. Yet some situations render us all so unapt for imitation, that we rather take disgust at the expression of affections not tallying with our own: in our seasons of jolity we cannot endure a melancholy aspect, and when under affliction, any levity disturbs us: but this proceeds rather from the force of sympathy, than otherwise; for that perpetually urges the mind to assimilate her trains to patterns she cannot follow under her present circumstances.

CHAP. XX.

INTRODUCTION OF MOTIVES.

SENSATION first moves us to action, in order to continue it if pleasant, or remove it if painful: thus the taste of victuals urges children to take more of them into their mouths, and the smart of a pin to catch away their hands from it. When they have gotten competent stores of reflection, these too affect them in like manner with sensation, and sometimes overpower it; for you may draw off a child's notice from any little pain or craving of appetite, by diverting it with play-things. As imagination becomes worked into trains, the notice, being put into one by some particular object, will run on to other ideas very different from those the object exhibited. Nor does imagination fail to suggest fancies of her own motion without any object to introduce them: of what kind they shall be, depends greatly upon constitution, the present state of our animal spirits or disposition of mind, inclining us either to seriousness or gaiety, business or diversion. Habits, too, attract the notice to follow them inadvertently by that ease there is in giving way to the little transient desires they present rather than restraining them. And when experience has brought us acquainted with the properties of things external, and the command we have over the ideas of our mind, which knowledge gives us the use of our understanding, we can then procure motives for ourselves; either by application of such objects as will raise any particular desire, or by putting reflection upon the hunt for something that will please us, or suggesting inducements to strengthen us in our purpose, or by resolution to banish some intruding ideas, and fix our whole attention upon others.

2. Thus there are three causes contributing to introduce motives into the scale: the action of the mind, impulse of external objects, and mechanical play of our organs; and these three mutually influence one another. The mind operates two ways, either by design or inadvertently; for when she turns her notice upon an idea, though with no other view than for the present amusement it affords, this occasions it to lead in a train of its associates, and often awakens a desire that would have lain dormant without such attention. Therefore, if we have any hurtful inclination belonging to us, it is very dangerous to let our thoughts run upon objects relative thereto; for we may raise a disturber we did not expect, nor can quiet again whenever we please: and perhaps desire scarce ever rises to any high pitch, unless assisted by some ac-

tion of the mind tending to foment it. But when the mind acts with design, nevertheless she has that design suggested by something happening to her from without, or by the spontaneous working of imagination; to which sources she must have recourse in search for motives of her conduct, or gathering encouragements to support her in an undertaking. Even in the most arbitrary exercise of her power, as when she endeavors to attain her purpose by dint of resolution, she uses some instrument to do her work. A man that holds his hand near a roasting fire, must have some reason for so doing, either to cure a burn, under the notion of fire driving out fire, or to try how long he can hold it there, or for some other purpose which appears satisfactory at the time, or else it would never have put him upon the attempt: this satisfactory purpose, then, he strives to retain in full vigor, without suffering it to fluctuate or fade, and withdraws his notice from that uneasiness the smart of the fire would throw upon him. Herein he acts upon the mental eye much in the same manner as we do upon the bodily, when we wink against a glaring light, or stretch our nerves to observe some obscure object that cannot be discerned without straining; or as we do upon the organs of hearing, when of two persons talking to us at once, we disregard the one, and attend wholly to the other. And in all cases of resolution, we may perceive the like method practised: we do not annex the idea of Best to what had it not before, but among opposite subjects, whereto that idea is already annexed, we hold one under contemplation, and exclude the rest, or strengthen it with other considerations, from whence that idea may be transferred.

Things external are made to operate upon us either by natural causes, or the situation we stand in, or the company we consort with: but what effect they shall produce in us depends greatly upon the cast of our imagination. For we have observed before, that the same objects affect people variously, exciting different judgments, and suggesting different motives in one from what they do in another: nor does the mind want a power many times of applying or removing objects, and of increasing or diminishing in some measure the impression of those before her by an operation upon her organs.

In like manner the spontaneous courses of our ideas, although depending chiefly upon habit, and running into those trains of thought to which we have been accustomed, yet may be diverted by objects occurring, or drawn aside by the force of sympathy, or controlled by the power of the mind, so as to take another track than they would have followed of their own accord.

3. If we examine our proceedings carefully, we shall find in all of them a mixture of volition and machinery, and perhaps the latter bearing a greater share than the former. We never enter upon an undertaking without some purpose starting up in our thoughts, or recommended by the present occasion as expedient or agreeable: we choose the measures for accomplishing it from among the stores presented by our understanding; and though we perform the work by our own activity, yet our manner of proceeding is such as former practice has made ready to us, and the minute steps necessary for completing it, rise mechanically in our imagination. Our latent motives, which bear so great a sway in the behavior of most men, cannot owe their appearance to the mind, because they escape her observation when she would discover them: and our minute motives prompting us to inadvertent actions, which are far more numerous than commonly supposed, must take rise from some other spring, because the mind perceives them not the moment before they operate, nor remembers them the moment after. Nor are the grosser parts of our machine without their influence upon our actions: the natural temperament of our constitution, the accidental condition of our humors, the brisk or slow circulation of our animal spirits, the circumstances of health or sickness, freshness or weariness, fulness or emptiness, render the mind alert or unapt for exercise, turn imagination into different trains, excite desires of various kinds, and in great measure model the shape of our behavior.

4. What is the particular structure of our machine, how the several parts of it communicate, or in what manner they operate upon one another, we cannot pretend to describe, and therefore must express ourselves by figures. Sometimes we talk of characters imprinted, or traces engraven in the memory, sometimes of roads and tracks worn in the imagination, of weights hanging in the balance, springs impelling to action, wheels resembling those of clock-work, images striking upon the mental eye, or streams and currents running in various channels. Those expressions, if intended for a physical account of our interior frame, could not all be admitted, as being inconsistent with one another: but when we speak figuratively of a matter we cannot describe directly, we may vary our images without inconsistency, for the same will not answer in every case, therefore it is allowable to take any that shall afford the greatest resemblance according to the present occasion for which we want to apply it.

But if we may guess at the internal texture of our machine by the grosser parts of it discoverable upon dissection, they will lead us to imagine that our ideas are conveyed by a multitude of little

tubes affecting us variously according to the motions excited in them, or according to the courses of some subtle fluid they contain: or should we, with Doctor Hartly, suppose the nerves to be solid capilaments, and the business performed by an ether surrounding them on the outside, this will amount to the same thing; because a number of these small strings placed close together will form tubes of the interstices between them, which may serve as channels for the foresaid ether to pass along. Therefore, if I were to compare the human machine to any of our contrivances of art, I should choose for my foundation a large Organ; wherein the bellows answer to the animal circulation, the pipes to the organs of sensation and reflection, and the organist to the mind. But the organist here does not make all the music: for the pipes are so contrived as to sound with the striking of things external upon them, or by the mere working of the bellows, which plays as it were by clock-work without a blower. Yet is this but an imperfect representation of the natural machine: to make our comparison more complete, we must suppose other sets of pipes for conveying objects of the other senses; besides innumerable smaller ones returning an echo to the larger, and new modulating the sounds or lights received from them, which supplies us with our ideas of reflection. These little vessels are so soft and flexible, that they will change their form and run into various contextures with one another, whereon depend our inclinations and stores of knowledge: for as a pipe will give a different sound according to the length or other dimensions it consists of, so objects affect us differently according to the disposition of the channels through which they pass. Nor must we omit the many conveyances necessary for distributing the alimentary juices, which serve like oil to moisten and supple the works or to repair the waste made by continual use. Add to this a multitude of other pipes which dilate and shorten upon inflation, and thereby draw certain strings fastened to their extremities: from whence proceeds muscular motion, and the power of acting upon the several parts of our machine, as well the grosser as the finer. And all this infinite variety of works, so complicated with one another, and yet so exactly disposed as not to interfere with each other in their play, Nature has stowed within the narrow compass of a human body; which if an artist were to endeavor to imitate by constructing an engine that should perform those few of the human movements that art can imitate, it would require an immense fabric to contain everything necessary for executing his purpose. But the most wonderful circumstance of all is, that our organist sits in utter darkness with respect to the nearest parts of his instrument, which are to be the immediate subjects

of his action, having no notice of anything but what comes to him through his pipes : he knows not the situation of his keys, on which hand lies the base or the treble ; nevertheless, after a competent practice in his trade, he acquires such an unaccountable expertness, that he never touches the wrong key, but takes his measures exactly, without perceiving what they are, and upon an idea only of some remote consequence they will produce.

5. Since there is so close a connection between the parts of our machine acted upon by the mind and those moved by the animal circulation, it follows that each must have an influence upon the other. Our vital spirits, according as they stand disposed, force a particular kind of ideas upon the mind, and the latter in every exertion of her power causes an alteration in the courses of the former : sometimes designedly, but oftener as a natural consequence of something else she intends. He that runs means only to arrive the sooner at the place whither he would go ; but besides this he quickens his pulse, heats his flesh, and puts himself out of breath, effects which he did not think of, nor perhaps should have ensued had it been at his option to have helped them. The like happens on other exercises of our activity, which propagate a motion to the several parts of our body corresponding respectively with the organs employed in those exercises ; and these parts, by frequently receiving such motions, become disposed to fall into them again mechanically, or upon the slightest touch, and thereby excite the same ideas that generated them. From hence arise our habits, which though learned at first by single, but perhaps inadvertent acts of the mind, yet recur upon us afterwards involuntarily. Hence likewise spring the passions, which I take to be only a stronger sort of habits acquired early in our childhood, when the matter of our composition being tender and pliable, may be worked easily into new channels wherein the animal spirits may flow more copiously. For I do not imagine that nature gave us passions : she may indeed have made each man more susceptible of one sort than another, but they are brought into form by the action of the mind bending her notice continually to particular sets of objects. Just as nature may have prepared one man for a dancer by giving him strength and suppleness in his joints, or another for a singer by giving him a clear and sonorous voice ; but it is art and patience that invests them with the respective faculties of dancing or singing.

CHAP. XXI.

PASSIONS.

WE have taken notice that children, on their first entrance into the world, have a general notion of action, though they know not in what manner to apply it : therefore when anything effects them strongly, they strain every nerve, and exert all their little powers of motion. But as they grow acquainted with the uses of those powers, they confine their efforts to some particular quarter : yet their knowledge for a long while being very imperfect, they still employ more exertion than necessary, striving to attain that by vehemence which they want skill to accomplish by management. These efforts made upon the organs of reflection, as well as those of motion, being frequently repeated upon the same parts, widen the passages communicating with the vital circulation, which thereby more readily admit the animal spirits, and take in a larger flow than they were capable of in their natural state. Whence proceeds the violence and obstinacy of passion, which will scarce allow any ideas to enter the mind besides those of its own cast, nor can be put out of its course until the ferment subsides of itself : wherein there is no room to doubt of the animal spirits being concerned, when we consider the effects generally visible upon the pulse, the nerves, and the countenance. Thus it appears we work out the passions by our own activity, not indeed with a deliberate design which the infant mind is scarce capable of at the time when she lays the foundation of them, but by that inadvertent notice she is led to fix upon striking objects.

The passions seem to have their particular provinces in the several parts of our machine : what alterations they produce in the body, it belongs to the painter, the sculptor, and the anatomist to ascertain ; and what play they give the mental organs belongs to no professor whatever, as lying beyond the reach of any science yet attained by human sagacity. So there remains only for me to examine what ideas give rise to each of them, and hang upon the mind during their influence : nor shall I attempt a complete dissertation upon them all, but offer such few observations as may occur concerning the principle.

2. Immediate satisfaction being the point that constantly attracts our notice, and gives influence to all our other ideas, we must look there as the most likely place to find the source of our passions. Whatever present action in our power promises satisfaction, prompts the mind to pursue it, and this state of mind we

call desire; for I take desire to be nothing else but the prospect of some agreeable perception, together with some present act apprehended productive thereof: this therefore is the spring that begins to set us in motion, and actuates us incessantly in every exercise of our powers, for we never stir a fibre but for the sake of something we desire to have produced thereby; and Mr. Locke declares himself of the same opinion, where he says desire is always the thing that determines the Will. But this common desire is not a passion, being too gentle to deserve that name: otherwise we could never possess our minds in tranquillity, because there is scarce a moment in our waking hours wherein we are not urged to something either momentous or trifling. But when the purpose we aim at does not ensue upon our first endeavors, the mind redoubles her efforts under an apprehension that a stronger exertion may succeed where a weaker did not; for it has been commonly remarked that difficulties lying in the way of desire, like water thrown upon coals, if not enough to extinguish it, make it burn with a fiercer flame. After having frequently practised exertions of this sort, the spirits get a habit of rising in a ferment, which will let no other idea intrude besides that of the engaging object; and then desire takes the form of a passion. I know that strong sensations, and cravings of appetite, will raise violent commotions in the earliest times of life, before any habit can be acquired: but sense and appetite have always been distinguished from passion, wherein the organs of reflection bear a principal share, and ideas hang longer, and make deeper impression upon the mind than sensation could have enabled them to do, which additional force they must have derived from habit.

But an objection may be started against my making the prospect of means tending towards an attainable satisfaction to constitute desire, because it is very well known, that men too often set their hearts upon things they see no possibility of obtaining. This I acknowledge to be fact, nevertheless, even in these cases there is something the mind apprehends to be feasible; for when the object of desire lies anything remote, every step leading to it, nay, the very thought of an approach towards it, soothes the mind with a momentary satisfaction, which thought may be in our power, though the object itself confessedly is not; for we have seen that persuasion does not always follow conviction, and as by reading a poem or a novel, so by an operation upon our mental organs, we may sometimes raise a temporary persuasion of things we know to be false. Besides, the holding an object in our thoughts is one means towards attaining it, because that may suggest expedients which did not presently occur, and because the strength

of an idea, heightened by our attention to it, urges us to a stronger exertion of our powers. These causes I conceive make people dwell upon whatever appears with an engaging aspect, and keep them still hankering after things they have found unattainable. For present satisfaction being the point continually in view, they flatter themselves with a fond imagination of making advances towards the obtaining of their wishes, where understanding can give them no such prospect, overlooking that disappointment which must necessarily ensue. The mind has a strange knack of deceiving herself with respect to the success of her measures, when the taking them promises some little amusement for the next succeeding moment. If the idea of something attainable were not part of the essence of desire, there would be no difference between desire and the contemplation of anything agreeable, which is contrary to experience. I suppose most of us would think it very agreeable to fly about in the air like a stork or an eagle; methinks it would be mighty pretty to glide along with such an easy motion, to transport ourselves suddenly from place to place, to soar in the upper regions, having an extensive prospect of lands and seas below, and varying our scenes at pleasure; yet we never fix our desires upon such amusement, but what hinders us, unless that we cannot raise even a delusive imagination of anything practicable towards the attainment of it? But should some Dedalus invent a plausible scheme for making wings, we should probably find ourselves very desirous of having a pair, though we sold our coaches for the purchase: and if after many fruitless attempts we were convinced the thing was impracticable, we might still continue to ruminate upon it for a time, and please ourselves with hunting after better expedients upon a bare possibility, though without any hope of finding them.

3. All that has been said above concerning satisfaction, may be applied with a little alteration to uneasiness, which urges us to fly from it in the same manner as the other attracts us towards it. Wherefore the schoolmen reckon another passion opposite to desire, which they call Flight, or Avoidance, and has some impending evil for its object: but since whatever appears hurtful we always desire to avoid, since the very escape from mischief affords a sensible satisfaction, and since nature has so befriended us that we never want for amusement, whenever we can keep clear of all disagreeable perceptions, there seems little need of distinguishing between the avoidance of evil and desire of good, the latter being always implied in the former: and the less, because it would require some nicety and labor of thought to make such distinction.

But there is another distinction which, though somewhat nice, we have found occasion to take notice of before, and may find the like again hereafter; I mean the making want a separate species of desire. For when the mind is moved by some object, and exerts herself strenuously in searching for some means of advancing towards it, but none offer, or such only as appear ineffectual upon their presenting themselves, this state of mind I call Want; and may be compared to the gnawings of an empty stomach, whose sides grind against one another, as having nothing to work upon. Therefore genuine desire finding continual issue for its efforts, proves the source of all our enjoyments, but want always torments us with uneasiness. Whenever incompatible desires assail us together, one of them at least must degenerate into want, if it still continue to solicit, and be not quite overwhelmed by its antagonist, wholly engrossing our attention. But though want throws the mind into such a disagreeable situation, yet it may be expedient to endure it sometimes for the sake of a greater future advantage: for many very useful desires not vigorous enough at first to surmount all opposition, and therefore meeting with continual disappointment, yet by being still kept alive, and put often to struggle with a superior adversary, may in time acquire strength to overthrow him. Content I take to be nothing else but the privation of want, which though indifferent in itself, yet a contented state is always a happy state in consequence, because as observed just now, we never fail finding matter of amusement, whenever we can keep clear of all disagreeable perceptions.

4. Desire, as we learn from Mr. Locke, obtains a place in all the other passions, and we may say they are only desire under so many different forms. As this derives its original from the expectation of satisfaction to come, so the actual possession of satisfaction throws the mind into a state of enjoyment. But possession does not always put an end to desire, but many times excites it, putting the mind upon stretching her mental optics to obtain a stronger view of the object that pleases her, and upon opening the passages of the animal spirits, to admit a larger current that may heighten and prolong the delightful sensations: when this is done with any considerable degree of exertion, it produces the passion of joy. I think we may pronounce the province of this passion extends over the whole system of vessels concerned in exhibiting ideas, or performing voluntary motion, and that it quickens the circulation of spirits throughout all their passages in general, whereas some other passions pour them more copiously upon particular quarters: for we find people very brisk and active in seasons of joy, breaking out continually into wanton

and extravagant sallies, unless restrained by decency and reflection. Sometimes joy has been known to rise so high as to produce great disorders in the body, and even extinguish life, too great a redundancy of spirits causing suffocation, like a strong wind blowing against one's mouth and nostrils, which hinders the play of our lungs : but these transports rarely happen, nor perhaps ever unless when the channels have been emptied before by some opposite stagnating passion, as grief, or fear, or want. The sight of an only child given over for lost, a pardon brought to a malefactor under the gallows, or a sum of money poured into the lap of a man in utmost distress, may have proved fatal : but then the pleasure comes accompanied with an idea of deliverance from something very irksome before, which gives it a double force. As joy introduces a pleasurable situation of mind, it would deserve encouraging whenever we could, if it were not for some pernicious consequences attending it : for it confines our views within the present to the neglect of our future interests, it disturbs the operation of reason, shutting our eyes against the lights she would offer, and turning a deaf ear against her remonstrances ; for the mind, perfectly satisfied with her present condition, cares for nothing else, but rejects every other idea that might interrupt or abate her enjoyment.

5. As the expectance of satisfaction, dependent upon our endeavors to procure it, causes desire, so the like expectance from external causes, when no endeavors of our own appear necessary, gives birth to Hope. It is true, we often find it incumbent upon us to do something ourselves for accomplishing our hopes ; but then so far as our own activity extends belongs to desire, hope relates only to that success of our measures which is not in our power : for no man is said to hope that his hunger will be appeased by eating when he has victuals set before him, and there is nothing requisite besides his own act to assuage his cravings. It is commonly reckoned that hope must contain a mixture of fear ; and perhaps this is generally the case, considering the uncertainty of events for the most part ; but sometimes we have the prospect of a distant good to befall us without any doubt of its arrival, and I know not what better name than hope can be given to this situation of mind ; therefore see no impropriety in the expression of a sure and certain hope. I am not quite satisfied that hope ought to be ranked among the passions, as being gentle in its own nature, and never raising emotions unless by means of other passions generated from it. For as a man reckons the reversion of an estate among his valuable effects, and esteems the gaining a title to such reversion an accession of fortune, so

the assurance of future good affords a present pleasure: and if the mind exults in the contemplation of that pleasure, or feels an extraordinary flow of spirits arise upon it, this we may call a species of joy. On the other hand, if the promise of distant enjoyment does not instantly satisfy, but begets an eager impatience of possessing it before the time, then hope assumes the form of want.

6. The old philosophers, as we may gather from Cicero, could not settle among themselves, whether to define anger a fervor of mind, or a desire of revenge; which seems to me just as wise a dispute as if they had contended whether Chrysippus were an animal or a man, the one being implied within the other, and differing no otherwise than as genus and species; for custom has appropriated the name of Anger to that particular fervor arising in the mind upon thought of a supposed injury. But there are fervors occasioned by other causes: any pressing pain or uneasiness sets the mind a struggling to throw it off; and difficulties, not apprehended unsurmountable, stir up an earnestness of resolution to master them: therefore it is common when we see people go about anything in a great hurry and flutter, to admonish them not to put themselves in a passion. And I conceive it is this view of difficulty that gives rise to the violence of anger; for as the party upon whom we would wreak vengeance will naturally oppose it with all his might, a more than ordinary exertion becomes necessary in order to surmount that opposition; and the mind, having found this to be constantly the case, gets a habit of eagerness and vehemence in everything she does, either tending or preparatory to revenge. Whatever may be thought of other passions, this cannot be born with us, for there are several things to be learned before we come to the idea of anger: nature makes us concerned originally only with our own pleasures or pains; we feel not, and consequently regard not, what happens to other people, until having received hurt from them, and found that our retaliating the like prevails upon them to desist from offending us, we thence learn the expedience of exerting ourselves upon such occasions. Thus the desire of revenge is not a natural but a translated desire: we first look upon it as a means of procuring ease to ourselves, and security from injury; but having often beheld it in this light, the end at length drops out of sight, and desire, according to the usual process of translation, rests upon the means, which thenceforward become an end whereon our views will terminate. We may reckon at least four stages in our progress to the passion of anger: our experience of damage brought upon us by others, of our power to give them displeasure, of the

effects of such displeasure to make them alter their measures, and of the opposition we must expect against the exercise of that power. But having by these gradations once brought satisfaction to connect immediately with revenge, it becomes a motive of action which we pursue many times by ways not at all conducive to the end that first rendered it recommendable. For men sometimes vent their wrath upon inanimate beings, although incapable of punishment, or of mending their manners thereupon : and in violent transports of rage beat their heads against a wall, or otherwise punish themselves, thereby bringing on that hurt which it was originally the purpose of anger to remove. Though anger raises a mighty flood of spirits, it does not, like joy, diffuse them equally throughout the whole system, but forces them in torrents upon the vessels concerned in action, producing sudden violent starts of motion, spreading a heat to the outward parts, and showing more apparent signs of disorder than any other passion : for which reason I suppose it has generally engrossed the name from the rest, for when we call a man passionate we mean that he is prone to take offence and quick to resent, not that he is apt to fear, or hope, or grieve, or fall into any other emotion. We may safely rank this among the uneasy passions, as partaking more of that species we have called want than of genuine desire : for, however it may have been said that revenge is sweet, the sweetness does not come until the desire ends by having been glutted ; but while the desire subsists, how strong assurance soever it may have of succeeding, there always remains a restless impatience, which, like immoderate hunger, never ceases to torment until it be removed.

7. When danger threatens and appears inevitable, or the means of avoiding it do not yet discover themselves, this fills the mind with fear, which proceeds upon two views ; one of collecting a fund of spirits to be ready for use when any method of deliverance shall offer, the other of benumbing or deadening the notice so that when the mischief comes it may affect us the less sensibly : both which are effected by the same means, to wit, withdrawing the animal spirits from the organs of reflection and motion : because the strength of our perceptions, and vigor of our actions depending upon the quantity of spirits employed therein, if we can withhold them from flowing upon the mental organs, we scarce feel the pungency of evil befalling us ; and if we forbear to spend them in fruitless endeavors, we shall have the greater supply ready to serve us when they may prove effectual. Therefore, fear overwhelms with confusion ; and though people will stare wistfully at a frightful object, they discern little of what they stare at, their ideas

being duller than usual : and if the terror rise to a very high degree, it totally stupifies the senses, and causes a fainting. Fear is observed to chill the limbs, crowding the whole mass of blood upon the heart ; and as the vital spirits have their circulation too, we may presume it gathers them all to some vessel, which performs the same office with respect to them as the heart does to the blood. But that there is a mighty fund of spirits collected somewhere, appears manifest from the uncommon force they operate with when breaking forth into action. Fear adds wings to our speed : none fight so furiously as cowards driven to despair ; and people in a fright have been known to exert double the strength they could muster up at other times with their utmost resolution. I have been credibly informed of a man so lame with the gout, that he could stir neither hand nor foot, who on hearing a sudden outcry of fire in the next house, started up out of bed and ran to the window, but upon finding the danger over, his strength immediately left him, and he was forced to be carried back again. Children and other animals show no signs of fear at their first coming into life ; nor can they be supposed capable of any before they have an apprehension of danger, which must come by experience of things hurtful : indeed, they learn very soon to take fright at hideous objects ; but then it is not till they can discern the difference between them and others whereto they have been some time familiarized.

8. Shame seems to be a species of fear, having for its object the evil of disgrace : like other fears it fills with confusion, and darkens the ideas ; it operates rather by deadening the notice than collecting spirits for future exertion, therefore seems to be occupied chiefly in driving them from the organs of reflection, whose seat probably lies in the head, and discharging them upon the next adjacent parts, which may account for the blushings wherewith it overspreads the countenance. Shame, indeed, oftens proves a powerful incentive to action ; but at such times it takes the form of desire, urging us to do something either for reinstating ourselves in credit again, which we look upon as an attainable good, or for preventing the censure that might otherwise happen, which we consider as an avoidable evil ; there is not properly shame until the consciousness of disgrace actually comes, or the mischief is apprehended irremediable, which throws the mind into a state of want wherein she exerts herself in endeavors to stifle the uneasy reflection, and withdraw her notice from it as much as possible. This is one of the latest formed among our passions ; for little children appear to have no notion of it a considerable time : it is so far from being infused by nature that it derives wholly from our

intercourse with mankind, nor would ever come to a person who from his birth should be secluded from all society; before we become susceptible of it, we must have gotten some use of language, without which we cannot well be made sensible of the estimation set by others upon anything we do: and though after having arrived at maturer reflection, we take shame to ourselves for follies that can be known to nobody else, yet are we taught this practice by censures we have found others pass upon us, or we have passed upon them. For as anger, although beginning on hurts received from other persons, will at length sometimes turn upon ourselves, so having got a habit of blaming what we have seen blameable elsewhere, we fall into the like train of thinking with respect to our own miscarriages. There is another emotion of mind, the opposite to shame, that deserves to be ranked among the passions with better reason than Avoidance, the opposite to desire: for commendation agitates the spirits and stimulates to action no less than disgrace. Nor let it be said that the one allures only as implying a removal from the other, for though we sometimes stand so circumstanced as that we must either attain the one or incur the other, according as we exert ourselves in something, or let it alone, yet this is not always the case; for persons already in good credit will bestir themselves strongly to increase it, where there is no danger of censure falling upon them if they were to forbear their endeavors. But I shall have occasion to consider this principle more particularly, when I come to my four classes of motives, of which I have made Honor to be one.

9. But of all the passions, there is none more difficult to be accounted for than grief, which keeps the mind intent upon a troublesome idea, that one would think she should endeavor most strenuously to throw off. It seems to contradict the constant experience of satisfaction being the point the mind every moment pursues, when we find her strangely courting uneasiness, and dwelling upon an object that affords her nothing but torment. I conceive the mind led originally into this absurd procedure by the same view that draws her into that situation we have termed want: for as we have observed under that article, the holding an evil in our thoughts is one step towards removing it, because they may suggest expedients which did not presently occur, and because the strength of an idea, heightened by our attention to it, urges us to a stronger exertion of our powers. Therefore you find it commonly used as an argument to dissuade men from sorrow. That it can do no good, and that the mischief is irremediable: which shows the general opinion, that when men afflict themselves, they

do it under a delusive persuasion of receiving benefit thereby, and that if we can get them out of this notion, they will rest contented. On the other hand, we endeavor to increase their vexation at evils brought upon them by their own misconduct, because there it may do service by withholding them from committing the like for the future. And our aptness to vex ourselves increases not a little by our intercourse with mankind: for complaint procuring us the comfort and assistance of others, and our complaints rising in proportion to the pressure we feel, we get a habit of adding to that pressure, in order to obtain the surer and readier relief. For which reason children grow more fretful for being humored, their fretfulness having proved a means of getting their desires gratified. Thus the mind having found the contemplation of evil, and the increasing her sensibility of its pressure, expedient, desire, as is usual in the like cases, becomes translated to the means, and her view terminates upon afflicting herself as much as possible, without prospect of any further end to be attained thereby. When she has often turned the spirits into this train, they will take it afterwards mechanically: for I can admit the doctrine of Hartley's German friend, Stahl, with respect to the mental organs, that motions in them which were voluntary at first, may grow to be automatic; and when this is the case, they will pour in one set of ideas forcibly, to the exclusion of all others. Therefore you see people under great affliction tasteless of enjoyments they were fond of before, incapable of business, and unable to think of anything but the subject of their grievance: nor can you extricate them from their distress, until by some amusement, or engagement, or danger, or pain, you can turn their spirits into another channel. Nor can it be doubted that there is an earnestness of want in all heavy sorrow, a want to get rid of the uneasiness, how improper means soever may be employed for that purpose, a want to undo what has been done, and to alter past events, which being palpably impossible, the mind works without any subject to work upon, and worries herself with empty strugglings: but if anything flatters with the promise of a momentary relief, we see how strongly she exerts herself, as in cryings, exclamations, stampings, tearing the hair, and beating the breast, which draw off her attention elsewhere for awhile, and thereby suspend her uneasiness.

10. Though we always find Love and Hatred upon the list, I take them to be not so much passions in themselves, as the aptness of certain objects to excite passions in us: for a man may be said to love what he has not in his thoughts, if we conceive him generally looking upon it with complacency; but he cannot be said to hope, or fear, or rejoice in a thing, whereof there is no

idea present before him. Besides, the beloved object may give occasion to opposite and incompatible passions, without making an alteration in our love : which shows it to be something distinct from them, since it can subsist entire under all their various forms without losing its essence. Therefore I apprehend love to be a disposition of mind to receive pleasure from certain things, which disposition nature never gave us, but we acquire it by experience of what has been used to please us ; and the idea of this effect being associated with that of the things themselves, the bare contemplation of them affords us delight. But as our pleasures are of very various kinds, so are the affections they generate : for the love of eating, of hunting, of money, of power, of reputation, of virtue, of a mistress, a friend, a child, or a wife, though all called by one common name of love, yet operate differently, and form dispositions spreading into very different branches, how much soever the roots may be similar. I shall not stay to examine all the several kinds of love the human breast is capable of, but confine myself to those which fasten upon our own species.

Under the helpless condition wherein we are born, we stand indebted to the care of others for the continual supply of our wants, and the satisfaction received in such supply, communicates a portion of itself to our idea of the person administering it ; therefore a child's first love is its nurse. But this love is of an imperfect nature, being the same in kind with that we entertain for things inanimate, which we consider only as instruments of our pleasure : for though the child will cry if you turn nurse out of the room, it feels the same emotion if you take away its rattle. But after having a little enlarged our acquaintance, and found that everybody will not, like nurse, give us the same assiduous tendance upon all occasions, but are more or less willing to oblige us, according as they are at ease in themselves, or as we can oblige them, then are we ready to do and wish them pleasure, that they may be the more ready to humor us. Yet this is not perfect love, which will suffer no advantage of our own to stand immediately in view. In further process of time, if we find our enjoyments arising chiefly from the conversation or intercourse of one, or a few persons, we practise the like method of engaging them to serve us so frequently, until this end slips out of view, and satisfaction, as we have before remarked in cases of translation, adheres immediately to the thought of doing them kindness. Then it is that love becomes personal, and then arrives at its highest state of refinement, wherein it may be defined the pleasure of pleasing : for I cannot conceive a purer love than that which makes us feel a sensible delight in gratifying another, and in everything that hap-

pens conducive to his gratification, without thought of any other benefit redounding therefrom to ourselves, except that very delight. And this delight is of two sorts, which may be distinguished into Love and Fondness; the latter tends barely to gratify, the other to gratify without doing a disservice, and even to forbear a present compliance for the sake of a real advantage.

Thus the most resplendent love springs originally from our concern for ourselves, and our own desires, like a rose growing from a dunghill: wherefore Cupid, that is, Desire, was supposed the god of love, and nothing nourishes it so much as reciprocal kindness, and a return of good offices, or rather a ready compliance with our humors; for we are more inclined to love those who humor us, than those who do us good. But as flowers retain no scent of the dirty ground from whence they sprung, so genuine love, although increased by acts of kindness, carries always a retrospect to those that are past, and does not look forward in expectation of having them continued. But though the natural progress of love be through expedience, yet our converse in society generally shortens the way, for seeing other people love upon receiving good offices, we catch the like disposition by sympathy from them, without needing to travel the usual road. For sympathy takes a nearer compass to arrive at its end than translation, and we sometimes contract a liking to things or persons merely upon finding others fond of them, with no other inducement than the force of example. For the same reason romances tend greatly to infuse that whining love wherewith they abound, by keeping the mind continually conversant in imagination among persons who talk and act with an amorous extravagance.

11. The strongest connexions of love are reckoned to be those of friendship, of the sexes, and of parents towards their children. Friendship we know proceeds from long intimacy, mutual interests, and similitude of temper, which lead friends into the same courses of action, and methods of diversion, whereby they continually assist in promoting their common schemes, and enhancing their common pleasures, until each other's company becomes almost necessary. Nor is it hard to guess at the source of that propensity between the sexes, which has been always assigned as the peculiar province for Cupid to reign in, for he does not pretend to interfere in the affairs of friendship, or parental fondness. The love lighted by this desire too commonly burns with the grossest flame, and is rather of the instrumental kind than the personal; men looking upon the beloved object as a means of gratifying their pleasures, rather than as amiable in itself. Such love, when desire happens to abate, changes instantly into aversion.

sion, as was the case of Amnon with respect to Tamar : and these accidents happening oftener than were to be wished, gave occasion to that severe remark of the poet, Two things in marriage happy are allowed, A wife in wedding sheets and in a shroud. And though there may be for the present a desire of pleasing, this is only a borrowed, not a translated satisfaction, which we have observed in a former chapter, rests for a while upon means apprehended necessary for a further end we have in view. Nor perhaps is there the true pleasure of pleasing until by cohabitation, by communication of interests, and partnership in amusements of all kinds, by those graceful acts, as Milton calls them, those thousand decencies that daily flow from all her words and actions, mixt with love and sweet compliance, which declare unfeigned union of mind, we have joined a thorough friendship to love : or at least, unless the prospect of such intercourse occupy the imagination as much as any other idea. If any one would know whether he possesses the genuine pleasure of pleasing, let him consider whether he could at any time forego his dearest pleasures, when he perceives them hurtful, or unseasonable, or disgusting to the party beloved : for if he could not, his passion is to please himself and not another. Love has been usually esteemed productive of our greatest pleasures, and our greatest pains, and which sort of fruits it shall bring forth depends greatly upon the object of our choice : if the disposition and qualities of that be such as may add friendship to love, we shall reap a plentiful crop of enjoyment ; if the contrary, it will yield continual vexation and disappointment ; if neither, our life will become insipid and tedious.

Parental affection has been currently ascribed to instinct, and is the only species of it that I remember ever supposed belonging to mankind : but if there were a sense of instinct infused by nature, nobody need remain in doubt concerning the genuineness of their offspring. Husbands would have a sure and ready test to try the fidelity of their wives, for they need only set their children in a circle before them, and by looking round upon each, considering how powerfully instinct operates, they would feel an emotion by which they might easily distinguish their own from those of the gallant : but I never heard of a discovery made this way, therefore we must seek for some other origin of this supposed instinct. I shall not trouble myself to examine how it might arise in a state of nature, though I think it might be accounted for there, without having recourse to a secret impulse : but as we live in society, we see the care of parents so universal, that we derive the like quality by sympathy from others ; the notion of children being our own flesh and blood throws a part of our self-love upon them ; we have

in view upon our entering into wedlock, the prospect of amusements and comforts expected from them; and receive congratulations from every quarter upon their birth. All these causes make us look upon them as a valuable possession, and begin our concern for them: therefore fathers who bring children into the world clandestinely and unlawfully, wanting these sources, feel less tenderness for them, and many times none at all. The regard we thus entertain at first for our children, urges us continually to provide for their welfare and gratification, and every exercise of our cares increases our affection: therefore we see people more afflicted for the loss of a child when grown up, than of a new-born babe. For continual tendance alone, from whatever inducement first undertaken, suffices to create a habit of loving. How often do nurses, though hired to the task, show as evident signs of instinct towards their charge as the parents themselves? and how many women feel a kind of parental fondness for the birds, the puppies, and the kittens, they have bred up.

12. It has been noted before, that anger sometimes vents itself upon inanimate beings, and imagination on other occasions personifies them, prompting us to behave towards them as though they were capable of receiving benefit or damage, pleasure or pain. We retain a kind of personal love for the towns, the countries, the places which have been the scenes of our enjoyment, after having been long removed from them, and never likely to see them again: we still wish them well, rejoice to hear of their flourishing, and if any calamity befalls them, express our sorrow by tender exclamations, in the manner we should do upon losing a friend.

Love, peculiarly so called, must always centre in a single object, because that thorough coincidence of interests, and participation of pleasures, necessary to render it perfect, cannot obtain between more than two persons. Friendship may take in a little larger compass, but can extend only to a few chosen objects: the friendships recorded in history, have always run in pairs, as between Theseus and Perithous, Orestes and Pylades, Scipio and Lelius, Cicero and Atticus. Yet I do not see why there may not be a sincere and hearty love, ardent enough to be reckoned a passion, between more than one friend, as well as a parental fondness for several children, which we know is often the case, and I can confirm upon my own experience: for I have more than one, and had I twenty, if I know my own heart, I could never see any signal good or evil befall any of them without feeling a strong emotion of soul. But love in a gentler degree may diffuse itself to multitudes, to the whole human species, to everything capable of being the better for it. A good-natured man can relish the pleasure of

pleasing ; whatever subject shall afford him an opportunity of enjoying it, he will be ready to oblige upon every occasion ; he rejoices in the enjoyments of others, and makes their successes become his own : but this pleasure does not rise to a passion, so as to render him uneasy whenever the means of gratifying it are wanting.

13. Hatred derives in like manner from the contrary sources to those of love, being produced by some hurt or displeasure received, or the apprehension of an aptness in certain objects to bring them upon us. It may be caught by sympathy, as well as infused by translation, for we are often drawn to detest merely by the strong expressions of abhorrence we see in those we converse with. I cannot subscribe to the notion that men are born enemies to one another, or that nature has given us any constitutional aversion ; for I apprehend we are born with a total indifference to all things, until experience teaches us to make a difference between one thing and another, upon seeing the manner in which they affect us. Sometimes hatred becomes personal, and then may be styled the pleasure of displeasing : under this disposition men desire and wish hurt to their enemy as an ultimate end, without any prospect of benefit, or effecting a security from danger to themselves. Generally, when people have taken a violent distaste to one or two persons, they behave with more than ordinary civility to the rest of the world : but there are those in whom the pleasure of displeasing extends to all mankind ; they take delight in crossing and vexing, and rejoice at the sight of mischief or disappointment, on what quarter soever it shall appear. On the contrary, there are other tempers to whom nothing is so hateful as hatred itself, therefore, they never give it admittance, or at least do not suffer it to become personal : and though the sight of detestable qualities has an aptitude to transfer an odium upon the possessor, yet they find means to separate the offender from the offence, and can do him all kind of good offices consistent with the general good, or a necessary regard to their own lawful interests. We have shown before in the proper place, how translation arises from the narrowness of our imagination, which when any purpose requires a number of steps to complete it, cannot retain the whole line in view, and as it loses sight of the further parts, desire rests upon those remaining : therefore the proneness to animosities argues a narrow mind, which having found the doing hurt to others sometimes expedient, forgets that expedience, and confines its views to the means which that had rendered desirable. But whoever possesses a large and open understanding, if the giving displeasure appears at any time necessary, will hold that necessity in view, which draws his aversion aside from the

person, and carries it forward to those mischiefs which cannot be prevented, without giving such displeasure.

14. Despair, envy, jealousy, contempt, vexation, peevishness, astonishment, and the like, are not distinct passions, but branches or mixtures of those already described, and therefore need no further notice. But there is one situation of mind, causing great emotions both in her and the body, that deserves particular consideration, as having been of late much recommended for uses whereto it seems not properly applicable : which is, that species of joy, called Mirth, expressing itself frequently in laughter. This has been commonly held by our moderns to arise from contempt, upon a comparison of ourselves with something apprehended greatly our inferior. I shall not urge that we make ourselves merry with compositions of mere matter, which cannot come into competition with any supposed excellences of our own ; because I know very well, and have observed just now, that imagination often personifies things inanimate, conceiving them at first glance as possessing the qualities and sentiments of men, or as representations of the human affections, or as evidences of blunders in the contrivers of them. But if we consult experience for instances of contempt and laughter, we shall find either of them often appearing without the other. If a man, going to take up something shining upon the ground, discovers it to be a pin, if upon being offered a bribe he rejects it with scorn, if he sees a child endeavor to stop his passage, will he burst into laughter upon the occasion ? Contempt and scorn are gloomy situations of mind, and the proud who deal most largely in them are the most solemn and stateliest of mortals : besides that a despicable object contemplated ever so long will appear equally so, but a diverting one cannot keep up your merriment forever. On the other hand, your merry giggling people love best to consort among their equals, to put themselves upon a par with the company, and are less supercilious or disposed to draw comparisons between themselves and others. The sudden appearance of an intimate friend spreads a smile over the countenance ; the sight of an exquisite dainty, the unexpected offer of an advantageous scheme, sets the voluptuous, the covetous, and the ambitious a chuckling, and would produce a downright laughter, if men had not been habituated to restrain themselves by the rules of decorum : but the situation of mind they then stand in seems the farthest imaginable from a state of contempt. Success of all kinds, if it does not immediately shake the sides, yet renders us more susceptible of mirth upon any little trifling occasion happening to excite it. Who are so easily set a laughing as young children ? but what idea of

superiority can they be supposed to have? They laugh before they are capable of casting back a reflection upon their own qualifications, much less of comparing them with those of other people. They laugh upon the sight of nurse, or mamma : begin, little child, says Virgil, to show you know your mamma by your smiles : but if they make any comparisons, they must consider nurse and mamma as their superiors and governors. That exultation the mind feels upon an opinion of superiority is a very translated satisfaction derived through many stages : she must have learned the tendency of things to gratify her desires, the propensity of other people to get them away for ministering to their own, the contest ensuing upon such occasions, the advantage of greater powers towards obtaining victory, and the reflection of possessing such advantages as of an immediate good ; by all which gradations satisfaction must have been transferred to the thought of superiority ; a process too long to be gone through in the first stages of life, wherein the proneness to laughter appears evident.

15. Mirth I conceive occasioned by a sudden influx of spirits generally, if not always, turned from some other channel, to which they have been drawn by an earnest attention : and therefore perhaps it is that to make merry is called to divert, as being a diversion of the spirits out of the course they have been strongly thrown into before. For that attention gathers a considerable fund of them appears manifest, from the fatigue and wasting it brings on if continued long, and when some pleasurable idea opens the sluices at once, it lets in so large a flood that reflection cannot employ them at all, having no other business for them than to contemplate that idea, and the superfluity overflows upon the muscles causing the convulsions of laughter. Thus there seems to be three causes concurring to excite laughter when not produced mechanically, as by tickling, by fits of hysterics, or the like : viz. a stretch of attention loosened at once, the suddenness of such relaxation, and want of employment for the spirits so discharged upon the mind. Wit consists in allusion, and is commonly said to carry two faces ; that on the grave side engages your attention, which upon turning the other instantly lets go its hold : the most diverting humor is that which raises your expectation of something very serious, and then upon breaking the jest cuts it short with an issue very different from what you expected. Nor yet is it always necessary there should be a long preparation to introduce a joke, imagination being extremely agile and quick in her motions, can fix a strong attention upon one object, and turn it off upon another in a moment : therefore a short expression, a single gesture, an arch look, a comical figure, will

suffice to create mirth. We learn from Mr. Locke that wit lies in putting ideas together, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity; to which I may add by way of comment, that the resemblance must be pointed out between things usually esteemed the most discordant, and which contemplated separately would lead the mind into the most opposite trains of thinking: for the quick transition of thought or fluctuation between such distant ideas is what causes your merriment. And the like changeable situation of mind occasions our laughter at the follies and blunders we see committed: for every blunder implies a deliberate endeavor to attain some purpose by means not conducive thereto, and the sight or thought of earnestness and expectation, in the persons so laboring, fills our own imagination by sympathy with the like ideas, which are immediately dissipated upon the reflection of their being ineffectual and nugatory. But I have said the relaxation must be sudden, and employment wanting for the spirits let loose thereby: therefore if the relator of a merry story manages so ill that you see beforehand how it will end, you lose half your pleasure. For the same reason, a story often repeated becomes insipid, and a jest may be worn threadbare: because when you know what is coming, attention cannot run into another channel from whence it might be suddenly diverted. Nor will all kinds of joyful ideas, how unexpected soever, provoke us to laughter: the news of an estate or some extraordinary success befalling us, leads in a train of advantages and pleasures attendant thereupon, which fill imagination with a variety of ideas, and find abundant employment for thought, so there is no redundancy of spirits to run over upon the risible nerves: but a jest presents one pleasurable idea without further consequences, which occupies the mind alone, and requires no pains to retain it, or keep out other ideas, but leaves the spirits at liberty to rush into whatever quarter their own impulse shall carry them.

16. If laughter sometimes accompanies a thought of superiority, it is owing to that vanity which too often teaches men a habit of exulting at the sight of folly or infirmity; for the vain having an immoderate fondness for pre-eminence, without either abilities or application to raise themselves above the common level, feel a sudden joy on beholding anything below it. And this aptness to mirth upon such occasions, whatever they may think of it, redounds very little to their honor, as implying a secret consciousness of wanting merit in themselves; for it shows that instances of their superiority come seldom and unexpected, carrying something of novelty and surprise, without which they could not instigate to laughter. A good-natured man can smile at indiscretions,

without casting back reflections upon himself; and whenever such reflection does occur, I believe it is most commonly an after thought, not so often the cause of mirth, as the consequence: vanity running on to a comparison of our own supposed perfections, which must rather abate the emotion than increase it, by finding other employ for the spirits: and we find, in fact, that it does make such abatement; every one sees the difference between a hearty laugh of real joy, and a scornful sneer, or a grin, expressing a claim to superiority; the laugh of contempt is a forced laugh, showing signs of gladness in the countenance, but not making the heart merry, and encouraged not so much to please ourselves, as to vex another.

Contempt being so apt to show itself in derision, hence the making a thing appear despicable and silly, has been called rendering it ridiculous. But ridiculous, although derived from the Latin word standing for laughter, does not always imply a quality of exciting even that affected laugh which is the expression of contempt: you shall see men with a very grave countenance go about to demonstrate the ridiculousness of a thing without ever raising mirth in themselves, or expecting to raise it in others: therefore ridiculous is not synonymous with comical or diverting, but rather coincides with absurd or foolish, and tends more to provoke your spleen than your laughter.

17. Upon this view of the nature and essence of wit and ridicule, it seems surprising to hear them recommended as methods proper for the discovery of truth, and offered as the surest test and touchstone to try the soundness of an opinion: for they tend to alarm the passions, they fill the mind with one single idea, barring her attention against all others, and produce their effects by their manner of placing objects, one setting them in a diverting, and the other in an offensive light. Whereas reason requires a calm and dispassionate situation of mind to form her judgments aright; she wants the whole attention to look round upon every circumstance, and places her objects in all the lights wherein they are capable of standing. But the most surprising thing, is to find the greatest stress laid upon jest and derision by those who make the loudest pretences to freedom of thought: for liberty consists in a thorough exemption from all influence and constraint whatsoever, which may as well be thrown upon us by the allurements of wit and stings of ridicule, as by any other impulse: for they cast a prejudice upon the mind, that cramps and confines it within the narrow point of view they hold their objects in; and he that lies liable to be laughed out of his sentiments, is no more master of his thoughts, than if he were driven by the force of authority or example.

It has been alleged, in support of these methods of arguing, that disputants of all kind are observed to employ them, if they have talents that way, and fit opportunities offer for exerting them. But I desire it may be remembered, there are two sorts of argumentation, one by way of rhetoric, and the other by that of logic: the former addresses the imagination, aims at working a persuasion there, and endeavors to interest the passions: the latter appeals directly to the understanding, proposes only conviction, rejects all kinds of artifice. Therefore, when we have fully satisfied ourselves of any matter upon a full and fair examination, and are only to persuade others who will not hear reason, being hindered by some prejudice or passion, it is allowable to use any contrivances likely to remove those obstacles: but when the business is to inquire into some doubtful point, and such are all to be esteemed during a debate with any sincere and judicious antagonist, none of the arts of persuasion ought to find admittance. I can allow jest and taunt to be useful engines of oratory, but can by no means think them proper instruments for reason to work with: nor do we ever find them employed in the sciences, where understanding alone is concerned. Where is there purer, closer, or clearer reasoning than in the mathematics? but what room do they afford for merriment? Whoever demonstrated a problem in Euclid by ridicule? or where will you find a joke in Sir Isaac Newton's Principia? The five mechanical powers, the properties of fluids, the courses of the planets, were not discovered nor explained by sallies of humor and raillery: and though the cycles and epicycles of the ancients are now become ridiculous by being grown out of fashion, they were first overthrown by serious argumentation from the phenomena of nature. Divination, astrology, magic, and the philosopher's stone, afford an ample field for humor and raillery; yet I believe no man who held them upon principle, was ever beat out of his notions by those weapons, without some solid argument convincing to his understanding.

18. Violence and turbulence constitute the essence of passion: the same emotions of soul, when too gentle to deserve that name, are styled Affections. It is not easy to ascertain the precise limits between passion and affection, the difference lying only in degree, nor indeed are they always accurately distinguished, either in discourse or writing; but, strictly speaking, passion is that which causes perturbation and disorder of spirits, throwing its own set of ideas forcibly upon the mind, and not leaving her master of her own motions; a situation very dangerous, as laying us open to every mischief, while the exercise of understanding, by which

alone we might help ourselves, remains suspended. Therefore, passion may be styled the fever of the mind, which disturbs and weakens, and cannot continue long, or return often, without pernicious consequences : but affection, like the steady beating of the pulse, actuates and invigorates, and keeps the mind continually alive. For we are every moment, while awake, pursuing or avoiding something or other ; and indeed it is necessary we should be so, for were it possible to remain totally unaffected and unconcerned with anything, there would be no business for volition to do, but we must lie like logs, to receive whatever chance should throw upon us. It is our affections that lay the foundation of prudence, by prompting us to look forward to the future, that multiply our enjoyments beyond those of sensation or appetite, and find work for understanding by suggesting objects to contrive and provide for. Nor are any of them un-serviceable, if properly directed, and kept within due moderation : cheerfulness preserves health, and renders the common scenes of life pleasurable : hope was esteemed of old, as we learn from the fable of Pandora's box, a salve to assuage the smart of all evils, and supplies the place of enjoyments when we have none actually in our power : caution helps to preserve the good things we have, and secure us against dangers : sensibility of the difference between good and bad usage urges us to apply the proper means for preventing injuries : decency keeps the world in order, nor could society or good manners subsist without it : reflection on cross accidents teaches us to provide against the like for the future : good nature and obligingness double our pleasures by making those of other people our own, and are the channels through which the benefits of society are chiefly conveyed : dislike to things or persons obnoxious secures us against catching contagion, or receiving mischief from them : desire, if not boisterous, furnishes us with constant employment, and gives a glee to everything we undertake : and want, not rising to impatience, spurs us up to industry and vigilance, and holds us steady in pursuit of useful aims not presently attainable.

19. I said at the end of the last chapter, that the passions were only a stronger sort of habits acquired early in our childhood : from whence of course it follows, that habits must be feebler passions learned later, when the organs being grown tough, become less susceptible of new forms, but having once taken them, are less easy to be thrown out of them again. The force of passion seems to proceed from the wideness of the channels, and that vigorous pulsation wherewith they drive on the spirits contained in them : that of habit from the stiffness of their coats, which will not

readily close, so as to turn the spirits from their accustomed track. Therefore passion does its work by vehemence and impetuosity, bearing down all opposition; it can only be mastered by a strong resolution, and that not without difficulty; but if you can stop the torrent it leaves you quiet. But habit prevails by perseverance and importunity; it does not bear you down by force, but steals upon you imperceptibly, or teazes and tires you into a compliance; it is easily restrained at any time with a little attention, but the moment you take off your eye it recoils again, and when grown inveterate, is extremely difficult to be totally eradicated. Our little motives are mostly introduced and the manner of our proceeding shaped by habit: it is that gives us dexterity and readiness in everything we do, and renders our thoughts and motions easy. We see how awkward and troublesome it is to consort with company, or pursue a method of conduct, or perform any work very different from what we have been used to. The tenor of our lives, and success of our endeavors, depends more upon habit than judgment: for what avails the knowing what is proper to be done, without an expertness and readiness to compass it? wherefore we cannot employ our understanding better than by enuring ourselves to such ways and practices as may prove beneficial, and carefully guarding against any others encroaching upon us: for if understanding can gain over habit to her service, it will do her work more completely, and effectually, and pleasantly than she could herself. Passion grows feeble with age, but habit gathers strength: old people can relinquish any fancy that comes into their heads, without much trouble, but none are harder to be put out of their ways; and in those few desires they have remaining, they show less of the eagerness of passion than the stubbornness of habit. But we take notice of their attachments to money, to command, and some other objects, and style them passions because they are few, and engross their whole attention for want of a competitor, not because of any violence, or impetuosity we discern in them. But as passion, affection, and habit, must have some matter to work upon, and the subjects giving rise to them, or recommended by them to our pursuit are infinitely various, it would be endless and perplexing to particularize them all: therefore I shall attempt to reduce them under a few general heads, and can think of none more proper than those four classes into which I had before proposed to distinguish our motives of action.

CHAP. XXII.

PLEASURE.

To Pleasure I might have joined Pain or Trouble, in the title of this chapter, but they being each of them respectively a species of satisfaction or uneasiness, may be treated of in the same manner, that is, both under the former. For as the one by repelling actuates us to almost the same motions as the other by attracting, what I shall observe concerning pleasure will serve equally for its reverse, unless where some particular occasion may require them to be considered distinctly.

Pleasure, like other satisfactions, when taken as a motive, must not be understood of the actual possession, but the prospect or idea of it: for motives do not prompt us to what we have already, which were needless, but to attain something we have not, or to preserve the continuance of something that would otherwise slip away from us. Yet as that idea rises from experience of the manner wherein things have affected us, we can only get acquainted with this species of motives by examining from what sources we derive our pleasures.

Nature gives us at first none other pleasures besides those of sensation and appetite, among which may be reckoned that soothing feel accompanying the free circulation of our blood and humors when in health and vigor, or the easy flow of spirits along the mental organs, when in contemplation or pursuit of anything engaging our attention: and in these internal sensations perhaps may consist all the pleasures of imagination and reflection which we feel in seasons of joy, or hope, or desire, or other agreeable situations of mind. But however this be, certain it is that in process of time, when reflection has learnt its play, it supplies us with a considerable fund of entertainment: the pleasures of reading, of meditation, of conversation, of diversions, of advancement in knowledge, honor, or fortune, belong to the reflection rather than the senses, therefore are styled mental, as the others are bodily pleasures. And the former furnish much the greater share of our enjoyments in our riper years: for if any man will reflect on a day agreeably spent, he will find much less of it taken up in mere sensation than in some pursuit or variety of amusement that engaged his attention. Thus our pleasures, how much soever afterwards multiplied, take their rise from sensation alone, all others being derivative or translated from that original. To instance only in acquisitions of knowledge, which is common-

ly held sweet to the mind by the very frame of her constitution : but if it were so, every accession of knowledge would engage everybody alike, whereas in fact we find the contrary. What would the mathematician give to know the newest fashions as they start into vogue, or be let into all the scandal and tittle tattle of the town? Or what cares the beau for discoveries in astronomy, or explanations of attraction, repulsion, or other secrets of nature? Though we all have our curiosity to a considerable degree, yet it leads us by various tracks to objects that we have found contributing most to our entertainment : not that we have always anything further in view than to gratify our present curiosity ; but it is the usual course of translation to confer a quality of pleasing upon whatever has often administered to our other gratifications. The most refined pleasures are those that have passed through the greatest number of translations, and therefore stand furthest removed from sense : but before we depend upon them for our enjoyments, we ought to be well assured of our having a real relish for them ; for men often deceive themselves in this point, affecting a fondness for refinements they have not ; from a secret motive of vanity which induces them to believe themselves possessed of anything they think will give them credit and reputation.

2. Our pleasures, as well those of the gross as the refined kind, depend upon the constitution and disposition of our machine ; some can bear hot weather best, others cold ; health and sickness, vigor and weariness, render the same sensations and exercises delightful or irksome. In like manner, the gust of mental amusements varies according to the cast our imagination has been thrown into by education, or custom, or habit, according to the humor we happen to be in, to various accidents or circumstances befalling us, or to the satiety or novelty we find in them.

This variety of disposition in mankind to receive pleasure from different objects is called Taste, because like the palate it enables us to distinguish the relish of things, and to discern which of them are savory, insipid, or disgusting. Taste is usually confounded with judgment, of which it is rather the basis than the thing itself : for taste properly denotes a sensibility of delight in certain objects, and therefore having experienced what has pleased us, we learn to judge what will please others or ourselves another time. Nature may have laid the foundation of taste, but the superstructure is raised by instruction, or conversation, or observation ; for we never find it in children, and very rarely among persons confined to the common laborious occupations of life. Not but that all men have their sources of amusement, and therefore in this sense your

mechanics and ploughmen may be said to have a taste for bull-baiting, foot-ball, the finery of a Lord Mayor's show, or diversions of a country fair : but taste is most usually applied to those relishes given by the perfection of art, or good company, or an uncommon sensibility of imagination. Yet we sometimes take it in a larger sense, as when we distinguish between a gross and a refined, a vulgar and an elegant, a false and a true taste : the latter being such as enables us to receive more exquisite or more durable pleasures from things, or in greater variety, or as Horace calls it, more sincere, that is, unalloyed with any disagreeable mixture. But there may be an over squeamishness and nicety of taste, which renders the imagination too delicate, and liable to disgust from the common objects continually surrounding it, like a very tender skin, that cannot bear the least drop of rain, or breath of air, without suffering, and is rather to be esteemed a weakness than a perfection. Therefore goodness of taste seems to be relative, that which is suitable to one man being not so to another : what good would a fine taste for opera music do him who could not afford to go to it? or of what service would a taste for poetry, rhetoric, or elegance, be to a missionary, who must spend his time among savages? I conceive the best, if not the truest taste, is that which gives a man the strongest and fullest relish of objects and employments lying within his power and suited to his situation and circumstances in life. But if one could cast imagination into any mould one pleases with a wish, I would make the same distinction here as I have done before between desire and want, and would wish to have a taste for the finest productions of art, without any distaste of those that fall greatly inferior : for by this means I should have a chance of being sometimes exquisitely pleased, but run no hazard of being ever disgusted.

3. What is called genius I imagine proceeds chiefly from the turn imagination has taken early in our youth : we do not discern when it begins, and therefore ascribe it to nature ; but though nature may have given each of us quicker and stronger, or duller and weaker parts, or made some of our organs more lithesome and sensible than others, yet their aptness to run into this or that particular course of exercise depends upon some accident or lucky hit, or the company we converse with. Mr. Waller supposes, that Great Julius, in the mountains bred, Perhaps some flock or herd had led : The world's sole ruler then had been, But the best wrestler on the green. 'Tis art and knowledge which draw forth the hidden seeds of native worth. A book falling into a boy's hands, an adventure related, or performance he sees, that happens to strike his fancy, the conversation of a servant, or a com-

panion, may lead his imagination into particular trains of thinking, which thenceforward becomes easy to him, and he cannot strike into others of a different kind without trouble and uneasiness. If example had not at least as great a share as nature in the formation of genius, why should we see different ages and countries produce their several sorts of it peculiar to themselves? and why should men ingenious in any particular way generally arise together in clusters? for we cannot suppose the time when, or place where they are born should make such a difference in their constitutions.

4. Beauty is a species of taste : it may be defined an aptness of things to please immediately upon sight ; for if they please from a view of something else introduced by them, they are not beautiful, but useful or valuable. But this aptness to please is a relative term, not solely a quality residing in objects, but depending equally upon the cast of our imagination : as the aptness of a shoe depends no less upon the shape of your foot than upon its own make ; for that which sets perfectly easy upon one man may pinch another, or may become uneasy by your foot being swoln. We find the taste of beauty infinitely various and variable, the same thing appearing charming to one person, indifferent to another, and disgusting to a third ; admired or neglected in the several stages of our lives ; courted or nauseated at different seasons, according to the disposition of body, or humor of mind we happen to be in. Therefore nothing is beautiful in itself ; those things bid fairest for the title that are adapted to please the generality of mankind : for as the features of all men have a resemblance in some respects, how much soever they may vary in others, so it is with the trains of our imagination. Our frame, our constitution, as well internal as external, our employments in life, our wants, our enjoyments, are in a great measure the same, and our daily intercourse with one another increases the similitude : therefore it is no wonder that some objects are generally beheld in the same light, and appear agreeable to every one. Hence it is we can pass a judgment on beauty, even when not affected by it ; for having observed what usually pleases, we get a standard wherewith to compare any object we behold, and if it agrees with that, we pronounce it beautiful, though through some particularity of our own it does not hit our fancy.

One cannot easily discover that little children have any notion of beauty at all : they will turn away from the sight of a celebrated toast, with all her tackle trim and bravery on, to hide their faces in the flabby bosom of an old wrinkled nurse : nor do they feel anything of those charms which, as Horace expresses it, in-

spire desires, and steal a man away from himself. We find the first notions they get of prettiness very different from those of their maturer years. Gewgaws, unsel, high coloring coarsely laid on, ill-shapen playthings, and figures carrying scarce a half resemblance of their originals, delight them. And though their fancy improves as they grow up, yet they scarce ever gain a relish for the finest performances of art, or works of nature, until taught by care, or led into it by example.

5. Thus our sense of beauty was not born with us, but grows by time, and may be moulded into almost any shape by custom, conversation, or accident. There seem to be four principal sources from whence the efficacy of beauty derives; composition, succession, translation, and expression. The materials of a fine building do not entertain the eye until disposed in their proper places: and a parcel of colors unstriking of themselves may hit the fancy upon being curiously assorted and interspersed together. Symmetry, proportion and order, contribute greatly to the good look of things: but we have already shown, in CHAP. X. that they consist in the correspondence of objects with the trains of our imagination, and the mind must have learned to run the proper lines of separation before she can discern anything of order or proportion. Order enables us to take in a larger view of the scene before us, presenting a more complex idea, consisting not only of the objects themselves, but of their situations, connections, and relations, with respect to one another. In deformed things there is commonly one or two remarkable parts at which the eye sticks. A lump of lead is neither handsome nor ugly, because as there is no composition, so neither is there a want of any, but may become either, according to the mould wherein it is formed; when cast into an ill shape, the continuity of parts leads the eye to expect a composition of which it is frustrated.

6. Succession is another spring of beauty; for as in some motions, as in riding, walking, bowling, and the like, which are pleasing at first, become indifferent, and then irksome by long exercise, so it is with our ideas of sensation and reflection, and in a much quicker transition; many that were striking at first, soon grow insipid, and afterwards troublesome; wherefore to prevent cloying, there must be a variety of objects succeeding each other to keep up the play. Order, symmetry, and proportion, furnish great store of variety, without multiplying the subjects whereon it is thrown: in the materials of a fine building, you see there is stone, there is mortar, there is timber, with a few other particulars, and that not without attention and labor; but when skilfully put together, they present a multitude of assemblages readily occurring to

the reflection. In the scenes before us, the notice, as has been formerly observed, changes continually to different sets of objects, or contemplates them in various lights, the reflections shifting while the sensations remain the same. Hence in a masterly performance, whether you consider the whole, or the principal members, or parts of those members, or move the eye from one to another, there is always something of composition or comparison presented, which perpetually supplies a fund of fresh entertainment. But mere novelty does not delight of itself, unless there be an aptness in the imagination to take impression of what it exhibits: for as a man would find it extremely uneasy to walk backwards, being an unusual motion, so the mind feels an awkwardness and irksomeness in receiving assemblages entirely different from any she has been accustomed to. A rustic, bred up among wilds and forests, being brought into a fine garden, would see more confusion than ornament there, and though you were to point out the disposition of the whole, and correspondence of the parts, you would not make him so sensible of them as to be affected therewith. Our pleasures are generally the greater for being preceded by pains, or set in comparison with them, and so are our lesser amusements of sight and imagination: therefore an agreeable object is rendered more so by having a foil, and a proper contrast of lights and shades embellishes a picture; for the notice passes to and fro successively, between the opposite branches of the comparison.

7. A third source of beauty is translation: whatever has been the occasion of much or frequent delights becomes agreeable in our eye, satisfaction being transferred from the effects to the cause. A person that has delivered us out of some great distress, or helped us in a matter we had strongly at heart, or gratified our desires in many instances, appears the handsomer for it ever afterwards: while the sight of him only introduces a reflection of the good he has done us, there is no alteration in his features, but by degrees the intermediate links of the chain drop off, the pleasure at the end becomes immediately connected with the person, and then it is that his beauty begins; which is often so closely united with his appearance, that we shall like another person the better for resembling him. Thus though Cupid be usually styled the son of Venus, we may say there is another of the name, who is the son of Pleasure, and many times begets a little Venus; for the love we entertain for things upon account of the gratifications received from them, gives them charms in our eyes they had not before. Wherefore lovers think their mistresses, and parents their children, handsomer than others do, because having found continual enter-

tainment in their company, they are accustomed to behold them with delight. So likewise women conceive an advantageous opinion of the favorite animals under their care, because the satisfaction and amusement they have found in a constant tendency upon them becomes transferred to the creatures themselves. And we see charms that other folks cannot discern, in a place where we have spent our time very agreeably, or found conveniences wanting elsewhere; whence the saying, that home is home be it never so homely.

8. The fourth and most plentiful source of beauty, is expression. The knowledge of this discloses the secret of that commanding majesty, that winning softness, and other graces of the countenance: for the face being a picture of the mind, whatever amiable qualities are discerned there, give a lustre to the features denoting them. Good nature, health, sprightliness, and sense, enable and dispose men to give pleasure to others, therefore the marks of them are pleasant to behold. The force of sympathy has a great influence here, for whatever bespeaks ease, satisfaction and enjoyment in the mind of the possessor, throws that of the beholder into the like agreeable situation: therefore in our description of beauty we commonly employ epithets belonging to the sentiments, as a cheerful, an innocent, a smart, an honest, or a sensible countenance. But the language of the eyes and face requires time to be perfectly understood: some turns of feature seem expressive at first, but are afterwards discovered to have no meaning; in others we find a significancy, upon better acquaintance, that did not show itself before. Therefore some beauties striking immediately upon sight, quickly fade away, and cloy; others make no strong impression, but steal upon the heart insensibly by imperceptible degrees. Beauty has the strongest influence upon those of the opposite sex: women are imperfect judges of one another's persons, because they are not affected by them; they judge by rules, not by what they feel. Though there be one original cause of desire between the two sexes, many subordinate desires of conversation, or other intercourse, branch out from thence, which have not a visible connection with the principal root, and therefore may consist with the purest modesty: now an object expressing all the requisites for gratification, even of those lesser desires, without any obstruction, abatement, or disappointment, is alluring to the sight. And a long intercourse of endearments, and good offices of all kinds, may increase the expression so far as to render the party exhibiting it the most agreeable object one can behold, styled in the language of mankind above two thousand years ago, by way of eminence, the desire of the eyes.

Many works of art are esteemed pretty, merely from their expressing a likeness with the works of nature : in artificial figures of men, birds, beasts, insects, trees, or flowers, the eye expects no more than an exact resemblance of the things they represent : wherefore there may be a beautiful copy of an ugly original. The famous statue of Laocoon is admired, though Laocoon himself would be shocking to the beholder : we admit pictures of satyrs, witches, old men with hard rugged features and grisly beards, to hang as ornaments in our chambers, where the real originals would be deemed an eye sore.

9. Beauty of action and sentiment seem to derive wholly from translation, for the good nature, complacency, innocence, cheerfulness, patience, and considerateness of others, so continually promote our advantage, ease, and enjoyment, in the commerce of life, that the pleasure felt in these effects is transferred to the qualities producing them, which thenceforward become engaging in themselves, so that we cannot help admiring them in persons at the greatest distance of place or time, from whom we can reap no possible benefit. But that we cannot help being thus moved no more proves us born with such affection, than that you cannot help understanding a reproach cast upon you proves you were born with a knowledge of language. But it has been usual to style acquisitions natural that we were led into by custom and experience, without any care or instruction to convey them, for we are said to speak our mother tongue naturally : and in this construction only we may admit our sense of the amiableness of good qualities to be natural.

From all that has been said above, it appears how little foundation there is for Plato's notion of an essential beauty existing independently of any subject whereto it might belong, and as that was superadded to particular substances it rendered them beautiful. For not to insist upon the inconceivableness of a quality existing without any subject to possess it, or of there being beauty before there was anything beautiful, we have found that objects, however qualified, please us or not, according to the disposition of our organs, translation, or resemblance casting a lustre upon what had it not before ; and that the same thing appears agreeable, or indifferent, or loathsome in the eyes of different beholders : which, if it depended solely upon the qualities of the object, then the opposite qualities of beauty and deformity must reside at once in the same subject.

10. Among our distastes, there is none so visibly dependent upon imagination as that of nastiness : a filthy word, a nauseous comparison, a mere fancy of having touched something loathsome,

shall set our stomachs a kecking against the most innocent food. Nothing is nasty of itself, but things become so by being assorted together in unsuitable mixtures: he that should gnaw his glove, and paw the meat with his hands, would be cried out against as a nasty fellow, but if he apply both to their proper places, you have nothing to complain of him. Dirt in the fields, gravel upon the roads, and the carpets upon our floors are not nasty, but whoever should lie down upon either, would be blamed for daubing his clothes. Nastiness seems to have no opposite, for cleanness is rather a negation of that than a contrary quality, and to make clean implies no more than to remove away filth, without substituting anything else in its room. We often use Neatness to express the middle point between beauty and deformity in objects, and Decency to denote the like in actions or sentiments: a neat little house, and a decent behavior, is that wherein there is nothing either to engage or offend the eye. Yet these middle points incline a little to the favorable side, for there is a degree of complacency in seeing things clean and neat, and persons behave decently about us: but this complacency perhaps is of none other kind than that which frequently arises upon contemplating the absence of anything that would disturb us.

11. Our tastes varying as much as our faces, make us very bad judges of one another's enjoyments, for we take for granted that everybody must be pleased with what we like ourselves, and according to the vulgar saying, measure other people's corn by our own bushel. Nor are there instances wanting wherein we measure our own corn by their bushel: when we see a crowd of people running to look at any sight, it raises our own curiosity to make one among them, and a dish, or diversion, we find others eagerly fond of, stirs up a longing to partake of the like: but upon trial, we often find our expectation disappointed, and that what may give another great delight, affords us no entertainment.

Nor do we judge much better of our own pleasures, for want of being well aware of their aptness to cloy upon repetition, and to change their relish perpetually according to our disposition of body or mind, or the circumstances we happen to stand in: neither can we trust even experience itself in this case, for because a thing has pleased us once, we cannot always be sure it will do so again. The boy who wished to be a king that he might have an officer appointed to swing him all day long upon a gate, took his resolution upon the remembrance of what had given him pleasure; for we may suppose he had often found a supreme delight in that innocent amusement, but little thought that the same continued for hours together would prove extremely tedious and

irksome. The like mistake prevails with many after their ceasing to be boys; they find a vast delight in diversions and fancies of several kinds, and therefore eagerly pursue them as inexhaustible sources of enjoyment; not considering that those things please only in the acquisition, or by their novelty, and lose all their poignancy upon growing familiar. Therefore it is one of the principal arts of life to find out such pleasures as are most durable, and least liable to change by an alteration of temper, or circumstances.

12. But if we make mistakes in estimating pleasures singly, we commit more in computing the value of a series of them taken collectively: for we cannot reckon them with the same exactness practicable in our money affairs, nor can we tell how many little amusements are equivalent to a great one, as we can how many shillings go to a pound. He that keeps a regular account of his cash, may know to a shilling, what were his receipts, and what his disbursements, in any month of the last year, and how much they exceeded, or fell short of those in any other month; but I defy any man to make the like entry of his enjoyments and disquietudes: if he can tell that such a day was spent more agreeably than such another, it is more than he can always do with certainty, but he can never cast up the exact amount on the debtor and the creditor side in any day, nor tell precisely the proportion one bears to the other.

Therefore we are forced to take our pleasures in the lump, and estimate them upon view; as a man who guesses at a flock of sheep by the ground they cover, without being able to count them, and who will do it very imperfectly, until he has gotten an expertness by long and careful practise. For absent enjoyments, whether past or future, being not actually existent, we cannot hold them as it were in our hand to weigh them, but must judge by the representative idea we have of them in our imagination; and we ordinarily determine their value by the degree of desire we feel in ourselves towards them. Besides, the mind being constantly attentive to the bettering her condition in the next succeeding moment, it is not, strictly speaking, distant enjoyment that ever moves her, any otherwise than by the desire it raises of advancing towards it, the gratification of which desire yields a present satisfaction.

13. For this reason, intense pleasures engage more with the generality of mankind, than a continuance of gentler amusements; for the latter weighing only by their number, cannot so easily be brought within the compass of a single idea, and when we endeavor to do so, we commonly fix upon one or two of them as a sample of the whole; as a man who would recommend a poem,

a play, or any other entertainment, pitches upon a few striking parts for a specimen of the rest : whereas high delights, carrying their whole force in a single point, make a deep impression upon the mind, which excites a desire proportionable to the representative idea left behind. But frequently desire encreases, though the relish dies away upon repetition, hence your men of pleasure retain the former, after having utterly lost the latter, and perhaps receive none other satisfaction from their pleasures, than what arises from the gratification of their eagerness in the pursuit of them. This probably induced Sir John Suckling, who was a man of pleasure, to say, It is expectation makes a blessing dear : and if he added, Heaven were not heaven if we knew what it were, we may presume it was because he had no idea of any other than the Mahometan heaven, which was not likely to prove one upon experience, how alluring soever it might appear in speculation.

But if we sit down to such careful computation as we are able to make of our enjoyments, we shall find ourselves much more beholden, upon the whole, to those of the gentler kind : for high delights, like high sauces, if they draw no mischiefs after them, at least pall the appetite for everything else, or create a hankering after themselves at seasons wherein they are not to be had ; thus making us pay dear enough for the transient gratification they afford. Yet pleasures of the tempting kind, if properly chosen, have their value, not so much for their intrinsic worth, as for the fruits they produce : for pleasing sensations or reflections rarely come upon us of their own accord, much the greater part of our enjoyment lies in the exercise of our activity, when engaged in some pursuit or employment ; but there can be no engagement without an end, which we conceive it would give us a more than ordinary degree of complacence to attain. The pleasures commanded by riches, or those expected from eminence of station or accomplishment, spur men on to industry in their several callings and professions. The joy of seeing a piece of workmanship completed, carries an artist through the toils and difficulties of his work. I find myself not a little encouraged in this my pursuit of the light of nature, by casting back a look now and then upon those rays of it already collected. Even virtue herself receives no small accession of vigor from the contemplation of such few of her beauties as we may have in our possession. Nor need I mention that seasonable recreation enlivens the spirits, gives briskness to the circulation, and renders the mind alert for any exercise : it often prolongs enjoyment beyond the present moment, by furnishing materials to think and talk of afterwards ; so

that a few days diversion in summer may supply a fund of entertainment for the succeeding winter. Let us not then think pleasures unworthy the attention of a philosopher, since in good hands they may be turned to excellent services.

14. As expectation makes a blessing dear, so by making dear it makes it valuable: the main of our enjoyment depends upon our desires, which take rise from experience of what has pleased us, whence we conceive an expectation of its doing the like again. But desire generally produces a more plentiful crop than the parent plant from which it sprung, especially in our common diversions, which lie almost wholly in the pursuit, and very little in the attainment. He that at whist should have four honors, six trumps, always dealt him, would lose his whole diversion, because he would have nothing to do but throw down his cards and set up his score. So in bowling, the player minds to deliver his bowl aright, he runs after it, chides it, encourages it, writhes his body into all manner of contortions, as if to influence the bias, and herein consists his entertainment; for the joy of winning the game passes over in a moment, he takes his stake, pockets it, and thinks no more than where to throw the jack for beginning another cast. Many a man has found greater pleasure in planting a tree, and tending, and pruning it, and observing its growth, than he ever did in tasting the fruit: yet the former arises wholly from the latter, for else why might not he plant a bramble as well as a nectarine?

But every pleasure does not keep desire alive alike, nor will every desire return an equal produce of entertainment, which makes the science of pleasure so little understood. Men run eagerly after the most intense, thinking the more of them they can obtain, so much the better, being deceived herein by their method of computation; for they reckon, like the boy, that if a quarter of an hour's swing upon the gate gave immense delight, five hours swinging must give twenty times as much: whereas the arithmetic to be employed in this science, differs widely from common arithmetic, two and two do not always make four, the second number often operating as a negative quantity, which being added to the former, diminishes instead of increasing the sum. Besides, when we have settled the intrinsic value of our pleasures, all is not done, we must consider other things dependent upon them, and proceed in a kind of algebraical method: such a degree of delight, more by the amusement it will afford us in the pursuit, the pleasing expectation it will raise beforehand, and the soothing reflections it will leave behind; less by the labor we must undergo, the difficulties and hazards we must run to obtain it, the wants and cravings it may create, the disappointments we may meet with, and

the mischiefs and inconveniences it may introduce. Thus we find the art of book-keeping in the commerce of pleasure very hard to attain, for besides the difficulty of reducing every species of coin to some current standard, we must make all fair allowances for interest and produce, and take all reasonable charges and deductions into the account: but any tolerable skill we can acquire in this business is well worth the pains of learning.

I have remarked in another place, that our idea of pleasures, like our prospect of visible objects, appears duller when they stand at a distance, and grows more vivid upon their nearer approach; and that habit and sympathy take effect by suggesting trains of thought, and methods of action, without the trouble of hunting for them. For there being a degree of complacency in every common motion of the mind, and exercise of our activity, ease and readiness become a species of pleasure, and whatever gives play to our powers, engages us in each succeeding moment, until something more important carries us into another track. From this source, I apprehend derived most of our little motives, influencing our by actions, and under motions, which steal upon us without our perceiving, and shape the manner of proceeding in all our performances.

CHAP. XXIII.

USE.

As the greater number by far of our pleasures spring from one another by translation, so our other satisfactions come to us through the same channel, being derived from pleasure; for nature affects us originally only with sensations excited by the play of our external or internal organs, and objects engage us according as in the various alterations and contextures of our frame produced by education, custom, or accident, they are made to give that play to the organs. But that use bears a derivative value, is implied in the very term, for whatever may have been said concerning things beautiful or laudable in themselves, we never hear them styled useful in themselves, but for something else; that is, so far as they tend to improve our condition, or contribute to our enjoyment, either immediately or remotely, in some respect or other.

Though nature has poured enjoyments around us with an unsparring hand, yet she has not hung them so near within our reach, as that we can pluck them whenever we please: we must do

many things beforehand preparatory to the obtaining them, we must provide instruments and lay in materials to serve us upon occasion, furnish ourselves with the necessary means for administering to our wants, and take pains in planting and cultivating the tree long before we can gather the fruit. This tendency to supply the means of gratification transfers our desire to things indifferent in themselves; so that having observed them frequently serviceable, we can willingly store them up, without view to any particular service they will do us, but upon the general prospect that we shall find occasion for them one time or other. And as the materials of enjoyment many times are no more to be had with a wish than the enjoyments themselves, but require other materials to procure them, hence use grows from out of use: for whatever conduces to the acquisition of useful things becomes useful itself upon that account. Thus, if the accommodations of life are useful for the comfort and delights they continually afford, money is useful too, because it will purchase those accommodations; an estate because it yields an annual income of money, a profession because it tends to raise a competency of estate, application and industry because they help to make men thrive in their professions, skill and sagacity because they render industry successful, experience and learning because they improve our skill and sharpen our sagacity. All that men esteem valuable or think worth their while to pursue, derives its value either directly from enjoyment or from something else first recommended thereby. Riches, power, fame, health, strength, existence, talents, knowledge, accomplishments, luck, liberty, justice, steadiness, become this way objects of our desire.

2. But desire, as has been shown in the last chapter, although the child of pleasure, begets an offspring of the same features, make, and complexion with its grandmother: for the gratification of any desire, by how distant object soever excited, affords a present pleasure proportionable to the eagerness of the desire. Therefore, we see men express great joy according to the ardency of their wishes upon any accession of wealth; or power, or knowledge, or enlargement of their liberty, or discovery of their strength of resolution: and these secondary pleasures take up much the larger share on the credit side of our account after we arrive at manhood; yet even these objects affect the balance more by the engagement of their pursuit or consequences of their possession than by the joy of their acquisition. Wherefore the wisest of men have been ever observed attentive to things useful in preference to things pleasant, because the former contains the seeds of many future enjoyments, whereas the latter can only improve our condition for the present moment: and we have

seen a little while ago that pleasure itself does not deserve regard so much for its own poignancy as when it becomes useful by raising an expectation that engages us in a pursuit giving scope to agreeable reflections, or instigates to something more beneficial than itself.

That species of use called convenience visibly bears a reference to pleasure; for though our instruments be inconvenient, nevertheless we may make shift to work with them, but when we have all our implements convenient about us we can complete our work with more ease and dispatch. The conveniences, as distinguished from all the necessaries of life, serve only to make it run more smooth and agreeable, and to render that an amusement which would otherwise have been a task. He that has all necessaries fully supplied him has everything requisite for his being, but conveniences superadded enable him not only to support but to enjoy his being.

Desire having passed through many translations we often lose all remembrance of the progress it has made, nor can trace it back to the original fountain, which induces us to believe many desires natural and interwoven into our constitution, that derived their influence from certain things conducive to our enjoyments and conveniences. A very little reflection will convince us this is the case with respect to money, which, however sometimes looked upon as desirable in itself, and how much soever the covetous man may prefer it beyond all things else, yet nobody can suppose he would ever have had the least attachment for it, if he had never found it serviceable to procure the enjoyments and accommodations of life. But there are other desires, whose derivation is not so apparent, and therefore are imagined born with us, or to be propensities infused into the mind, and which break forth into act immediately upon the proper objects to excite them being presented. Of this sort are the desire of knowledge, of liberty, of power, of self-preservation, and many others. I shall examine only two, which may serve as samples for the rest: the love of justice, and that fondness for having our own wills discernible more or less in all men.

3. We find justice commonly divided into two branches, called Commutative, directing us to render to every man his due; and Distributive, guiding us in the application of reward and punishment. The first of these you see no appearance of in children, who greedily catch at everything they can get without regard to the claims of their playfellows: and when they grow up, all the laws, the penalties, the punishments in the world, are little enough to prevent the invasion of property; but the generality of man-

kind still remain disposed to overreach one another in a bargain, and take all undue advantages whenever they can do it safely. So that since the golden age Astrea resides no more upon earth: even the honestest of men, if they will speak ingenuously, must acknowledge it extremely difficult to preserve a strict impartiality of judgment, in matters affecting their own private interest. Besides, it seems to be agreed among the learned, that nature gave the earth and all its produce among mankind in common, and that property would have had no existence, but for the necessity of it to preserve order and encourage industry with all the improvements consequent thereupon. The view of these advantages inspires us all with a liking to justice, but it is when discerned in other people, and certainly there can be nothing more convenient than that everybody should behave justly to us: therefore, no man but would be glad to see justice prevail universally, with an exemption only for himself. And though I doubt not there are many who would act uprightly although there were no laws nor even hazard of a discovery to restrain them from the contrary, yet these are persons who have learned to regard the interests of others as well as themselves: so that their principle of integrity still results from convenience, though not their own, but that of other people.

As for distributive justice, we have already seen under the article of anger, how the desire of revenge springs from expedience; and though men of consideration and judgment will often punish but not in anger, they do it from the necessity of punishment to keep the world in order; wherefore, they regard the intention more than the deed, knowing that the use of punishment is not to repair the damage sustained, to which it will by no means contribute, but to mend the manners and direct the intention of mankind to the forbearance of injury. Even the vulgar, though ordinarily prompted by impulse of passion, yet if you would dissuade them from the prosecution or retaliation of wrongs, reply readily, Why otherwise we cannot sleep safe in our beds, or we shall be liable to perpetual insults: which however insincere they may be or ignorant of their real motive, shows that common sense dictates expedience as the only plea to justify resentment. If there were a natural and necessary connection between offence and punishment, how could there be any room for mercy? which a person of humanity will always show whenever it can be extended to the offender, without inconvenience to the public, or detriment to private persons. Nor does our inclination to reward grow from any other root than that of expedience, as encouraging men to repeat the good offices that have deserved it. When we promise a poor

man a reward for doing us some particular service, or offer one for the recovery of goods lost, or apprehension of a thief, we have visibly our own ends in view. And the observation that the return of good offices engages men to continue them, is so obvious as to escape nobody's notice ; but the convenience found in such returns occur so continually in the commerce of life, that satisfaction, as customary in translations, becomes connected with the practice, and we get an habitual aptness to retaliate favors as well as injuries, without looking forward to the benefits attending upon so doing. Thus the heartiest gratitude, as I have shown in the proper place concerning the purest love, though bearing the fragrantest flowers, sprouts originally from the earthly principle of self-interest.

4. And that adherence to what we have once set our hearts upon, so common in the world, issues from the same bed : for our larger actions, by which alone we can help ourselves in our needs, consist of many single acts, which must all tend towards the same point, or they will never form an entire body to complete the purpose we intended. We cannot walk across the room with a single step, nor help ourselves to a glass of wine by one motion of our arm, nor compass anything whatever, until our volitions have been accustomed to follow one another in the same direction. This discovers to us the expedience of a steadiness and consistency of conduct, and renders the having willed a thing, a motive with us to will it still, until some cogent reason shall occur to the contrary. Experience indeed might convince us, in time, that it is often expedient to change our measures, and comply with the necessity of our situation : but all do not profit by experience ; and those are observed to be the most wilful, who have found the least need of compliance, being either such whose strength of body, and hardiness of constitution, have enabled them to resist compulsion, or such as being constantly humored by persons about them, have used to gain their ends by persisting. But this sturdiness of temper ought by no means to be absolutely rejected, being eminently serviceable or pernicious, according to the objects whereto it is directed : when turned the wrong way, it is called obstinacy, stubbornness and perverseness ; when the right, we entitle it steadiness, resolution, and bravery, without which there is no enduring pains, hardships, and difficulties, nor going through with an arduous undertaking, nor indeed completing any work that requires labor and time. For considering the fluctuating nature of our ideas, it is impossible to keep up the desire first urging to the task in its full colors, but we should faint in midway upon any fatigue or obstacle intervening, if it were not

for the habit of perseverance in what he had once begun. The forming a resolution requires a very different situation of mind from that of executing: in the former we gather as many considerations as we can to fortify our resolves; in the latter we are too busy with the measures to be taken to admit any further idea relating to our purpose than the strength of resolution, wherewith we had determined upon it. Especially when pain assaults us, it so fills the mind, that we have no room for more than the remembrance of our having judged the thing, to be attained by supporting it, expedient, without any of the foundations for that judgment: all we can do further is by an operation upon our organs, to withdraw our notice from the smart and heighten our desire, or want of perseverance in our design as much as possible.

Since then adherence to our purpose proves so signally serviceable upon great occasions, and so continually useful upon common ones, no wonder it becomes the object of desire, in some degree with all men, and gives them vexation upon being crossed, and pleasure upon being gratified. They may not always be able to trace out its reference to use: they know they love to have their Wills, but forget by what steps they fell in love with them; for understanding cannot penetrate into all the private recesses of imagination. In other cases, men are frequently deceived with respect to the influence that use has upon them, self-interest giving a wonderful bias to the judgment, and producing those motives we have called the obscure, because sheltering themselves under cover of more specious reasons, while they too often give the real turn to our behavior.

CHAP. XXIV.

HONOR.

As use sprouts from pleasure, so honor branches out from use, and stands one remove further from the parent root, for which reason it is more readily supposed insate, its derivation being not so easily traced; for it never grows to maturity, while adhering to the mother plant, nor until separated from it as an offset, and standing upon its own stem. We are not thought actuated by honor, so long as we have any further advantage or gratification in view, nor until it becomes a motive of itself sufficient to operate upon us, without needing recommendation from anything else to give it weight. But this does not prove it to be the gift of na-

ture, for we may remember many instances already pointed out of translation, wherein satisfaction has been made to fix so strongly upon things originally indifferent, as to render them powerful motives of action.

Our principle of honor is so far from being born with us, that we should never have acquired it, if we had always been debarred from society. Little children, as they show no signs of shame, so neither do they discover any notion of applause, until being perpetually told that Mamma will not love them, nor Papa give them pretty things, nor Nurse take care of them, unless they be good, they learn to look upon the approbation of persons about them as desirable. And when we grow up, we find it so extremely and continually useful to have the good opinion and esteem of others, which make them friendly and obsequious to our desires, that this is enough to give us a liking to esteem, and consequently to those actions or qualities tending to promote it. For reflection and experience leading us by gradation from one thing to another, our desire of approbation throws a complacency upon actions procuring it, and this again makes us value the possession of qualities productive of such actions, although we have no present opportunity of exercising them.

2. Besides, there lies a nearer way for good qualities to arrive at their valuableness; for we find the very sight of them raising an esteem in the beholder, without staying for the benefits to be received from them. Nay, that sight contributes more to give a good opinion of the possessor than the reception of the benefits, and the latter only as an evidence of the former. Whatever enables a man to do much good or hurt, sets him higher in the estimation of the vulgar, than a disposition to use his powers well: therefore we see great talents, sagacity, strength of body, nobility of birth, and even opulence and good fortune, introduced for topics of panegyric as well as beneficence, public spirit, and industry.

But what is more useful carries away our attention from what is less; therefore we judge of things by comparison, placing our esteems upon those which are excellent and supereminent in their kind; and what we once greatly admired, may be eclipsed by something darting a superior lustre. And our admiration of superiority renders the marks of it subjects of our admiration too: hence proceeds our fondness for titles of honor, splendor of equipage, and badges of distinction: hence likewise majesty of countenance, dignity of gesture, and solemnity of deportment, command our respect, as expressing something extraordinary and excellent within; for where we know the subject exhibiting them possesses nothing more than common, they excite our laughter: instead of

our admiration. Nor are we unaffected with excellence appearing in beasts, or things inanimate, or the performances of art: we admire the noble mien of a lion, the magnificence of a building, the immense expanse of heaven, the regular courses of the stars, the master strokes of poetry, and sublimity of style, because these objects afford immediate entertainment, by filling imagination with large ideas, or express something extraordinary in the authors and causes of them. And honor, resting chiefly in comparison, teaches us to see an expedience in excelling; for it is not so much matter what we are in ourselves, as what degree we stand in amongst others; which sows the seeds of envy, emulation, and contention for superiority. But as excellence will not produce its effects until made visible, this opens the door to ostentation, vanity, and affectation, which may be observed abounding most in those who have been flattered into an opinion of their having something extraordinary to exhibit, or some agreeable peculiarity in their manner.

3. But the thought of possessing whatever we esteem useful or advantageous, soothes and gives immediate pleasure to the mind: for which reason there is a near affinity between beauty and honor, both delighting the eye instantly upon sight, without reference to those further advantages which first made it recommendable, and love and esteem commonly generating one another, or at least nourishing each other's growth. In visible objects one can more easily discern the distinction than describe it, only we may say that beauty seems to affect the sense alone, whereas admiration more apparently requires the concurrence of imagination. But when applied to actions and sentiments, it is harder to know them apart: wherefore the Greeks used the same term to express them both, and though the Latins had a different name for each, yet they applied their epithets promiscuously, distinguishing things indifferently either into beautiful and deformed, or laudable and blameable. But the mind, having a natural propensity to pleasure, loves to solace herself in the contemplation of whatever belonging to her she conceives will do her honor: this engenders pride; which may be called a habit of dwelling upon the thought of any supposed excellences or advantages men believe themselves possessed of, as well power, birth, wealth, strength of body, or beauty of person, as endowments of the mind.

But our propensity to this as well as other pleasures, produces mischievous effects, too often misleading the understanding, damping industry, and destroying its own purpose by overcharging the appetite. It casts a wonderful bias upon the judgment, inclining men to fancy themselves possessed of advantages they

have not, to overvalue those they really have, and to depreciate those of other people. It keeps them so attentive to their own self-sufficiency, as to think it needless to look for anything further: whereas industry bespeaks a humble mind; more solicitous to make new acquisitions, than to count over those already gained, as not judging them enough to rest satisfied with. And it destroys the relish men find in the possession of good things, by satiating them with the contemplation: for as our bodily members tire upon continual exercise, so our mental organs cloy upon repetition, soon exhausting the sweets of an object, and entertaining no longer than while receiving fresh supplies of novelty and variety. Accordingly the proud reap no delight from their pride: we rather see them more gloomy and discontented than other people; and if they still retain a fondness for reflecting on their superexcellence, it is like the unnatural thirst of a drunkard, which does not draw him by pleasure, but drives him by the uneasiness of his unextinguishable cravings.

4. Is it then never allowable to cast back a look upon anything wherein we have succeeded well, or upon any advantages we possess? This I do not assert; for the complacency we feel upon such occasions improves our condition, so long as we can enjoy it pure, and whatever pleases deserves our regard, if none other consideration interfere. I see nothing should hinder the boy from swinging, provided he took care to do his lesson first, not to break down the farmer's gate, and to leave off his diversion before it grew tiresome: so neither need we scruple to ride upon any little excellency we may possess, taking only such transient views of it as may afford us a real gust, if we have nothing else to do, and neither injure nor offend anybody, nor harbor a thought injurious or offensive to anybody. Besides, there is a further use beyond the present amusement, in making proper comparisons of things and persons: for the retrospect upon what we have done well, encourages us to persevere in the like conduct; the knowledge of any good things we possess, whets our industry to preserve and procure more of them; and a due sense of our estimation among mankind, withholds us from consorting with persons, or giving into behavior unbecoming our character. But what comparisons of this kind are proper or not, depends upon a fair computation of the service they will do, or the net income of real pleasures they will yield upon the balance.

5. As honor branches from use, so it takes divers tinctures, according to the stock whereon it is grafted. The professions and situations of men in life rendering different things serviceable to them, creates proportionable variety in their sentiments of honor:

the merchant places it in punctuality of payment, the soldier in bravery, the artificer in the completeness of his works, the scholar in acquisitions of learning, the fine gentleman in politeness and elegance of taste, the lady in her beauty, or neatness of dress, or skill in family economy. There is no man utterly destitute of honor, because no man but finds the expedience of it in some degree or other: nor is there a possibility of living in any comfort or tranquillity under universal contempt. But men's notions of it are widely different and discordant: what one esteems an honor, another looks upon as a folly or disgrace; one values himself upon his sincerity and plain dealing, another upon his art of dissimulation: one upon his patience in enduring wrongs, another upon his quickness in resenting them: though Falstaff ridiculed the grinning honors of the field, yet he scorned to give a reason upon compulsion: every one esteems that highest which he has found turning most to account in the way of life wherein he is engaged, or best promoting his designs, or adding to his enjoyment in the company among whom his lot has fallen. Which shows that our sense of honor is not natural like that of seeing, for this exhibits the same distinction of colors to all alike, nor ever makes a lily appear blue to one man, green to another, and scarlet to a third, according to the several ways they have been brought up in, or employments they have followed.

6. Though our estimation of things commonly first arises from the credit they bear with other people, yet the judgments of mankind being so various, obliges us to look out for some other rule to direct us in our observation: for by following what we see admired at one time, we may be thought to pursue trifles or incur censure at another. To avoid the trouble such accidents would give us, we have none other remedy than by hardening ourselves sometimes against reproach, which we see every one ready to do more or less upon occasion: for there could be no steadiness of conduct nor perseverance in any purpose, if we were to veer about with every blast of applause or censure. But as no man would wish to throw off all sensibility, he must distinguish when to restrain and when to give it scope: this teaches him to look inwards upon himself and observe what estimation things bear in his own mind, and the judgments the mind passes in such cases immediately upon inspection are called the sentiments. I know this term is often applied to opinions concerning the truth or falsehood, expedience or inexpedience of things: as when a man is asked to declare his sentiments upon a point of natural philosophy or a maxim of policy or measure of prudence, the question means no more than to know what he judges most agreeable to reason, or

most conducive to the purpose aimed at. But Sentiment being derived from Sense or Feeling, seems more peculiarly applicable to those judgments the mind passes upon matters of praise or blame, which she cannot do without feeling a degree of complacency or disgust in contemplating the subject whereon she so passes her judgment.

One can live but little while in the world without acquiring some of these sentiments, and when deeply rooted by long habit, they become powerful incentives of action. The testimony of a man's own breast when clear and full will bear him up against the reproaches of a whole world. Self-approbation when strong and well grounded will support him under hardships, disappointments, and distresses; and the desire of doing something he may applaud himself for will carry him through labors, difficulties, and dangers. You may move any man almost any way by touching his point of honor, if you can but find out where it lies: but herein and in applying the proper means to affect it rests the difficulty, for perhaps it does not lie in the same part nor look towards the same objects as it does in yourself. We currently pronounce the vulgar void of honor because they want those notions of it instilled into us by education and good company: but if they had not a sensibility of their own, they would never be moved unless by blows or something affecting them in point of interest, whereas we find the meanest of mankind as apt to take fire upon opprobrious language or defamation, when they understand it, as the most refined.

The generality of men draw their sentiments of honor from those with whom they consort, or from the tendency of things to promote what they most ardently desire: they feel themselves affecting some objects and shocked at others; they neither know nor inquire how they come to be so, but follow the present impulse without further examination. But the studious, desirous to see with their own eyes, and unwilling to trust either the opinions of mankind which they perceive infinitely various and contradictory, or even their own sentiments which they find wavering and clashing with one another, endeavor to fix upon some criterion whereby to distinguish true honor from the false. This has led many into the notion of an essential quality, which residing in certain objects they became laudable in themselves: which quality I take to have been understood by the *Kalòn* of the Greeks and *Honestum* of the Romans, to which I know of no word that answers in the English tongue, but it may be described, that which raises your approbation instantly upon being suggested to the thought, without reference to any consequences attendant thereupon. If you asked what this *Kalòn* was, you were referred to the effect it

would have upon the eye of an impartial beholder. But several beholders see different appearances in the same object : this it was replied arose from a fault in the vision, for the optics of some are so dimmed and overclouded by the mists of error and prejudice, that, like a jaundiced eye, they cannot see the Kalòn in its true colors. Well, but how shall we know whether our optics be clear and how to rectify them ? why, observe the best and wisest men, and learn to see as they do. Thus, the whole matter is at last resolved into authority, a method unbecoming a philosopher ; for though the examples of wise men be an excellent guide for us to follow in our conduct, it lets us nothing into the nature of things unless we have the grounds explained whereon they formed their judgment : and as we shall meet with many instances wherein we cannot have the benefit of their example, we shall still remain at a loss how to distinguish the genuine Kalòn from the spurious. Besides, the actions of the wise themselves have been made the subject of controversy, many judicious persons having doubted whether Cato the censor had a just idea of the Kalòn when he persecuted the Carthagenians to destruction, or Brutus, when he assassinated Cæsar, or the younger Cato, whom Seneca pronounces a perfect wise man, when he deserted his post of life at Utica : so that we want some other test to try the dictates of wisdom when mingled among the frailties of human nature in the very best of men.

When such disputes happen, the parties generally recur to some principles they think will be admitted on the other side ; and if those are agreed to, it is very well ; but what if they be denied ? or what if it be asked upon what grounds those principles are founded ? I know of none other way to determine the matter than by a reference to use. And so far the old philosophers seem to have admitted this rule as to allow that all things laudable were useful, but then they placed those qualities out of their proper order, for they held that things were therefore useful because laudable, whereas the truth appears to me to be that they are therefore laudable because useful : for I cannot conceive how any practice can be laudable which will never do the least service to the performer nor anybody else, nor blameable from whence more good will accrue by following it than letting it alone. All services are esteemed, as well in the eye of the world as in a man's own reflection, according as they are more or less signal : and if temptations and difficulties standing in the way render a deed the subject of greater applause, certainly nothing can be more useful than an ability to surmount difficulties and resist temptations when they would withhold us from anything beneficial.

8. But if things be laudable because useful, must not use and honor always go together? Is there then no difference between one and the other? If a man entrusted with a valuable deposit by a person deceased, debates with himself whether he shall apply it to the purposes directed or to his own benefit, does not use exhort him one way and honor the other? Certainly they do: but then use must be understood here of what appears such to him, not what is really such upon the whole upshot of the account. We get a habit of looking upon power, profit, and such like, as valuable, and thence contract a desire of attaining them whenever an opportunity offers; but this desire would lead us many times into mischiefs and inconveniences if not withheld by the restraint of honor: or we grudge the pains of pursuing things really valuable, and should miss of them unless shamed out of our indolence: here the sense of honor does us signal service by stimulating when interest wanted sharpness sufficient, and urging to practices, whose use we are not sensible of, as lying too remote for us to discern. Were there a race of men of so penetrating and extensive an understanding as to comprehend at one view all the consequences of every action, and so well regulated a taste as constantly to prefer the greater remote good before the lesser near at hand, they would have no sense of honor because they would want none: for their own discernment would lead them precisely into those very courses which true honor recommends. The necessity of this principle arises from the weakness and narrowness of our capacities; they that are whole need not the physician nor his remedies, but they that are sick; and honor is that remedy which alone can cure the disorders and confusions brought upon the world by a too close attachment to our injudicious desires in disregard of the general good, wherein our own is ultimately contained, or I may say lies concealed. The voluptuous, who constantly follow whatever appetite or fancy prompts, have the narrowest minds; a prudent regard to interest widens them a little; but a due sense of honor opens the heart and enlarges the soul as far as it is capable of extending. Therefore, the wisest and best of men, as they have ever been observed attentive to things useful in preference to things pleasant, so they give the like preference to the laudable before the useful, and for the same reason; because as use contains the seeds of many future enjoyments, so honor leads to further uses than their wisdom, but imperfect at the best, can always descry.

Now to come as near as possible to my old friends of former ages I shall readily admit that, although things be not therefore useful because laudable, yet they ought therefore to be es-

seemed useful because of that approbation we feel resting upon them in our own minds. For as we have shown in CHAP. XI. that many truths reputed self-evident were not innate but acquired by experience of facts, nevertheless we may justly employ them as the basis of our reasonings, because the strength wherewith they strike upon the judgment is a good evidence that we had sufficient grounds for embracing them, though now absolutely forgotten and irrecoverable : so when we perceive objects commanding our applause instantly upon inspection, we may rest assured that we ourselves, or those persons from whom we have taken the tincture, have found advantages in them which we do not now retain in memory, nor can readily trace out. The uses we see daily resulting from a principle of honor, are enow to give it a value in the eyes of every prudent person ; continual experience testifies that this principle rightly grounded, withholds us from folly, rouses us to industry, shines through the mists of prejudice, and balances the influence of passion : nor can anybody avoid taking notice how much men's regard for their credit with others, and self-approbation within themselves, contributes to preserve that good order in the world, the benefits whereof they want penetration to discern. Therefore we shall do well to follow the dictates of our own heart concerning what is commendable or unworthy, for that will inform us sufficiently for common occasions, if we take care to consult it sincerely and impartially : and when doubts arise, we must adhere to such sentiments as we find established most firmly, and striking most strongly. I know nothing further we can do, unless we stand in a situation to discern all the consequences and tendencies of the matters under deliberation ; and then that which appears least confined to private or present gratification, but most extensively and generally advantageous, will deserve the character of the most laudable.

9. But in computations of this sort, regard must be had, not only to the usefulness of the objects proposed, but likewise to the usefulness of praise or blame towards attaining them : for if there be other motives sufficient to set us at work, commendation were thrown away as being superfluous. This explains why, though honor depends upon use, nevertheless everything useful is not laudable : because where we discern the use, and are moved by it to exert ourselves, there is no use for honor. Therefore we do not lavish our applauses upon things we find men willing enough to do of themselves, however beneficial they may appear. What is more useful than eating and sleeping ? but nobody gains credit by them, for appetite prompts us fast enough without it. Bakers, shoemakers, and tailors, are very serviceable members

of society, but whoever rose to honors by exercising those trades ? for why ? the prospect of getting a livelihood holds them tight to their work, without any other spur to assist it. But upon boys being first put out as apprentices the master finds it useful to encourage them by commendation, because they have then none other inducement to do their duty besides reward and punishment. We chide and applaud our children to make them careful of their money ; but when they have gotten a competent habit of economy, then honor changes stations, standing as a fence on the other side, to secure them against covetousness.

Hence too we may learn why the most considerate persons honor the intention rather than the deed, for though the usefulness of an action results from the performance, not the design, yet the use of commendation lies only in its operating upon the mind, nor does it at all influence the success any further than by doubling our diligence. Yet a proper estimate of external objects has its use too, as directing us which way to apply our endeavors out of several presenting : for if there were not a credit in having things neat and handsome about us, many men would satisfy themselves as well with grovelling always in the dirt ; and if there were not a respect paid to eminence of station and fortune, even where we have no high opinion of the persons, we should invalidate those rules of good breeding which keep up decorum, and render conversation easy. Hence likewise we may see why honor generally runs counter to profit and pleasure, because the use of it lies in restraining them when they would carry us on to our detriment ; and the more forcibly they tempt us, the greater is the merit of resisting them, because we then need a stronger weight to overbalance their influence. The same reason may account for honor resting upon comparison, because use frequently does so too : for as among many things proposed to his option, a prudent man will always choose the most useful, so he will prefer the most laudable, as carrying the presumption of being the most useful. Therefore the desire of surpassing others is always faulty, unless when some real benefit will result therefrom, or there be some good purpose in view, which cannot be attained without it.

10. The desire of honor, like all other desires, gives an immediate pleasure in the gratification, or when moving on successfully towards its object ; and this may be reckoned among the uses of honor. But these pleasures are not to be valued according to their intenseness, for high delights of all kinds, though they ravish the mind while fresh and new, yet they pall the appetite, and render it tasteless of common enjoyments ; nor can they keep their

relish long, because our organs are too weak to support the violent exercise they put them upon. But there is a self-approbation, which, being of the gentle kind, throws the spirits into easy motions that do not exhaust nor fatigue, and soothes the mind with an uninterrupted complacency in the reflections she may cast back upon her general tenor of conduct. For as ease, health, and security, afford a degree of actual pleasure, though implying no more in themselves than a negation of pain, sickness, and danger, so there is a real satisfaction in keeping clear of everything for which others might justly censure us, or we might blame ourselves. This then the wise man will be most careful to attain, as adding more to the sum total of his happiness than the momentary transports of joy, upon excelling in any way whatever. Nevertheless, an ardent desire of doing or possessing something extraordinary has its value, but as we observed before concerning intense pleasures, not so much for its intrinsic worth, or for the gust found in the gratification, as for the good fruits it may produce, by stimulating our industry, furnishing us with employment, and putting us upon useful services we might otherwise have omitted.

11. If there be any meaning in the expression of things laudable in themselves, it must belong to those we find esteemed most universally, or by the best judges, or from which we cannot withhold our applause whenever we consider them in our own minds, though we know not why they so affect us: but our not seeing the benefits resulting therefrom, is no proof of their non-existence. By such tests it behoves us to try our sentiments every now and then, for as we catch a tincture from others by custom or example, without this caution we shall lie perpetually liable to be drawn aside by the glare of false honor from pursuing the true. But when we do employ the method of reference to use, we must carry the reference to all quarters whereto it can extend: for it is not enough to weigh the consequences of the present action, but we must consider what effect our departure from a rule may have upon ourselves at other times, how far it may influence other people to follow our example, when they have not the like reason for doing as we do, and in short all the circumstances that any ways relate to the case. Honor, says Mr. Addison, is a sacred tie, and its laws are never to be infringed, unless when more good than hurt will evidently result from dispensing with them: nor must the danger of weakening their authority be forgotten in the account; and if that be considered, there are some of those laws which perhaps a sufficient warrant can never be found for transgressing.

12. Situation and circumstance may cast a dishonor upon

what appears perfectly innocent in itself: there are many things I need not name, that every man must do, and therefore will acquit himself in doing, yet every discreet man will choose to do in private, and conceal from the knowledge of others as much as possible. It is well known what irregularities the Cynics were led into by judging of things as laudable or blameable in themselves: for intrinsic qualities cannot be divested by the circumstances of time and place, from the subject whereto nature has united them. A stone will retain its hardness so long as it remains a stone, and air be yielding to the touch always and everywhere: therefore they made no scruple to commit the grossest indecencies in public, because their adversaries could not but admit the acts they performed were at some times allowable. But if they had judged by a proper reference to use, they must have seen the expedience of decency and decorum, that what becomes one man may not become another, and that the same actions, according as they do, or do not, tend to give offence, or to the breach of good manners, may become blameable or allowable.

13. Much ado has been made of late days about certain moral senses, which nature is supposed to have furnished us with, for the discernment of things laudable or blameable, becoming, or ridiculous, as she has with the bodily senses for the discernment of sensible objects; and this notion seems introduced to supply the place of innate ideas, since their total overthrow by Mr. Locke. If we allege that nature is more uniform in her gifts than we find these moral senses to be, which judge very variously of the same object in different persons, we are silenced with the old pretence, that all who do not see as we do, must labor under some disorder in their vision, by having contracted films before their eyes from error and prejudice. But how shall the moral sense be proved born with us, when we see no appearance of it before we arrive at some use of our understanding, and there are whole nations who seem utterly destitute of it? Our five senses we receive perfect at first, they rather decay and grow duller than improve by time: the child and the savage can see, and hear, and taste, and smell, and feel, as well as the most refined and civilized. Let us then look upon this supposed sixth sense as an acquired faculty, generated in us by the operation of those materials thrown in by the other five, together with the combinations formed of them, and other ideas resulting from them in our reflection. We ordinarily imbibe our sentiments by custom or sympathy from the company we consort with, or from persons whose judgments we revere: therefore the exposing of children, the extirpating of enemies, assassinating for affronts, persecuting for heresy, do not strike with

horror in countries where commonly practised, or taught by the leaders. But as all custom must have a beginning, and all judgment some foundation to build upon, let us try to discover what might first bring into credit those objects which the moral sense, when supposed clearest will recommend : and this will appear upon examination to be nothing else besides their expedience and eminent serviceableness to promote the happiness of mankind. The objects that seem most strongly to affect the moral sense are integrity of justice and restraint of brutal appetites, which we have already seen deriving their value from expedience : and it is remarkable that the mind discerns the beauty of them abroad before she can discover it at home. For as the eye sees not itself, unless by reflection in a glass, so neither can we know our own internal features, unless by beholding the counterparts of them in other persons : therefore if you perceive the moral sense in anybody a little dull, it is common to clear it up, by asking him how he would approve the like behavior in another towards himself. Which shows that actions have not an intrinsic turpitude necessarily touching the sense, when contemplating them naked, but we must place them in other subjects, where their tendency to bring trouble and inconvenience upon ourselves casts a turpitude upon them : having frequently seen them in this position, we learn to reflect that what appears foul and ugly without doors would do the same within, if we stood at the proper point of view ; we then practise the art of removing ourselves to a distance from ourselves, through which channel we derive that skill of discernment called the moral sense.

Nevertheless, I am not for depreciating these moral senses ; on the contrary, I wish their notices were more carefully regarded in the world than they are : for their being acquired is no diminution of their value, unless we will despise all arts and sciences, acquisitions of learning, and whatever else we had not directly from the hand of nature ; which would reduce us back again to the helpless and ignorant condition of our infancy. Men of the most shining characters and exemplary lives are found peculiarly attentive to them, nor will ever suffer themselves to be drawn into a disregard for them, by the impulses of passion, or temptations of profit. Yet being apt sometimes to gather films and foulnesses, it may not be amiss to examine them at the bar of reason by a jury of their peers ; that is, by comparing them with one another, when we have leisure and opportunity to give them a fair hearing, and take full cognizance of the cause : for the presumption lies strongly in their favor, and the burden of the proof belongs to him that would impeach their character. For we may have had sub-

stantial grounds for our estimation of things, though we do not now retain them in mind, and the experience of others may have discovered an expedience that we never stood in a situation to discern: therefore whatever appears shocking to our thought, or generally odious in the eyes of mankind, deserves to be rejected without very evident and invincible reasons to the contrary.

CHAP. XXV.

NECESSITY.

By necessity I do not mean that impulse whereby bodies are made to move and strike upon one another, nor those laws, by which nature carries on her operation in a chain of causes and effects unavoidably depending upon each other, without choice or volition. For I consider it here as a motive driving the mind to one manner of action, when we have the contrary in our inclination and our power: and we hear the term often applied this way, how properly I shall not examine, choosing rather to regard every expression as proper, that obtains currency in the language of mankind.

I have laid down that all our motives derive their efficacy from pleasure, other satisfactions flowing through the channel of translation, either immediately or remotely from that: but then it must be remembered, that under pleasure I comprehend the avoidance of pain, and it is the latter solely that gives rise to the class of motives at present under consideration. In all necessary actions, we have some uneasiness, or displeasure, or damage, in view, and some inclination drawing us another way which we should gratify if it were not for such obstacle; and as inclination generally stands for Will, we are said in such cases to act unwillingly or against their Wills, notwithstanding that we perform the acts by our volition, and therefore are no more necessary agents than when pursuing the thing most agreeable to our heart's desire.

2. Thus the motives of necessity have the very reverse for their objects to those of the three former classes, to wit, some pain or disquietude of mind, some detriment to our possessions, or blemish in our character, to which may be added the omission of something pleasant, profitable, or creditable, which we conceive in our power to attain; for whatever we desire strongly we feel an uneasiness in the thought of going without, which uneasiness many times lays us under a necessity of taking all measures to

prevent it. To this class belongs the obligations of duty, of honor, of justice, of prudence, of the laws of the land, and of fashion: the attachment to professions, application to business, preservation of our persons and properties, checks of conscience, and the greatest part of the influence of our moral senses. For whenever we do so or so because we must, whether the obligation be laid upon us by our own fondness for particular objects, or by the judgments of reason, we are actuated by the apprehension of some mischief attendant upon the forbearing it. Conscience particularly acts as a monitor, like Socrates' demon, never exhorting to anything, but restraining our desires from the course they would otherwise take, informing us what is right, no otherwise than by warning us against what is wrong: and moral senses, when young and newly acquired, operate by the dread of that compunction we should feel upon transgressing their dictates.

The very term *Must* implies that we should have acted otherwise, had matters been left to our choice, and indicates a desire subsisting in the mind, which unavoidably degenerates into want upon our being obliged to thwart when we cannot stifle it. Therefore, want being an uneasy passion, necessity always throws the mind into a state of suffering, greater or less in proportion to the degree of want urging us to the course we must not take. But men frequently misapply the term, using it as a pretence to justify what they really like and might have omitted without the least inconvenience: or when there is a real necessity, ascribing their action to that, though they were in fact pre-engaged by other motives. For we must remember the motive of action is always something actually in the scale; not every good reason that might move us if its help were wanted, but some object in view, and weighing with us at the instant time of acting. So that we cannot certainly conclude people uneasy when we hear them talk of being obliged to such a particular proceeding: for perhaps there was no obligation, and they only amused themselves, or meant to amuse us, with the pretence of one; or if they were, perhaps they had nothing less in their thoughts, but proceeded upon other grounds. What is more necessary than eating? yet which of us sits down to table upon that motive? we do not need to be told that without victuals we cannot sustain life nor keep our bodies in health, and this consideration might have sufficient influence to bring us to them, if there were nothing else: but appetite engages us beforehand, and sets our jaws at work long before necessity can heave itself into the scale. On the contrary, physic, having no other recommendation, will not go down with us, until we throw in the heavy weight of necessity. And in this as well as all other

cases wherein the cogency of necessity gives the real turn to our activity, there is an uneasiness corresponding to the reluctance we feel against complying with it.

But as this uneasiness proceeds from the opposition of contrary desires, if that which occasioned the reluctance can be totally silenced, necessity changes its nature, and becomes a matter of choice, having no competitor to struggle against it: for as when driven by necessity, we should have acted otherwise if that necessity had not occurred, so we should have readily complied with it as a thing desirable, if we had had no contrary inclination which must be thwarted by it. Therefore persons well practised in the ways of honor, take delight in performing the obligations of it, and fulfilling the rules of duty and justice: for though these ties were obligations at first, and still retain the name, they no longer act as obligations, but as objects of desire, nor does the party influenced by them once think of any mischief that would ensue, or any pleasure he might lose upon transgressing them.

3. The bare exemption from evil, often suffices to touch us with a sensible pleasure. The testimony of a good conscience, although implying no more than a clearness from offence, has been ever held a continual feast to the mind. And in common cases, the avoidance of mischief does not operate as a motive of necessity, where there is nothing to raise a reluctance against the measures to be taken for preventing it. We bar up our doors and windows every night to secure them against robbers; we provide fuel against winter, and send down stores into the country for our summer occasions: there is no pleasure in all this, nor should we do it unless necessary; yet being familiarized to the practice, we do it as a thing customary without thinking of that necessity. The essence of necessary action consists in an unwillingness to perform it; take away that unwillingness and the necessity is gone. There are persons of so happy temper as to bring their minds into a ready compliance with what must be done, and upon discerning that, whatever desires they might have had before for doing otherwise instantly vanish: if we could attain a perfect acquiescence in whatever the present circumstances require, we should escape the iron hand of necessity, we might see which way it drives, and lay our measures accordingly, but should always elude its grasp, and take the gentler guidance of expedience.

Nevertheless, since our desires will not always lie down quiet at the word of command, we can only restrain them from mischief by contemplating the necessity of so doing, and inculcating that

idea so strongly as to drive us into the performance of what we could not do willingly : for though it will throw us into an uneasy situation, we must submit to it for the good fruits expectant thereupon ; the road to ease and pleasure lying frequently through trouble and uneasiness. It is by this way we first come within the influence of honor, prudence and justice ; and the moral senses, as we observed before, begin their operation in this manner, though by a long and steady practice they get the better of all opponent inclinations, and become themselves the sources of desire, which would then prevail with us if there were no necessity to enforce them.

But as necessity by good management may be refined into pleasure, so pleasure by indiscretion may be corrupted into necessity ; a constant indulgence of our appetites increases their cravings while it lessens and at last totally destroys the gust we had in gratifying them ; so that desire, whose office it is to solace and delight us, changes into the tormenting passion of want. It has been often said that hunger is the best sauce to our meat, but this the voluptuary never finds in his dish ; and likewise that novelty gives a relish to pleasures, but by hunting continually after a variety of them, we may bring novelty itself to be nothing new. Many run a perpetual round of diversions abroad only because they should be miserable at home ; so that while they seem invited by pleasure, they are really lashed on by the scourge of necessity. Therefore if we wish to pass our time easily and agreeably, the worst thing we can do is to make a toil of a pleasure, and the best to make a virtue of necessity.

CHAP. XXVI.

REASON.

Thus far we have been busied in laying our foundation, a toilsome and tedious work, but wherein diligence and an attention to minute particulars was requisite, because we were unwilling to leave any cracks or chasms unfilled, over which our future building might stand hollow : how well we have succeeded in the attempt ; and whether we have worked the whole compact with a mutual dependance, and due coherence of parts, must be left to the judgment of others, whose decision in our favor I rather wish for than expect. For, to say truth, it has not answered my own

expectation, as wanting much of that complete workmanship I am well satisfied the materials were capable of: but with regard to the necessity and usefulness of all we have been laboring, I beg the determination of that may be suspended until it shall be seen what uses we can make of it. Let us now begin to raise the superstructure, wherein I hope to proceed with a little more ease to myself, and satisfaction to anybody that may deign to look upon me. We have examined how and upon what incitements men act, together with the tendencies and consequences of their action: let us try to discover from thence how they ought to act. But I am not so fond as to imagine anything can be done this way so completely as to render all further care and consideration of other persons needless: if I can set up the main pillars of morality, and perform the offices of mason and carpenter in erecting the edifice, this is all that can be required of me: I may leave it to each particular man to fit up the several apartments according to his circumstances and situation in life; for things calculated for general use, require some pains and circumspection in applying them to private convenience in the variety of cases that may happen.

2. We have seen how the actions of men are of two sorts, inadvertent and deliberate, the former prompted by imagination, and the others by understanding. To imagination belong our combinations and judgments, starting up immediately upon the appearance of objects, our spontaneous trains of thought, our passions, habits, and motives giving the present turn to our volition. Of what kind all these shall be, or when, or how they shall affect us, depends upon the impulse of external objects, upon experience, custom, and other prior causes: the mind has no share either in modelling or introducing them, and though she acts by her own power without their assistance to invigorate her, yet she shapes her motions according to the directions received from them. There remains only the understanding, in whose operations the mind acts as principal agent, comparing and marshalling her ideas, investigating those that lie out of sight, forming new judgments, and discovering motives that would not have arisen of themselves. It is therefore by the due use of our understanding, or reason alone, that we can help ourselves when imagination would take a wrong course, or proves insufficient for our purposes. To this then we must have recourse, if we would avail ourselves of anything we have learnt in the foregoing inquiry; because we must employ this to rectify whatever shall be found amiss elsewhere.

3. And in such employment consists principally, if not entirely,

the benefit we may expect from reason, which is necessary to be noted, that we may know wherein she may prove serviceable : for some people require too much at her hands, more than she is able to perform ; they want her to actuate every motion of their lives, which is impossible, for her power lies in her authority rather than her strength, she does little or nothing herself, but acts altogether by her inferior officers of the family of imagination : at least, till she takes them into her service, her efforts terminate in speculation alone, and do not extend to practice. Nor can she work, even in her own peculiar province, without continual supplies from elsewhere ; for she works upon materials found in the repository of ideas. She never produces a judgment or a motive from her own fund, but holds the premises in view until they throw assent or satisfaction upon the conclusion. She is perpetually asking, Why is such a thing true? Why is it desirable? but former experience must suggest the grounds from whence the answer will result ; for reason does not make the truth nor the desire, but only lays things together whereout either of them may grow. And when she has formed her decisions, she must deposit them with her partner for safe custody against future occasions ; who proving ever so little unfaithful, all she has deposited will either be absolutely lost or so weakened in its colors as to become unserviceable. She runs very short lengths, sees very little way at once, therefore must establish rules and maxims for her own guidance, and makes over her treasures to imagination as she acquires them, that they may rise spontaneously to serve her afterwards in her further advances towards knowledge. But we ordinarily mistake the province of reason by supposing everything reasonable to lie within it, whereas that epithet implies no more than a thing that reason would not disapprove. But many very just and solid opinions we imbibe from education or custom, without any application to our reason at all : and those we do acquire for ourselves by the due exercise of that faculty, when firmly rooted become the property of imagination ; conviction growing into persuasion. They then command our assent without contemplating the evidences whereon they were founded, and that full assurance wherewith they strike the mind instantly upon presenting themselves, is not an act of reason, but of habit or some moral or internal sense, which continue to influence, though consideration and understanding lie dormant. Were our faculty of reason to be suddenly taken from us, how unable soever we might find ourselves to make new acquisitions of knowledge or judgment, we should not necessarily lose those already gotten by former exercises of the faculty.

4. But if the office of reason lie within so narrow a compass

in her own province of speculation, we shall find it reduced to narrower limits when applying her theory to practice; for she is a tedious heavy mover, poring a long while upon objects before she can determine her choice: our active powers will not always wait her leisure, but take directions elsewhere while she deliberates. Besides, there is not always time for consideration: when the season of action comes unexpectedly, we must instantly turn ourselves one way or other, therefore should make no dispatch in business, or must give up the reins to chance, if we had not some rules and measures of conduct ready in store for our guidance: and the principal service our understanding does, is by holding our attention steady to those rules, wherein she quickly tires and faints unless there be some motive of pleasure, or profit, or honor, or necessity, at hand to assist her. And yet in doing this service she performs the smallest share of our work, directing only the main tenor of our conduct; but the component acts whereof that conduct consists must be suggested in train by former practice and experience: for it avails little to know what is expedient, or the rules proper for attaining it, without an expertness and readiness in practising them. The orator may choose his arguments and select the topics proper for enforcing them, but the figures, the language, and the pronunciation, will be such as he has accustomed himself to in former exercises. The musician may think what tune he will play, what divisions he shall run, or with what graces he shall embellish it; but unless his eye has learnt by use to run currently along the notes, and his fingers along the keys, he will make very indifferent harmony. The business of life goes on by means of habit, opinion and affection, which understanding only checks from time to time, or turns, or sets them at work without adding anything to their vigor, unless by bringing several of them to co-operate together. Reason, as Mr. Pope says, is the card, but passion is the gale; and if there were a necessity of parting with one of them, we might better spare the former than the latter; for though the course of the ship would be very uncertain without a compass, yet without a wind it would not move at all. To lose our reason would make us beasts: to lose our appetites, mere logs.

5. If there be any instances wherein reason shows signs of an active vigor, they are when we surmount difficulties or endure labors or pains by mere dint of resolution: yet even here every one's experience may convince him how feebly she acts unless seconded by some powerful motive retained in view, and how carefully she is forced to fortify herself all around with considerations of damage, or shame, or compunction. Nor has she even

this little vigor naturally, but acquires it by inuring the mind by previous discipline to a habit of perseverance ; which when gained, a little time passing in softness and indulgence will divest her of it again. And when with all her care and contrivance she has mustered up a resolution, we know too well how woefully it fails in time of trial, how often it is borne down by the weight of pain or passion, undermined by the working of habit, or surprised by some sudden temptation catching her at unawares.

I have remarked elsewhere that if our imagination were rightly set so as to exhibit no false appearances, and our appetites and desires all turned upon proper objects, we should want nothing else to answer all the purposes of life more effectually and readily than we can do now. On the other hand, if our understandings were so large as to comprise in our respect all the tendencies of things so far as they might affect us, and to see the future in as strong colors as the present, we might serve ourselves of that alone to supply all our occasions. But since we have neither of our faculties perfect, we must employ both in their proper offices to make up for each others deficiency. Man has been incompletely defined a rational animal ; he is rather, to use Mr. Woolaston's words, *sensitivo-rational*, therefore must regard both parts of his constitution ; for one can do nothing without the other, and this would run riot and do worse than nothing without continual direction from that.

6. The contrariety and opposition observable in the mind gave rise, as I have already remarked in my first chapter, to the notion of several Wills within us : for the mind constantly following the direction of her ideas, that state of them immediately preceding her action, we entitle the Will, by a metonyme or sometimes mistake of the cause for the effect. For, if we apprehend every prospect of objects inclining us to act to be really a Will, we shall fall into the absurdity of several Wills, several agents and persons in the same man : whereas it is the same agent, the same power, that acts in all cases, whether we act madly or soberly, whether we deny or indulge our Wills. But, if we take the matter figuratively, this diversity of persons may serve aptly enough to express the disordered condition of human nature, wherein reason and passion perpetually struggle, resist, and control one another. The metaphor employed by Plato, was that of a charioteer driving his pair of horses, by which latter he allegorized the concupiscible and irascible passions : but as we have now-a-days left off driving our own chariots, but keep a coachman to do it for us, I think the mind may be more commodiously compared to a traveller riding a single horse, wherein reason is represented by the

rider, and imagination with all its trains of opinions, appetites and habits, by the beast: Everybody sees the horse does all the work; the strength and speed requisite for performing it are his own; he carries his master along every step of the journey, directs the motion of his own legs in walking, trotting, galloping, or stepping over a rote, makes many by-motions, as whisking the flies with his tail or playing with his bit, all by his own instinct; and if the road lie plain and open without bugbears to affright him or rich pasture on either hand to entice him, he will jog on, although the reins were laid upon his neck, or in a well-acquainted road to take the right turnings of his own accord. Perhaps sometimes he may prove startish or restive, turning out of the way, or running into a pond to drink, maugre all endeavors to prevent him; but this depends greatly upon the discipline he has been used to. The office of the rider lies in putting his horse into the proper road, and the pace most convenient for the present purpose, guiding and conducting him as he goes along, checking him when too forward or spurring him when too tardy, being attentive to his motions, never dropping the whip nor losing the reins, but ready to interpose instantly whenever needful, keeping firm in his seat if the beast behaves unruly, observing what passes in the way, the condition of the ground, and bearings of the country, in order to take directions therefrom for his proceeding. But this is not all he has to do, for there are many things previous to the journey; he must get his tackling in good order, bridle, spurs, and other accoutrements; he must learn to sit well in the saddle, to understand the ways and temper of the beast, get acquainted with the roads, and inure himself by practice to bear long journeys without fatigue or galling; he must provide provender for his horse, and deal it out in proper quantities; for if weak and jadish, or pampered and gamesome, he will not perform the journey well: he must have him well broke, taught all his paces, cured of starting, stumbling, running away, and all skittish or sluggish tricks, trained to answer the bit and be obedient to the word of command. If he can teach him to canter whenever there is a smooth and level turf, and stop when the ground lies rugged, of his own accord, it will contribute to make riding easy and pleasant: he may then enjoy the prospects around, or think of any business without interruption to his progress. As to the choice of a horse, our rider has no concern with that, but must content himself with such as nature and education have put into his hands: but since the spirit of the beast depends much upon the usage given him, every prudent man will endeavor to proportion that spirit to his own strength and skill in horsemanship; and according as he finds

himself a good or bad rider, will wish to have his horse sober or mettlesome. For strong passions work wonders where there is a stronger force of reason to curb them; but where this is weak the appetites must be feeble too, or they will lie under no control.

7. From all that has been said above, as well literally as allegorically, we may learn what the proper business of reason is, namely, to watch over our motions and look out for the proper measures of conduct with as much circumspection as the present circumstances of the case shall permit or require. For this there is little need of instruction, but rather exhortation, to prevail on men to exert their faculty; for everybody knows the difference between considerate and thoughtless behavior. The principal part of her employment lies in storing the mind with solid knowledge, establishing useful rules of conduct, and above all, contracting such habits and desires, as may continually lead the active powers into proper courses. For this last branch is of the most importance, because it fructifies our knowledge by making it practical; nor can any one doubt that the world would receive more improvement by everybody's living up to what they know, than by any increase of their knowledge whatever; and that they do not live up to it, can be owing to nothing else besides bad habits and inordinate desires. But every rule and every desire must have some purpose to drive at, and it becomes reason to examine the propriety of the purpose as well as conduciveness of the measures towards obtaining it: this commonly leads to some further end first recommending that purpose to our choice, and that many times points out another end lying still beyond, and so on without limitation. For the most part we stop at a few general principles which we have found most universally received or esteem valuable in themselves, without knowing or without remembering what first discovered to us their value: and this method may serve well enough for common use. But the studious, in their seasons of leisure and contemplation, endeavor to carry back their researches as far as they can push them, and penetrate quite to the fountain head: but being sensible that reason must come to a stop at last, and arrive at something which had a recommendation prior to any that she could give it, they strive to find out what is that First or Ultimate end; for first and last here are the same thing, which nature has given for our pursuit, and from which reason must deduce all those principles and rules of action she recommends. And as there has been great variance upon this point, it will deserve a particular consideration, for which I shall appropriate the next ensuing chapter.

CHAP. XXVII.

ULTIMATE GOOD.

FOR so I choose to translate the *Summum Bonum* of the ancients, as much and as unsuccessfully sought after as the philosopher's stone, rather than call it the Chief Good, as it is vulgarly termed. For the inquiry was not to ascertain the degrees of goodness in objects, or determine what possessed it in the highest pitch beyond all others; but, since the goodness of things depends upon their serviceableness towards procuring something we want, to discover what was that one thing intrinsically good which contented the mind of itself and rendered all others desirable in proportion as they tended directly or remotely to procure it. Good, says Mr. Locke, is that which produces pleasure, and if we understand it thus strictly, in the true original sense, our inquiry were vain: for then the very expression of good in itself would be absurd, because nothing good could be ultimate, the pleasure it produces lying always beyond. But it is customary to call that good which stands at the very end of our wishes, and contents the mind without reference to anything further: and in this common acceptation the term will be applicable to our present purpose.

2. Upon perusal of the chapter of satisfaction and those of the four classes of motives, whoever shall happen to think they contain a just representation of human nature, need not be long in seeking for this *summum bonum*: for he will perceive it to be none other than pleasure or satisfaction, which is pleasure taken in the largest sense, as comprising every complacency of mind together with the avoidance of pain or uneasiness. Perhaps I shall be charged with reviving the old exploded doctrine of Epicurus upon this article, but I am not ashamed of joining with any man of whatever character in those parts of it, where I think he has truth on his side: though whether I do really agree with him here, is more than I can be sure of, for I find great disputes concerning what he called pleasure. If he confined it to gross sensual delights or imaginations relative thereto, as his adversaries charged him with, and the bulks of his followers seem to have understood him, I cannot consent to shut myself up within such narrow limits: for though these things may afford a genuine satisfaction sometimes and when sparingly used, yet it is to be had more plentifully elsewhere. Therefore, being regardless whether my sentiments tally or no with those of Epicurus, I shall not trouble myself to examine what he really thought, but endeavor as far as I am able to

explain what this satisfaction is, which I suppose the *summum bonum* or ultimate end of action. And this I cannot do better than by referring, as I have done before in the chapter upon that article, to every man's experience of the condition of mind he finds himself in when anything happens to his wish or good liking; when he feels the cool breezes of a summer evening or the comfortable warmth of a winter fire; when he gains possession of something useful or profitable; when he has done anything he can applaud himself for or will redound to his credit with persons he esteems.

3. But to consider satisfaction physically, it is a perception of the mind, residing in her alone, constantly one and the same in kind; how much soever it may vary in degree: for whether a man be pleased with hearing music, seeing prospects, tasting dainties, performing laudable actions, or making agreeable reflections, his complacency and condition of mind will be the same if equal in degree, though coming from different quarters. But this complacency, and indeed every other perception, the mind never has, unless excited in her by some external object striking upon her bodily senses or some idea giving play to her mental organs. We have supposed there may be some certain fibre whose peculiar office it is to affect the mind in this manner, and our organs please or not by their motion according as, in the natural texture or present disposition of our frame, they stand connected with this spring of satisfaction. Whether there really be such a particular spring or no is not very material to know, for if we could ascertain its existence we cannot come at it either with the finger or surgeon's probe so as to set it a working for our entertainment. Since then we cannot touch this spring directly, we must endeavor to convey an impulse to it by those channels that nature has provided us with for the purpose: for common experience testifies that there are a variety of sensations and reflections qualified to excite satisfaction in the mind when we can apply them. But our attention, usually reaching no further than to these causes, for if we can procure them the effect will follow of course, we give the name of pleasure to those sensations and scenes of imagination which touch us in the sensible part: hence pleasure becomes an improper term to express the *summum bonum* by, because objects or ideas that have pleased, may not do so again; therefore if we were to recommend it as the end of action we might be misunderstood, or mislead some unwary person already inclined that way into the pursuit of a wrong object; for pleasure in the vulgar acceptance will not always please. If Epicurus understood it in this sense, I renounce communion with him as a heretic; but if by

pleasure he meant the very complacency of mind generated by agreeable objects of any kind whatever, I cannot refuse him my assistance against all opponents; and the rather for fear this may prove the only point whereon we shall ever have an opportunity of joining forces together.

4. Nor can it be doubted that satisfaction is proposed to our pursuit by nature, when we reflect how universally and perpetually it engages all mankind, how steadily volition follows the prospect of immediate satisfaction, as has been shown in the foregoing inquiry, if one may be said to show a thing that was before sufficiently manifested by Mr. Locke. The man and the child, the civilized and the savage, the learned and the vulgar, the prudent and the giddy, the good and the wicked, constantly pursue whatever appears most satisfactory to them in their present apprehension: and if at any time they forego an immediate pleasure for sake of a distant advantage, it is because they conceive a greater satisfaction in the prospect of that advantage or uneasiness in the thought of missing it. Therefore, those who can content themselves with the enjoyments of to-day without feeling an actual concern for the morrow, will never be moved to action by anything future, how fully soever they acknowledge the expedience of it: and when pain rises so high as that the mind cannot find any contentment under it, it will overpower the best grounded resolutions. Neither is there any more room to doubt of satisfaction being the ultimate end than of its being a natural good, because all other goodness centres in that: the gratifications of pleasure, the rules of prudence and morality, are good, only as they tend by themselves or in their consequences to satisfy the mind: one may give a reason for all other things being good, but for that alone no reason can be given, for experience not reason must recommend it. Why is knowledge good? because it directs us to choose the things that are most useful. Why are useful things good? because they minister to the supply of our wants and desires. Why is this supply good? because it satisfies the mind. Why is satisfaction good? here you must stop, for there lies nothing beyond to furnish materials for an answer: but if anybody denies it, you can only refer him to his own common sense, by asking how he finds himself when in a state of satisfaction or inquietude, and whether of them he would prefer to the other.

In short, the matter seems so clear that one may be thought to trifle in spending so many words to prove it: and after all, what is the upshot of the whole but to show that satisfaction satisfies? a mere identical proposition adding nothing to our knowledge,

but the same as if one should say that plenitude fills, that heat warms, that hardness resists and softness yields to the touch. Yet as trifling as the proposition may appear, Mr. Locke has bestowed a great deal of pains in proving the value and efficacy of satisfaction: nor have there been wanting persons of no small reputation with whom such pains were necessary, who out of their extravagant zeal for virtue denied that all other pleasures conferred anything towards bettering the condition of the mind. Had they pronounced them cloying, unstable, often delusive of the expectation, and productive of greater mischiefs, they had said right and enough to answer their main purpose: but this would not do; they insisted that when we see a man actually pleased with trifles, wanting nothing else, but fully contented with the condition of mind they throw him into, nevertheless he was miserable at the very instant of enjoyment without regard to consequences. What is this but undertaking to prove that satisfaction does not satisfy, which whoever can accomplish may rise to be a Cardinal, for he need not fear being able to demonstrate transubstantiation. Our divines talk more rationally when they admit that the pleasures of sin may satisfy for a moment, but are too dearly bought when purchased with disease, shame, remorse, and an incapacity for higher enjoyments.

5. One remark more concerning the *summum bonum*, viz. that though a noun of the singular number, nevertheless it is one in species only, containing a multitude of individuals. For our perceptions are fleeting and momentary, objects strike successively upon our organs, and ideas rise incessantly in our imagination, which thereby throw the mind into a state of complacency or disquietude, corresponding with the manner of their impulse, which has no duration: therefore satisfaction cannot continue without a continual application of satisfactory causes. This gains another name for the *summum bonum*, and makes us entitle it Happiness, which is the aggregate of satisfactions. For though this term be sometimes applied to the enjoyment of a single moment, and then is synonymous with satisfaction, yet it more generally and properly denotes the surplus of successes a man has met with or may expect over and above his disappointments: if the surplus be anything considerable, we pronounce him happy; if his disquietudes greatly exceed, we style him miserable. Ovid understood it in this sense when he laid down that we can never pronounce a man happy before his death, because the fortune of life being uncertain, whatever enjoyments we see him possessed of we can never be sure they may not be overbalanced by evils to come: and Milton the same, in his apostrophe to our first parents, Sleep

on, blest pair, yet happy if ye seek not other happiness and know to know no more. But sound sleep, being a state of insensibility, is capable neither of satisfaction nor uneasiness: therefore the sleeping pair were happy only in respect to that ample store of unmingled pleasures lying in reserve for them against they awoke,

Thus happiness relates to the whole tenor of our lives, but multitudes of our actions do not reach so far as to affect our condition so long as we have our being: this breaks happiness again into smaller portions corresponding with the length or extent of their influence. It may be all one after dinner whether I eat mutton or chicken, but if one will please me better during the time of eating and the indulgence will do me no harm, why should not I take that I like best? When we lay out a day's diversion by some little excursion abroad, we regard what will entertain us most for the day, notwithstanding some trifling inconveniences of slopy roads or indifferent accommodations at a paltry inn. If we take a house we consider, not what will be the most easy for the first month, but most commodious during the whole lease. And when a father puts his son to school, he might supply him with more enjoyment at home than can be expected during the seven years of schooling; but he considers that learning will enable him to pass his life afterwards more agreeably and usefully. Thus upon several actions proposed to our option, that is always the best which will add most to our happiness as far as its consequences extend.

6. Our satisfactions come sometimes from causes operating of their own accord, as upon change of weather from chill or sultry to moderate, or upon hearing joyful news unexpectedly; but for the most part we must procure them for ourselves by application of the proper means. Now since we are prompted to use our activity by desire, since the good things occurring spontaneously would have been objects of our desire had we known of them beforehand, or our intervention been wanted, therefore may justly be styled desirable; and since desire of itself renders objects satisfactory which would otherwise have been indifferent, therefore it is the first rule of happiness to procure the gratification of our desires; nor shall I scruple to recommend this as the proper business of life. Let every man by my consent study to gratify himself in whatever suits his taste and inclination, for they vary infinitely: one man's meat is another man's poison; what this person likes the next may abhor; what delights at one time may disgust at another; and what entertains when new may grow stale and insipid afterwards. Our appetites and fancies prompt us fast enough to this gratification, to choose objects suited to our particular tastes, and to vary

them as we find our relish change : but the misfortune is that desire often defeats her own purpose, either by mistaking things for satisfactory which are not, as when a child goes to play with the flame of a candle ; or by a more common mistake apprehending gratification to lie in a single point, whereas this, like happiness, consists in the sum aggregate of enjoyments. He that indulges one desire to the crossing of many others, ought no more to be thought pursuing gratification than he can be thought to pursue profit who takes twenty pounds to-day for goods that he might have sold to-morrow for forty : a true lover of money will reject it when offered upon such terms, and a true lover of gratification who knows what he is about will reject it upon the like. Therefore there is no occasion to persuade men out of their senses, and face them down that gratification adds nothing to their satisfaction, no not for a moment : on the contrary, we may exhort them to pursue it as a thing most valuable, and therefore to pursue it in the same manner as they would other valuable things, that is, not to take a little in hand in lieu of more they might have by and by. Any trifle that hits our fancy suffices to content the mind, and if we could enjoy it forever with the same relish, it would answer our whole purpose ; for I know of no weariness, no satiety, no change of taste in the mind ; these all belong to the organs bodily and mental. When a glutton sits down to a well-spread table with a good appetite, if he ever has any, he possesses as much of the summum bonum as can be obtained within the time ; and if he had victuals continually supplied him, a hole in his throat to discharge them as fast as swallowed, and nothing in the world else to do, he might attain it completely : but this cannot be : yet if he can prolong appetite beyond its strength by high sauces, until he has overcharged himself, still I can allow him in a state of enjoyment during the repast, for he has a desire, and he gratifies it. But has he none other desires that will solicit him by and by ? has he not a desire of being free from sickness of stomach, or distemper ; nothing else he wants to do with his money ; no diversion, no business that requires alertness of spirits, no regard for his credit, the good word of his friends, or his own peace of mind ; if he has other desires that must suffer by indulging this one, he is a very bad accountant in the article of gratification. Thus the very interests of our desires sometimes require self-denial, which is recommendable only on that account : nor would I advise a man ever to deny himself, unless in order to please himself better another time.

7. Since then our desires mislead us so grossly, sometimes mistaking their own intention, and at other times starving one another, let us have recourse to reason to moderate between them,

and to remedy the inconvenience they would bring upon us: and this, upon observing the opposition among them, will quickly discover that there are two ways of attaining gratification, one by procuring the objects we desire, the other by accommodating desire to the objects before us, or most convenient for us upon the whole. Either of these methods would answer our purpose, if we could pursue it effectually: were it possible to command everything with a wish, and supply fuel to our desires as fast as they start up, still varying their objects, as they themselves vary; or could we carry our heart in our hands, moulding it like wax, to the shape of every circumstance occurring, we need never feel a moment's uneasiness. But neither of these is possible: many things that would please us, lie out of our reach, some of them never to be obtained, others only now and then, as opportunity favors, but the greater part of them satiate, before desire abates: on the other hand, there are some natural desires we can never totally eradicate, some necessaries, without which we cannot sustain our bodies in vigor, nor our spirits in alertness, to serve us upon any occasion. Therefore we must drive the nail that will go, use our understandings in surveying the stock of materials for gratification, either generally or at any particular time in our power, and examining the state of our desires, which among them are most attainable, or least contradictory to others, or what we can do towards bending them to the ply most suitable to our convenience.

The former of these methods, that of procuring objects to our fancy, is the most obvious, therefore most commonly practised. We see men run eagerly after whatever their present desire urges them to, in proportion to the strength of their inclination; yet even here they must often call in consideration to their aid. For our pleasures, even those of them which are attainable, do not always hang so close within our reach, as that we can gather them whenever so disposed, but there are many things preparatory to the obtaining them; materials to be provided for supplying them, skill to be learned, dexterity to be acquired for the making and properly applying of that provision. This gives rise to the common rules of prudence, to all arts and sciences, directing or enabling men to make advances in fortune, honor, elegance, or other principal object they have set their hearts upon, and supplying the world with the conveniences and entertainments of life. The preparatories to pleasure, will by translation become themselves objects of desire sufficient to move us, without the reference they bear to their end; and it is necessary they should, or else we must miss of the benefit they will do us. For as a traveller must not keep his thoughts constantly intent upon the place he wishes to

arrive at, if he would make any dispatch in his journey, but having once taken the right road, fixes his eye upon the nearest parts of it as he goes along; so neither can we always contemplate the enjoyments we are providing for ourselves without interrupting our progress. Our capacities are too short to hold the whole line of our pursuit in view, but we must rest upon some part of it most convenient for our present direction: nor indeed could we always see to the end of our line if we were to strain ever so much, therefore must trust to others, or to our own former determination, for an assurance that it will lead us the way we would wish. Thus happiness, although the ultimate end of action, yet is not always, perhaps I might say very seldom, our ultimate point of view: for our road lies through lanes and hedges, or over an uneven, hilly country, where we can see very little way before us: nay, sometimes we must seemingly turn our backs upon it, and take a compass round in the plain beaten track, to avoid impracticable morasses, or other obstacles intervening. Hence we may learn why pleasure is so deceitful a guide to happiness, because it plunges us headlong forward through thick and thin, fixing our eyes upon a single point, and taking them off from the marks leading to that aggregate of satisfactions whereof happiness consists. Wherefore he that resolves to please himself always will scarce ever do so, for by perpetually indulging his desires he will destroy or lose the means of indulging them.

8. For the skill of providing materials to gratify our desires, we must consult common prudence and discretion, or resort to the professors of arts and sciences, containing the several branches of it: but the other method of gratification by managing the mind itself and bringing desire to the most convenient ply, belongs properly to the moralist; whose business lies not so much in informing you how to procure what you want, as how to forbear wanting what you cannot have, or would prove hurtful to you. But want cannot be removed without aid of some other want; for as you can never bring a man to assent to a proposition unless by means of some premises whereto he does already assent, so you can never bring him to any desire, unless by showing the connection it bears with something he already desires. The desire of happiness would suffice for this purpose, if we had it stronger infixed than we find in our breasts: but though all have this desire, so far as that they would be willing enough to receive happiness, if they could get it upon asking for; yet, being an aggregate, and therefore always in part at least distant, they prefer the present gratification of other desires before it. Therefore the moralist will begin with striving to inculcate this desire of

happiness into himself and others as deeply as possible. But since this can hardly ever be done so effectually as one would wish, for we can never raise so vivid an idea of remote objects, as to equal those standing close to us, he will examine all other propensities belonging to us in order to encourage those which are most innocent, most satisfactory, most compatible together, and best promoting his principal aim. These he will endeavor to render habitual, so as that they may start up to the thought uncalled, and gather strength enough to overpower others he wishes to eradicate. As we cannot upon every occasion see to the end of our proceedings, he will establish certain rules to serve as landmarks for guiding us on the way. These rules, when he has leisure and opportunity for mature consideration, he will build on one another, erecting the whole fabric upon the basis of summum bonum before described. But because their reference to the ultimate end cannot be continually kept in mind, he will inure himself and everybody within his reach, by such methods as he shall find feasible, to look upon them as good in themselves, that they may become influencing principles of action. The outer branches of these rules, calculated for ordinary occasions, will of course vary according to those occasions or to the tempers, abilities, situations, and needs of different persons, to particularize all which would be endless and impracticable; but there are a few general rules universally expedient, as being the stem whereout the rest are to grow. The first seems to be that of habituating ourselves to follow the dictates of judgment in preference to any impulse of passion, fancy, or appetite, and forbear whatever our reason disapproves as being wrong: for there is nothing more evident than that the knowledge of right and wrong can do us no benefit while resting in speculation alone and not reduced into practice, which it can never be unless become habitual, and striking with the force of an obligation or an object of desire.

CHAP. XXVIII.

RECTITUDE.

WE hear much of an essential rectitude in certain things, but before we attempt to judge of their essence it will be expedient to settle with ourselves the purport of the word Right, for we shall be likely to reason very indifferently without understanding the terms we employ. Right belongs originally to lines, being

the same as straight in opposition to curve or crooked. Everybody knows a right line is the shortest that can lie between two points so as to touch them both, and the nearest approach from any one to any other given point is along such right line. From hence it has been applied by way of metaphor to rules and actions, which lying in the line of our progress towards any purpose we aim at, if they be wrong they will carry us aside, and we shall either wholly miss of our intent, or must begin again and take a longer compass than necessary to arrive at it : but if they conduct effectually and directly by the nearest way, we pronounce them right. Therefore the very expression of right in itself is absurd, because things are rendered right by their tendency to some end, so that you must take something exterior into the account in order to evidence their rectitude. Rules are termed right upon a supposition of their expedience, and so are actions too for the most part : when a man digs for hidden treasure, we say he has hit upon the right spot if he pitches his spade just over where the treasure lies, though perhaps he did it by guess : but since we are often uncertain of our actions, we apply them to some rule in order to determine their propriety. Hence action has another source of rectitude, namely, its conformity with rule, and consequently may chance to be right or wrong, according to which of the two sources you refer it ; for our rules being generally imperfect or built upon probability, we may act right, that is, conformable to them, and yet take a wrong course with respect to the design we had in view. If you look over the hands at whist, and see the party upon whose side you have betted lead his ace of trumps when the adversary has king alone, you will be apt to cry out Right played ! because it suits your purpose best of anything he could have done ; yet perhaps he might play wrong according to the rules of the game. What if you see him playing on sundays ? you may perceive he plays his cards extremely well, yet if you are a conscientious man you will condemn him for acting wrong : but playing is acting, so then he acts right and wrong at the same instant. What becomes now of the essence of rectitude, when the opposite essence resides in the same subject ? Can the essence of things change without any alteration in themselves, but as they are compared to this or that particular object, or set in various lights ? Besides that actions perfectly innocent, having neither essence regarded nakedly in themselves, may derive it elsewhere : nothing can be more harmless than wagging your finger considered in itself, yet if the finger rest against the trigger of a loaded musket, and a man stand just before, you cannot do a wronger thing, and why ? not because of anything contained in

the essence of the action, but because of the fatal consequences attendant thereupon. Nor are rules less liable to vary their rectitude, which constantly follows expedience and changes with the change of persons or circumstances. Suppose you lay down for a rule, *When you want provisions go to the east*; this may be a very good precept for those who live to the westward of a market-town, but when carried to villages on any other point of the compass loses its essence.

2. It must be owned that this essential and intrinsic rectitude is not attributed to all rules, but to those only supposed invariable and general, not confined to particular cases. I know of none better entitled to this character than that recommended at the close of the foregoing chapter, to follow reason in preference to passion and appetite: yet one may question whether this be in fact perpetual, for what rule is it to a young child not arrived at the use of his understanding, or to a man who has lost it through age or distempers? Or if there were a man whose appetites were so happily turned as to fix always upon things beneficial, our rule would be wrong, because reflection and consideration would retard the speed of appetite and interrupt it in its operations. But this case being never likely to happen upon earth, we will admit the rule to be invariable; still its rectitude flows from the condition of mankind, which may be looked upon as a permanent circumstance attending them through the whole line of their existence. So then all rules whatever, as well general as particular, become right, not from anything essential or in themselves, but from their reference to happiness, and the situation either natural or accidental of the party to be directed by them.

3. Though I said just now that the conformity to rule was a second source of rectitude in actions, yet this conformity does not so much constitute as discover their rectitude. Could we always see the certain consequences of our conduct we should need no rules, for our own sagacity would be a sufficient guide: but since our ultimate end is not perpetually our ultimate point of view, as lying beyond our ken, we want certain marks to direct us in our approach towards it. The rules of life are those marks hung up by observing men for the benefit of themselves and others travelling the road: but nobody supposes a mark to carry any essential intrinsic goodness. Thus rules draw their goodness from the shortness of our views and narrowness of our capacities, and bear a reference not only to the good end whereto they conduce, but likewise to the need we stand under of a conductor. As people make further proficiency in any art or business they employ the fewer rules, and in things quite familiar to them they use none:

like carriers jogging on continually in the same road with whom posts of direction lose their quality and become no direction at all. To tell a man that when he walks he must step one foot first and then the other, were no rule, for he does it of his own accord; but what is, nothing can have no essence and contain nothing.

4. But it may be objected that actions sometimes receive a rectitude from their conformity to rule when they do not answer the purpose intended by them. A good man, failing in the success of his endeavors, will find great consolation in reflecting that he had acted right, that is, had laid his measures justly and executed them punctually. But let us remember that the good man aims at happiness rather than pleasure, that is, at the greater sum of satisfactions preferably to the less, and though he misses his purpose in the present instance by following his rule, yet he shall attain it more completely in other instances by the like adherence. Your gamblers have two sayings current among them, one that the cards will beat anybody, the other that the best player will always come off winner at the year's end. So how much soever fortune may influence our success in the game of life, yet she is not so unequal in her favors but that prudence and steadiness will always succeed in the long run better than folly and inconsiderateness. The consolation under disappointment of measures rightly taken rests upon this bottom, that as acts of conformity to rule strengthen and evince our habit of adherence to regular conduct, the possession of this habit conduces more to our happiness than any little success we might have gained by a lucky misconduct; and we may reasonably esteem ourselves put into a better condition upon the whole by performing those acts of conformity than we should have stood in had we omitted them. Therefore whenever we can discern the inexpediency of our rule, and may depart from it without lessening our own regard for it or those of other people, we always deem this an excepted case: and if it be true, what is commonly held, that there is no rule without exceptions, then there is no rule which may not become wrong in some instance or other.

5. Let us now trace out if we can the origin of those epithets Essential and Intrinsic, and examine how they first came applied to rectitude of rules: for we cannot but suppose there must be some good foundation for the use of terms we see currently used among learned and judicious men. There are some rules which respect the qualities of objects wherewith we have any concern, and of course must vary according as those objects change their position, or others succeed in their room, or as we have or cease

to have a concern with them: these we style occasional, being calculated for particular occasions and relating to the situation wherein we happen to stand. Others take their rise from the make and constitution of man, and therefore cannot change with any change of place or things external, because we can never remove ourselves from ourselves: these are called essential, as being founded on the very essence of human nature. Thus, lay in a stock of coals in summer, is a very proper rule of family economy here in this climate, where the coldness of our winters renders such a provision necessary; but if we were to inhabit the torrid zone, this rule would lose its rectitude. But look before you leap, is a rule calculated upon the observation of human nature, wherein appetite would continually hurry on to mischief if not restrained by consideration: therefore this rule will remain right everywhere and always so long as we continue to be human creatures, that is, sensitive-rational animals. The former I take to be of the occasional kind, and the latter essential: and a very proper distinction it is, as instructing us which to prefer when they happen to come into competition. Nevertheless, the essence belongs, not to the rule, but to the object whereon it is grounded.

6. The idea of right in itself I conceive arose from observing that our rules grow from one another, their rectitude depending upon the rectitude of those whereout they spring; and that some of them may be rendered right or wrong by authority, custom or compact. It was right some years ago to import and wear cambric, but now it would be wrong, because the laws have prohibited it: it was right among our ancestors to appear in public with ruffs, slashed sleeves and high hats, but now wrong, the fashion being altered: it might have been right yesterday for me to have resolved upon taking a long journey of pleasure, but if I have since made a solemn appointment to meet a neighbor here at home, it would be wrong to disappoint him. These things are rendered right or wrong by their conformity or contrariety to the higher rules of obedience to the legislature, of decency and good manners, and of fidelity to our engagements, without which there can be no order nor agreeable converse, nor dependence in the world: but because we do not always discern, or at least not think of their expedience, we entitle them right in themselves; whereas the rules receiving their sanction from them we do not call so because we can see to what they owe their rectitude. This distinction likewise is of great use, because it helps to discover the proper objects of authority, custom, and compact; for what carries a strong intrinsic rectitude they cannot alter: no laws, nor general practice of a country, nor private engagement can make

it right to commit murder. I said a strong intrinsic rectitude, for there are various degrees of it, and rules carrying a higher degree may supersede those of a lower. Surely the rule of self-preservation must be acknowledged right in itself, yet the laws of every country oblige men to neglect this by compelling them into military service, and I never heard such laws absolutely condemned by the speculative as unrighteous. And when intrinsic rules interfere, that ought to carry the preference which conduces most largely to happiness, wherein not only the present expedience is to be considered, but likewise the danger of invalidating a rule and the greater mischiefs that may ensue thereby: which make such cases many times extremely difficult to determine, there being so many distant consequences to be taken into account.

7. Thus I conceive those rules essentially and intrinsically right of whose rectitude we are well satisfied or find no controversy made, although we do not discern from whence that rectitude flowed; and these rules are of signal service for trying others of an inferior kind by an application to them: therefore, I am not for discarding the terms, but giving them their due weight and setting them upon their proper foundation. For some men carry them a great deal too far by supposing them to imply something valuable contained in the exercise of a rule without reference to anything further: as when they place the wisdom of Regulus's choice of a certain and cruel death rather than breaking faith with his enemies, in the sole act of conformity to the rules of fidelity abstracted from consequences. If Regulus did right, it must be not for any value in the naked act, but upon supposition that he acted more for his own happiness in the sequel than he could have done by any breach of faith, for we can hardly think he acted more for his present ease. I know of nothing absolutely good besides satisfaction; but since there are many actions not apparently satisfactory or sometimes the reverse, which yet tend to procure an increase of happiness, rules are the marks directing us to the choice of such actions: and the highest rules are those which answer this purpose most generally and effectually. We meet with persons sometimes who, perceiving a character of rectitude in their rules, will not suffer you to ask why they are right, but stop your mouth with the repetition of a necessary and essential rectitude: such may be very honest and worthy men, and if their principles be good and their practice conformable, they certainly deserve that character; but to talk in this strain upon a serious inquiry or contest with an opponent is talking very unphilosophically. For no rule is right without a reason that renders it so.

not are the clearest of them above examination; nay, an examination now and then is adviseable, they being apt to warp with common use or contract rust and dross with lying by; and if their purity and sterling be doubted of, there is none other so certain way to try them as by the touchstone of expedience.

CHAP. XXIX.

VIRTUE.

VIRTUE has been always esteemed something habitual: our first advances towards it were styled by the ancients an Inchoation of virtue, or as we may call it the embryo or seedling not yet arriv'd to perfection. A drunkard who abstains from liquor once or twice does not instantly commence a sober man, nor do we think him entitled to that appellation until he has so mastered his fondness for tippling that it disturbs him no more. Thus virtue we see is a habit: it remains to fix on some characteristic whereby to distinguish it from other habits. The most obvious definition is that of a habit of acting rightly; but this upon examination will be found much too large, as taking in other things which do not belong to the subject we would define: for though we must acknowledge every act of genuine virtue to be right, yet every right action is not an act of virtue. It is certainly very right to eat when we are hungry, sleep when we are weary, put on boots when we ride a journey, and a great coat when we must walk abroad in the rain: so is the habit of taking things with the right hand rather than the left, speaking when we are spoken to, crying out when somebody treads upon our toe: but these are never looked upon as instances of virtue, nor have they any other concern with her than that she does not disallow them. The next definition occurring is a habit of contradicting any inordinate desire or impulse of passion; but against this there lies two exceptions. One that there are people whose natural temperament or manner of education inclines them to be temperate, chaste, industrious, generous, or obliging, without any efforts of their own: now it would be hard to deny these qualities the title of virtues, and imprudent not to propose them as such to the imitation of other persons. The other that this definition seems not to suit with virtue at all unless in her imperfect embryo state wherein she is not herself: for after the opposite passion being completely mastered, there remains nothing for her to contradict. Can we

suppose then that virtue loses her essence the moment she has gotten it? or were there a man who had conquered all his passions, should we deem him destitute of every virtue because he possesses them all? Let us try then once more and call virtue a habit of pursuing courses contrary to those pernicious ones that passion or appetite generally lead men into: we shall now save the credit of natural good qualities and those imbibed insensibly from custom, together with the benefit of their example to the world, and secure the prize to all who have completed their conquest. Nor shall we contradict the old observation, that the paths of virtue are rugged and thorny at first, but lead in a delightful champaign country: whereas did virtue consist in opposition alone, she could accompany her votary no further than through the thorny paths, but must quit him as soon as the champaign opens. This definition, I believe, contains the idea of virtue most generally entertained, and will serve best for common use: for those courses which virtue would recommend being beneficial, let us encourage the practice of them by any means we can, and bestow our applauses upon them in whatever manner acquired. If a man be affable and courteous, and ready to help his neighbors upon every occasion where wanted, it is all one with respect to the world and to his own pleasure of mind in the exercise of those qualities, whether he had them from nature or good company, or gained them by his own good management and industry. Under this notion of virtue it will appear capable of variation both in kind and degree; for as many evil courses as there are into which men stand liable to be drawn by their passions and desires, there will be so many opposite virtues: and as every habit gathers strength by exercise, it will enable a man more and more to resist temptation in proportion as it strikes deeper root. The man may be sober at home, who cannot forbear excesses among a jovial company: or may have common honesty, though he wants that total exemption from the bias of self-interest which would denominate him strictly righteous.

2. Yet it still remains a question whether we ought to satisfy ourselves, much less can please everybody even with this last definition; for it may be asked, What merit is there in following the bent of inclination or torrent of example when they chance to carry us in a right course? Does not the province of virtue lie solely in controlling the passions and surmounting difficulties? at least, is she not stronger and more conspicuous in the conquest of an adversary than when she has none to contend with? When we see a man bear a slander and reproach with a becoming patience, does it not heighten our opinion of him to hear that he was

of a warm violent temper, bred up in a country remarkable for being choleric and testy? Remember the story of Zopyrus, the physiognomist, who, pretending to know people's characters by their faces, some of Socrates' scholars brought him to their master, whom he had never seen before, and asked him what he thought of that man. Zopyrus after examining his features pronounced him the most debauched, lewd, cross-grained, selfish old fellow he had ever met with; upon which the company burst out a laughing. Hold, says Socrates, do not run down the man; he is in the right, I assure you: for I was all he says of me by nature, and if you think me otherwise now, it must be because I have in some measure corrected my nature by the study and practice of philosophy. Now does not this story manifest a higher pitch of virtue in Socrates than he could have attained had his stars befriended him with the happiest turn of constitution?

To these queries I shall answer, there is a particular species of virtue, which we may call the habit of following the dictates of judgment in preference to the impulse of fancy or appetite, and therefore may well enough fall within our definition, and if it were possible to be attained in full perfection would subdue all other desires, so that it could not then consist in opposition, having none to struggle against. This I acknowledge to be the most excellent of the virtues, as most generally serviceable to influence the practice, and being the root whereout we might raise all the others: for if we had this habit in any considerable degree, it would supply their places and quickly bring us into such of them as were wanting. Therefore when we behold a man persevering in a right course against the bent of nature and stream of example, we know he must have an ample portion of this higher virtue, which redounds more to his honor than any of the inferior kind. But I see no reason why the superior excellence of this virtue should destroy the merit of all the rest. Silver may be worth having though not so valuable as gold: and whatever tends to mend our manners, to the benefit of society, or our own convenience, does not deserve to be despised, though something else may tend more eminently to the same purposes. If a man be made honest by self-interest to preserve his customers, it is better than that he should not be honest at all: if he keep himself sober for his health's sake, still it is a point gained: if he learn activity and perseverance in difficult undertakings from a love of fame, it is likely he will do more good to the world and find more engagement for his time than if he sat still in indolence. Therefore I am for storing up as many of these inferior virtues as possible, by any means we see feasible. As old Gripe said to his

son, my boy, get money ; if you can, honestly ; however, get money : so would I say to anybody that will hear me, Acquire good qualities by your desire of rectitude, if you can ; however, acquire them. Yet notwithstanding what I have been saying here, I think we ought to make the love of rectitude our principal care, to strengthen it as much as in us lies, and keep it in continual exercise by rectifying the frailties of our nature and turning those inclinations that still point towards an improper object.

3. The stoics, as far as I understand of them, would allow none other virtue besides this of rectitude : therefore they held all exercises of virtue and all offences equal and alike, robbing an orchard as criminal as breaking open a house or betraying the most important trust. For they said that right action without regard to consequences being the sole proper object of desire, so that the wise man would not forbear housebreaking out of fear or shame or because it hurt his neighbor or any other consideration, except because it was wrong, every departure from this rule showed a want of such desire or at least an influence of other desires : he that quits his rule of right to steal a cauliflower, shows that he has not an abhorrence of wrong doing purely as such, therefore when he travels the right road it is by accident, and if he abstains from robbing a house, there must be some other motive that withholds him. I think this doctrine of the equality of crimes is now quite out of doors, and therefore we need not trouble ourselves any further about it. But they held some other tenets that we still hear of now and then, as that virtue is good in itself and only desirable, that it is the ultimate good, making the possessor invariably happy : and I think some of them denied that it could be acquired, but must be implanted by nature, or that the party possessing it could ever lose it.

4. As to the unacquirableness of virtue, this somewhat resembles Whitfield's day of grace, which being not yet come or being once past, no man can attain to righteousness. But if we look back upon human nature, there will appear no color to suppose ourselves born with an idea of right or that it ever comes upon us at once. Our senses first put us in action, and upon observing what objects please them we get a desire of those objects : in our further progress we find it often necessary to make long preparation for obtaining the things we desire, but the measures we take sometimes succeeding and sometimes failing, we learn by observation to form rules for our conduct, and thence get the idea of right, by which we understand no more than that such a measure will lead us surely to any purpose we have at present in view : thus if we would obtain the favor of tyrants, obsequiousness and

flattery may be the right way. But this is not rectitude considered as a virtue, which we know nothing of until having experienced that our desires thwart one another, that it is expedient to restrain them, and that the exercise of such restraint in adherence to the dictates of judgment meets with commendation from others and the approbation of our own breast: we then look upon the *Honestum* as a mark directing us to what will conduce most to our happiness, and at length as an object of immediate desire; and when this view appears in the highest pitch of coloring imaginable, and becomes steady so as never to vary nor fade, then, if ever the case happens, I conceive a man completely possessed of the virtue of rectitude. Thus we see the desire of the *Honestum* is a translated desire, drawn originally from our others by a prudent regard for the greater number of them in preference to any particular one that may solicit at present. Nor can it be doubted without contradicting experience, that a man's progress in virtue may be quickened by instruction, exhortation, example, and his own industry, or that after having in some measure attained it he may receive further improvement by the same means. There may be a particular time wherein virtue first manifests herself, and so there is in the manifestation of most other habits and acquisitions. If you converse every day with a man from his beginning to learn any art or language, you will become able in some one moment to pronounce him a master of it: yet for all that, his skill was growing gradually all along from his first entrance upon the rudiments; nor perhaps did he make a larger progress in that day when you took notice of it than in any other before, or than he will do again by further use and practice afterwards. And as we gain habits by use so we may lose them again by disuse: therefore it is a very dangerous position which some have maintained that the saint can never sin; it were much safer to take Saint Paul's caution, Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall.

5. Whether virtue be good in itself may be determined by referring to the last chapter but one, wherein it appears that satisfaction, the only intrinsic good, lies in our perceptions: action is only good as it applies the proper objects for raising those perceptions, and virtue, which is a habit or disposition of mind, is good only as it leads into such actions; so that virtue stands two removes from the *summum bonum*. There are some pleasures fully contenting the mind which come upon us by the operation of external objects without any care of our own to procure them: if we could have a continual and uninterrupted supply in this manner we should have no use for volition at all, and were our appe-

tites so rightly set as to put volition upon everything most beneficial for us we should have as little use for virtue, which is good for nothing else but to rectify the disorders of our nature ; but that is enough to make its value inestimable though not intrinsic. But it will be said, there is a satisfaction in the very exercise of virtuous actions : this I grant ; but then it must be to those who have a taste for virtue ; and there is the like satisfaction in gratifying every other taste. The virtuoso finds it when catching a curious butterfly, the proud finds it when flattery soothes his ear, the covetous when driving an advantageous bargain, the vindictive when taking measures to satiate his revenge. Perhaps you will say there is a secret misgiving and compunction attending the performance of unwarrantable actions : I believe there would be in you or me, because I hope we have some seeds of virtue in us ; but the consummate villain, who has none of these, feels no remorse to embitter, no reluctance to lessen, the pleasure of any wickedness his vicious inclinations prompt him to ; so then in this respect he has the advantage of us. But it is the fairest way to compare both parties in those instances wherein they gratify their respective desires. If you and I can at any time command our passion by the authority of reason, as I hope we sometimes do, we find an immediate content and complacency of mind : if the hardened wretch goes on successfully in any wicked attempt he has set his heart upon, he finds an immediate content and complacency of mind ; therefore thus far the case of both is similar. You will ask whether, if the thing could be done with a fillip, I would be content to change my situation with his? By no means, for it is in my power to act right always, unless where my judgment happens to be doubtful ; but it is in my power to gratify my other inclinations only now and then as opportunity favors. When I act right I am providing for my future enjoyments ; when I act wrong I am doing something that will cross my other desires or bring mischief upon me. If I take one course I shall find frequent occasion to reflect with pleasure on having pursued it ; if the other, I shall find perpetual cause, if not to repent, at least to rue sufficiently for my misconduct. Thus the advantage of virtue over vice and trifle does not lie in the very act, but in the consequences. The pursuit of either will please each man in proportion as he has a relish to it : but one relish prompts to take in wholesome food, the other to that which will bring on sickness of stomach, painful distempers, and perhaps utter destruction.

6. Were virtue the ultimate and only desirable good, she would have nothing else to do besides contemplating her own beauties : she could never urge to action ; because action must proceed upon

a view to some end, and if that end were not desirable the action were nugatory; but such contemplation is so far from being our only good, that one may question whether it be a good at all. If grant the satisfaction felt in acting right makes one considerable part of virtue's value, but then it must be such as arises spontaneously, not forced upon the thought. Should a man do nothing all day long but reflect with himself; How I love rectitude! how happy am I in the possession of virtue! you would hardly think the better of his character for this practice. Such contemplations as these, I fast thrice a week, I pay tythe of mint, annise, and cummin, I give alms of all I possess, are more likely to engender spiritual pride and bring unischief upon a man than to prove his virtue or ensure his happiness. Besides, the confining virtue to the satisfaction of possessing her, destroys her very essence, which consists in the efficacy she has to set us upon exerting our active powers, which cannot move without an aim at something better to be had than gone without: and when the good man enters upon an undertaking, though the satisfaction of doing right might urge him to resolve upon it, yet our capacities are too narrow to admit of his carrying this reflection throughout! when he comes to the performance he will be too busy in pursuing his measures to think of anything else; but must fix his desire from time to time upon the several objects as he goes along. He reaps none other benefit from the rectitude of his design, during his engagement in the execution of it, than that his conscience does not check, nor his moral sense disturb him, which is a mere negative benefit. Nor would virtue find materials to work upon if she could find nothing else desirable besides herself; she does not make her objects desirable, but chooses those already made so to her hands, whose prior value recommends them to her option: were there no difference what befalls us, it were wholly indifferent what we did, for every manner of acting and even total inactivity would become equally right. Where would be the difference between setting a man's house on fire, and running in to extinguish the flames? or why does virtue urge you to the latter, unless because you think the security of a family, and preservation of their property desirable things? If you know them to be virtuous persons, I suppose you would not be the less forward to assist them: but why may you desire to do what virtuous persons ought not to desire should be done? and if they may desire to have it done, the desirableness has no relation to their virtue, which would continue the same whether burnt out of house and home or no, nor would suffer diminution though they were to perish in the flames, but must arise upon some other account. I would not willingly drop a word to

abate our love of virtue, for I think it cannot glow too strong, so long as we preserve it pure and genuine : but you know I have distinguished between love and fondness. Let us not then be so fondly enamored with our mistress as to allow nothing valuable elsewhere, for there are other objects desirable previous to her recommending them : nay, she herself would never have become desirable had it not been for them ; for why should I ever desire to do right, or whence come by a satisfaction in so doing, unless from a persuasion that it is better for me, that is, productive of more good, to act right than wrong ?

7. We will now examine whether virtue will make the possessor completely and invariably happy ; or, in modern language, whether of the two kinds of evil, physical and moral, the latter alone be really such, and the former only in imagination. For my part, I can see none original evil, besides the physical ; were there none of that in nature there could be no such thing as moral evil, for we could never do amiss if no hurt could ever redound from our actions, either to ourselves or anybody else. Could you steal a man's goods without endamaging his property, without depriving him of something useful, without taking off the restraint of honesty from your own mind, or shaking the authority of those rules which keep the world from disorder and confusion, why need you scruple to do it ? Were it possible to murder a man without pain, without abridging him of the enjoyments he might expect in life, or might assist in procuring for other people, and without setting an example that might occasion the murdering of others not so circumstanced, where would be the immorality of the deed ? But since these are wild and impossible suppositions, and that moral evil constantly leads some way or other, directly or remotely, into physical, therefore it is an evil most strenuously to be avoided.

8. The question we are now upon commonly produces another, namely, whether pain be an evil, or only rendered so by opinion : because it being never pretended that virtue would exempt a man from all pain, while this remained an evil, she could not perform her engagement to ensure him perpetual happiness. In the first place, let us observe that pain appears an evil to young children, before they can be supposed to have contracted any erroneous opinion, so there remains no doubt of its being sometimes an evil not of our own making ; and if we may afterwards render it harmless, merely by thinking it so, then it will follow that we can change the nature of things by our opinion of them, which surely no philosopher will assert. The truth seems to be, that we may sometimes help ourselves against the pungen-

cy of pain, not by pulling out its sting, but by turning it aside from us. It was observed at the close of the chapter of sensation, that our frame is of a very complicated texture, the influence of objects passing through many stages before they arrive at the seat of perception, where only they can affect us: now if pain can be stopped in any part of its passage, we shall receive no hurt from it. The mind sits retired in kingly state, nothing external, not even the bodily organs can approach her, but they deliver their message to the mental organs, and if these officers do not transmit it to the royal audience, it is the same as if never delivered. But the mental organs do not stifle messages out of wantonness, they only drop them when engaged by something else picked up in the family: therefore when painful sensations do not gall, it is by means of some other idea occupying our notice, and sheltering us from their sharpness. Certain it is, we can all upon occasion support a small degree of pain without uneasiness: young ladies will bear it for their shape, a beau for the neatness of his foot, a common laborer for his sustenance; sometimes diversion will beguile it, business lull it asleep, fear banish it, revenge despise it, wilfulness, eagerness after pleasure, or the love of rectitude overpower it. In all these cases there is a withdrawing of our notice from the pain, and turning it upon other objects, either by presenting those objects, or by an operation of our own upon the organs, in which latter case, the moment we remit our efforts the pain pinches again. In like manner, affliction may be rendered easy by suggesting topics of consolation, or encouragements for enduring it, or diverting the thoughts into another channel. But it does not prove a burden not galling in its own nature, because you can shrink away your shoulder from it, or thrust in something soft between: and while you can thus keep off the pressure of the burden, it is no wonder you are of opinion it is easy. Therefore we may admit it true that pain is no evil to those who do not think it so, because they think it none who do not feel the smart: but opinion must follow fact, and cannot make it; nor can you alter your opinion, without an appearance at least, of evidence, but merely by willing it. However, it may be of excellent service to entertain a good opinion, if you can, beforehand, for nothing like a strong assurance to help us in exerting our strength for applying the proper means to relieve ourselves: when Virgil said of his competitors for the naval prize, that they could because they thought they could, he did not mean that success was nothing more than opinion, but that their confidence spurred up their activity to a higher pitch than they could ever have raised it without. If any man can attain so

ardent a desire of rectitude as shall overbalance all attacks of pain, it is happy for him ; but he may allow us, who have not such an effectual remedy in store, to call it an evil : and if he can master it so far as to keep it from stinging him, yet I suppose it will require his whole efforts, so that he will have none to spare for other occasions wherein he would wish to employ them, and in this light it deserves some bad appellation, let him choose his term to express it by.

9. The desire of rectitude, like other translated desires, cannot subsist without continual exercise in actions tending to the gratification of it : therefore virtue alone, how completely soever possessed, cannot insure happiness, as being unable to insure its own continuance without the concurrence of fortune supplying opportunities of exerting it, which are the food necessary for keeping it alive and vigorous. This probably induced some of the most extravagant zealots for virtue to maintain the lawfulness of suicide, when fortune was so averse that there was no sustenance for virtue to be had. And even in its most flourishing state, it gives more or less delight in proportion as things fall out well or ill : for how much soever the virtuous man may comfort himself under disappointment of his endeavors to serve his neighbor with the reflection that he has done his best, yet I suppose he would have been still better pleased had the success answered his intention : and if he sees a distress he knows not how to relieve, will he not feel an additional joy upon the proper means being put into his hands ? Could he say to any one imploring his assistance, Look ye, friend, I'll do my best to serve you, because it is right, but I do not care two-pence whether you reap any benefit from my services or no : were he capable of saying this, it is hard to conceive how he could have any spice of benevolence, and as hard to conceive, how without benevolence his virtue could be complete. So that were there two persons alike consummately virtuous, the one destitute of all materials or abilities for doing good to mankind, the other amply provided with both, this latter would pass his life more happily than the former. Besides, as we have remarked before, there are many right actions requisite for the sustenance and support of nature whereto we are prompted by appetite ; in these virtue has no concern unless negatively to forbear restraining us from them : if the moral sense does not check, if the demon does not warn, this is all that appetite desires, for she wants no assistant nor conductor ; and he must be of an uncommon make, different from all other men, who will never eat when hungry, nor lie down when sleepy, until urged by the motive of its being right.

Now, during the performance of these actions, the virtuous man must be happy, or else he would have gaps in his happiness, which it would be woful heresy to allow; but during such performance, he receives no benefit from his virtue, her influence being suspended, for he does the same and feels the same as the sensualist: therefore he is beholden in part at least to nature for his happiness in giving him appetites, the sources of these enjoyments, and to fortune for supplying him with materials for satisfying his appetites.

10. But how mighty matters soever may be justly ascribed to perfect virtue in the highest idea we can form of it in speculation, I fear such perfection is not attainable among the sons of men: the highest pitch we can rise to will not set us above all approach of evil; pain will gall, labor will fatigue, disappointment will vex, affliction will torment, when they cannot overcome us; so that we owe more of our enjoyment to nature and fortune than to virtue. There are people with a very moderate portion of virtue, no more than just to keep clear of turbulent passions and destructive vices, who, being placed in an easy situation of life, pass it more agreeably than others of far superior merit, forced to struggle perpetually with disease, poverty, contradiction, and distress. Much less will it appear upon an impartial survey, that every man's share of enjoyment in the world bears an exact proportion to the measure of his virtue. Nor yet do the strongest instances of virtue prove always the scenes of greatest enjoyment: for we must remember that uneasiness sets our activity at work as well as satisfaction, and the love of right sometimes operates by the uneasiness of departing from it. If we have desires which we cannot banish from our thoughts, urging us strongly to do wrong, but the moral sense threatens with shame, remorse and mischief, it acts as an obligation, laying us under a necessity of fulfilling it: and we have shown in the proper place that necessity always throws the mind into a state of uneasiness. For aught I know, this might be the case of Regulus. I would not detract from his merit, nor pretend to dive into the exact situation of his thoughts; therefore shall suppose what I conceive possible in theory, that he might feel so strong a satisfaction of mind as overbalanced the pain of the tenters. But suppose another person not quite so happily disposed, yet he might have a violent abhorrence of infamy, self-reproach, and breach of faith, and the uneasiness of falling under what his soul abhorred, might prevail upon him to undergo any torments for escaping it: he might still expect uneasiness in the tentered cask, nevertheless, might choose it as the lesser evil, and in so doing he would act right, and what all men of honor and probity

would applaud him for ; yet this less evil remains still an evil, and he, while under it, in a state of suffering. Nor is it a just inference, that whatever all wise men approve, and the moral sense clearly recommends, must necessarily be an act of enjoyment ; for wise men and the moral sense regard the whole of things, therefore will recommend a present diminution of happiness, for a greater increase of it to be obtained thereby. We may sometimes fortify ourselves against pain and self-denial by the dread of infamy or compunction, and holding the force of our obligations strongly in view, when we cannot raise an immediate satisfaction in our proceeding : therefore, it is for the interests of virtue that we should, upon occasion, put ourselves into the iron hand of necessity ; she will pinch us sorely while she has us under her clutches, and all that time we shall be very virtuous, and yet very uneasy.

11. Thus we see that virtue cannot secure us uninterrupted enjoyment, for there are other causes contributing to procure it ; but though the condition of men does not always answer to their degree of virtue, yet I conceive every particular man will be more or less happy in proportion as he acts right. Life has been compared to a game, and we know the cards will beat anybody, but he that plays them carefully, will do more with the same cards than another who throws them out at random. The gifts of nature, education, and fortune, are the cards put into our hands : all we have to do, is to manage them well by a steady adherence to our judgment. Therefore virtue, taken in the largest sense, as including every right conduct, as well upon small as great occasions, may well be styled the only thing desirable, as drawing all other good things in our power after it ; for though there be others valuable, yet Seek ye righteousness first, and all these shall be added unto ye. In common language, a thing is called desirable for its consequences ; therefore this, on which all good consequences we can procure depend, may well deserve that epithet : we may have other desires, but they need be only such as arise of their own accord, or the present occasion requires, but upon this alone it behoves us to take pains in fixing our desire, because it will direct us to encourage or restrain our other desires as shall be most for our benefit. And things are said to be good in themselves, when they have a natural tendency to our advantage, without regard to reward or applause, or other adventitious benefits attending them ; so virtue may be termed good in itself, although bringing no honor nor profit, nor anything else we desire, because it will lead us into a right behavior most conducive to purposes we shall hereafter desire, and furnish us with pleasing

reflections that will abundantly repay the trouble we are at in pursuing it. In like manner, Happy, in vulgar acceptation, as when Milton pronounced the sleeping pair happy, does not stand confined to the instant time of speaking, but like an estate which denominates the owner rich, though at present quite low in pocket, it relates to the whole stock of enjoyments belonging to a man. Thus virtue, which we may look upon as an estate, yielding an income of happiness, may well entitle the possessor happy, although the rents may not happen just now to come in : and, as a man, having his all, amounting to a hundred pounds, in his pocket, would be glad to exchange condition with one of large fortune whom he finds at a distance from home without ready money or credit ; so a prudent man, deficient in virtue, would think it a happiness to be placed in the condition of one possessing it in an eminent degree, though at that time not in a state of enjoyment. In the sense herein last described as being the most obvious, one should naturally understand those expressions of virtue, being the one thing desirable, good in itself, and making the possessor invariably happy ; and I believe the persons who first employed them, meant to be so understood, wherein they carry a just and useful meaning. Therefore, I am not desirous of discarding or contradicting them, nor shall I hesitate a moment to agree with Socrates, that it is happier to receive an injury than to do one : but, as some of his followers, ancient and modern, men of deeper thought than judgment, have strained them to an extravagance, I was willing to endeavor restoring them to their proper and genuine signification. This is one of those transmutations spoken of in the introduction, whereby valuable and excellent truths, which have been debased into error and falsehood, may be transmuted back again into their original sterling.

12. I apprehend several advantages accruing from our resting the merit of virtue upon this true and solid basis, its usefulness : for if you talk of an essential and independent goodness, few can discern it ; if you appeal to the judgment of the wise, many think themselves wiser ; if you tell them that every act of virtue affords greater immediate enjoyments than the practice of vice, they will not believe you, nor do I know how they should, as it contradicts their experience ; so you will have your principle to battle for, before you can deduce anything from it. But we proceed upon a postulatium that will readily be granted, for nobody can deny that he had rather have his desires gratified than crossed : we need only exhort men not to forget their absent friends, nor to neglect such desires as they may have at another time, for the sake of one or two at present uppermost in their thoughts : so the door stands

open before us, and we shall be willingly admitted to go on in showing the necessary connection of virtue with gratification. A second benefit of referring virtue to use is, that it helps us to rectify our notions of it, to interpret our rules, and teaches us which of them to prefer when they appear to clash: for our moral sense, though the best guide we have, is not always to be trusted; education, custom, prejudice, and human frailty, will sometimes set it to a wrong point, and when suspicions of this kind arise, there is no surer way of trying the justness of them than by examining whether the courses, we find ourselves prompted to, tend more upon the whole to the increase or diminution of happiness. Many of our rules may be understood variously, but when this is the case, that construction, which appears evidently the most conducive to general convenience, ought to be chosen as the truest: nor is it scarce possible to apply a rule always properly, or know what circumstances require an exception, without understanding the drift and design of it: and when two of them interfere, we can never determine the preference so well as when we can clearly discern which of them it would be most dangerous to break through. For a third advantage of frequently tracing out the good consequences of virtue, we may reckon that it will give us a better liking of her, and greater confidence in the rules she dictates; for by consideration and continual observation of their tendency, we shall often discover an expedience we could not at first descry, and shall more readily entertain an opinion of the like expedience in other cases where we cannot discern it. Whatever practices have the general approbation of mankind or our moral sense urges us earnestly to, though seeming needless or inconvenient in our present apprehension, will then carry a strong presumption, sufficient to persuade us of their being beneficial, and we shall pursue them by desire, not necessity; that is, not as an obligation but as our interest. This seems the readiest way to conduct us to a love of virtue for her own sake, for having once gotten our thorough confidence and esteem, wherever she appears she will become our ultimate point of view, which we shall follow without looking for anything beyond, and this we may do without supposing her the ultimate end of action, for we have seen before that these two are often different.

CHAP. XXX.

PRUDENCE.

I GAVE warning in the introduction, that I might sometimes seem to shake the main pillars of morality, but should never do it, unless when I conceived them slid off their original bases, in order to restore them to a solid and durable foundation. I hope I have not been found failing of my promise; for though in the last preceding chapters, we have appeared sometimes to turn our backs upon rectitude, and take the gratification of every man's tastes and inclinations for our ultimate end, yet, at the close of them, we have left virtue in a recommendable light sufficient to engage the attention of every reasonable person, as being justly entitled to be called good in itself, the one thing desirable, and capable of making the possessor happy, in the proper and genuine meaning of those expressions, when not strained to unwarrantable lengths, but understood as common sense would lead us to understand them. We have likewise endeavored to ascertain the province of virtue, which does not extend to everything right; for our appetites prompt us to many right things, the sensualist doing the same in some instances as the righteous: therefore, the office of virtue lies in watching over their motions and instigating to such right actions, from which our other inclinations would lead us aside. But this description of virtue being thought too general, your ethic writers have distinguished her into four principal branches, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice, which they call cardinal virtues, from a Latin word signifying a hinge, these four being the main hinges whereon all inferior virtues and particular rules of conduct hang. The first of these in order they reckon Prudence, as being the chief, and, in effect, comprehending the other three, which relate to the removing three certain obstacles in our nature most apt to disturb and stop us in the exercise of prudence.

2. Before we enter upon a particular consideration of this cardinal virtue, it will be necessary to observe, that there are two kinds of prudence which may be distinguished, as evils have been, into physical and moral. The former consists in knowing the best measures to be taken upon any occasion, and depends upon sagacity, quickness, and strength of parts, or upon experience, instruction, or the opportunities we have had of advancing our knowledge: this we may reckon a valuable endowment, but can by no means be ranked under any class of virtues, for we find it

conspicuous in persons overwhelmed with vice and debauchery. But moral prudence, with which alone we have concern at present, consists in making the best use of such lights as we have, not in the number or clearness of them ; for virtue lies solely in the right application of our powers, and may reside with those of the narrowest as well as the largest extent. Were a man wholly void of moral prudence, to be invested with it at once in the most eminent degree conceivable, he would not become a whit the more knowing for the acquisition : it is true, at the year's end, he might advance considerably in knowledge, because he would omit no opportunity of improving it, but he would not instantly discern a single truth more than he did before, unless, perhaps, by dispelling the mists of some passion that might just then prevent him from taking notice of what he knew well enough already.

3. If we survey the transactions of mankind, we shall find there is a discretion much more valuable than knowledge, as being more generally serviceable and carrying on the affairs of life more completely and clearer of mistakes. Your men of fine sense, having lost their common sense, get nothing by the exchange : they will work wonders sometimes in matters happening to suit their talents, but know not, or regard not, how to apply nor conduct them, or commit some egregious blunder that overthrows all the good they have done : they perform excellent service under proper direction, but plunge into some quagmire when left to themselves : they can give the best advice to others, but through some whim or oddity let their own affairs run to ruin. On the other hand, we see persons of very moderate capacities, who, by a discreet management of them, pass their life with more comfort to themselves and credit among their neighbors, than others of far superior endowments. They know the extent of their talents, and do not aim at things beyond their reach. They regard the propriety of their design as well as of the measures of executing it ; no less carefully considering what they shall do than how they shall compass it. They attend to all the notices of their judgment, never fondly fixing upon any one point to the overlooking of others. They are ductile and flexible, never striving obstinately against the stream, but ready to seize every light that shall break in upon them, and to lay by their design or change their measures as occasion varies ; yet steady to their purpose, so as not to waver with every sudden start of fancy. Willing to play a small game, rather than stand out, and always making some progress when they cannot run extraordinary lengths : yet not backward to quicken their pace and enlarge their schemes, whenever they find it safe and feasible. Their conduct is uniform and consistent

throughout : if they cannot perform great undertakings, what they do is complete and free from fatal mistakes, one of which may do more mischief than a great deal of sagacity and diligence can afterwards repair.

4. Now this discretion discoverable in the ordinary behavior of some person is not the moral prudence we seek after, yet seems to be the root giving birth to it, and communicates its own complexion and flavor to the fruit : for persons having practised this happy manner of proceeding in the common affairs of life, will follow the same when they come to have an idea of virtue ; they will use their whole understanding, regard all the rules of rectitude, and proceed upon a judicious love, not a fanciful fondness for virtue, regarding all her interests so as to hurt none of them by too eagerly pursuing others. It is a virtue, says Horace, to escape vice, and the first step to wisdom is made by getting clear of folly : and we know where else it is recommended, not to confine our eyes so closely to what things we ought to have done as to overlook what things we ought not to have left undone : therefore they will be more solicitous to avoid acting wrong, than to act remarkably right, nor think that the omission of common duties can be compensated by works of supererogation. I do not say that moral prudence is incompatible with great accomplishments ; on the contrary, it will improve them to the utmost, employ them most usefully in services whereto they are fitted, and appears most conspicuous in the management of them : nevertheless it may subsist without them, or be wanting where they abound, being a distinct quality of itself. It does not always accompany the most glowing zeal, nor give birth to the most shining performances : as Horace says, we may pursue virtue too intensely, that is, when we pursue her with passion, not with judgment. It is not the disquisitions of the closet, excellent discourses, or profound speculations upon the nature of right and wrong, nor yet single acts, how exemplary soever, but the general tenor of a man's conduct that denominates him virtuous. As thought and consideration contribute greatly to increase and clear up the lights of our understanding, one should be apt to imagine, that those who think most carefully upon the subject of righteousness, should be the most righteous persons ; but this is no certain rule ; for men may contemplate forever without making use of their discoveries, which then tend only to enlarge their knowledge ; wherein we have seen virtue does not consist, but employs it only as an instrument for effecting her purposes. And there are persons of lively tempers and little inured to study, who cannot think intensely at all, yet do not want discretion to steer them right in

all the variety and quickness of their motions. In most common instances it is easy to see at a glance what is the best step to be taken, the characters of our duty being printed so large, that he that runs may read them : and if men would use themselves constantly to follow their present judgment, when clear and vivid, they would make greater progress towards rectitude than by any other exercise of their faculties whatsoever.

5. It is not easy to pronounce upon actions, or distinguish precisely, when they proceed from the virtue of prudence, and when not ; for we have seen the rectitude of actions consists either in their conduciveness to the purpose intended, or in their conformity to rule : but men sometimes act very right upon wrong principles, or adhere to their rule, because no temptation starts up in their thought to draw them aside ; in neither of which cases their prudence can be inferred from their acting prudently ; for their taking the right course is luck rather than virtue. Nor are we complete judges even of our own prudence, because having no better method of estimating it than by reflecting back upon our past conduct, we cannot retain in mind the secret motives that may have actuated us, much less tell what unlucky turn of imagination might have led us another way. Therefore, as I said before, we may judge best of ourselves or others from the general tenor of conduct, rather than from any particular parts of it how shining soever. Yet this will not ensure us against mistakes, for our leading principle or ruling passion, as it is called, which gives the general turn to our actions, may have been inculcated by others, or taken up upon hazard, and we been led by good fortune into a right course of behavior, without having ever examined whether it had that tendency, or discerned the reasonableness whereon it was founded.

6. Neither is it an easy matter to settle the exact idea of this cardinal virtue we are speaking of, so that we may know what to look for when we go to pass our judgment. It is not knowledge, nor acuteness of parts, nor clearness of understanding, nor largeness of information, nor goodness of principles instilled ; for it should be something entirely our own : but all these depend upon other causes. It may seem, at first sight, to lie in the exercise of our reasoning faculties, because most of the miscarriages in life proceed from inconsiderateness and hasty determination ; but then it lies as much in quickness of following the lights of reason, whenever they shine out clear : for to stand thinking when we should be acting, or hunt after speculations when something lies ready at hand for us to do, were not much less imprudent than never to think at all. Since, then, it is so difficult to describe, and when

we seem to have laid our finger upon it still it eludes our grasp, let us endeavor to place it in several lights, that one may supply what shall appear wanting in another. I conceive, then, prudence will enable him that has it completely, to keep the mental organs open and watchful, hearing the whispers of the moral sense amid the clamors of passion, and discerning the feeblest glimmerings of reason through the glare of fancy; so that every object in the prospects glancing before him, whether the scene contain more or fewer of them, will be seen in its true shape, and his notice will instantly turn upon that which is most proper. For our doings being all made up of single momentary acts, volition perpetually following the fresh ideas thrown up by imagination, must take their denomination from that of their component parts: therefore if the steps be prudently taken, the whole progress must needs be so too; but if they be not, we may still chance to steer the right course while nothing occurs to mislead us; but our success will be owing to the goodness of our lights rather than to the soundness of our eye. Nor does this vigilance or openness of the mental eye depend wholly upon industry and the intense application of our optics: they help to improve it when deficient, or on the contrary may sometimes do hurt by confining it to one narrow point; but when once acquired, it becomes a habit operating spontaneously, rather using application as an instrument to effect its purposes than wanting it as a spring to put itself in motion. Whoever could attain this habit completely would never act in the dark nor at random; for though his lights might be faint, he would distinguish which of them were the clearest, he would find an opportunity for doing something in every situation of circumstances, and would discern what is feasible as well as what is desirable. It would direct him which of his several faculties to exercise, when to deliberate and when to execute, when to suspend his judgment and when suspension were needless, when to exert resolution and when to comply with the occasion, when to bestir himself and when to receive whatever ideas occur. In short, he would act with the same uniform tenor throughout, as well in trifles as matters of importance, and though he might sometimes take wrong measures through ignorance, his every motion would be right with respect to his degree of knowledge or present information.

7. In another light we may consider prudence as a disposition of mind to regard distant good equally with present pleasure, estimating both according to their real not apparent magnitude: like the skill we have of discerning a grown person twenty yards off to be larger than a child sitting in our lap, although the latter take up more room in our eye. Nature first moves us by sensations

of pleasure or pain : experience soon teaches us that pleasurable sensations will not always come of themselves, but we must do something to make provision for obtaining them ; hence spring our desires and passions. Upon further experience we learn that desire often leads into mischief, this gives rise to the moral sense admonishing to restrain desire when pointed the wrong way : but there being an ease in gratifying and a trouble in crossing it, the contest in these cases lies between expedience and pleasure, and to choose constantly the former is an effect of prudence. For as worldly prudence engages a man upon every occasion to improve his fortune rather than get a little ready-money in hand, so moral prudence will incline him always to prefer that which is best before that which will immediately please his senses or gratify his desire or his indolence.

8. The third light wherein I shall endeavor to place our virtue is that of a readiness in following the dictates of reason : but by reason we must not understand here the act of reasoning ; for that, in many cases, might be imprudent, but those treasures which we have shown elsewhere reason deposits in the storehouse of ideas, that is, such notices occurring from time to time to our judgment as were formerly the produce of careful consideration or have been examined and approved thereby. The bare possession of these treasures renders a man more knowing and many times a more useful member of the community, because the deed does the service, not the internal disposition of the performer ; but it is the readiness in following them instantly upon their appearance that constitutes him a perfectly prudent man. For our active power must take some turn every moment, and if the present judgment does not operate, the turn will be taken imprudently, though no damage may happen to ensue. This readiness depends upon a happy cast of imagination, representing the dictates of reason as satisfactory ; for volition ever moves towards that point where satisfaction appears connected, and is not influenced by a conviction of the understanding until it becomes a persuasion too and an object of desire : therefore prudence is no more than a steady, habitual desire of acting reasonably, generated by a thorough persuasion that in so doing we shall act most for our advantage ; for nothing else can give birth to such a desire, because all desires not natural must derive by translation from those that are.

9. Hence it appears that this cardinal virtue must have had a beginning, owing its rise either to natural constitution inclining some men to be more observant than others, and rendering their imagination more pliable to receive persuasion easier from con-

viction, or to accidents teaching them discretion from their own miscarriages, or to instruction and example. The growth and progress indeed depends chiefly upon our own care and industry, but then we must be prompted to use that care and industry by some consideration already in our thoughts, and the first act of prudence we ever exerted must have had some prior motive exciting us to it, which was suggested by our other desires. Whether, as the nature of man is constituted, it may be lost again when once arrived to perfect stature, we cannot certainly know, having never seen an instance of such perfection among us; yet it seems hard to conceive how the habit of following reason can subsist after reason itself is totally lost and all the characters imprinted by her obliterated by age and distempers: but we find by woful experience, that such degrees of it as man can attain may be lost again by despondency, or uninterrupted prosperity, or too great security, or evil company, or other causes. Nevertheless, it is the most durable possession we can have, as being untouched by many outward accidents that may deprive us of all others, and warning us against the approach of whatever might endanger it: and the most valuable, for though it cannot ensure us perpetual success, it will help us to the greatest measure of all other valuable things in our power to obtain: nay, if we believe Juvenal, we shall find no deity averse if prudence be not wanting.

10. This virtue of prudence constitutes the essence of moral wisdom, of which some in former ages have entertained very absurd and extravagant notions; supposing the wise man beholden to himself alone for his wisdom, placed above the reach of fortune to hurt him, and master of all arts and sciences, from the highest to the lowest, even to the making the clothes upon his back, the shoes upon his feet, and the ring upon his finger: wherein they confounded wisdom with capacity, which are manifestly different, the one consisting in extensiveness of knowledge, the other solely in the due management of such as we have, be it more or be it less. Therefore there may be the greatest folly where there is the most knowledge, and upon that very account; for if two persons take the same improper course together, he will be deemed to act most imprudently who best knew how to have acted right. If a man unacquainted with a wood takes a country fellow for his guide, who knows all the paths and turnings perfectly well, but will needs push on the nearest way through the thickest part until both are entangled in the briars, it is easy to see that the charge of folly lies wholly at the door of the guide, and for this very reason, because he knew better than the other. Besides, by placing wisdom in science, they overthrow the wise man's claim to the

sole merit of it, making it to depend upon the natural endowments of body or mind, and accidental advantages: for, not to mention the necessity of instruction, leisure, and quickness of apprehension, to render knowledge complete, I suppose they would hardly pretend that a man born blind could ever make himself perfect in the art of painting, or science of optics.

11. But neither, when we understand wisdom in the proper and genuine sense, can the possessor claim it as entirely of his own creation, for it grows out of common discretion, being the same quality carried to the greatest length human nature can contain: but this depends upon an observant, though perhaps not always a thoughtful temper, upon good guidance or example, and upon lucky accidents: for men often learn discretion from their own misconduct, when the mischiefs of it happen to be so obvious that they cannot but take notice, and so galling that they cannot fail of remembering them. And he must have an uncommon degree of self-conceit, who can persuade himself that he should have acted with the same discretion he does, had he been born with a dull apprehension, and strong sensations, or bred up among the savages in America. I know some affect to cry up the barbarous nations, as furnishing instances of as great soundness of judgment as is to be met with among the most civilized: I shall not deny that such instances may be found, because having no acquaintance with those nations, I cannot disprove them; but we must remember that discretion proceeds from observance of temper, incidents touching the notice, instruction, or example; and any one of these causes may sometimes operate so favorably, as to supply the place of the others.

Let us now suppose the sage possessed of perfect wisdom, yet is he secure that he shall always retain it? Why yes, it is always in his power to act according to the circumstances of every situation that shall happen. I grant it, but this is no answer to the question, for so it is in the power of the unwise: but our power takes its turn, or in other words, volition is determined, by the motives and ideas present in the thought, and what ideas, or in what color shall be presented, depends upon the state of the mental organs; so that any little change in their texture might destroy the best disposition of mind, or turn it into the worst. Now who can know the whole composition of man so thoroughly, as to pronounce certainly, that no external causes may operate to work a different texture in our organs? It may perhaps be alleged, that the mental organs have a separate mechanism of their own, independent of the bodily, so that though their play may be suspended or varied, according to the different action of the latter,

yet no disease nor accident happening to the grosser parts, nor impulse of outward objects can alter their texture. Whether the case be so in fact, or no, is more than I can tell, but admitting it true, still is the wise man beholden to nature for having framed his composition in two such distinct compartments; and he owes the preservation of his best property to the laws she has kindly provided for securing it against damage from that part of his mechanism which does not lie under his absolute command. Neither is he little beholden to fortune for supplying him with materials and opportunities of exercising his wisdom, which render it more serviceable to others and productive of enjoyment to himself than it could be without those assistances.

12. But whatever condition the consummate wise man may stand in, we who only make distant advances towards his perfection, cannot pretend to self-sufficiency, nor claim the merit of every little success we meet with as all our own: for we find our pittance of virtue improve and kept alive by exercise, but when this exercise is interrupted for want of proper subjects to work upon, or our minds thrown off the hinge by cross accidents, or our discretion beguiled by temptations, we perceive ourselves retarded, if not thrown backward in our progress. Let us then acknowledge our obligation to nature, as well for the good she has already done us, as for the continuance of it by her salutary establishments, and own ourselves dependent upon fortune for the favors we may still hope for at her hands, leaving however, like wise generals, as little to her disposal as possible: and nothing will better put us in a way of being befriended by her when favorable, or shelter us from her attacks when she proves out of humor, than such degree of moral prudence as we are capable of attaining.

CHAP. XXXI.

FORTITUDE.

OF all the obstacles standing in our way, when disposed to act right, none operates so powerfully as fear: other passions beguile or tire us out, but this stops us short in our career; therefore the conquest of this passion has been made one of the cardinal virtues. It is not easy to fix upon a proper definition of this virtue: at first thought one should be apt to call it a habit of fearlessness, but every absence of fear is not courage; for it may proceed from

ignorance of the danger, as when a child goes to play with the muzzle of a loaded musket; or it may arise from an insensibility of temper, for there are people who see their danger, but want feeling enough to be touched by it. Now we must acknowledge this insensibility a very useful quality to the public, for without it, perhaps, we could not properly man our fleets nor recruit our armies: yet is it so far from deserving the name of virtue, that it seems scarce compatible with the principal of them. I mean prudence, which grows out of caution, and ever keeps it in company throughout all her proceedings. Besides that, we find fear a necessary engine to restrain many inordinate desires and unruly passions that would else make strange havoc and disorder in the world: and if the intrepidity of pirates and banditti could be wrested from them, it would be much better both for themselves and all others within their reach.

2. This fearlessness of temper depends upon natural constitution, as much as any quality we can possess; for where the animal system is strong and robust, it is easily acquired, but when the nerves are weak, and extremely sensible, they fall presently into tremors that throw the mind off the hinges and cast a confusion over her. Nor are the changes in our disposition of body without their influence: old age abates the spirit; men have their ebbs and flows of bravery, and some distempers bring a mechanical terror upon the imagination. It has been observed, that courage may be partial, dauntless to some objects, and gone upon the appearance of others. Mr. Addison tells us he knew an officer who could march up to the mouth of a cannon, but affrighted at his own shadow, and unable to bear being left alone in the dark. Such contrariety of character must have been owing to impressions taken in his youth; and indeed courage as well as timorousness may come by sympathy and imitation from the company wherewith men consort: the recruit becomes intrepid by the dauntless looks and discourses of his comrades, and their taunts upon cowardice, he improves better this way, than he could do by all the lectures of philosophy aided by his own utmost industry. Courage, from whatever cause arising, may be ranked under those inferior virtues mentioned at the beginning of CHAP. XXIX. which spring indifferently from nature, education, custom, or our own diligence: nor is it the less intrinsically valuable, because sometimes turned to mischievous purposes, for the best things corrupted become the worst. It gains admiration and applause more than the rest, for fear being the most difficult passion to overcome, therefore the conquest of it deserves to be most honored, because honor, as we have already seen under that article, belongs not

only to things the most useful, but to those where the honor itself will be of the greatest use : as it certainly will here, for nothing carries men so effectually through danger as a quick sense of honor, which therefore has always been looked upon as the necessary qualification and distinguishing characteristic of a soldier. Yet courage, to deserve the name of virtue in any degree, must be habitual, not owing to insensibility ; for the danger must be seen but despised ; nor accidental, or occasioned by the prevalence of any passion. Some folks are mighty valiant in their cups, others in the heat of resentment care not what becomes of themselves so they can but wreak their revenge ; others again, eagerly bent upon some foolish desire, will run any hazards to gratify it : in all these cases their courage is not their own, but cast upon them by another agent working upon their organs, and is rather a mark of stupidity, or weakness of mind, than of bravery.

3. From what has been observed above, we may gather the true notion of fortitude, and having seen what it is not, may more easily discover what it is. The contempt of danger, when owing to the want of apprehension, thoughtlessness, or to some other idea forcibly occupying the thought, carries no merit at all : when the effect of constitution, education, or the desire of applause, has become habitual, it deserves the name of virtue, and our commendation as such : but to entitle it a cardinal virtue, it must be a branch of prudence, which we have seen consists in discerning all the lights of our understanding as they present from time to time before us. Therefore he that possesses fortitude completely, will enjoy a perpetual presence of mind ; nothing will ruffle or discompose him, but he will proceed in an equal tenor, not having his seasons of failing, nor particular objects to start at ; the dread of shame will no more disconcert him than other evils ; he will regard consequences in order to take his measures accordingly, but rest wholly unconcerned at the event ; he will suffer no idea to intrude upon him against his liking, and will have the absolute command of his notice to fix it upon any point he judges proper. Etymologists derive virtue from virility, supposing it to denote a manly strength and vigor of mind : now vigor will naturally exert itself in throwing off everything displeasing or unwelcome ; and as a concern for sinister events, further than requisite in directing us to provide against them, and the dazzle of objects preventing the sight of others that lie before us, are what everybody would wish to avoid, when ideas intrude forcibly upon the mind, it proves her infirmity and inability to resist them. Thus the being master of our thoughts, having the perfect use of our discernment, and all that authority over our mental organs which they are ca-

pable of obeying, constitutes prudence ; and that branch of it relating to terrible ideas is understood by fortitude, which though not the less for being aided by nature, custom or other causes, yet is not complete until it can operate without them.

4. But in order to render this command of our ideas complete, it is necessary that present evils should be no more capable of discomposing us than the apprehension of them at a distance ; for if we can face danger while aloof, but shrink under mischiefs when actually falling upon us, it argues a feebleness of our ideas rather than the strength of our mind. Therefore patience has always been esteemed a species of fortitude, enabling us to bear pain, labor, indignity, affliction, disappointment, and whatever else is irksome to human nature. I will not undertake to determine whether these may be rendered quite harmless, so as not to hurt at all yet if there be any salve to prevent their galling, patience is certainly the thing, which whoever possesses completely, if he cannot escape suffering by them, yet he will be able to divert his thoughts in great measure upon other objects : for he will never be thrown off his basis, nor permit them so to obscure the notices of his judgment, as that he cannot find something proper to be done upon the present occasion, which may in part, at least, engage his attention. Nay, he will very often prevail to fix it wholly upon the measures of his conduct ; in which case, he will relieve himself entirely ; for when we can forbear attending to uneasiness, it vanishes, which made some imagine it lay solely in opinion. When the mind has gotten this habitual command over her motions, she will exercise it, I conceive, for I can do no more than conjecture, with ease, freedom, and readiness, and without variation. But for us learners in the art we must expect to meet many difficulties, which we cannot surmount, nor hope to make any improvement without frequently exerting our utmost resolution : nor should we disdain to avail ourselves of example, company, shame, argumentation, or any other helps that may advance us forward. But to make the most of our resolution, it will be requisite to know the strength of it, that we may not put it upon more than it will perform : because repeated ill success may drive to despair, and damp the spirits instead of raising them. It will be expedient to take all opportunities of increasing what little courage or patience we have, to examine in what particulars we are defective, and what feasible methods we have of remedying that defect, thus keeping our resolution in continual exercise ; for every habit and every power of our nature gathers strength by being exercised. With such good management, and a vigilant but judicious use of the strength we have, we shall be continual.

ly advancing forwards by little and little : and the acquisition of any of those inferior virtues spoken of in § 2, will bring us so much nearer to perfection ; for if it were possible to attain every one, I imagine the aggregate of them all would make that fortitude we are in quest of.

5. Intrepidity in the day of battle, is not the only species of courage, for I suppose many a brave officer might not be able to walk upon a wall like our common bricklayers ; which shows he has not an absolute command over his ideas, since some of them will intrude so far upon his judgment as to make him throw himself down for fear of falling. The art of walking upon walls is scarce necessary for those who do not intend to follow the trade of a bricklayer, for they may find other objects whereon to exercise their resolution to better advantage ; therefore I do not recommend it anybody to learn until he has completed himself in all other branches of knowledge : but I apprehend the ideal sage, having a perfect mastery over his imagination, would upon occasion run along the ridge of a house as securely as he could upon the same tiles ranged along his chamber floor ; and would likewise, where it were necessary, bear any filthy discourse, noisome smell, or nastiness besmearing him, without squeamishness or offence to his delicacy. But besides natural terrors which may seize anybody upon first trial, before they have hardened themselves by custom, there are others which gather like rust upon the imaginations of particular people, making them distrust their own senses, and afraid that some sudden impulse should drive them upon extravagant actions, though they have never yet done any such, and have the strongest intention to avoid them. I know a very sensible man, who once scrupled to take a bank note into his hand for fear he should throw it into the fire : another unwilling to go near a precipice, lest he should have an inclination to throw himself down. I have heard of a lady that terrified herself when going a visiting, with a notion that she might tumble down on entering the room, or say something very rude ; and I myself when a boy, having occasion to retire to some private corner, have been sometimes grievously disturbed, lest I should be still in a room full of company, and only fancied I had left them. I am apt to suspect there are more of these whimsies in the world than one hears of, for people are shy of betraying their foibles, and it is but by chance after being very intimate, that one gets any such confession out of them. These little distempers of mind may proceed from too great intenseness of thought ; for as hard labor brings a trembling and weakness upon the nerves until refreshed by rest, so the organs of attention being overstrained, become un-

able to resist whatever fancies start up in its way, and I believe your hard students if they take notice will find more of this disturbance after a series of close application, or having been much alone than at other times: but if it be thought that ladies and children cannot be supposed to hurt themselves this way, let it be remembered that they too sometimes puzzle their brains as much, though not upon the same subjects nor in the same manner as great scholars. The like effect may spring from a custom of making uncommon suppositions, which the studious sometimes necessarily and sometimes needlessly give in to, or the habit of building castles in the air, that others often divert themselves with: for, by these practices, we teach imagination to paint her figures as strong as the real objects exhibited to us by nature. Another source of the same stream may rise upon taking too much of the pillow, for sleep protracted longer than necessary will not be sound; but in dreams, volition remains inactive, all being carried on by the spontaneous workings of our organs, which having thereby gotten a habit of moving themselves, will afterwards throw up dreaming thoughts amongst our waking ones so strongly, that we shall scarce be able to know them asunder. I would recommend it to persons laboring under this infirmity, to observe whether they do not find it trouble them less upon those days wherein they happen to have risen early. I do not know that the believers in a free will of indifferency are more subject to these fantastical disturbances than other folks, yet one may well wonder why they should not, for upon their principles the danger would be real, not fantastical: because what avails it to have our senses, our judgment, and discretion, if, by our elective power, we may annex the idea of Best to whatever they warn us most clearly against? How can we depend upon our subsequent behavior corresponding with our precedent, if volition be determined by nothing antecedent, nothing exterior to the will itself? In short, take away the influence of motives, and all before us becomes contingent, doubtful and hazardous.

But whatever causes give rise to such apprehensions, they certainly indicate an impotence of mind, that has not a command over her ideas, nor can turn her notice upon any spot she pleases in the scenes of her imagination. One cannot expect a remedy in this case so much from reason as resolution, or rather care and vigilance; for authority grows by custom, and every power gathers strength from exercise: therefore it is expedient to accustom ourselves to choose out of the ideas before us for our inspection, to thrust away those that would intrude upon our notice, and to discern the degree of evidence sufficient to work assurance.

It has been made appear in CHAP. XI. that absolute mathematical certainty was not made for man ; therefore whoever looks always for that, must hang in perpetual doubt and obscurity.

6. There is likewise a courage of assenting, as well as acting ; for it cannot be denied that men may cramp themselves in their deliberations for fear of discovering a fallacy in something whereof they have conceived a favorable prejudice : and certainly, without a freedom of thought, there is very little advance to be made in our researches after truth. But then it ought not to be forgotten that there is a difference between courage and rashness, between freedom and change of servitude : for if we run deeper into one prejudice by flying eagerly from another, we shall not much enlarge our liberty. Therefore, it behoves us to join caution to our bravery, without which it will not be genuine ; to look around us, observing every quarter from whence an undue influence may fall upon us ; to examine all sides calmly and impartially, and give a just weight to the presumption that our prejudice may have been founded upon solid reasons formerly discerned by ourselves or others, though we cannot now recover them.

7. Neither is patience confined solely to the endurance of pains and labors ; those whose situation exempts them from such trials, may yet find subjects whereon to exercise this branch of fortitude. There is nobody but meets with disappointments, cross accidents, contradictions and interruptions, as well in business as diversion ; and if we could bear these without ruffling, it would certainly be gaining a valuable point. For my part, I often envy the patience of hackney coachmen sitting whole hours in all weathers upon their boxes, tradesmen waiting behind their counters, and servants attending in anti-chambers liable to be called upon any trifling errand at every touch of the bell : were I in their situation, restrained from employing myself as I liked, and unable to enter upon a train of thought, because expecting every instant to have it broken, I should be miserable : but though I would not choose to pass my time in idleness, I should be glad to bear it when forced upon me unavoidably. While I am poring with the microscope upon objects lying within the light of nature, if a billet rolls off the hearth, or my servant comes in abruptly with a message, I cannot help fretting and vexing a little inwardly : this I acknowledge to be a failing, and would wish to receive all events with tranquillity and evenness of temper, pursuing my little engagements without anxiety, and breaking them off without discomposure. For virtue is valuable all over ; if we cannot obtain large portions of her, yet every little scrap will repay the trouble of acquiring, as containing a source of enjoyment, and adding something to our estate in the fund of happiness.

CHAP. XXXII.

TEMPERANCE.

THERE have been heroes intrepid in dangers and indefatigable in labors, despising death, wounds, and hardships, who yet have been shamefully overcome by luxury and all kinds of wanton desires, made slaves to popular applause, or to some favorite mistress. For besides the dread of approaching, or pressure of present evil, there is another obstacle against the influence of reason by the allurements of pleasure, either in prospect or fruition; and it no less requires an exertion of vigor in the mind to secure her against being drawn off her basis by the one than driven by the other. Therefore the habit of resisting pleasure and controlling desire has been justly reckoned a cardinal virtue, called by the name of Temperance. Nor does it less deserve a title to one of the four principal places than fortitude, as being more generally useful for all ranks and conditions of people and more difficult to be attained completely. For many persons are not in a situation exposing them to much danger or labor, nor of a constitution subjecting them to acute or frequent pains, and so may pass through life well enough, although somewhat deficient in courage or patience: but there is no man without desires, and no man whom they will not lead astray from the paths of reason if he has not power to restrain them. Nor perhaps is it harder to subdue terror effectually than pleasure: the one requires a stronger resolution, the other a more constant vigilance. Pain and danger assault us rarely; their attacks are furious but generally short; if you can sustain the first onset, the business is done; or should they renew the charge, they will do it feebler after every repulse, until at length they cease to be formidable: but desire brings a numerous host into the field; put one enemy to flight and another presently succeeds in his place; if they cannot master you by force, they will weary you down by importunity; if they find you invulnerable in front, they will detach a regiment of secret motives to take you in rear, so that you may be brought to the ground without knowing from what quarter the blow came. Therefore you must continually keep upon your guard and bestir yourself without respite, which demands a larger fund of vigor to perform than any sudden starts of resolution, as it shows more robustness to carry a weight for miles than to pull out a wedge at a jerk. Besides that intestine enemies are always accounted the most dangerous, and though pleasure sometimes allures with outward

objects, it oftener tempts by desires that have found harbor in the breast : and the most judicious persons have always esteemed the conquest of oneself the most important and most glorious of victories, which a man may most justly applaud himself for, however the world may think otherwise.

2. According to my notions of temperance, it is not confined to restraining the solicitations of appetite or what is usually called pleasure, but extends to habit, passion, humor, and whatever else would entice us away from following our judgment : therefore covetousness, ambition, resentment, extravagant joy, sanguine hope, thirst of knowledge, and even zeal for virtue, when not conducted by reason, are species of intemperance, as well as luxury, debauchery, and indolence. Pleasure is most dangerous in the season of youth, when the organs are vigorous, sensations strong, and every allurements presents with the charm of novelty : in our riper years there is generally some ruling passion, either of advancement in honor or fortune, increase of knowledge, or other particular aim, that captivates the mind, and instead of obeying the command of reason presses it into its service : and the intemperance of old age shows itself in an attachment to our own ways and humors upon the most trifling occasions. But education, custom and constitution, raise a different set of ideas in each man ; therefore it behoves him to examine his condition of mind, and set himself most carefully to guard that quarter where he perceives the greatest danger threaten.

3. As desire not only entices by the delight promised upon gratification, but when opposed often degenerates into want, which arrives by the uneasiness of missing the thing desired, therefore temperance must call in patience as an auxiliary to assist her ; and we find the uneasiness arising upon a delay of desire vulgarly styled impatience. He that cannot forbear hankering after pleasure lost, nor support the trouble any little importunate habit may give him, will make no progress towards mastering them ; for whatever ground he may have gained by repelling the first attack, he will lose it all again upon the second. And sometimes, I believe, men give way for fear of this uneasiness, when it might not have proved insupportable ; so that a little courage and confidence in our strength is very helpful upon these occasions.

4. Of all the propensities that take us at unawares none are more dangerous than indolence and pride, or vanity, because none are more universal, and none more sly in making their approaches covertly : a man can hardly fall into excesses of debauchery without being sensible of them ; but he may be vain or idle without ever knowing that he is so. Laziness seems

to be the very opposite to virtue ; for as this consists in exerting the vigor of the mind to discern the lights of our judgment when overshadowed by other ideas, he that could keep this vigor perpetually alert, would never fall into any error of conduct. But there is a love of ease in us all, that makes people often bestir themselves prodigiously in the prosecution of some fond desire, rather than be at the pains of overcoming it, and gives birth to the violence and impatience of passion, which wants to have the purpose aimed at by it presently attained that the business may be over. And, perhaps, laziness may lie at the bottom of all pride and vanity ; for there is much less trouble in persuading ourselves we possess accomplishments we have not, in contemplating those we have or displaying them to public view, than in improving them, or acquiring new ones. He that is always diligent in advancing forwards, will scarce have time for more than a transient look now and then upon the progress he has made, much less will he stand pointing out the length of it to every passenger he sees in the way. But vanity is so deeply rooted in us by education, by example and sympathy, and assails on so many quarters, that no wonder we can never guard against it effectually : we are taught to judge of ourselves and our possessions of any kind by comparison with others, to despise or overlook what we have not, and value ourselves upon any trifle peculiarly our own. The Spectator tells us of a young lady whom he found one day hold up her head higher than ordinary, and wondering what could be the occasion, her sister whispered him that she had got on a new pair of silk garters. One would think virtue should secure a man most effectually against all vain imaginations ; but there is a pride of thinking oneself and a vanity of appearing virtuous : nay, some have been proud of their humility and contempt of pride, as witness Diogenes, when he trampled upon the fine tapestry brought by Plato from the court of Sicily. But until a man can discover all the secret recesses of his heart, and restrain his fondness for contemplating or displaying any supposed perfection, he will not have attained completely the virtue of temperance.

5. Nor is moderation less necessary than courage to insure a true liberty of thought. Men esteem themselves free-thinkers because they can think anything, but I do not hold them really such unless they can likewise forbear to think anything. It has been often observed there is a certain enthusiasm in poetry, and perhaps there is a degree of it though not so much observed in argumentation and most prose compositions. The neat structure of an hypothesis, the shrewdness of a discovery, the acuteness of an observation, the charm of novelty or pleasure of overthrowing a

vulgar error, will sometimes transport men beyond themselves : one sparkling thought will eclipse all others their judgment presents, and a secret inclination cast a glare of evidence upon any notion that favors it. There are other restraints upon our freedom besides pusillanimity, and in order to think perfectly free we must learn to think soberly as well as boldly ; for courage and caution, like two antagonist muscles, serve to keep one another from drawing the mind awry : if either of them have lost its tone, the party may be said to labor under a paralytic disorder.

6. Some seasonable austerity and self-denial will be found expedient or rather necessary for us all to practise : for we have not such strength of mind as to surmount all opposition, therefore must endeavor to weaken the enemy by entering the lists against him as often as we can do it safely, and by so doing we shall add vigor to our own resolution, which always gathers strength by exercise. This consideration will engage us sometimes to deny innocent desires, that we may have it in our power to restrain them when hurtful. For the same reason we ought to keep a guard upon our thoughts as well as upon our actions : for there is an intemperance of imagination that engages men to dwell upon fantastical scenes of power, or gain, or revenge, or unwarrantable pleasures, under a notion of their being harmless, because they do not immediately break forth into act. But, when we reflect upon what has been shown before in the course of these inquiries, how great a sway imagination has, in shaping our behavior, it will appear extremely dangerous to let that take a wrong turn : for it may steal upon us insensibly, and give a wrong turn to our conduct when we are not aware ; at least, it will abate our relish for other employments wherein we might spend our time to better advantage.

7. But self-denial is an evil considered in itself, wherefore, those are not to be heeded who would persuade us into a life of austerities without regard to any good purposes to be effected thereby : for happiness, that is, content and solace of mind, is our proper aim, nor does present enjoyment ever deserve to be rejected, unless for the sake of some greater enjoyment to be had in exchange for it. There is no good merely in crossing and afflicting ourselves ; but self-denial becomes recommendable, for the ease it will procure us, by breaking the force of those desires that would interrupt and tease and torment us perpetually with their importunities. Our business is not to extinguish desire, without which there could be no pleasure in life, no choice among objects before us, nor glee in anything we undertake, but to prevent it from being troublesome : and while we have unruly desires be-

longing to us, it is necessary to travel the rugged road of self-denial in our progress towards the wise man's tranquillity. For I conceive the consummate sage, if there were such a one upon earth, would never practise self-denial, because he would not have an opportunity, his desires lying under such control as never to raise an opposition for him to struggle against: not that he would be without desires; on the contrary, I imagine he would abound in them more than we do, receiving delight from them in many things we should count insipid; but they would hang so loose about him, as to let go their hold the instant an object appeared improper or unattainable, to leave no secret hankering behind nor ever degenerate into want like the sheep, who they say is never thirsty, unless when he sees water; so his appetites would prove sources of pleasure to him, but none of pain. And why should we think such a disposition of mind impossible when there is scarce any of us, who do not possess it in some little degree? We can sit down with desire to a party at cards when proposed, or content ourselves without it, if not agreed to: we may eat fruit with good appetite in summer, and take pains in planting trees to procure it, without wanting it in winter: we can bestir ourselves lustily in forwarding schemes of hunting, or bowling, or dancing, or other diversion, when they fall in our way, and rest fully contented with our situation when they do not. So that we have nothing to do, but improve a faculty we already possess, and extend our authority gradually to all our other propensities, whether of profit, or honor, or building, or equipage, or curiosity, or knowledge, or whatever else would raise an intemperance of desire. The secret of happiness lies in having a multitude of engagements fitted for every occasion that can happen, so that some or other of them may constantly give us an appetite for employment, but none that shall disturb us when we judge it necessary or proper to break them off.

8. As self-denial helps to bring desire under control, so indulgence must needs have a contrary effect, adding vigor to the adversary and enfeebling ourselves: it is throwing the reins upon the horse's neck, which will quickly make him grow unmanageable. Wherefore, it behoves us to be cautious of our most innocent desires, lest by indulging, we render them habitual, and instead of inviting, which is their proper office, they will drag us forcibly along: nor shall we ever recover our liberty, without a more painful self-denial than had been otherwise needful. Nor do intense pleasures deserve the value too commonly set upon them; it may be a man's misfortune to have been too highly delighted, for it will often destroy the relish of his common enjoyments, or

fix so strong an impression upon the fancy, as shall obliterate all other ideas, and make him perpetually restless for a repetition: so that whoever seeks to be highly pleased, runs a hazard of being seldom pleased, and passing the greatest part of his time in disquietude and impatience. Many persons, especially young folks, make pleasure their sole aim whenever they can get the command of their time, in those intervals when the restraints of their superiors are withdrawn, imagining they shall enjoy the more by how much the more assiduously they pursue it: but this is a fallacious way of reckoning, for pleasure is an errant coquet, flying those who court her most servilely, and showing herself most gracious to those who bear the greatest indifference towards her. She makes forward advances to the unwary to bring them to her lure; but when she has gotten them fast in her fetters, she uses them scurvily, allowing them no rest in her service, and feeding them only with delusive expectations and stale scraps of enjoyment, that have utterly lost their savor. Nor indeed is it in her power, were she ever so kindly disposed, to give a solid and lasting enjoyment; for those pleasures your men of pleasure hunt after, owe their gust merely to their novelty and the vigor of youthful blood and the freshness of the organs, but our organs can supply no more than a certain portion of entertainment; for when much employed in the same way, though they may still perform their work, yet they lose that sensibility in the exercise, which they had originally. Therefore, he that makes intense pleasure his whole business, is like an extravagant heir, who squanders away his whole patrimony in a year or two, and leaves himself nothing to live upon afterwards besides poverty, want, and distress. Hence we may see the benefit of this cardinal virtue, Temperance, which will debar us no pleasure we can have at free cost, but rescue us from those that would make us pay more for them than they are worth, will open to us many sources of delight the voluptuous never taste of, and secure us an estate for life in such enjoyments whereof our nature is capable.

CHAP. XXXIII.

JUSTICE.

THERE is one particular desire, that of appropriating whatever we can get to ourselves, and following our own pleasure without regard to the hurt it may do other persons, which prevails so universally and strongly among mankind, and which, indulged, causes such disorder in the world, that the restraint of it has been thought worthy to be made a cardinal virtue, distinguished by the name of Justice. It is easy to see that justice owes its being to society, for it could have no place were each man to live separately by himself, or had he not in any instance a power of endamaging the possessions, infringing the liberty, or abridging the enjoyments of his fellow creatures. Were men just now brought out of such a state, and placed upon this habitable earth, every one would naturally take of the good things scattered around him, whatever he wanted for his present occasion; when he went to do the same a second time, he might often find that somebody else had taken away the things he wanted before him; this would put him, as often as he had an opportunity, upon securing as many of them as he could get together, to provide against the like accidents for the future; from whence springs self-interest, the desire of gain, and covetousness. But as others would do the same, the public stock would be soon exhausted, the fruits all gathered from the trees, and the desire of engrossing would then prompt men to invade one another's hoards: whence must ensue trouble, vexation, and contentment, and much waste must be made in the struggle, to the great damage of them all. These inconveniences being severely felt, would teach them to see that their true interests lay in restraining their own desires within such compass, as might bring them compatible with those of others, and they would form rules for securing to each man the share of his blessings that nature had poured out among them. But it being obvious that the gifts of nature may be improved by labor, nor indeed can fully supply our wants without it, and there being no encouragement for any man to labor, if all the rest were to share the fruits of it with himself, they would find it necessary that all should enjoy the produce of their skill and industry in severalty, without interruption from others: and this would lay the foundation of property. But as it may often lie in a man's power to work out some advantage for others or for the public, and the security of property would be no encouragement with him so to do, because the fruits of his labor

in this case would not redound to his own benefit, they would see the expedience of a compensation or reward, to serve as an encouragement for performing such services. On the other hand, some would still employ their strength or cunning to encroach upon their neighbor's properties, or through mere wantonness, or resentment, or other unruly passion, would endamage them in their persons or possessions: this would show the necessity of punishment to restrain such outrages. And as vicious inclinations, according to their strength would require a greater or less restraint to curb them, therefore punishment would be apportioned to the heinousness of the offence, of which the greatness of the mischief done would be deemed an evidence when the inward depravity could not otherwise be discovered.

2. Were mankind reduced to a state of nature, I imagine they would gradually fall into notions of justice by such steps as those above described. But we being born into settled communities, having regulations already established, take them as we find them, with the sanction of authority annexed to them, without penetrating into the sources from whence they are derived. Yet if we were to suppose all reward and punishment, all law and honesty, banished from among a people, there would be nothing left to guide them besides self-interest, appetite, passion, and humor; and it is easy to see what wild doings, what havoc and distraction, these would introduce. Since then we find so manifest a necessity of justice to secure the happiness and tranquillity of life, we need seek for no other foundation than utility, whereon to build our obligation to support it. Many laws are calculated for the particular convenience of the people to whom they are given, and would be unjust because inconvenient if transported into other countries. The duty of subordination and obedience to higher powers, arises from the benefits of union: for it being impossible that all individuals should agree in their measures of conduct, or stand in a situation to judge of them, if the authority were not placed in a few hands, a nation could never act as one man to repel the invasions of an enemy, nor execute any one undertaking that required the concurrence of numbers. Therefore, though it be possible that governors may command things inconvenient, yet it is not justifiable to disobey them, because of the debility that must ensue upon loosening of their authority. Just as a man, who should find a troublesome twitching in his muscles, would do very wrong to destroy the tone of them: for he had better bear the present uneasiness than lose the use of his limbs. It has been commonly said, the worst kind of government was preferable to anarchy: wherefore the consideration of that preference will prove a tie upon every prudent man to submit to such government.

3. Nobody will deny there is a natural justice distinct from the legal, and must be presupposed before men can pay a proper submission to authority : for whoever obeys the law for fear of incurring the penalty is not a just man ; he only deserves the title of just who would deal honestly, and forbear offending, although there were no terrors hanging over to compel him, and who does not think of the penalties annexed, but acts upon a motive of principle. Where this principle is wanting, the best contrived laws cannot wholly supply the deficiency ; for they being calculated for general use, it is impossible to shape them so exactly as to suit all the variety of cases that may happen, therefore there wants some other clue to direct us when to pursue and when to abate the rigor of justice. Besides, there are many ways by which men have it in their power to affect one another in matters where the law does not and perhaps could not interfere, particularly in the application of applause and censure : in all these cases they can have no other guidance than the law of their own minds binding to the observance of certain rules, founded originally upon utility, though not always, or rather very seldom, carrying a visible connection therewith. We have seen under the article of honor, that praise and blame belong properly to those objects whereto the annexing them will do greatest service. Reparation for damages tends to the security of property, preventing retaliation, and answering as a penalty to restrain mischievousness and heedlessness. The laborer is worthy of his hire, because it cannot be expected men should labor without it : and the shopkeeper ought to be paid for his goods, because else there would be an end of all commerce and industry. Merit and demerit of all kinds, arise from a right understanding, and prudent regard to our own interests ; and the very term *Deserve*, implies that such a particular treatment will be most expedient upon such or such a behavior.

4. Thus every species of justice, as well public as private, as well commutative as distributive, rests upon the basis of utility : but what causes the mistake upon this matter is, the double sense of the word utility, as distinguished into real and apparent ; for in philosophical consideration, it is understood of that which upon the whole amount of consequences tends most to advance a man's real happiness, but in vulgar language it stands for that which exhibits the clearest prospect of advantage or profit. If we look back upon the chapter of *Use*, we shall find how pleasure transfers satisfaction upon things instrumental or preparatory to the procuring it, from whence grow the principle of self-interest, and many desires of things conceived beneficial or conducive to our purposes.

Now if we take this self-interest, and the gratification of these desires of utility, it is certainly quite different from justice as standing generally at the greatest variance with it ; he that deals honestly when not compelled either by the fear of punishment or censure, and without this he cannot claim a title to honesty, manifestly foregoes his interest for the sake of justice. But our ultimate end of action is not always, or rather very rarely our ultimate point of view, for our faculties being too scanty too look forward to the journey's end, we set up certain marks whereon to fix our attention from time to time for our guidance on the way : some of the first of these marks are the rules of interest, profit, convenience and worldly prudence ; but they proving often insufficient, we find a necessity of other marks in the rules of honor and justice to rectify their mistaken directions.

I am well aware that each of us singly, learns our honesty by instruction or sympathy from others, but then it can scarce be denied that those, who first set the example, did it from observation of the mischiefs attendant upon a too close attachment to interest. If we could constantly see to the end of our proceedings, and compute exactly the whole produce of enjoyment and suffering to be expected from them, we should want no other rule than that of preferring the greater distant good before present pleasure, for our own advantage would guide us sufficiently in all parts of our conduct ; but since we cannot look so far, and interest frequently leads astray from its own purposes, we have need enough of the restraint of justice to keep us from being beguiled by it, and led out of the road to real utility, which we often miss of through too great eagerness for the apparent. It may be remarked, that honor and justice abound more in rules than any other principle of action ; because, lying further removed from pleasure, we can seldomer discern the connection therewith, and consequently stand more in need of direction. But rules will stand us in no stead without a propensity urging strongly to practise them, which propensity, in the present case, is styled the moral sense or conscience : wherefore it behoves every man to cultivate or improve this moral sense or conscientious regard for the obligations of justice to the utmost, and adhere to it without reserve against all the solicitations of interest. The proper office of justice lies in restraining our selfish desires : a thorough righteous man will never suffer any of them either to draw him privily, or hurry him forcibly upon actions for which his heart may afterwards misgive him, or which his moral sense warns him to beware as unlawful, although he may not directly discern their inexpediency. It is true he may sometimes mistake and forego his lawful

advantages needlessly, but the possession of a strong moral sense is more valuable than any present benefit he could receive from its weakness ; and he may look upon these inconveniences in the light of troubles naturally attending an estate, which no man would throw away for the sake of escaping them.

Therefore it is much the safer side to be too scrupulous than too remiss, especially for young people. Tully used to reckon exuberance a good sign in a young orator, and say he loved to find something to prune off. The moralist may say the same with respect to his scholars, that he loves to see the moral sense vigorous and redundant, affording something to prune off ; for it is much harder to nourish up a weakly plant than reduce one that is luxuriant. The expedience of justice lies through so many stages, that it is difficult to trace them, but the inconveniences of over strictness are easier manifested, nor will fail to discover themselves upon a little experience. But though the moral sense ought to master desire, it ought not to prevail over reason ; therefore whenever upon a full and fair examination, we find our rules lead to greater harm than good, we must alter or dispense with them ; and since they are liable to error, it will behove us, as often as a proper opportunity offers, to try them by a reference to use. This will prevent their running into extravagances, and give us a better opinion of them ; for by frequently observing the benefit of justice, we shall become intimately persuaded of its expedience at other times when we do not discern them : which will teach us a confidence in our moral sense, and make us look upon the laudableness of an action as a certain evidence of its usefulness.

5. As we are mighty fond of personifying everything, even the creatures of imagination, abstract notions, and whatever we can express by a noun substantive, it is common to consider the law either of the land, or of nature, as a person, having perception, volition, design, desire, and passion. In this light, if we look for what design the law must be supposed to have, we cannot well conceive any other than the preservation of property, the security of life, limb, peace, liberty, and all other requisites for enjoyment, that may be destroyed or lessened by the behavior of men to one another. But all design tends to something future, the past being no object of power or contrivance : hence it is plain the law carries always a prospect forwards, and only casts a retrospect behind, in order to take her measures for providing against the time to come. The reparation she awards for damages sustained, manifestly relates to the future convenience of the party aggrieved ; for if he be satisfied by being reinstated in

the possession of those materials for enjoyment he had before the offence committed, or receiving an equivalent that will answer his purposes as well, the law is satisfied too. But it may often happen that the offender is not able to make reparation, or the injury, as in cases of murder or maiming, is of a nature not to be repaired or compensated: under these circumstances the law will not be supposed to design impossibilities, and can only have in view the preventing the like injuries for the future, by such punishment as shall be judged sufficient for that purpose. So that in reality punishment is not inflicted for crimes committed, but as a remedy against those which might be committed hereafter; and guilt is rather a direction than a motive for taking vengeance. And that this is so, will appear more evident when we reflect that natural justice restrains the thoughts, desires, and intentions of men, as well as their outward actions: nor do the laws sometimes scruple to punish for the intent where no mischief has been actually done. Conspiring to defraud, assaulting with intent to rob or ravish, are deemed misdemeanors; lifting up a latch in the night-time with intent to commit burglary, forging or knowingly publishing a forged note, are made felony; imagining the death of the king, is high treason. And if an overt act be required to convict the delinquent, I believe every one, who knows the nature of right and wrong, will admit that the overt act adds nothing to the delinquency, but is only necessary to prove it, because we cannot dive into the thoughts of men, nor judge of them otherwise than by their actions. Were there a man to whom the hearts of all others should lie open, and a discretionary power entrusted, to do as he judged reasonable, he would not think it unjust to apply such punishment for the most secret evil designs, as he conceived effectual for preventing them from breaking forth into act.

6. But to pursue our idea of personality in the law; as we all look upon the defeating of our designs as a damage, and the law designing the peace and security of those under her protection, therefore every hurt brought upon individuals, is considered as an injury done the law itself, for which she will require such satisfaction as can be made, that is, such adequate punishment as may deter the offender or others from repeating the offence, and reinstate her in her power she had before of protecting: this brings punishment under the idea of a reparation or satisfaction for damage done, not indeed to the party injured, but to the law; for when the offender has undergone the chastisement allotted him, he is said to have satisfied the law, and to stand right again in court. Then as in ourselves satisfaction becomes often transferred from the end to the means, particularly in resentment, where we

think of nothing further than wreaking our revenge, and in pursuits of honor or power, which we do not follow for their uses but to gratify our present desires of them, we conceive the same passions to prevail and the same narrow views to obtain in the law, which animadvert upon delinquents for her own satisfaction rather than for the sake of the community under her charge.

7. This custom of conceiving the law to have interests of her own to serve, and the detestation which arises instantly in the hearts of the best and wisest men upon the thought of heinous wickedness, has given rise to the opinion of an immediate and essential connection between offence and punishment, which is supposed due to the former without taking any other idea into consideration. I shall readily agree that in taking measures for punishing we need consider nothing further than the degree of delinquency; for being well satisfied our rule is right, we need not, any cannot constantly look forward to the reasons inducing us to believe it right; and so we depend upon the 47th of Euclid as a certain truth, without running on to the demonstrations convincing us of its being true: but if we search for the foundation of justice, though here too we shall find a connection, it will be hard to trace it out unless by the intervention of two links lying between; I mean, the power of men still to hurt one another, and the tendency of punishment to make them change or withhold them from executing their evil intentions. Were mankind to be suddenly placed in a situation which should render them incapable of ever more receiving damage from others, or their dispositions of mind so changed as that they should never more think of doing acts of injustice, I believe every good man would vote for a general amnesty of all former misdemeanors, because the remembrance of them would be needless in one case and useless in the other.

If the connection between offence and punishment were natural and necessary, submission and repentance could never dissociate them, for the nature of actions cannot be altered by anything subsequent; but repentance, answering the purpose intended by chastisement, takes away the use of it, and thereby dissolves the connection: therefore when severity appears necessary as a warning to others, that they may not expect to come off upon the like easy terms, the just man will not accept of repentance: thus we see justice disarmed upon becoming needless, and the sword put into her hands again upon the further prospect of necessity.

And the same cause extends her province beyond the limits naturally belonging to it, by warranting her sometimes to take vengeance upon the innocent for wrongs wherein they have had no share: for this is the case of war, wherein the goods and posses-

sions of private persons are invaded for injuries received from the state. I know that in national transactions all the members of a community are looked upon as constituting one person, and in this light you take revenge upon the person that injured you : but this is only an imaginary personality, very useful for pointing out the measures of national justice, but by no means supporting it as a foundation. If the French king has fortified Dunkirk, or encroached upon our colonies in America, in breach of treaties, you cannot charge the merchant trading from Martinico with any faithlessness or badness of heart upon that account : so justice stands here separated from delinquency and every spice of evil intention ; for you esteem it lawful to seize his effects by way of reprisal. But why do you judge it lawful ? because you cannot right yourself otherwise : so necessity makes the justice ; for were it possible to come at the governors directly without touching the subjects, no righteous man would think the latter method justifiable, notwithstanding any supposed identity of person between them.

8. Were the justness of actions essential and inherent, whenever the rules of justice clash, as we find they sometimes do, that which must be superseded must abate something from the justness of the other : for the case is so in matters of profit or pleasure. If you lay out a sum of money to make an improvement of greater value upon your estate, you are certainly a gainer : yet could you procure the same improvement free of charges your gain would be greater. If you might partake of some very agreeable diversions by going five miles through very dirty roads, it is worth your while ; yet could you have it without that trouble I suppose you would like it better. But suppose two men in different parts of a field near a river, alarmed by the cry of some person drowning, one has a path to run along, but the other cannot go to help without trampling down his neighbor's corn, which you must allow to be an unjust action considered in itself, nevertheless I conceive the strictest casuist would acknowledge the merit of both equal : so the lesser rule bears no intrinsic value to be subtracted from the greater, for the expedience of abstaining from another's property is taken off by the higher importance of saving a man's life.

9. Nor do the obligations of truth and fidelity rest upon any other basis than expedience : it is easy to see that were truth banished the world, there could be no intercourse among mankind, no use of speech : if you asked anybody's direction upon the road, you might as well let it alone, for you could gather nothing from their answer if there were no truth in men. Were all falsehood wrong as such, why are poems and novels suffered ?

why do moralists invent fables wherein they introduce beasts talking, gods appearing in the air, and the moon desiring to be taken measure of for a suit of clothes? But when fiction may serve some good purpose and does no hurt, the wisest do not scruple to employ it. Did the bare form of an agreement create an obligation to perform it, no circumstance whatever could render it invalid. Are then all those suitors unrighteous who apply to our courts of equity to be relieved from their contracts? or are the courts iniquitous in decreeing them relief? But were there no faith among men, no regard to their engagements, anybody may see, with half an eye, what stagnation of business, what mutual diffidence and confusion must ensue; and it is the avoidance of those evils that gives them their sanction: therefore, when the rigid observance of compacts manifestly tends to greater mischiefs than could be avoided thereby, no righteous judge, having authority so to do, will scruple setting them aside. Nevertheless, this does not justify a man in breaking his engagements whenever he finds it detrimental or inconvenient to keep them, for our views are so narrow that we cannot always see all the consequences of our actions, and rules are the marks hung out to direct us to an advantage we cannot discern: therefore the wise man will adhere inviolably to his rules though he cannot discover their expedience; for he will look upon the manifest injustice of a thing as a stronger evidence of its being detrimental than any appearance that may arise to the contrary; yet an expedience there must be, or the rules will not be right. For justice is the minister of reason, though it ought to be the master of action; and it is one thing to establish rules of conduct, but another to show the foundation of them. When a man is to act, he ought to consult his ideas of justice, and follow whithersoever they direct, without reserve or looking to anything further; but when we inquire why justice is recommendable, it behoves us to trace out the reference it bears to happiness; for without this it will be hard to prove the obligation to it; and this being once clearly evinced, it would want nothing else to give it all the influence that could be desired.

This method seems to have been attempted by the old philosophers, but they stopped short in the midway, as we may learn from Cicero, who was no philosopher himself, but an elegant reporter of the Greek philosophy, where he endeavors to show the prudence of Regulus' conduct in LIB. III. CAP. 27, 8, 9, of his offices; for he tells us those are to be rejected who would separate utility from justice; because, says he, whatever is just or honestum is therefore useful. This is giving the ladies' reason, It is

so because it is; for he does not vouchsafe a word to prove why it is useful. That everything just is really advantageous I shall not deny, nor that the practice of justice is the surest road to happiness, but I must deny that this is a first principle or self-evident proposition, or to be discerned without much thought and consideration; for I know that in many cases the contrary appears upon first sight: therefore it had become a philosopher, especially such a powerful artificer of words as Cicero, to have laid open the fallacy of this appearance and shown the intermediate steps by which justice leads to utility. He might have had an ample field to expatiate upon in the benefits and necessity of justice to the welfare of mankind. He might have showed that the Roman commonwealth rose to that pitch of grandeur they shone in by a strict fidelity to their engagements, and that they afterwards began to decline and fall into confusion by their oppression of the provinces taken under their protection, and their selfish endeavors to encroach upon one another's rights. He might then have gone on to prove the good of every individual contained in that of the public, and thence concluded that Regulus, all things considered, acted more for his own advantage in submitting to the torments he underwent than he could have done by any breach of faith whatsoever. As for his rhodomontade that the brave man looks upon pain as a mere trifle, this overthrows his other assertion, because it seems to admit that if pain were an evil it might justify the breach of engagements: and indeed we, who take it for such, commonly do admit it as an excuse when in a degree we conceive intolerable. When a sum of money is sent for a particular purpose, justice certainly requires it should be disposed of according to the owner's direction. Suppose then the party carrying it attacked on the way by ruffians, who threaten him with some grievous mischiefs unless he will deliver it them: if he be perfectly honest, and at the same time possessed of the stoical fortitude so as not to value pain at a straw, he will bear the worst they can do to him rather than betray his trust: but suppose the messenger were a weak and fearful woman, to whom violent ill usage were really terrible, I believe none of us would think it the least abatement of her character for honesty if she yielded to her terrors. So that justice is not so necessarily connected with use, but that a greater evil on the other side may separate them, and in that case the action ceases to be just: wherefore utility constitutes the essence of justice, but not justice that of utility.

10. But though justice be not utility, nevertheless it ought to be esteemed the certain mark and evidence of utility, and an intimate persuasion of its being so, will fasten desire upon it as upon an

ultimate point of view, without needing anything beyond to recommend it. Whoever has this desire so strong as to counterpoise all other desires, possesses the cardinal virtue here treated of; and whoever has not this desire at all, cannot be called an honest man in any degree, though he may do honestly for fear of punishment or prospect of advantage. Therefore, if a righteous man be asked why he fulfils his engagements, though to his own manifest detriment, he will answer, because it would have been unjust to have failed in them; for he wants no other motive to induce him; and if the querist be righteous too he will want no other reason to satisfy him. But if he be asked further, why he esteems justice a proper motive of action, and he be a person who does not take his principles upon trust from the example or authority of others, but has used to examine them himself, he will refer to the general necessity and expedience of justice, and allege that what conduces to the general good of mankind must be good for every particular. But could it be made to appear that injustice in some single instance tended to the general advantage, he would not think himself warranted to practise it, because the mischief of setting a bad example, and weakening the authority of a beneficial rule, would be greater than any present advantage that might accrue from the breach of it. And even supposing his injustice could be concealed from all the world, so that it could do no hurt by example, still he would not believe it allowable, for fear it should have a bad influence upon his own mind. For whoever understands human nature, knows how dangerous it is to lessen the force of those restraints that withhold us from the exorbitances of self-interest: if we break into them in some instances where we might do it innocently, we shall run a great hazard of losing their influence at other times when it will be absolutely necessary for keeping us within bounds. Nor can we doubt of there being an utility in justice, when we find it acknowledged in some measure, by the unanimous consent of all mankind: it is a vulgar saying, that Honesty is the best policy; nor perhaps is there a man who, if he could accomplish his desires justly, would not choose it that way rather than by wrong. The very gangs of highwaymen and street robbers observe some fidelity, though little enough it is true, in their engagements with one another: so that even those persons who take their notions of utility and pleasure for their sole guidance, still pay some regard to justice, being led by their experience of its conducing necessarily thereto.

11. The just man, to deserve that appellation, must be so throughout, in small matters as well as great: he will regard natural-justice, and legal too, when it is not superseded by the other:

he will abstain from injuring, not only the persons, possessions, and liberties of his neighbors, but likewise their good name, reputation, and claim to the merit of their performances, neither deceiving by flattery, blackening by calumny, overbearing by haughtiness, nor overreaching by cunning: he will beware of wronging anybody, even in his own private estimation, nor give credit hastily to unfavorable reports, but judge of persons and interpret actions candidly and cautiously: he will look upon all untruth or bias to the prejudice of another as a species of injustice, and will esteem ingratitude one of the most flagrant.

12. As justice consists in a hearty desire of doing right to every one against the solicitations of other desires urging another way, and as among contending impulses the most vigorous will always prevail, therefore justice, though distinct from temperance and fortitude, cannot well subsist without them, because it is their office to reduce our other desires within a manageable compass. Ambition, covetousness, extravagant fondness for pleasure, anger, and all kinds of intemperance, hurry men on, otherwise well disposed, to unwarrantable actions. Fretfulness, sloth, over delicacy, effeminate softness, and every other branch of impatience, will not suffer them to do justly, where any pains or difficulty are requisite. These vices lay them under a necessity of transgressing: but though we have seen before that a real necessity takes away injustice from a deed, yet an unnecessary necessity, if I may be allowed the expression, that is, one brought upon us by our own folly, leaves it in full colors. Therefore, the ancients were right when they said that whoever possessed one virtue completely, must possess them all, because they mutually nourish and protect one another.

CHAP. XXXIV.

BENEVOLENCE.

THE grand impediment against making philosophy universally understood, arises from the particular style unavoidably employed therein, different from that used upon common occasions. Sometimes it is found necessary to frame technical terms unknown to the man of plain sense: at other times, when words of general currency will serve, yet a peculiar idiom and structure is necessary to make them answer the purpose effectually. This is nowhere more apparent than in speaking of the virtues, which are vulgarly

conceived infinitely numerous and various : but the moralist, being willing to methodize his thoughts and reduce the wilderness into a regular plan, endeavors to comprise them all under four general heads, to which he assigns names already in use, but must extend their signification beyond what custom will warrant, in order to bring them wide enough to take in all he would have them. By this means it happens that the plain man, attempting to follow his method, finds himself frequently perplexed : for after being fully satisfied that an action is right, he still remains at a loss to know what particular species of virtue it belongs to ; or perhaps sometimes mistakes that to be the virtue recommended which is really no virtue at all. Thus prudence, the principal virtue comprehending all the rest, stands in vulgar acceptation for sagacity, penetration, experience, and clearness of judgment, which are not virtue but good fortune ; or if attained by our own industry, still are the fruits of virtue rather than the tree itself : and as prudence is vulgarly understood of a cautious regard to interest, we find it often standing at the greatest variance with virtue. But we have seen before, that moral prudence consists in making a due use of our lights, not in the abundance or clearness of them, and vigorously adhering to the dictates of reason, against the solicitations of interest, or any other desire whatsoever. So likewise fortitude is made to include patience, because the same robustness of temper that enables the possessor to stare danger in the face, is supposed to render him invincible by pain. But to common apprehension a man may be very patient and yet very timorous : nor on the other hand, if we see him preserve an uninterrupted presence of mind in perils of all kinds, shall we think him deficient in courage, because he frets under imprisonment, or cannot bear disappointment and contradiction. In like manner temperance implies the moderation of every desire and appetite that would carry us on unadvisedly to present gratification : but in our familiar discoursés, we confine it to sobriety in eating and drinking ; for if we find a man abstemious in these points, we count him a model of temperance, notwithstanding he may be ambitious, or slothful, or revengeful. To come lastly to the cardinal virtue of justice, the philosopher must comprise under it benevolence and whatever we do for the benefit or pleasure of others without regard to our own : but nobody else would esteem that person a friend or good neighbor who should do no more to serve another than what the strictness of justice obliges him to.

2. For this reason I have thought convenient to make a distinct article of benevolence, which if you please may be called a fifth cardinal virtue. For though it has been hitherto reputed a

branch of justice as springing from the same ground, namely, that our own good is contained in the good of others, yet I do not see why it may not as well be reckoned the root, and justice the branch, since it bears that and many good fruits beside; for we do not use to behave dishonestly to our friends, and if we had a proper regard and concern for all mankind I do not imagine we could ever deal unjustly with anybody. However this be, there is a manifest difference between them in the common conceptions of the world. Justice only restrains from doing damage or wrong: good nature does the same too, but over and above, this prompts to do all the service for which there is an opportunity. A debt and a favor seem essentially distinct, so that what is one cannot be the other; for a man is bound by obligation to render to every one his dues, but in doing a kindness he must be free from all obligation or else it is no kindness. If a man pays you what he owed, you do not thank him for it, he only escapes the censure you might have thrown upon him for failing: but if he does you a service you had no right to expect, he deserves your acknowledgements. Since then benevolence carries a different idea in common apprehension from justice, what has been offered in illustration of that subject, will not suffice for this: and if we consider how it is generally understood, I think it may be called a diffused love to the whole species, in which light the same definition we gave of love will remain applicable here, to wit, the pleasure of pleasing: or if, as we distinguish the passion into love and fondness, so we should distinguish the virtue into benevolence and good nature; the one will be a pleasure of benefiting and the other that of pleasing. To render it perfectly formed, desire must connect immediately with these ends, for if there be any thought of our own interest or gratification between, what we do for others is not an act of kindness. I do not apprehend that nature gives us any such desire, but we have already shown in several places by what steps desire becomes transferred from ourselves to other objects, and when we can perform good offices upon the sole consideration of their being such, then is the translation complete. Whoever has this desire habitual, will feel a satisfaction in acts of kindness proportionable to the benefit of them which will urge him to perform them as a matter of entertainment, whenever they fall in his way.

4. Persons deficient in this quality endeavor to run it down, and justify their own narrow views, by alleging that it is only selfishness in a particular form: for, if the benevolent man does a good-natured thing, for his own satisfaction that he finds in it, there is self at bottom, for he acts to please himself. Where then, say they, is his merit? what is he better than us? he follows

constantly what he likes, and so do we : the only difference between us is, that we have a different taste of pleasure from him. To take these objections in order, let us consider that form in many cases is all in all, the essence of things depending thereupon. Fruit, when come to its maturity, or during its state of sap in the tree, or of earthy particles in the ground, is the same substance all along : beef, whether raw or roasted, or putrified, is still the same beef, varying only in form : but whoever shall overlook this difference of form, will bring grievous disorders upon his stomach : so then there is no absurdity in supposing selfishness may be foul and noisome under one form, but amiable and recommendable under another. But we have no need to make this supposition, as we shall not admit that acts of kindness, how much soever we may follow our own inclination therein, carry any spice of selfishness. Men are led into this mistake by laying too much stress upon etymology ; for selfishness being derived from self, they learnedly infer that whatever is done to please one's own inclination, must fall under that appellation, not considering that derivatives do not always retain the full latitude of their roots. Wearing woollen cloaths, or eating mutton does not make a man sheepish, nor does employing himself now and then in reading, render him bookish : so neither is everything selfish, that relates to oneself. If somebody should tell you, that such an one was a very selfish person, and for proof of it, give a long account of his being once caught on horseback by a shower, that he took shelter under a tree, that he alighted, put on his great coat, and was wholly busied in muffling himself up, without having a single thought all the while of his wife or children, his friends or his country : would not you take it for a banter ? or would you think the person or his behavior could be called selfish in any propriety of speech ? What, if a man agreeable and obliging in company, should happen to desire another lump of sugar in his tea to please his own palate, would they pronounce him a whit the more selfish upon that account ? So that selfishness is not having a regard for oneself, but having no regard for anything else. Therefore, the moralist may exhort men to a prudent concern for their own interests, and at the same time dissuade them from selfishness, without inconsistency.

4. As for the influence of satisfaction, we have already seen how that gives life to all our motions, so that if that rendered them selfish, there would be no use for the term, nor any distinction between selfish and disinterested : for the wise and the foolish, the good and the wicked, the thoughtful and the giddy, in business and diversion, in their deliberate and inconsiderate actions, all incessantly follow satisfaction. But we have shown that satis-

faction is ever one and the same in kind, and the variety of motives arises from the difference of vehicles containing it, which vehicles are the objects of desire, for we know well enough we must have the satisfaction if we can attain the satisfactory object : wherefore desire fixes upon this as an ultimate point, and we take our measures according to what we conceive satisfactory. Nature first conveys satisfaction by the ministry of the senses, from thence it becomes transferred to the instruments or materials we have found qualified to furnish us with agreeable sensations : by degrees we come to have an intercourse with mankind, and find that they get away the materials of pleasure from one another, we then learn a desire of securing as many of them to ourselves as we can, and this I apprehend, gives rise to self-interest, which is never understood, either in common or philosophical language, of the natural propensity to pleasure, but of the pursuit of our own ends in opposition to those of other persons. In process of time, wantonness, or resentment, or bad company brings some to delight in mischief, and these we term mischievous : others are led by consideration, or kind usage, or better example to take the like delight in good offices, and these become benevolent : such as have neither of those tastes, but always do either good or hurt, just as it serves their own purpose, are properly selfish. Hence the following of inclination does not constitute selfishness, for in this respect, all men are alike ; but the difference results from what they severally fix their inclinations upon : for it is the object of desire, the ultimate point in prospect, that denominates an action. He that abstains from mischief, out of fear of punishment or for some private advantage, is selfish, not benevolent in the deed, and if he do it because he thinks it his duty, still he is not benevolent, though he may have some other virtue which guided him in the doing ; for to entitle an action to that epithet, it must proceed from the sole motive of good-will, without thought of anything beyond the benefit of the party who is the subject of it.

5. Nor need anybody be at a loss to form an idea of such an inclination, for I suppose the most selfish creature breathing may chance to be sometimes in good humor, and has some child or mistress, or boon companion, to whom he can take delight in doing a favor when he has no end of his own to serve upon them : let him only reflect upon the state of his mind in these hearty moods, and he may understand that benevolence is no more than the same disposition carried as far as human frailty can extend it. Neither need we seek for any greater refinement or purity of intention than this I have been speaking of : we may lawfully and laudably follow our pleasure, provided that be set

upon such an employment. The good old rule holds in this case, of doing and standing affected to others as we would have them do and stand affected to us: now what can we desire better, than that they should take delight in pleasing us? Could your family, your friends, your neighbors, your acquaintance, come and say with truth and sincerity, Sir, please to let us know wherein we can serve you, for we shall take delight in doing it: what would you want of them more? what other disposition could you wish them to put on? Would you answer them, Look ye good folks, while you take delight in serving me, you do it to please yourselves, so I do not thank you for it: but if you would lay a real obligation upon me, you must first hate me with all your might, and then the services you shall do me will be purely disinterested. Surely he that could make this reply must have a very whimsical turn of thought, and a strong tincture of envy, since he cannot be content to receive a kindness, unless the person conferring suffers for it, by forcing himself against his inclination.

6. As commendation, and a return of good offices tend to encourage benevolence, therefore it deserves them: for we have seen in a former place, that honor and reward belong properly to where they will do most service. But the reward must not constantly follow too close upon the action, for then it will be apt to catch the eye, and become the end expected, at every performance, which will render it selfish. But when good offices meet with a return of the like only in general, or in the gross, they lie too wide to be carried always in view, and desire will fix upon the acts of kindness as upon an ultimate point: wherefore many spoil their children by hiring them perpetually with playthings to do as they would have them. As an action takes its quality not from the thing done, but from the motive operating to produce it, therefore benevolence, to be genuine, must be free and voluntary: for what we are drawn or overpersuaded to do, does not proceed from inclination, and is rather an act of impulse than choice. There is a softness and milkiness of temper that cannot say nay to anything; but he that can never refuse a favor, can hardly be said ever to grant one: for it is wrested from him, not given; he does it to rid himself of an opportunity, and save the trouble of a denial, in which case it is a weakness rather than a virtue. Hence good nature is often called, and sometimes really proceeds from folly, which gets no thanks when it proves most beneficial: for men applaud themselves for having gained a compliance by wheedling or pressing, and secretly laugh at the silly thing that could be won by such artifices.

7. There is likewise a spurious benevolence which flows from vanity; it makes men helpful and obliging to show their power and importance, or gain the incense of applause, or bring others into dependence upon them. Persons actuated by this motive, may behave kindly enough to such as are submissive to them, but are generally envious of their superiors, and carry themselves haughtily to those who do not want them, and cannot endure to see any good that is not done by themselves. Wherefore how much soever they may value themselves upon their good deeds, they carry no intrinsic merit: for their desire never terminates upon the good of another, but only urges to it as a necessary means for serving their own ends. So that the commendation bestowed on them by such as penetrate into their motive, is not paid as a debt, but thrown out as a lure, drawing them to a continuance of the like practices; and the commerce on both sides is rather a traffic of interest, than a mutual intercourse of kindness.

8. But true benevolence, as it will not bear mingling with any other motive or passion, so neither may it become a passion itself, for it must be judicious, and then can never be such. We have laid down in the chapter of passion that the difference between that and affection lies only in the degree, and that not in the absolute strength of it neither, but in its rising so high as to become uncontrollable by reason. If this description of passion be admitted, I can readily come into the stoical doctrine concerning apathy: for the wise man will always remain master of his own actions, he will never suffer any inclination, not even the best of them, to gain an ascendant over him, he will permit them to recommend and invite, and will employ them to assist him, but never follow them implicitly, and will preserve his seat of empire over them to prevent their encroaching upon one another's rights. By this impartiality and steady tenor of conduct he will fall deficient in no one branch of benevolence; and though he will prove a tender and affectionate relation, a sincere and zealous friend, yet his attachment to particulars will not overwhelm his regard to mankind in general, but rather cherish and purify it: for by reflecting on the sincerity and heartiness wherewith he can run to oblige those who are dearest to him, he will have a pattern from his own experience, instructing him what kind of disposition to put on with respect to others. Nor will he carry himself stiffly and austere, despising little good offices, when they do not stand in the way of more important; for though his benevolence will not degenerate into fondness, neither will it want for tenderness. He will study not only to do solid good, but to please and humor whenever it can be done.

without ill consequence, and it will be as much though not so weakly compliant, as the good-natured man a little before spoken of, to every innocent desire and fancy : but in the manner of his compliance, will resemble the ivy which twines and conforms itself freely to all the inequalities of the substance whereto it adheres, rather than the metal that takes an impression forcibly stamped upon it, or the vapors drawn up out of their element by the insinuating action of the sun. Courteousness is the skin and outside of virtue, and though a man would wish, in the first place, to enjoy vigor of limbs, and soundness of constitution, yet if he can have a good skin too, it is no detriment to his person. Therefore this will not be neglected by the sage we have in idea, he will finish his virtue in every part, small as well as great, ornamental as well as serviceable, nor think the body of it complete until the bones and muscles are invested with their proper covering.

9. But the having one inclination does not necessarily imply the utter banishment of all others, therefore benevolence will never make a man's regard for another destroy his proper regard for his own interests, nor supersede the obligations of justice, temperance, or other rules of action : much less will it prompt him to humor anybody to their own real detriment. If we take our idea of benevolence from the notions of it current among the polite world, it should seem to consist wholly in trifles, subscribing to a concert, making one in a party of pleasure, saying civil things, promoting any little scheme of one's acquaintance, or complying with them in all their follies and fancies. What is this but placing the essence of virtue in her outside, making her a man of straw, an empty covering containing nothing within ? But the wise man, though not regardless of an agreeable complexion, will desire to have a solid substance underneath ; he will aim constantly at the greater good, use his judgment to discern it, consult his moral sense and discretion as the surest guides to find it, and exert his resolution to follow their directions.

10. Nevertheless, if different inclinations may reside in the same person, yet inclinations directly opposite cannot ; wherefore pure and perfect benevolence can never delight in mischief, nor harbor any thought of revenge. I do not say that it will preserve the same behavior under all kinds of usage, for this would make it a weakness instead of a virtue, but a proper notice may be taken of injuries without any sentiment of revenge. The judge is not revengeful when he pronounces sentence upon the criminal, nor the magistrate when he chastises those who contemn his authority : for they do it to preserve peace, property, and order,

the greatest blessings of society. But revenge is properly a desire of hurting those who have offended, without any further consideration: the view terminates on that point, which it can never do in the good man, being always turned a contrary way. He may punish or censure where he has it in his power, and judges it expedient and necessary, but he always carries that necessity in view: so that his animadversions will be matter of compulsion not of choice, an undesirable means to attain a greater good. He will consider wickedness as a distemper of the mind, dangerous to the patient, contagious and pernicious to the public, and proceed against it in the same disposition as a surgeon who performs a painful operation for the sake of a cure, or cuts off a limb that would endanger the whole body. He will take injuries patiently when he has not power to resent them, or finds the retaliation attended with more inconvenience than advantage. He will be ready to forgive whenever repentance renders punishment unnecessary, and rejoice to find it become so. Nor will he not retain a good will even towards his enemies, for enmity he will have none himself, nor any resentment against them, but will only oppose them so far as to repel their attacks, or take away their power, or restrain their inclination to do hurt: in all other matters consistent with those purposes he will be ready to do them any kindness. He will have that laudable love of pleasure as to take it in all the good he sees, and feel the prosperities even of strangers; and be so covetous of enjoyment, as to make that of other persons his own, by partaking in the satisfaction attending it.

11. This it may be said is a glorious and happy temper of mind, but possible only in speculation and unattainable by frail mortal men, who are so deeply engaged in providing for their own necessities as not to be capable of opening their thoughts much beyond themselves, whose passions prove too strong for their reason to control, and whose aptness to injure would perpetually break out into act, if there were not a desire of revenge to keep it in awe. I am afraid all this is but too true, yet by contemplating the character of an ideal sage, we may learn what it is we are to aim at, and if we despair of arriving at perfection, we may endeavor to resemble it in some particulars we find feasible. For we are none of us without some seeds of good nature, which, with due cultivation, may be made to produce something in the most barren ground. Our own occasions do not so perpetually engage us but that we may sometimes spare a look elsewhere, nor do any of us want our seasons of good humor, wherein we can find a sensible delight in assisting and obliging without prospect of ad-

vantage to ourselves. The business then is to encourage these favorable dispositions whenever they appear, for though we cannot raise nor change an inclination at once, yet experience testifies that like a tender twig it may be brought to grow in any shape by continual bending: so that though we must force ourselves at first, yet repeated acts will contract a habit, which we shall then follow with ease and pleasure. It will be of signal service frequently to place ourselves in the situation of other persons, to adopt their desires, and imagine ourselves under their wants, at least, to paint as exact a representation as we can of their condition of mind, according to our manner of behavior towards them: for then the force of sympathy will assist us greatly, because as a cheerful countenance makes the company cheerful, we shall be willing to brighten the prospect as much as we can, that it may reflect the more pleasurable ideas upon ourselves. Nor must we neglect to root up those weeds that check the growth of benevolence, an intemperance of self-interest, an averseness to trouble, a contemptuousness of pride, an inconsiderateness of vanity, but, above all, a spirit of animosity. I hope we are none of us insatiable in our resentments; and if we can set a measure to them all, what better able to assign the proper limits than reason? but this will always apportion them to the necessity of preventing some greater mischief that could not otherwise be avoided. And though passion may sometimes suspend the influence of reason, we may hinder it from enslaving her; and if we cannot help being angry, may take care that the sun shall not go down upon our wrath. As an encouragement to practise the methods above pointed out, or any others our observation may suggest, let us consider and inculcate in our memory the benefits naturally redounding to ourselves from a benevolent temper of mind, which I shall now endeavor to investigate.

12. I have assigned happiness, a man's own happiness, or the aggregate of his satisfactions, for the ultimate end of action: therefore it behoves me to show what reference the quality I recommend bears to that end, or else it will not appear worth the wise man's possessing. Nor does this contradict what I laid down a little while ago, that a benevolent act must carry nothing of self in view: for it has been made evident upon several occasions already, that our ultimate end is very rarely our ultimate point of view, but we have divers principles, like so many stages of our journey, which occupy our thoughts from time to time as we proceed. Thus, when the wise man meets an opportunity of doing a kind thing, he follows his disposition to embrace it without looking for anything further; he performs the good office because he

likes it, because he judges it right : but we must imagine he had taken his own heart under examination before, and determined to cherish benevolence there, because of the connexion he had observed it to have with happiness, or with some other principle wherein he had formerly found the like connexion. Let us then suppose him utterly divested of all his desires, except that of happiness, and that virtues, vices, tastes and inclinations of every fashion, were to be sold like clothes ready made at the saleshop : let us consider why he would choose to purchase benevolence as most convenient for his wear. In the first place, he would presently discern the benefits of society, which arise solely from the mutual help afforded by mankind to one another ; and though there be other motives urging them to provide for one another's conveniences, as fear, shame, glory, profit, self-interest, or custom, he would see these are only expedients to supply the want of mutual good-will, but cannot answer the purpose so completely nor universally. We see how, in parties of diversion or intercourses of friendship, the pleasure and interests of all are much better provided for by a willingness to promote them than they could be by any regulations that human skill can devise ; and could mankind in general be inspired with the like sentiments, there would want nothing else to keep the world in order. If the desire of promoting the general good were to prevail among all individuals so strongly as to overcome their averseness to labor and trouble, I am persuaded it would bring back the golden age or paradisiacal state again, without any change in the elements ; and whatever advances the happiness of all, must necessarily increase that of every particular. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that benevolence, in the midst of a selfish world, must admit a little more reserve and caution than would be needful among persons of its own character : yet still every feasible exercise of it tends something towards advancing the general good, wherein a prudent man will see his own contained.

13. Secondly, benevolence, judiciously exercised, will generally engage a return of the like, and entitle us to the assistance or comfort of others when we may stand in need of it : at least it will afford no fuel for malice, but tend to lessen animosity. A soft word, says Solomon, turneth away anger, and kind usage seems most likely to prevent it : if it meet with unsuitable returns, they do not fall so heavy as suitable returns upon the malicious ; for malice, disappointed or chastised, fills with a vexation that has nothing to alleviate it ; but the good man repaid with ingratitude still has the consolation to reflect that he acted right, and possesses a quality that will yield him better fruits upon other occasions.

One receives no pleasure unless successful : the other feels a delight in the action as well as the event, so misses a part only of his reward by failing of success. Add to this that a readiness to do good offices begets esteem even with those who want it themselves : it gives a confidence in the possessor, and renders his transactions of all kinds easier to be dispatched ; for nobody will scruple to trust him whom they find always wishing them well and ready to do them more than justice.

14. Thirdly, benevolence is an inclination oftener to be gratified and less liable to disappointment than malice. It is true, mischief may be done easier than good, but then mankind will quickly be aware of it and take measures to prevent it, whereas they will be ready to assist the endeavors of him that designs them well. So that though according to the principles formerly laid down, we must admit that acts of good or ill nature may give equal pleasure to those who have a taste for either, yet the one will naturally meet with opposition and the other with concurrence from the persons upon whom they are to be exercised. If I take delight in mischief, there may be ways of vexing another which I do not know ; these he will carefully conceal from me, and so I shall miss a pleasure that was in my power to have enjoyed : but if he knows me fond of good offices he will be ready enough of his own accord to tell me wherein I can serve him, and so furnish me with opportunities of gratifying my inclination that I might never have thought of myself.

15. Fourthly, good nature multiplies the sources of enjoyment, for as the pleasure of life consists for the most part in action, and he is the happiest man who can always find something to engage his pursuit, therefore a relish for good offices is an advantage to the owner, because it will furnish agreeable employment for many spaces of time wherein he has nothing to do for himself. Besides, it will teach him to rejoice in services wherein he had no hand, make him partake of the pleasures he sees, and even lighten his misfortunes by reflecting how many people are exempt from them. Nor let it be objected that those who sympathize with the successful will be apt to do the like with the afflicted, for the perfect wise man would feel none of the uneasiness of compassion, and though we imperfect creatures must encourage it so far as to give a spur to our industry in helping, yet we may prevent it from making us suffer much at the sight of distresses we cannot possibly relieve. So that for a few troubles of this kind the tender-hearted man meets with, he finds a multitude of enjoyments the cross-grained and selfish never taste of.

16. Fifthly, benevolence prevents groundless suspicions and jealousies, ill opinions of mankind, unfavorable construction of words and actions; for men are not wont to think ill of those to whom they wish well. It will likewise make us observant of happy events befalling other people, for we naturally take notice of objects we are pleased to see; which will give us a better notion of external nature and the dispensations of fortune. For the tastes and wants of mankind varying infinitely, what suits one extremely well is wholly useless to another, wherefore those narrow souls who can see nothing good that does not relate to themselves, if their own desires happen to be disappointed, grow melancholy, discontented, and out of humor with the world. But the generous open hearted man sees a thousand bright spots in the prospect around him, not striking directly upon himself but reflected from others: when the clouds hang over his own head he can smile at the sunshine on either hand, and please himself in contemplating the uses of things that cannot do him any service. I believe it may be generally remarked that the best tempered people are the best satisfied with the persons and things about them, freest from gloominess and repinings at the condition of human life, and consequently easiest in themselves, most uninterruptedly cheerful, and best pleased with their situation.

17. By often contemplating these advantages of benevolence, a man may bring himself to a hearty liking of it, and then whatever opportunities of exercising it offer, he will embrace them out of inclination, not from any selfish views, but because he thinks it the best, the most becoming, and most satisfactory thing he can do. For desire being perfectly translated to the act itself, he will no more need to retain in mind the reasons first inducing him to put on that disposition, than the covetous man has to keep his eye upon the conveniences he may purchase with his money, or the mathematician to run over perpetually the whole process of demonstration by which he arrived at his theorems. For we have remarked more than once before, that it is the motive at present in view, not any inducement formerly recommending that motive, which denominates the action: therefore he who shows an habitual readiness to do good offices without further consideration than their being such, is truly benevolent, whatever prudential or other causes first gave him that relish.

18. But there is a spurious benevolence, too often mistaken for the genuine, which proceeds from violent attachments to particular persons: some will do anything for those they fancy, but nothing for those whose faces they do not like. This stands but one little remove from selfishness, being a weakness rather than a

virtue, rendering men partial to their favorites, unjust or indifferent to everybody else, and therefore ought carefully to be guarded against. For the virtues do not use to destroy nor interfere with one another, nor will sterling benevolence ever make the possessor unequitable, or intemperate in his likings; it knows no bounds besides those of reason, and diffuses itself to all capable of receiving benefit by it: I do not say in equal measure, but as justice, though not requiring an equality of possessions, yet secures the rights of all alike, so will benevolence deal out to all their proper share of kindness, nor ever confine her regards so closely to one or a few objects as to have none left for any others.

 CHAP. XXXV.

MORAL POLICY.

PLATO, in his fifth republic, introduces Socrates declaring, that the world would never go well until either philosophers were entrusted with the management of public affairs, or persons in authority became philosophers: that is, as he explains it afterwards, until both sciences of political and moral wisdom centred in the same persons. If this assertion be taken literally, I am afraid it will not conduce much to the benefit of mankind, for each science being more than enough to employ the thoughts of any single man, were our ministers to spend their time in hunting after the abstractions of metaphysics, they must unavoidably neglect many duties of their station; and on the other hand, were the helm of government committed to persons well versed in these matters, the ship would quickly strike against the rocks for want of skillfulness in the pilots, who would be more attentive to the rectitude of their course than expert in their measures for pursuing it. This construction then savors more of philosophical vanity than sound prudence: as it arrogates to the studious a claim to power, or at least would make him of consequence with men of power, by urging them to a pursuit wherein they must resort to him for instruction. Therefore I should rather interpret Socrates' meaning to be, that either professor, without interfering in the province belonging properly to the other, should only adopt so much of each other's science as may render his own more complete and effectual.

2. How much of philosophy may be requisite for politicians I shall not presume to determine: for as they must be possessed

of great sagacity and penetration to have merited that character, they are much better qualified to judge for themselves than I can be to direct them. Yet I think I may without offence, exhort them to use their own judgment, not only in contriving methods for bringing their schemes to bear, but in discerning the propriety of the schemes they take up. What tends most effectually to increase their power and aggrandizement, it belongs to their own science to ascertain; but I could wish they would ask themselves further why they desire power or aggrandizement at all. I do not propose this question by way of defiance, as if I thought there could no solid reason be given for entertaining such desire: but if we have ever so good reasons for our conduct, I conceive it expedient we should know them, because they may direct us how far and in what manner to pursue it. Common persons may be allowed to act implicitly upon principles instilled into them by others, for their want of capacity to strike out lights for themselves will plead their excuse: but for men of extraordinary talents to make power their ruling passion merely because they were taught to admire it in their childhood, because they see others aspiring eagerly after it, because it gains the applauses of the multitude, because it happens to hit their fancy, seems unbecoming their character. It may be expected from such that, instead of acting upon impulse or suffering themselves to be drawn by sympathy and example, they should trace their motives up to the first principles where no reason can carry them, and before they begin their career of ambition, examine the grounds which may justify them for entering upon such a course. If they should find upon such inquiry that happiness or complacency of mind, from whatever object received, is the sole proper and ultimate end of action, that the good of every individual is best promoted by promoting the general good, that our passions and particular aims ought to be regarded as engines, employed by reason for spurring on our activity to work out her purposes, and that whatever desire can be no longer gratified it is most prudent to extinguish, they might then employ their power while they had it, in advancing the welfare of their country, as well by procuring its strength and security against foreign dangers, as by establishing regulations for its internal polity: and if age or infirmities, the intrigues of a cabal or popular distaste, should divest them of their authority, they might resign it quietly, without reluctance, without attempting to raise disturbances, and without want of employment to solace themselves with, in a private station. I am the more emboldened to offer this exhortation, because I conceive it not disagreeable to the taste of the present times; if one

almost immured within his closet may judge of the sentiments of the great by so much of their behavior as stands exposed to public view. For our wars are made, not for ambition or conquest, for particular views or private resentments, but for the security of commerce and advancing the public interests: wholesome provisions are annually contriving for the better order, the convenience, and even pleasures of the community: when changes happen in the ministry they pass on silently without interruption to public affairs, except a little clamor and invective while the smart of a disappointment is fresh, which disturbs the quiet of none but such as are fond of the sport for want of something better to employ their time in: and in general I think I can discern a stronger tincture of sound philosophy and regard to the general good among our modern statesmen than I can find in the histories of our ancestors.

3. Thus much may suffice for the politicians, and more it might not have become me to urge upon men of their superior talents: but with regard to the philosophers, under which class I would beg leave upon the present occasion to comprehend all who apply any serious attention to study the measures of right and wrong, I may be more free and particular, as reckoning them to lie nearer my own level. And I cannot help remarking that their ardor for virtue sometimes outruns their discretion, and like other strong desires defeats its own purposes through too great eagerness in pursuing them. It is possible with the best intentions in the world to bring much mischief both upon ourselves and others, by following headlong a blind zeal without knowledge and without examining the expedience of our aims or fitness of the measures taken to effect them. The province of zeal lies in seasons of action, and its office is to carry us through labor, pain, difficulty, danger, to bear down the force of any passion that shall obstruct our passage; but it does not become us to act without considering why nor wherefore, and in seasons of deliberation the mind cannot be too calm and unprejudiced, nor the mental eye too disengaged from any single point, or too much at liberty to look upon every object around and discern them in their proper colors. Wherefore, I apprehend with Socrates, that the world would go on much better, if well disposed persons would not confide too implicitly in their rules, but examine them from time to time as they have leisure and opportunity, consider their tendencies, mark how they succeed, and observe whether in particular instances they lead to that ultimate end of all rules, the increase of happiness: and further, if in the prosecution of them they would mingle a little policy with their uprightness, choosing such measures, as upon every occasion will

contribute most to the purpose they have in hand. Craft, cunning, and artifice, stand opposed to fair dealing, sincerity, and open-heartedness; from whence it seems to have been unwarily concluded, that to be honest a man must have thrown aside his understanding. But there are honest arts as well as deceitful tricks, and it is not the manner of proceeding, but the aim driven at, that denominates them either. The same sagacity and attention to catch opportunities, which makes craft in the selfish, becomes prudence and good policy in the benevolent: nor do I see why a man should not employ all the talents nature and education have furnished him with to good purposes, because some others have perverted them to bad ones. The covetous man, who makes money his idol, will cheat for it if he cannot procure it otherwise: what then should hinder the good man, who takes happiness for his sole aim, from cheating his neighbors into it, if he cannot get them to receive it willingly?

4. The foundation of politics I take to lie in submitting every other desire to the ruling passion: though honors be particularly alluring to the ambitious, yet if the statesman sees that he shall have greater influence by sitting among the commons, he will not accept of a title; and how strongly soever he may have established maxims with himself for increasing his interest, if he perceives them by any circumstances rendered improper for his purpose, he will readily forego them. Now the virtuous man's principal aim is the advancement of happiness, to which every other consideration ought to give way; and though he may have contracted desires as subservient thereto, and set up marks for himself to guide him on his way, yet if by any accident his desires become incompatible therewith or his rules lead him astray, he ought to depart from them without scruple; he may cast his eye upon the marks for the direction they will afford him, but ought never to forget the main purpose for which they were set up. We have seen that satisfaction consists in perception, that action is good only as it affords satisfactory perceptions, and virtue good as it leads into a course of such actions: so that virtue is a means only conducting to our ultimate end, and stands at least two removes from happiness. It is true we cannot expect to attain our end without using the proper means, and I know of no means so proper or effectual as a steady adherence to whatever our moral sense represents to us as right. Were our internal senses of nature's immediate donation, they would probably discern their objects as truly and distinctly as the bodily senses, but it has been shown in a former place that their judgments are of the translated kind, conveyed to us through experience, sympathy, or the in-

structions of others, which channels sometimes corrupt the stream : so that this guide, though the surest we have, does not always prove infallible, nor is there anything so idle or absurd but what men have been reconciled to, under a notion of its being right. How many have been led into all the follies of 'fashion, drawn into mischievous compliances with the company, put upon ruinous expenses, urged to take revenge for slight affronts and supposed injuries, hurried on through all the cruelties of persecution, because they esteemed them right? Perhaps their own judgment and inclination would have carried them another way, yet they proceed, though with reluctance, because they think they ought. For shame, resentment, vanity and prejudice, will sometimes assume the garb and countenance of a moral sense.

5. Nor is reason herself to be trusted too hastily, for she may find occasion to correct her own mistakes : and an obstinate adherence to her decisions once made, against further information, tends as much to produce bigotry as any deference to authority whatsoever. Persons of this tenacious turn allege ordinarily in their defence, that we must necessarily follow our reason, because we have no higher faculty to control it : but it is no uncommon thing for the same faculty to control its own judgments. What have we to judge of visible objects beside the eye? yet this eye, upon their being brought nearer, or placed in a different light, may discover the fallaciousness of the notices itself had given before : or on perceiving a haziness in the prospect, may know its own appearances to be imperfect, and yield to the information of others who stand in a situation to discern them clearer. So reason may find causes sometimes to submit herself to authority, and trust to others in matters belonging to their several sciences, although appearing paradoxical to herself : nor can she ever be so sure of her determinations, but that evidence may arise sufficient to overthrow them. Let us then admit it possible that a man may act very unreasonably through too strong an attachment to reason ; let her therefore continually watch over her own motions, as well as those of our inferior powers, for if she treads confidently and carelessly, she may be as liable to trip as appetite.

6. Besides, it has been made appear before that reason actuates very few of our motions, she acts chiefly by her inferior officers of the family of imagination : while her treasures remain in her own custody they rest in speculation alone, nor do they become practical until she has made them over in property to her partner, in which case they take the nature of appetites. For it avails nothing to know what is right, nor to resolve upon it, until we have contracted a desire and inclination strong enough to carry

us through all difficulties in the pursuit of it : so that virtue itself when completely formed is but an appetite, acquired indeed by our own industry, but impelling to action in the same manner with the natural. Now none of our appetites, not even the best of them, can be left entirely to themselves without extreme hazard : our very hunger and thirst after righteousness, like that of meats and drinks, if eagerly and fondly indulged, may rise to extravagant cravings, or hanker after unwholesome food.

7. But neither can the love of rectitude in general answer all the purposes of life : we must divide it into various branches, and furnish ourselves with under propensities suitable to the various occasions wherein we are to act, from whence spring those inferior virtues that help to diversify the characters of mankind. Now how much soever the main foundations of right and wrong may be laid in nature, and consequently unalterable, certain it is that the particular habits and propensities, conducting us in the several parts of our behavior, may change their rectitude with a change of situation or circumstances ; and what is virtue at one time or in one man, become vice or folly in another. What is more commendable than application in a young lad, while the spirits are brisk, and the animal circulation vigorous ? but if he continues the same intenseness of application after age and infirmities have disabled him from doing any good thereby, when it takes him off from other duties whereof he may be capable, or tends to impairing his health, it becomes faulty. To the young trader beginning upon a slender stock, a habit of parsimony and attention to little matters is a necessary duty : but if any sudden fortune should cast an estate upon him, the same disposition of mind would remain no longer proper or becoming. It is well known what strong hold our habits of all kinds take upon us, and those first recommended by reason, or taught us by persons in whose understanding we confide, are looked upon as right in themselves, taken as first principles of action, and not easily laid aside when grown unreasonable ; unless we have practised that statesman's habit of casting our eye frequently upon our ultimate end, and used ourselves to try our rules of conduct by a reference to expedience.

8. The same consideration likewise may induce us to regard other things more beneficial to the world in some cases than what is ordinarily esteemed virtue. A man that wants shoes, will sooner resort to a clever workman, than one scrupulously honest, that is a bungler in his trade : and when attacked by a distemper, had rather call in a debauchee physician, skilful in his profession, than one strictly conscientious, but of dull capacity and little ex-

perience. Were all our artisans and professors to barter their knowledge and dexterity for a proportionable degree of virtue, the world would suffer greatly by the exchange : we should all be ready indeed to help one another, but could do no good for want of knowing how to go about it. Therefore there are other qualities, beside that of an upright disposition, worthy the attention of him that designs the general good. The want of making this reflection, seems the grand mistake of enthusiasts and rigid observers of a stoical rectitude : for by their incessant and vehement exhortations to inward righteousness they either make men selfish, so busied in improving the state of their own minds as never to do anything for anybody else, unless to pray for them, or censure them, or give money to those who pretend to give it away again ; or else take them off from the business of their callings, wherein they might do real service to their neighbors. But virtue, as has been observed before concerning reason, confers us very little benefit with her own hands, no more than by that complacence of mind we feel in the exercise of it, which we may sometimes find as well in the gratification of any other desire : the principal service she does is by keeping us diligent in acquiring all other things beneficial to us, and applying them, when acquired, to the best advantage both of ourselves and others. Wherefore he that never loses remembrance of the general good, will endeavor to procure for himself and such as lie within his influence, all useful endowments both of body and mind, as well as the disposition to use them rightly. If he should do otherwise, he would be like a man who should spend his whole time in a riding school, in order to make himself a complete horseman ; but never get a horse to ride upon either on the road or field.

9. Nor must it be forgotten that our virtues do not start up in us instantaneously, but grow out of other habits and desires. Ambition, covetousness, vanity, spur us on to industry, an affectation of being thought polite, makes men obliging, fear begets caution, obstinacy produces courage, and a careful regard to our own interests generates discretion, from whence sprouts the cardinal virtue of prudence. The main turn of our future lives, is ordinarily given before we arrive at manhood : the course we are then put upon by our friends, or led into by our own particular liking taken up without judgment but by mere fancy, the tastes, inclinations, opinions, we then imbibe, lay the foundation of those virtues we afterwards acquire. Perhaps, an admiration raised at the finery of a Chancellor, or Lord Mayor's coach, may have stimulated many a young school boy or apprentice to that application which lays the ground-work of those good qualities that will

make him eminent at the bar, or in commerce. Therefore a judicious lover of virtue, will study to cultivate and prepare the ground for its reception, and nourish up such wild plants as may serve for stocks whereon it may be grafted most easily, and flourish most abundantly.

10. He will consider further, that the busy mind of man cannot stand a moment idle : our activity must exert itself some way or other from morning to night, and if reason has not planned out a course wherein it may expatiate, it will run after any whim or folly that shall present it with allurements. Besides, satisfaction being momentary, cannot be provided for completely without supplying fresh fuel every moment to keep it alive : happiness depends upon having something constantly at hand, wherein we can employ ourselves with relish. Now, the grand occasions of exercising virtue do not offer at every season, nor can the mind always find employment in her immediate service : wherefore it will be expedient to furnish ourselves with other aims and pursuits, methods of engagement or recreation, which may fill up the spaces she leaves vacant ; choosing such, if possible, as may conduce remotely to her interests, or at least such as are innocent, and may protect her by preventing the growth of those evils that might blight and overshadow her.

11. It is one characteristic of policy, that it aims at things feasible rather than things desirable, never attempts impossibilities, but applies its endeavors always to drive the nail that will go, and lays aside its most favorite schemes when the tide of popular dislike sets most strongly against them. If the nation will not have an excise, the statesman lays aside all further thoughts of it ; and if they will have a militia, he concurs in planning schemes to satisfy them. In this respect, your very righteous people prove often grossly deficient : they fix their eye upon the sublimest heights of virtue, without considering whether they be attainable ; they confine their exhortations to practices that would prove of excellent service, but they have no likelihood of ever being followed ; and so by aiming at too much, miss of that benefit they might have done. Whereas it would become them better to study not only the abstract nature of things, but likewise the nature of men, their characters, dispositions, and capacities ; accommodating their endeavors to the subjects whereon they exert them, and circumstances of the times wherein they exert them ; choosing rather to sow such seeds as the soil will bear, and the season cherish, than such as would yield the most delicious grain. The interests of virtue require sometimes that we should temporize and dissemble, becoming all things to all men, if by any means we may gain

some, and drawing them unawares into their good, by seeming to soothe them in their favorite inclinations. He that would serve virtue effectually, must not disdain to do her small services as well as great, for occasions of the latter, as was observed in the last section, do not occur at every turn; and many times, when we cannot get her authority to prevail, we may introduce something very much resembling her, and contribute to the growth of other good qualities, that shall in some measure supply her place, by instigating to the very works she herself would recommend. Besides, when the mind has been habituated to the practice of good works, from what motive soever induced thereto, it will become more susceptible of right intentions afterwards.

12. There is a well-known maxim of politics, Divide and govern, which the moralist may turn to good account in the management of his province. The little state of man is far from being an absolute monarchy, or having any settled or well-regulated polity, the prerogative lies within a very narrow compass, but the power lodges in the rabble of appetites and passions: and any importunate fancy, that like some popular orator, the favorite of the day, can raise a mob of them to clamor after it, bears down all opposition. Reason can do nothing to stem the torrent, unless she can stir up a party among the populace to side with her: for if they begin to quarrel among themselves, she may then cast in her weight, to turn the balance between them. Nor can she ever prevail by mere dint of resolution, to have her commands vigorously executed without aid of some passion to second her; and, as she will always find one or other of them opposing her measures, she must continually play them one against another: pleasure against indolence, selfishness against pleasure, vanity against selfishness, fear against rashness, shame against indulgence, resentment against cowardice, reputation against injustice; and particular desires against their several competitors. Wherefore she ought to bend her endeavors towards suppressing the most riotous, rather encouraging the weaker and more manageable, that she may have something ready at hand to assist in pulling down the others: but above all, she must beware of letting any one grow so powerful, as that it may wrest the staff out of her hands. If she does admit a ruling passion, let her employ it as a first minister to execute her orders, not as a favorite, to gain an ascendant over her, nor suffer it to fill the council board with a clan of its own dependents. Your zealots sometimes commit this oversight; for observing that all men have a desire of excelling, they endeavor to turn this principle to the services of virtue, and herein they do well: but they go on to encourage it without measure

until it begets spiritual pride, censoriousness, sourness, envy, and ill nature, possesses their whole minds, becomes the sole motive to do good works, and vitiates the best of their performances.

13. The politician carefully surveys the ground before him, considers what may be done with the materials he has to work upon, does not run counter to prevailing humors nor particular fancies, but studies how to turn them to his own advantage, sets every engine at work, and neglects no trifle that may be employed any ways to advance his purposes. So let the moralist observe the disposition and qualities of his own mind, the circumstances of his situation, the temper and character of the times wherein he lives: not striving to force his way by opposition, nor vainly expecting to make everything tally with an ideal plan, how well soever framed in his own imagination; but contriving how to draw the most good from opinions and customs already received, by grafting something beneficial upon them: not driving men violently out of their accustomed courses, but turning them gently and dexterously into such track as may lead to their solid advantage. For a single person may promote the interests of virtue better by joining in with the company to encourage practices tending in any degree thereto, than he can by striking into a new road which he has nothing besides his own authority to recommend. Nor let him despise every little ceremony or vulgar notion as idle and unworthy his notice: for sometimes these small springs may be turned to good account, or made to put others in motion which may prove more efficacious.

14. It is no inconsiderable branch of the minister's art to discern the talents of men, to know what they are fit for, and employ every one in the way wherein he may be most useful. In like manner it is an essential part of the moralist's office to observe carefully with what endowments nature and education have furnished himself or any others he has to deal with, what are the duties of their respective stations, and what opportunities they have of promoting the grand design of happiness. For though it were to be wished that every virtue might be infused into every man, yet this being impracticable, it behoves each person to acquire such particular species of them as are best adapted to his use. For different professions require different qualifications to succeed in them: courage is peculiarly necessary for some, temperance for others, impartiality of justice for others.

Wherefore let every man apply himself to the attainment of that virtue wherein he can make the greatest progress, and which will render him the most serviceable according to the situation and circumstances he stands in. Were it possible to make profound

philosophers of the common artisans and mechanics, the world would be very little benefitted thereby, for it might take them from attending to the business of their occupations, and render them less useful members of the community: therefore it were better for them to cultivate the qualities of honesty and industry in their callings without aiming at much beside. Some, whose talents fit them peculiarly for the office, may do more good by improving their reason, pursuing such speculations as may produce something beneficial to others; but few of these are wanted in the world, for one man may discover what will employ thousands to use. The far greater part of mankind have little more work for their reason than to choose their guides and apply the directions received to their own particular occasions, for the service they do lies in action. The purposes of life are effected by an infinite variety of different ways, and would be better answered by every one taking the task properly belonging to him, than by all crowding in to perform a few of the most important.

15. Your statesmen are observed often to stand much upon punctilios, to contend strenuously for the precedence of an ambassador, the ceremonial of an entry, or style to be used in a treaty. So the moralist, though he always prefers substantials before forms, yet where the latter affect the former he will stickle as earnestly for them: for he extends his view as far as it can reach, and regards not only the present action but the most distant consequences attending it. When he sees usages and ceremonies, however insignificant in themselves, so connected in people's minds with matters of importance as that one cannot be broken through without endangering the others, he will consider them as bulwarks protecting the essentials, and contend for them accordingly with might and main. As the inhabitants of a town exert all their efforts in defending the ramparts, though yielding neither corn nor pasture nor accommodations for their dwelling, for this obvious reason, because when those are taken the town lies at mercy. Of this kind we may reckon the rites of burial and decencies observed towards the dead, which though of no real avail or intrinsic value, yet find place in all civilized countries: because they stand as barriers against that savageness which might otherwise encroach upon men's tempers and cause infinite mischiefs among the living. Nor will he consent to have his rules dispensed with whenever he sees them expedient for the present, if there is a hazard of their being so weakened thereby as never to recover their influence again: proceeding upon my lord Coke's maxim, that the law will rather suffer a private injury than a public inconvenience.

16. But how anxious soever the man of consummate policy may appear about niceties upon proper occasion, there is nobody less hampered with scruples when he sees them standing in the way of his desigus : he can throw aside animosities, put up with injuries, submit to indignities, when it serves his purpose, and join with his bitterest enemies when there chances to be a coalition of interests. Here, too, the man of judicious virtue will follow his steps, nor disdain to employ the ministry of her adversaries in promoting her desigus, not scrupling to cherish any vice or folly that tends evidently to check the growth of others more enormous. It is true he can scarce ever find occasion to use his endeavors this way, for vice and folly sprout fast enough of themselves without needing any culture, and were it possible it would be desirable totally to eradicate them all, for then we might expect to reap a more plentiful crop of happiness. But since evil dispositions will abound, since they continually oppose one another's aims, and prevent the mischievous effects that would flow therefrom, it behoves him to act circumspectly, forbearing to do good where it may occasion a greater hurt, nor attempting to reform the world in points wherein, though it may be faulty, yet a worse evil would ensue upon such reformation. Nor can it be called deserting the interests of virtue to turn our backs upon her for a while in order to serve her more effectually, for policy requires us to do the same in our other pursuits : we follow pleasure through the road of self-denial, money must be disbursed to purchase commodities that will bring in a larger return, and lowliness, says Shakspeare, is young ambition's ladder. So that virtue may well excuse us for running into the enemy's camp to turn his own cannon against him, if we have her interests at heart all the while, and a reasonable prospect of promoting her service in the long run by so doing.

17. Great pains was taken by a particular author some time ago to show that the vices of men tend to the benefit of the community, and though he seems to have made good his assertion in particular instances, yet it was an unfair conclusion to infer from thence in general that private vices were public benefits : for so it might be proved that disease conduces to health, because the doctor sometimes brings on a gout in order to cure other more dangerous distempers, or wishes to raise a fever to force away obstructions causing paralytic disorders. But disease is then only salutary when necessary to remove disease, and vices then only tolerable when they put men upon actions from which their other vices would withhold them. So that the benefit of vice, when it affords any, arises from its hurtfulness : for if the vices it coun-

teracts were not mischievous, there would be no good in that which obstructs their operation.

18. But it is the property of a politician to be close and covert and keep his motives of action to himself. This the man wisely righteous will imitate with respect to the doctrine above mentioned of conniving at particular vices occasionally, which falling into unskilful or ill-designing hands may prove of dangerous consequence, as opening a door to the most latitudinarian practices. Therefore he will lock it up among his esoterics for the use only of adepts, and think the sacredness of the rules of virtue cannot be too strongly inculcated upon the vulgar, who, being apt to take that for good which suits their own humors and interests, would make mad work, unless restrained by the authority of rules. For they do not stand in a situation to judge of the general expedience, but can only be led into it by the maxims of morality, and must unavoidably lose their way the moment they take off their eye from that guidance. I have said before under the article of justice, and repeat it here with regard to morality in general, that I like to see young men rather over scrupulous, nor would wish them to wear off their scruples but by degrees, as they arrive at a full discernment of their respective inconveniences: for it requires a considerable degree of skill and competent experience to prevent liberty from running into licentiousness. Our school-masters keep their lads strictly to the rules of grammar and prosody, nor until perfect therein ever suffer them to launch out into poetical license: they would whip a boy who should write, like Milton, Adam the godliest man of men since born his sons, the fairest of her daughters Eve; or reckon only three syllables in Tiresiàs, or four in Beelzebub, or place their accent in the middle of Prosérpine. It is the master-piece of moral science to know when a fundamental rule may be dispensed with, nor ought great liberties ever to be taken until we have learned by long experience how to do it safely, and have made such a proficiency in virtue, as that a single act of necessary disrespect cannot endanger the lessening our cordial regard for her.

19. There is one piece of good policy very proper for the moralist, though not at all suited to the cabinet, which is, to make others like himself, and diffuse his virtues as far and wide as he has opportunities for so doing. Considering how much of our enjoyments depends upon those we converse with, it may be made a question whether it would be more for a man's case to be wicked himself, but surrounded with persons just, prudent, and benevolent, or to be singly good in the midst of a corrupt and perverse gen-

eration: but there is no need to canvass this point, for it must certainly make for his interest, that the morals of all with whom he has any concern should be improved, and he can take no likelier method for propagating good qualities elsewhere than by cultivating them first in himself. But then he must proceed in this culture with discretion, attending not only to the growth of his plants but to their aptness for transplanting, taking care to make his virtues inviting as well as genuine, to set them off with such appearance as may make them more easily caught by sympathy, to abate of such rigor and austerity as might raise a distaste against them, to forbear what is innocent when likely to give offence; remembering that things lawful may not be expedient, and to have a view in all his actions to their exemplariness, as well as their rectitude.

CHAP. XXXVI.

LIMITATION OF VIRTUE.

I HOPE what has been hitherto delivered, may be found tending to recommend virtue as the most desirable object a man can pursue, to rest it upon the solid foundation of human nature, instead of those airy notions of an essential beauty wherein some have placed it, and to purify it from those extravagancies wherewith it has been loaded by the indiscretion of zealots. But to deal ingenuously and aim at truth, rather than saving the credit of our performance, let us not suppress an exception there lies against it, as limiting and confining the obligation of virtue within a certain compass which ought to extend to all cases universally. For it may be urged, that if satisfaction, a man's own satisfaction, be the groundwork of all our motives; if reason can furnish no ends of her own, but serves only to discover methods of accomplishing those assigned her by sense; if she recommends virtue and benevolence solely as containing the most copious sources of gratification; then are virtue and benevolence no more than means, and deserve our regard no longer than while they conduce towards their end. So that upon an opportunity offering wherein a man may gain some pleasure or advantage slyly and safely without danger of after damage to himself, though with infinite detriment to all the world beside, and in breach of every moral obligation, he will act wisely to embrace it.

2. I cannot deny that the consequence follows in speculation upon the case above supposed, but I conceive such case can never happen in fact, so long as a man has any prospect of good and evil to come. For we must take into account, not only the advantage accruing from an action, but likewise the benefits or mischiefs of the disposition of mind giving birth to it: and if this will lead us into evils overbalancing the present profit of the action, we cannot be said to do it without danger of after damage to ourselves. The virtues belong to the heart rather than the head; or to speak in our own style, their residence lies in the imagination not the understanding; and to be complete must direct our inadvertent motions as well as our deliberate, that is, must become appetites impelling to action without standing to consider their expedience. Now whoever resists their impulse soberly and premeditatedly upon consideration of their being inconvenient to his private purposes, will thereby make such a breach upon their authority and give such a crooked turn to his mind, as must unavoidably draw him into evils greater than any immediate advantage he may gain. All vice, says Juvenal, stands upon a precipice, and if we once step over the brink, nobody can tell how far we shall go down: one of these two things must necessarily follow, either we shall continue sliding until we fall into destruction, or must put ourselves to infinite trouble in climbing the precipice, a trouble far exceeding the pleasure we may have felt at first in the ease of a downhill motion. He that cheats when he can do it safely, will want to cheat at other times, and consequently, must suffer, either by a self-denial or the mischiefs of an indulgence: so that it had been more for his benefit to have adhered inviolably to his rule of honesty. The ultimate end we have assigned for a reasonable creature to act upon was not present pleasure or profit but the aggregate of enjoyments: and we have labored, I hope not unsuccessfully, to prove from a survey of human nature that nothing adds so largely to that aggregate as a right disposition of mind. We have indeed placed enjoyment in gratification, but then have put those who will lend us an ear, in mind, that gratification depends more upon bending desire to such a ply as that it may fasten upon things attainable and convenient, than upon procuring objects of every desire starting up in our fancy. Now the habits of moral prudence and benevolence alone can bring desire to the proper ply: but those habits cannot retain their influence with him who shall wilfully and upon principle permit his other desires to break in upon them. Therefore though the common rules of virtue may lawfully be dispensed with upon an honest regard to her interests

and a judicious discernment of the greater general good, for this strengthens our attachment to those objects whereon the rules were founded : yet we may never infringe them upon any other consideration of pleasure or selfishness, for this would be introducing another principle of action inconsistent with the former. But it would be the most imprudent thing in the world for a man to allow himself in such liberties as must destroy a principle of conduct that prudence and reason have recommended, so long as there remains any prospect of his receiving future benefit from its influence.

3. Nevertheless, it must be confessed that when life draws near to an end, if it should be urged upon us that then the obligations to virtue must cease, I should not know what to answer. For since they arise from expedience, they must drop of course when there is no longer a possibility of that expedience taking place. We have laid down before, that a man need never deny himself in anything unless in order to please himself better another time ; if then he shall never see that other time, there is no reason why he should deny himself at all : but he may without scruple gratify whatever desires he finds in his heart, since there is no room for any bad consequences to follow upon them ; nor need he fear their subverting a principle he has found all along of excellent use to guide him in his conduct, when he has no further course to run wherein that principle may direct him. Why should he restrain his extravagance when he has enough to last him the little time he expects to live ? why should he forbear intemperance when it cannot have time to fill him with diseases ? why should he scruple to cheat when he shall slip out of harm's way before a discovery can overtake him ? why should he trouble himself with what becomes of the world when he is upon the point of leaving it : or do anything for the benefit of others, when he can receive no returns from them, nor in any manner gather the fruits of his labors ?

4. But notwithstanding this concession, it does not necessarily follow that a man must quit the practice of virtue when he sees his dissolution approaching ; for this will depend upon the turn of mind he has already taken. If indeed he has pursued it hitherto by constraint, and still finds in himself strong propensities to gluttony, debauchery, gallantry, and other inordinate desires, I have suggested no arguments which might induce him to restrain them, nor offered advantages he can reap sufficient to compensate the trouble of a self-denial. For as physicians permit, a patient, whom they have absolutely given over, to eat and drink whatever he pleases, because when nothing can do him good nothing can hurt him ; so the moralist will think it in vain to prescribe a regimen

for diseases for the mind, when there is no time to work a cure, nor any enjoyment of health to be expected. Our motives of action are not to be changed presently, nor can we give a new turn to desire as easily as put on our clothes; therefore, when the glass is almost run out, it is too late to think of taking up a set of fresh inclinations, but every one must be left to make the most of those he already possesses. But this very consideration will engage the man who has spent his days in a virtuous course to persevere in it to the last: not indeed now from obligation or expedience, but for the ease and pleasure he finds in pursuing an habitual track. We observed just now that the virtues to be complete must have fixed their residence in the heart, and become appetites impelling to action, without further thought than the gratification of them; so that after their expedience ceases, they still continue to operate by the desire they raise. Nor is it unusual in other cases for men to continue the courses they have been accustomed to, after the reasons upon which they began them are no more. I knew a mercer, who having gotten a competency of fortune, thought to retire and enjoy himself in quiet, but finding he could not be easy without business, was forced to return to the shop and assist his former partners gratis, in the nature of a journeyman. Why then should it be thought strange that a man, long inured to the practice of moral duties, should persevere in them out of liking, when they can yield him no further advantage? To tell him that he may squander without fear of poverty, gluttonize without danger of distempers, and bring a secret mischief upon others without hazard of its ever coming round upon himself, were no temptation to him: for he has no relish to such diversions, his appetites having been long since set upon what is just, and becoming, and beneficent. So that though prudence has no further commands, he will employ himself in the same exercises he used to enjoin, as the most agreeable way wherein he can lay out his few remaining moments.

5. Upon this occasion, I cannot avoid entering the lists once more on behalf of Epicurus, to vindicate him against a charge of inconsistency, laid by Tully in his second *de Finibus*, Cap. 30, 31. Epicurus it seems had written a letter, on the last day of his life, to one Hermachus, earnestly recommending his pupils, the children of his deceased friend, Metrodorus, to his tuition. And had directed by will, that his executors should provide an entertainment, yearly, on his birth day, and on the like day of every month, for such as used to study philosophy with him, in order to preserve alive in their minds the remembrance of himself and of the said Metrodorus. Now this friendly concern for

the name and family of Metrodorus, and this careful provision for keeping up the spirit of the sect, by bringing them together once a month, Tully thinks acting out of character in one who referred all things to pleasure, and held that whatever happens after our decease is nothing to us. But whoever observes the motions of the human mind, may see that many things which are nothing to us when they happen, are yet a great delight to us in the prospect and contemplation. How often do people please themselves with laying schemes for raising a family, or spreading their fame to future ages, without any probable assurance that they shall enjoy the successes of their family, or have any knowledge of what the world shall say of them a hundred years hence? but the thought of what shall then happen affords them a present entertainment, and therefore they follow pleasure as much in promoting those schemes as they should do in pursuit of any favorite diversion. I would fain know how Tully would have had Epicurus dispose of his last day to have acted in character: should it have been spent in the enjoyment of nice dainties, exquisite wines, or fine women? this he might have expected had he had the same notion of Epicurus that we have of an epicure. La Fontaine's glutton having eaten up a whole salmon all but the jowl, so surfeited himself therewith, that his physicians declared him past all hopes of a recovery: well, says he, since the case is so, then bring me the rest of my fish. Now this man we must own behaved consistently with himself throughout: but why must other people follow his example who have not the same fondness for salmon? Let us give everybody their due, whether we like them or not: it appears from what accounts have been handed down to us, and which Tully was not ignorant of, that nobody was less of an epicure than Epicurus himself. He had carefully studied the sources of pleasure and found nothing more conducive thereto than temperance, patience, benevolence, and all the moral virtues; we may suppose he had so full a persuasion of this their tendency, and so inured himself to the practice of them, that he had gotten an habitual liking to them, and could not turn his hand to anything else with equal relish. Imagine then a man of this turn arrived at the last morning of his existence, and considering how to pass his only remaining day with most satisfaction to himself: how could he do it better than by continuing that course which he had constantly found most pleasurable and best suited to his taste? There is no occasion to suppose the love of probity, friendship, and public spirit, to be innate: for the perpetual experience and contemplation of their advantageousness is enough to make them objects of desire.

6. But though I have thus much to allege in favor of Epicurus, towards showing that his conduct might be all of a piece when he wrote the letter and made the will above mentioned, notwithstanding his referring all things to pleasure: yet I cannot so easily justify Regulus against all imputation of imprudence upon the like principle. For it is one thing to contrive how we shall lay out the day in a manner most agreeable to our liking, when nothing we do therein can affect us to-morrow, and quite another to take our measures wisely when it depends upon our present behavior whether we shall have a morrow or no. There is nothing more glaringly evident than that the end of Being must put an end to enjoyment: therefore, he that takes a course, how satisfactory soever to his own mind, which must destroy him, acts imprudently, as he consults present satisfaction rather than the aggregate of it wherein happiness properly consists. Nor am I moved with those ranting exclamations of the Stoics, that there is more joy in a day well spent than in years of sensual delights: I am sensible our pleasures are not all equal in degree, but I cannot conceive how so much enjoyment can be crowded into a small space of time as to make it worth our while to neglect years to come for the sake of it; for our organs can neither bear nor contain so large a measure. Such outcries are in the style of the dissolute and inconsiderate, as encouraging the same disregard to the future with the maxim they proceed upon, a short life and a merry. But the most fatal mistake men are apt to fall into, lies in their estimating pleasures according to the degree of them: for it has been made appear under the article of Pleasure, that we are much more beholden to those of the gentler kind, as adding more largely to the aggregate of satisfactions, than to the intense. Even our common diversions please more by the engagement of some pursuit they put us upon than by the joy of an acquisition. Nor shall we see cause to lay so much stress upon the raptures of virtue, when we reflect how many less worthy objects can give them as well for a time; a sudden turn of good fortune, a title of honor, a ribbon, whether blue, green, or red; the smiles of a mistress, a kind word, a delusive promise, the veriest trifle, will do it in proportion to the fondness there is for them: so that a day spent in the accomplishment of any eager desire carries as much intrinsic weight, abstracted from all considerations of the future, as a day spent in the exercise of virtue. Wherefore the preferableness of virtue does not arise so much from the transports she occasions as from the calm serenity and steady complacency of mind she insures, the satisfactory reflections she gives scope to, the attainableness of the desires she raises, their compatibleness

with one another, and their clearness from mischievous consequences: all which regard the time to come, and therefore cannot consist with whatever renders us incapable of good or evil for the future.

7. Yet neither can it be certainly concluded from men's enduring patiently for a good cause, that they feel those transports in supporting it which shall keep their minds in a state of continual enjoyment: for we may remember, that objects operate no less by the want than the desire of them; by our unwillingness to miss them than by the pleasure of moving towards them: and that there is an abhorrence of vice as well as a love of virtue. When motives act this way they fall under the class of necessity, which always throws the mind into a state of uneasiness; nor is her condition instantly bettered upon doing well while it is done out of obligation, nor until we can come to do it upon liking. If this were Regulus' case, we must certainly pronounce him to have acted imprudently, and that Epicurus could not have done the same consistently with his principles, since he gave up all those enjoyments he might have expected in a longer life without receiving even present pleasure in exchange: and it had been for his benefit to have had no such strong attachment to his obligations. But not to derogate from the character of Regulus, let us suppose the utmost that can be supposed in his favor: let us allow him to have felt so great satisfaction in the nobleness of his conduct as drew out the sting of every evil that could befall him, and to have ended his days in exquisite delight amidst all the cruel torments that were inflicted upon him. Still this delight, how high soever in kind, must necessarily fall short in duration; and he had better have contented himself with smaller pleasures which might have compensated by their continuance for what they wanted in weight. Perhaps it may be said he had contracted so strong a detestation of treachery and abhorrence of infamy that he could not support himself in any quiet of mind under the reflection of them: so that being no longer capable of enjoying life with pleasure he chose to end it in a manner that might prove most satisfactory. But what brought him under this incapacity besides his own disposition of mind which could find a relish in nothing but what was just, becoming, and laudable? Another who had not the same squeamish disposition might have found enjoyments enough under general censure and self-reproach to make life desirable. Nor will it suffice to allege that he had good grounds at first for acquiring this disposition, which having once taken up it was not in his power to lay down again at pleasure: for it is not our business to find excuses for him in the weakness of human

nature, which cannot suddenly change a rooted habit of acting or liking that we have long accustomed ourselves to, but to inquire whether this procedure of his were a weakness or no. And for this purpose we must imagine to ourselves a man who should have an absolute command over his inclinations to turn them this way or that as he saw proper, and consider how such an one would use his power in the situation of Regulus. We cannot well suppose otherwise than that such a person would keep his eye constantly fixed upon the original rule of rectitude which drives solely at happiness. He would establish upon that bottom certain maxims of conduct and morality as he judged them conducive thereto: but he would never suffer himself to be enslaved by the maxims himself had established, nor let any subordinate means lead him away from his ultimate end. He would know that what is good and laudable at one time, may become mischievous and blameable by a change of circumstances. He might encourage in himself a love of probity and honor as yielding the largest income of satisfaction, yet if matters came to that pass as to make it appear they must have a contrary tendency, he would throw aside his scruples and turn his thoughts to such enjoyments as were to be had without them.

8. Upon the whole we are forced to acknowledge that hitherto we have found no reason to imagine a wise man would ever die for his country or suffer martyrdom in the cause of virtue, how strong propensity soever he might feel in himself to maintain her interests. For he would never act upon impulse nor do anything without knowing why: he would cultivate a disposition to justice, benevolence, and public spirit, because he would see it must lead him into actions most conducive to his happiness, and would place such confidence in his rules as to presume they carried that tendency in particular instances wherein it did not immediately appear. But it is one thing not to see directly that measures have such a tendency, and another to discern clearly that they have a contrary: and when they take away all capacity of further enjoyment, this is so manifest a proof of their inexpediency as no presumption whatever can withstand. Therefore he will never let his love of virtue grow to such an extravagant fondness as to overthrow the very purposes for which he entertained it.

9. I am apprehensive this conclusion will give offence to many as seeming to undo all we had done before in the service of virtue, by thus deserting her at last in time of greatest need when she is entering upon her most arduous undertakings. Yet I know not wherein we have acted unfairly either in the choice of our premises or deduction of inferences from them. We have searched

every corner of the human breast, and found that all our motives derive either immediately or remotely from our own satisfaction and complacency of mind. Nature has given us this spring as the first mover of all our actions and ultimate object of all our contrivances. We have seen that reason cannot work upon her own bottom, but must fetch materials from elsewhere, for there is no reasoning unless from premises already known before we enter upon the consultation: therefore how far soever she may investigate her principles upon one another she must at last rest in such as she finds assigned her by sense and appetite, her office being only to correct their errors in the prosecution of their aims, to take better measures than they do, and lead to the same point discreetly and effectually which they drive at preposterously and vainly. We have shown that the rules of morality stand on the foundation of happiness, that all notions of them which have not this basis to rest upon are fantastic and unstable: from whence it will follow that whenever, by the unlucky circumstances of our situation, this support happens to be withdrawn from under them, they must necessarily fall to the ground. Thus if our premises lead us to a conclusion we do not like, we may say with Doctor Middleton, that we cannot help it: for it was not our business to hunt for arguments in support of any cause whatsoever, but to take a careful survey of nature without prejudice or prepossession, and gather such observations as should appear resulting therefrom.

10. But it will be said that we have made only a partial and imperfect survey; for if we had availed ourselves of all the light nature would have afforded, we might have discovered that the end of life is not the end of Being, that our dissolution is but a removal from this sublunary stage to act upon some other, where our good works shall follow us and yield a plentiful harvest of happiness which had not time to ripen here: therefore a man does not act imprudently who perseveres in his virtues to the very last, although they manifestly tend to cut him off from life with all its enjoyments, and promise him nothing but pain and torment for the little time he has to continue upon earth. All this, consistently with the nature of my work, I can regard yet only as a suggestion, having found nothing in the progress of these researches to convince us of another life, or show the tendency of what we do here to affect us hereafter: yet neither have I found anything to disprove them, so that they remain proper matter of further inquiry. And since I find them maintained by persons of the greatest learning and judgment, and almost universally received among mankind, since they are in themselves matters of

the utmost importance and we see the limits of virtue cannot be ascertained without them, it would be inexcusable to pass them over unregarded, or without a thorough and careful examination; which not being easily dispatched, so as to settle those points to our satisfaction, I shall reserve them for the subject of another volume. Therefore it may be considered that I am but in the midway of my journey, and what I may learn in the succeeding stages of it is yet uncertain; nor because it is said in § 4 that I have suggested no arguments to induce a vicious man near the end of his days to restrain his desires, and in this section, that I have found nothing to convince us of another life, ought it to be inferred from thence that I may not in my further progress. He that has a good opinion of religion, as having a rational and solid foundation to stand upon, ought to believe that I shall find such arguments and grounds of conviction as have not hitherto occurred, when prosecuting the subject with a fair and careful examination; and may presume that what now appears the most exceptionable part of my doctrine, will then become capable of being turned to the advantage of religion, by showing its absolute necessity to make the system of morality complete. In the meanwhile he cannot surely blame me for attempting to prove that the practice of virtue is the wisest course a man can follow to attain happiness even in this world; and to abate the scandal he might take at the exception made of a person in Regulus's situation, to whom a strong attachment to virtue would be a misfortune, he may please to reflect it is not unsimilar to a declaration of St. Paul's, that if in this life only we had hope we were of all men the most miserable. But one who is proceeding on a course of inquiries can take nothing for granted beforehand, he can draw his inferences only from the premises already collected, and must shape them in such manner as they shall naturally lead him. So that I must still adhere to my present conclusion, until seeing cause to alter it, for I cannot yield to any authority how great or general soever; this would be to depart from the plan I proposed at setting out, which was to try what lights I could strike out by the exercise of my reason, without calling in foreign aids; the extent of that, be it greater or be it less, is the line I am to run; and when I am come to the end of this line I must stop short, unless by another effort of reason, I can chance to catch hold of another clue.

11. Nevertheless, I am very loath to leave the scrupulous reader with an ill impression of me upon him, though but for a season, and yet I do not know how to efface it myself, but must trust to his candor to do the best he can for me. Perhaps his good na-

ture may suggest to him, that if this conclusion I pretend to abide by were my real ultimate opinion, I should not be so inconsistent with myself as to divulge it. For the discovery that a man's own safety will supersede all obligations, is of a nature not to be communicated without lessening its value to the owner: he may believe then I should have locked it carefully up, as a precious deposit to be reserved for private use, that if ever the case should so happen as that I cannot obey the dictates of honor and conscience, without endangering my person, I might avail myself of this secret to slip my own neck out of the collar: but it would certainly be for my interest to persuade the world that the duties of virtue are indispensable, and they ought to sacrifice everything for the good of the public, whereof I am a member, and must consequently share in the fat of their sacrifices. Therefore I think it is no unreasonable favor to expect, that he will suppose I have already run over in my own mind the matters I am to present him with by-and-by, and foresee something will occur among them, which will oblige me to recant the odious part of my doctrine, and come over to his sentiments. Let us then take leave in good hopes, that however we may part a little out of humor for the present, we shall grow better satisfied with one another upon our next conversation.

THEOLOGY.

THE LIGHT OF NATURE PURSUED.

THEOLOGY.

CHAP. I.

SUBSTANCE.

HITHERTO I have proceeded only upon a view of human nature, and the things we are daily conversant with; in order to frame some rules for our conduct, as well in the prudential management of our powers with regard to our own interests, as in joining our mutual endeavors towards promoting those of one another, whereby we may render life more comfortable and happy. But as I proposed in my general introduction to examine the foundations both of Religion and Morality, the reader may think himself disappointed in that, after having attended me through so large a portion of my work, he finds me amusing him with one of them alone without mentioning a single word of the other, and that in such manner as to leave it grossly defective at the conclusion. I am now going to satisfy him in this particular, by which, if pursued with tolerable success, he may expect I shall be able to restore morality to that completion whereof he thinks I have defrauded her.

Let us now therefore, enter upon a careful examination of what other principles may be found besides those we have already collected, and push our researches beyond the scene exhibited by our senses and our experience. And as this attempt will lead us to take a view of external nature and things invisible, or which can be discovered only by the eye of reason, we shall have an ample field to expatiate in, distant objects and extensive prospects

to contemplate, no less than universal Nature, comprehending things visible and invisible, with the connections and dependences running between them, so far as the feeble optics of human understanding can reach to discern them. In the progress of this task I must learn to handle the telescope, the vastness of whose scenes may demand as close an attention to view them distinctly as our minute observations of the microscope have done before. For the objects we are ordinarily conversant amongst lie within a certain compass of magnitude: whatever greatly exceeds or greatly falls short of the sizes familiar to our acquaintance, carries a strangeness and unwieldiness forbidding and irksome to those who read for amusement only. The description of them must not be read but studied, and the describer can do no more than strive to make the study as little laborious as possible. But I cannot yet consent totally to lay aside the microscope, for I pretend to no extraordinary illumination nor direct intuition of things invisible, but can hope only to investigate them by the things that are seen: therefore, it behoves me to attend still for a while to minute objects, being desirous to lay the remainder of my foundation with the same exactness I have endeavored at before.

2. But before we enter upon a view of external nature or proceed to investigate causes from their effects, in order to discover what powers or what laws there may be to govern the invisible world, it will be proper to consider whether we are likely to have any concern in their operation. For as Epicurus rightly observed, that what shall happen after we cease to exist is nothing to us, it will be superfluous to inquire into the sources of enjoyment or suffering in future times, until we have satisfied ourselves that we shall stand in a capacity of being affected by them. Nothing is more certain than that this bodily frame of ours shall be dissolved in a few years; we daily see instances of its mouldering into dust or putrefying into corruption, so that we cannot flatter ourselves with its having a long continuance: but it has been made appear in our survey of human nature, that the body serves only as a channel of conveyance to the mind, which is properly ourselves as being our sentient principle which perceives whatever is perceived by us, acts all that we do, and receives notices from external objects through the corporeal organs. So that our capacity of good and evil to come must depend upon the durability of the mind: concerning which we can know nothing from sense or experience, for they inform us not what becomes of the mind upon dissolution of the body, we do not see it moulder and putrefy like that, yet neither do we see it give any signs of life or existence; nor can we learn anything from the testimony of others

concerning the inhabitants of that country from whose bourne no traveller returns. Therefore, we must endeavor to gather by deduction of reasoning from such observations as experience has afforded us, what is the constitution of the mind and whether it be of a lasting or a perishable nature. I do not forget that we are taught to believe a resurrection of the body, and that some have maintained that the mind although naturally perishable, may be preserved in Being by the agency of a superior power. I would not be thought to reject either of those opinions, but it is obvious that the consideration of them cannot fall within the compass of my present plan : for none ever attempted to show by the mere light of reason, either that the body shall rise again, or that the mind, if corruptible in itself, shall be continued longer than the term assigned her by nature. Wherefore the nature of the mind is the thing to be inquired into : and all who have examined this point, seem agreed to resolve it into another, namely, whether the mind be a compound made up out of several materials, or a pure simple substance without parts or mixture.

For it was admitted on all hands, that whatever was generated may be corrupted ; the productions of nature being only so many various assortments of matter united together by the mutual action of the elements upon one another, as that action never ceases to operate, it must of course destroy what itself had produced : so that the forms of bodies whereon their essence depends continually change and fluctuate ; what is one thing to-day becoming another to-morrow, and a quite different the day after. Those therefore who would shorten our existence to the period of human life, proceeded upon a supposition that the finer parts of the elements, united properly together in a certain organized structure, might produce an animal endowed with life, sense, and motion ; that the degree of sense depended upon the greater or lesser nicety of this organization ; and that thought and reason could not subsist out of the human form. So they held that the mind itself was nothing else beside a curious assortment of elementary particles ranged together after a particular manner, or a harmony resulting from the nice order and mutual congruity wherein they were disposed. This being laid down, it would follow incontestably that the laws of nature, which have brought those elements into the order wherein they stand, may as easily separate them again, and divest them of that sense and reason they had acquired by their contexture : in which case the mind must be destroyed upon dissolution of the body, nor can the harmony subsist after the strings that gave the notes composing it are broken asunder. From whence they justly inferred that the end of life must be the

end of being, and that we can have no concern with anything that shall happen after our decease.

3. Those on the other hand, who would extend our duration beyond the present state, generally set out with showing the absurdity of imagining that any combination of senseless matter could produce sense and reason, which must be primary qualities belonging essentially to the subject wherein they are found, and not resulting from any others. They insist that Mind is a kind of fifth element, different from the other four, not producible out of them, and totally dissimilar from that first matter, whether water, or fire, or atoms, or whatever else can be supposed, whereout the elements themselves originally sprung: that being no production of nature, it is not destructible by any law or power of her's: that when united to body, it does not inhere therein as an accident or modification, but is joined thereto as a distinct substance, and may be separated again without losing its existence. They conceive that upon such separation, it may perform its proper functions better and freer than while encumbered with flesh; or if it should become incapable of exercising its powers, it will nevertheless retain the powers themselves, and continue capable of being united to another organization, which may prove equally fitting for its purposes with that it now inhabits. From whence they as justly infer that death is not an end of Being, but at most only a suspension of sense: therefore it behoves us to carry our thoughts beyond this present state to what shall happen hereafter, as being matters wherein we ourselves may have an actual concern.

4. This question then concerning the simple or compounded nature of the mind, I am to begin with: but before entering upon the discussion, I conceive there is something to be done preparatory thereto, for ascertaining the terms we must employ, without which we cannot proceed with exactness in our reasonings: and as our ideas of compounding seem a little variable and undetermined, I shall begin with endeavoring to settle what is to be understood by the terms Composition and Substance.

5. I have met with people who pretend they have no idea of substance, because they cannot comprehend a naked substance divested of all its accidents: they want to see one taken out from its qualities, and laid upon a table for them to push about and examine, like the spring of a watch taken out from the work. But this is a most unreasonable expectation, for though I see no impossibility there may be a substance devoid of all qualities whatsoever, it is not at all probable there should, because it could be of no use either to itself or anything else: yet if there were any

such we could never know it, for substances discover themselves to us only by their qualities, and those qualities are as irrefragable an evidence of their existence as we could have were we able to discern them without. What we term qualities, as Mr. Locke observes, are powers of affecting us, or of causing alterations in other substances making them affect us differently from what they did before: thus whiteness in snow is the power of affecting us with the sensation of white, heat in fire is the power of affecting us with the sensation of warmth, and of melting wax, whereby it is made to exhibit another appearance than it did while cool and hard. But an act of power is the operation of some agent, of which therefore it gives as full evidence as of the power thereto belonging; for there cannot be power with nothing to exert it. So that naked quality is no more comprehensible than naked substance, and you might as well undertake to lay a substance devoid of quality upon the table as to lay whiteness, squareness, softness, coolness, without laying something white, or square, or soft, or cool: now if this assertion be intelligible, as I presume it is, you must have an idea of every term employed in it, and consequently of the word *Something*, if then there be a meaning in the word, you may take that for your idea of substance.

6. But the quality that most commonly gives us evidence of substance, is solidity, or tangibility, therefore the vulgar do not count those things substantial which they cannot feel compact in their hands, such as froth, vapor, smoke, light, odors, or the like: and they frequently conceive a production of substance, as in the growth of plants; or the destruction of it, as in burning wood, or evaporating water over a fire. But those who use ever so little reflection, know that our senses cannot in any manner be affected without an agent to operate upon their organs: we cannot see light without something striking upon our eyes, nor smell an odor without something entering our nostrils; we cannot perceive a smoke or vapor unless there be something floating about in the air to obscure it, nor discern the colors in a bubble unless there be something capable of refracting the light. They know likewise that our discernment of things, though an evidence of their being, is not an evidence that they began to be just when we discerned them: nor is the loss of that discernment an evidence of their ceasing to be, but only of their removing beyond the reach of our senses. If I find my table dusty, I shall not think the dust a new production, but that it was flying about in the air before I perceived it, and is now only gathered into a thickness to make it visible: and if, on my return after going out

of the room I find the table clean, I shall not suppose the dust absolutely destroyed, but only swept away somewhere out of my sight. So when I see a tree which I remember to have been a slender twig, there is no need I should imagine the great accession of substance a new production, but drawn from the earth, the air, or the clouds, wherein it lay dispersed and undistinguished: and when the tree is cut down and consumed in the fire, there is no occasion I should believe it reduced to the little substance of ashes left behind, but that the rest is dissipated in imperceptible portions in the same manner as before their coming into the tree. Yet when substances by their minute divisions are withdrawn from our observation, we still apprehend them possessing qualities had we senses acute enough to be affected by them: for we are ready to think that we could feel the smallest particles if we had fingers fine enough to take them up, and that if one were pressed ever so strongly on each side by two others of equal bulk, it would keep them from coming into contact. Thus some qualities, especially those of resistance and solidity, seem to be inseparable companions of the substances we are ordinarily conversant with or exercise our thoughts upon; and all qualities, during their continuance, are inseparable from the substances whereto they belong, nor can be removed from them without being lost, for if you rub over a piece of paper with ink, the whiteness is not banished into another quarter but is absolutely destroyed.

7. This necessary connection of qualities with some substance makes them an evidence to us of its existence, for if there could possibly be whiteness without an object to exhibit it I could not conclude from seeing a whiteness that there is something white lying before me. This likewise may convince us that existence belongs solely to substance, quality having none, of its own, being no more than a particular mode of existence in whatever possesses it. Not but that quality has a reality concerning which we are liable to mistake, for a child on seeing an evening mist rise out of a pond may take it for smoke and think the water must be hot: but what else is this than an apprehension that the water is so conditioned as that it will scald him upon putting in his finger, whereas in reality the condition of the water is otherwise and would feel cold to the touch; so that the existence of coldness is nothing else than the water being in such a state as might affect our flesh with a sensation of cold upon being put into it. I am not unapprized that Plato supposed qualities might subsist without any substance to possess them, because while we can form an idea of them they may have a reality in our thoughts: but I beg leave to observe that our idea of a thing is not the thing itself,

for one may remain after the other ceases, and may subsist though the other never had a being. I know well enough what the toothache is though now quite free from it; I remember the transactions of yesterday, but the occurrences themselves are clean gone and over; I have a clear idea of a Cyclops, a Centaur, a Chimera, yet without believing there ever were such things in nature. Nor do I find other people backward in denying the reality of qualities they conceive readily enough: some in their melancholy moods, when put out of humor by egregious impositions, will insist there is no such thing as honesty in the world, they do not mean that they have no idea of it, but in their notion of its reality they refer to some substances possessing it, and you must understand them saying there is no man who possesses a principle of perfect honesty. Besides that the reality of a quality in one subject is not preserved by its remaining in others: the whiteness of this paper does not depend upon the whiteness of that, but would continue the same though there were nothing else white in the world besides; and if I blot it over, the whiteness of that particular paper is utterly gone out of all reality, though I should have ever so many sheets in my closet still unsullied and should remember ever so well how it looked before I spoiled it.

8. From hence it appears that identity carries another meaning when applied to substance than what it does when applied to quality, in the latter being nominal only not real: for though we currently say that two sheets of paper have the same whiteness, yet upon coloring one, the whiteness of that is absolutely destroyed, the other remaining still unhurt, but it is absurd to suppose the same thing can subsist and be destroyed at the same instant. Nevertheless our uses deriving from the qualities of things, it concerns us chiefly to take notice of qualities; for which reason whatever continues to serve our uses in the same manner, we denominate the same thing notwithstanding any change of substance there may have been in it. Thus we count a river the same although perpetually changing its waters, provided those waters be equally fit for our services in swimming, or rowing, or washing, or drinking. Here it is easy to see, that the identity of form only in the river, continues all along, the substance every moment varying: as on the other hand, if you mould a piece of wax with your fingers, it may become sometimes round, sometimes square, sometimes triangular, according as you fashion it, the wax being still the same. Therefore, there is a formal or specific, and there is a substantial identity; the former, when several substances stand so conditioned as to affect us exactly in the same manner, the other, when we are satisfied the substance remains the same,

whether appearing under the same or various forms. Specific identity is a branch of the formal, being of those qualities which constitute its essence, adapt it for some particular uses, and gain it a particular name : thus the wax, while moulding into different figures, still is wax ; but if laid long in a damp place where it loses its oiliness, the essence of wax is gone, and it becomes dirt or some other kind of thing, yet substantially the same it was before. As we can know substances only by their qualities, if we have a dozen eggs in all respects similar which we would distinguish apart, it is common to mark them with No. 1, 2, 3, &c. in order to know them again severally, after being taken out of our sight : for this reason, I suppose, substantial is often called numerical identity, as a synonymous term. Substantial or numerical identity cannot be lost, though we may not know where to find it, for one substance cannot be changed into another, but must always continue the same it ever was ; it can only succeed in the room of another, or assume its form upon that being removed to some other place : and though qualities be so far unchangeable as that squareness can never be roundness, yet are they perishable and producible ; for when the wax is new moulded, the squareness it had is totally lost, not flown off to some other quarter, and the roundness substituted in its place, is a new production, not drawn from any fund where it had lain concealed before.

9. As to the unity of substances, that is not easy to be ascertained, for want of acuteness in our faculties which require numbers of them to affect us in any manner ; for frequent experiments assure us, that all the objects we discern are composed of substances numerically distinct from each other, which when separated, are singly too feeble to touch any of our senses ; we cannot see them nor feel them nor count their numbers, but are perpetually perplexing ourselves with subtle questions concerning their infinitude. But though we cannot tell what is one, we may know what is many ; for whenever we perceive distinguishable parts in an object, we may rest assured it contains as many substances as there are parts we can distinguish. If I have a gallon of wheat before me, I may pronounce that the gallon consists of so many substances as there are grains in the vessel, though I cannot restrain them to that number ; because not knowing how many dusts of flower or particles of bran, all of them distinct substances, lie in each grain ; and if I pitch upon some particular grain and then shake the vessel I may still remain satisfied that my grain is somewhere among the rest, numerically the same as when I took notice of it, and not changed into any other, though I cannot now

find it again. Or suppose the wheat sent to mill, the flour kneaded into dough, then baked into bread, and the bran all employed to stuff pin-cushions: I cannot doubt that the substance of my grain, although altered in form, and dispersed indiscriminately among that of the other corn, still subsists undiminished in the meal, the bread, and the cushions, and that all together contain at least the same number of substances as there were grains in the gallon, besides an accession of others in the water, the yeast, and silk coverings to hold the bran. And as the corns in the gallon, and particles of flour or bran in the corns, have each a distinct being and existence of their own, independent on the rest, and which receives no increase by their junction; hence it seems to follow that the gallon has no other existence than that of the corns, and the corns none other than that of the flour and bran composing them; that nature has made all things in individuals, and though we cannot tell whether what we commonly term so, consists of finite or infinite parts, yet that it must derive its existence originally from single substances, how many soever there be that enter into it.

10. I have observed before, that though qualities are our sole evidence of the substances possessing them, yet we do not imagine the substance destroyed upon losing its qualities: in like manner though the operations of qualities upon ourselves, or upon other substances, when we can perceive them, are our sole evidence of their reality, yet we apprehend the qualities more permanent than their operations, and not lost when they cease: for, if I take a snow-ball into my hand, I shall be satisfied of its coldness by my sensation; but if I throw it out upon the grass where I no more feel it cold, nor perceive its effects upon anything else, nevertheless I shall still remain persuaded it retains the quality of coldness; but if I put it into a saucepan over the fire it will lose its specific essence, being turned into water, and may exchange its quality of freezing for that of scalding. Hence it appears there are qualities which a substance may assume or lay aside according to the texture and position of its component substances or motions among them, and these we term secondary qualities: others which we conceive inseparable from all substances falling under the observation of our senses, whether single, or in junction with others, such as solidity, impulse, and mobility, and these are called primary qualities. Which primary qualities are a necessary foundation of the others, for without solidity a knife could not have the quality of sharpness to force its way into whatever we employ it to cut; without motion and impulse the lucid darts of day-light, as Lucretius calls them, could not affect our optics with

colors ; nor could bodies discover to us their figures without resistance to our touch or force to throw off the light in a particular manner upon our eyes.

CHAP. II.

COMPOUND SUBSTANCES.

WHOEVER will consider the idea of composition a little attentively must perceive it to be a particular manner of juxtaposition, and to contain several species under it as joining, coalescing, mixing, incorporating, and the like. But every bringing of things together does not form them into a compound : if I bespeak a table of Hatchet, the carpenter, which I will needs have him make up in my presence, he prepares the materials at home and brings them all together in a hand-basket ; but I do not conceive them in that position to be anything until he has joined the several parts properly to one another, and then I look upon the boards, the legs, the hinges, the screws, the glue, and whatever else he has put among them, as one thing, which I call a table. So when the cook brings out her flour, her suet, her sugar, her raisins, they still are but what they were before though laid ever so close upon the dresser ; nor do we even then consider them as single things but call them heaps or parcels, which are nouns of multitude, until she has mingled them well into one mass which then becomes a pudding.

2. In like manner nature forms her productions out of materials collected from the elements, but with this difference, that as she works in a finer manner than art can imitate, we seldom know the ingredients she uses until they appear in the composition. Thus the particles constituting a plant could not be distinguished whilst they lay mingled in the mould, the water, or the air, nor do we perceive the sources at all diminished from whence they were drawn, wherefore we are vulgarly apt to regard them as new beings not framed out of any others. Sometimes indeed we may know partly what are the ingredients employed, as when a farmer enriches his ground with manure ; but then the manure must be divided by putrefaction into imperceptible parts before it be fit for nature to work upon. Nevertheless, it is universally agreed by all men of thought and consideration that the substance of everything we see produced was existing before, and is only brought together into that form and order which renders it the object of our notice.

3. Nor does the mind want a power of compounding things that nature has not joined, or of making arbitrary junctures for which she has given no foundation ; as a flock of sheep, a nation of men, a parish, or a bay. For the sheep of a flock, or men of a nation have no more natural connexion with one another than with those of any other drove, or country, the lands of a parish lie as closely contiguous to those of the next as they do to any lands of the same, and the waters of a bay are as much mingled among the waters of the ocean as they are with one another : yet we consider each of them as one thing and call them by names of the singular number.

4. Thus we see compounds produced three ways, by nature, by the hand of man, and by the imagination : and all three proceed in the same manner, to wit, by selecting materials from the funds where they are to be had and placing them together so as to strike our observation as one object. Nevertheless they proceed differently in this respect, that the two former make a real change of position in the things they compound, whereas imagination can work only upon its own ideas, throwing them into a particular order or combination, without actually removing anything from its place. But all composition, whether actual or mental, bears a reference to the thought, for the essence of things depends upon the uses we have for them, the properties we observe in them, or the manner wherein they affect our senses : therefore we conceive them to remain the same so long as they continue to exhibit the same appearances, how much soever the component parts may be shifted : thus we esteem the Thames the same river we saw last year, although the waters of it have been changed a thousand times. Nor do we consider everything as entering into a compound if it does not answer our purpose so to do, although joined as closely as those we call constituent parts : if while Hatchet makes up the table he carelessly drops a spoonful of glue which fastens a chip to it ; or if while our backs are turned, an unlucky boy screws a piece of deal upon one of the leaves, we do not reckon the chip or the deal a part of the table. So neither do we esteem an oak apple as part of the tree, but an excrescence, although adhering as firmly to the leaves as they do to the branches. We say oil will not incorporate with vinegar ; because after shaking them ever so long we can still distinguish them floating amongst one another : but water, arrack, orange juice, and sugar, compose punch, which we reckon a new production, because it affects our senses with a taste and appearance the several ingredients had not before. The blood, humors, and fat in our bodies, seem to enter into the composition of them ; but not the breath

in our lungs nor victuals in our stomachs; because we perceive these continually coming and going: but we do not see when the others fly off or are renewed. Nature unites nothing, not even the strongest of her works, any otherwise than by holding the parts of them firmly together. It is now I think generally agreed among the learned that that quality of bodies called the attraction of cohesion, which keeps them united, is the effect of a certain subtile fluid pressing strongly against them on the outside: so that if a carpenter setting an upright post to support a floor, upon finding it too short should drive in a plank between the post, the plank, and the beam above, although manifestly distinct from one another, would be as truly united as the parts of iron, marble, or other the most compact and durable substances.

5. But it seems this subtile fluid, which makes the particles of matter cohere so firmly when pressing them on the outsides, if it can get between them, rends them as forcibly asunder, whence proceeds their elasticity; so that the heaviest bodies, upon having their parts dissipated beyond their sphere of attraction, may become the lightest: and Sir Isaac Newton supposes air itself generated this way out of metals and minerals. Thus all production is no more than an assortment of minute bodies, imperceptible before, in such manner as to render them discernible; or else throwing them into new forms from whence shall result qualities they had not in their former state: and all destruction no more than a dissipating of them again, or else such a change of their contexture as shall divest them of the qualities they had by their first union. And it depends upon our customary manner of conception and the use of language to determine what shall be deemed a change of one thing into another or only a circumstantial change of quality in the same thing. Cream beaten into a certain consistency by churning produces butter, but upon the same consistency being destroyed by melting it continues butter still, unless the careless cook, thinking of her sweetheart, should let the saucepan stand over the fire, for then we say it is turned into oil. So butter kept to be sour still retains its essence; but dough grown sour makes leaven, and well baked becomes bread, though raw beef well roasted is nothing more than beef as it was before. What is it forms the stars into constellations besides the consent of astronomers? and that upon an apparent only without a real juxtaposition; for the stars of each constellation lie at immense distances from one another, and probably some of Aries may stand further apart from others of the same sign than they do from those of Libra in the opposite hemisphere.

6. The more closely we consider the nature of compounds the more fully shall we be convinced, that how much soever they may change and vary, there is nothing new in them beside their order and situation and the properties arising therefrom ; and that they are nothing but collections or numbers of things brought together so as to affect us in a different manner from what they did when separate, or joined into one idea by the arbitrary power of imagination. It is this collectiveness of compounds that enables us to divide them, and furnishes us with the idea of whole and parts, which being relative terms cannot subsist without their correlatives : for nothing is a whole unless as it contains all the members necessary to complete it, and nothing a part unless in reference to other parts among which it is to be numbered. Every compound must have some quantity, and all quantity may be expressed by numbers, which alone renders it divisible ; for nothing beside numbers is capable of being divided ; but they being combinations of one another and ultimately of units, may either in fact or thought be separated into them again. But what perplexes this matter is that arithmeticians understand by dividing a separating into equal parts : but there may be an unequal as well as an equal division, twenty may be parted into nine and eleven as easily as into two tens, or into three, four, six, and seven, as into four fives ; and in this sense there is no number indivisible until you come to unit ; lower than which you cannot go, for one cannot be divided. I know we often proceed to fractions supposed to express less than unit, but in this notion we impose upon ourselves by shifting our ideas and considering that as a multitude which before we considered as one ; therefore we cannot make a fraction without multiplying first before we divide. He that would part a sum of money into several shares, proceeds first to see how many pounds belong to each, if there be a remainder he multiplies it by twenty to find the shillings he shall allot beside, and so on to pence and farthings ; if there still be a remainder and he would be very exact, having no lower denomination of money to reduce into, he makes an arbitrary coinage in his own mind, and supposes his farthings to contain so many pieces as there are shares into which he would distribute them, which he sets down for the denominator of his fraction ; so a farthing with him is no more an unit than a pound was at first ; nor is seven-thirteenths of a farthing less than an unit, any more than three-pence or seven shillings, which everybody will allow to be whole numbers.

7. Hence and from what has been said in the last chapter may be gathered that composition works a different effect upon quali-

ties from what it can do upon substances: for quality having no existence of its own, but being a particular manner of existing in substances, it is easy to conceive how the manner will vary according to their various coalitions, and that they may acquire powers of affecting us which they had not while single, which will then be new productions having no reality before. This experience testifies, for things invisible when separate may become objects of sight by being brought together in numbers: the vapors in a clear sky we see nothing of, but when condensed into clouds we discern them plainly enough; if you bring up a bottle of wine out of a cool vault in a hot day, though the air appear clear you will quickly perceive a dew gather upon the glass. Qualities mingled together may generate a new quality different from all its constituents: blue and yellow will make a green: all the variety of colors we behold are supposed to be only various combinations of the seven primary, yet you cannot possibly tell which of them, nor in what proportion go to form a brown: whiteness has been demonstrated to arise from the joint action of all the seven operating equally upon you, yet the idea of white contains nothing of other colors as component parts. Position likewise will give substances a form which they had not singly; I may place a number of shillings so as to make a square, the shillings themselves still continuing round; here then squareness has a reality in the number and roundness in the several pieces: so there is no absurdity in a compound having forms and qualities of which the component members are destitute. But this holds good only with respect to secondary qualities which are producible and perishable, as the primary are not; for a solid body cannot be made up of unsolid materials, nor a moveable body of those that are incapable of motion. Therefore forms, qualities, and essences, are producible by composition, destructible by dissolution, and interchangeable among one another by the various stationing of the materials composing them: but with substances the case is otherwise, for however dispersed, or gathered together, or however variously placed among one another, they continue always numerically the same, without increase or diminution of their numbers, or of their quantity, without transubstantiation of any particular one into any other that was not of their number before. A pint of water is the same quantity whether lying in a basin, or evaporated in steam, and if there were five millions of particles in the vessel, there are still the same identical five millions floating about in the air: it is not now water, but still is substance, having lost its essence but not its existence. Or if you suppose each aqueous particle to consist of infinite parts, which might then

be separated to infinite distances, yet in their dispersion they would be the same quantity and number of substances, be it finite, or be it infinite, as while collected in the particle: for it is inconceivable that nature can ever lessen or add to the number of substances she has already in store; she can do no more with them than congregate, or dissipate, or assort them variously, by changing their positions with respect to one another. But our business in common life lies solely with the qualities of things, not their substance, for so we find them convenient for our purposes, we need not care what substance or particular materials they are composed of. If a vintner gives me the taste of wine from a particular pipe in his vaults which I like, I may perhaps desire to have a parcel out of that very pipe, because doubtful whether any of the others might please me so well: but if I could be assured he would send me wine of exactly the same quality and palatableness, I should not be solicitous to have it drawn out of that or a different vessel.

8. For this reason we ordinarily denominate things the same or different, according to their appearances or aptness for our purpose, and when we give them those epithets, we oftener mean specifically than numerically the same or different. Thus if I order my merchant to send me the same wine I had last spring; I can expect only wine conditioned alike; for I must know it is impossible he should send the very wine I have already drank out. Or should I bespeak a box of the joiner, which on coming home appears not shaped according to my orders, I may be apt to say, this is not the thing I wanted: if he carries it back, and afterwards brings me one exactly answerable to my intentions, I shall be content with it, as being the very thing I would have, yet without regarding whether he had made it up of the same materials with the former, reframed, or of fresh stuff, and if he tells me I shall not alter my opinion thereupon. Therefore it is very material for having a just idea of identity and composition, to observe whether, when we use the word Same, we understand thereby the same thing, or the same sort of thing: in the case before mentioned of sending the same wine, it is plainly to be understood wine of the same kind, and when I say of the ill-contrived box, it is not the thing I wanted, my meaning must be that it is not such a sort of box as will suit my purpose, for had it been constructed and worked to my mind, I should have been equally satisfied whatever pieces of deal or wainscot it had been made of. Cream churned into butter is still the same thing it was before, but a different kind of thing, and applicable to different uses: the human body is certainly a different thing in a full-grown man

from what is was in the new-born infant, yet is counted all along the same body, because conveying sensations, and serving for an instrument of action to the same person. But the common language of mankind adapted to the common occasions of life, which require our attention to the kinds, the qualities, and uses of things, leads us perpetually to mistake essence for existence, specific for substantial identity, and the manner of being for being itself. Hence we look upon the production of a compound as a creation, and the change of a substance from one species into another as a transubstantiation : for, when a millwright has set up a windmill, we suppose there is a new thing, a new being produced, because there is a new kind of thing, having properties wanting before, for now it will turn with the wind, and grind our corn, which the disjointed materials could not do : and upon salt being thrown into water, we think the salt has utterly lost its being, and a new substance produced which we call brine. Whereas anybody, with a little reflection, may see that the materials of the windmill retain the same existence when put together as while separate, making only a more serviceable kind of thing than while lying in confusion : and that the brine contains no more nor other substance than was in the water and salt when kept apart. So that all the operations of nature and art which have been performed in the preceding year, have neither added to the number of substances, be they finite or infinite, which were in being a twelve-month ago, nor diminished, nor changed them, but only cast them into various kinds, exhibiting different appearances, and diversely answering our uses.

9. From all that has been observed above, I think it must appear manifest that existence belongs only to individuals, that whatever has a being of its own cannot be divided, and that a compound is no substance otherwise than to our apprehension, but an aggregate of so many substances as the component parts whereof it consists. This will be seen plainer if we consider the incorporations made by men : if our sovereign lord the King embodies six hundred men into a regiment, to be called the royal volunteers, the regiment taken collectively is no real being, but a creature of the imagination : I do not mean to call it a mere shadow, for the brave fellows composing it have a real existence, and I doubt not will prove themselves effective substances in the day of trial, but the body has no other existence than what belongs to the men ; if it had, there would be a power of creation by human management, for then, upon the incorporation, there must be six hundred and one beings instead of only six hundred there were before. In like manner the productions of nature, which are only collec-

tions of imperceptible particles into a perceptible form, add nothing to the number of beings, nor does anything properly deserve that appellation, unless what is uncompounded and indivisible.

CHAP. III.

DIVISIBILITY OF MATTER.

BUT an objection may be thought to arise against the sole claim of individuals to existence, from the divisibility of matter, which according to the fashion at present prevailing among the learned, is held to be absolutely infinite. For it may be urged, that if all body consists of parts, those again of under parts, and so on forever, we must either suppose with Dr. Berkeley, that the bodies we daily see and handle, are mere phantoms and ideas of the mind; or if we allow them a real existence, we must needs rest it at last upon something which is itself a compound; because, after infinite divisions we can nowhere find anything which is not so. But it must be granted that infinite divisibility, as well as finite, has its difficulties; which, I believe, are gotten over principally by the definition generally given to matter of an extended substance. If you ask what is meant by the term extended, they tell you it is the having parts without parts, that is, extraneous to one another. Now for understanding this explanation we must observe, that appearances, or ideas, may have parts within parts, coextensive together throughout the whole compound; thus our idea of a piece of gold, contains the ideas of weight, compactness, ductility, fusibility, with many others as parts thereof, and each of these is diffused equally through the whole piece: but when we consider its bulk and substance, the right side does not reach into the left, nor is the top diffused among the bottom; so that the substantial parts do not lie within one another, but each has its separate station. Thus to say that matter is divisible, because extended, amounts to no more than saying it is so because it consists of parts distinct, and removeable from one another: a pretty way of proving the point, being no better than the ladies' reason, it is divisible because it is.

2. It seems a more colorable argument, when our conception is appealed to, and we are defied to imagine any particle which must not at least have two sides distinct and distinguishable from one another. I may perhaps by-and-by accept the challenge,

and attempt to show, that we do not always conceive of things as having two sides : but for the present, let us see what can be concluded from this argument, supposing the premises assumed in support of it were true. It has been shown by Mr. Locke, and in our chapter on Reflection, that our ideas concerning external objects are originally derived from sensation, all we can do for ourselves is by repeating, compounding, associating, dividing, or extracting from what we have received by that channel. Nor is it certain we can form any conception of magnitude greater or less than what we have seen : we talk indeed currently of immense spaces, of millions of miles, of vortices and planetary systems ; but our imagination keeps all the while within the same compass it would do if we were to contemplate any measurable portion of ground we could distinguish with our eyes. We proceed in the same manner a person would who should undertake to draw any plan assigned him upon a slate : if he be set to describe a garden, he marks the walks, the beds, the groves, the buildings, in their proper dimensions, so as that the whole may just fill up the space he has to delineate them upon ; if a county, then spacious roads and wide rivers run in the place of walks, and you find towns occupy the spots where there stood alcoves before ; if the terraqueous globe, the parishes are lost through their minuteness, and their room is taken up by mountains, kingdoms, seas, and oceans ; if the solar system, he places a little ball in the middle to represent the Sun, draws the planets with their satellites rolling round at proper distances, and makes the orbit of Saturn touch the edges of his slate : thus when he is put to take in a larger space he does not enlarge his draught, but contracts his scale, and lessens his figures to bring them within the limits to which he is confined. Just so it fares with imagination, whose scenes contain the same dimensions whether we contemplate larger spaces or smaller : we fancy ourselves climbing to immense heights, but in reality contract our objects to a conceivable size, and draw down immeasurable distances within the length of our own line : like Prior's squirrel in the tinman's shop, who seemed continually mounting up in his rolling cage, but never advanced one step higher beyond his own length.

3. Let us now invert the glass and turn our thoughts upon objects less than what ordinarily fall under our observation. He that would cut a hair as small as possible, may work a good while with a caseknife by drawing the pieces doubled along the edge ; when he has reduced them so small that they will not double, he may lay them upon a smooth table and cut a little longer with a penknife ; after he has done what he can this way he may take a

microscope and by help of that, make two or three cuts more with a fine lancet : there is now no more room for manual operation, but if he will proceed further he must go to work with his imagination ; which may chance to play him a sly trick he is not aware of ; for, upon contemplating one of the little particles of his last division, he will find it grow into a magnitude having two distinguishable sides, which he can easily conceive separated from one another ; but upon their separation, each will immediately grow again into the former size ; and thus he may go on without end until he be tired of the sport. Hence it appears, that our imagination is hemmed in by certain boundaries on both sides beyond which it cannot pass : nor can we conceive things greater or less than certain dimensions, unless by diminishing or magnifying them, we can bring them to a size discernible by our senses ; and that when we attempt an infinite division, we proceed without making any way, undoing as fast as we work, and only dividing what we had magnified ourselves : just as was shown before in the case of numbers, where we make a fraction supposed less than an unit, by the process of multiplication, how much soever we may fancy it dividing. Wherefore this argument drawn from our want of conception, seems inconclusive, it may convince us of a failure in our faculties, but proves nothing concerning the nature and constitution of matter : for since there is a certain measure below which we cannot form an idea, since experience and reason assure us there are particles far within that measure, how know we what we might conceive, had we faculties piercing enough to discern them clearly ?

4. Mathematicians tell us, that points disposed in a row form a line, that lines placed side by side make a superficies, and that a number of superficies laid over one another compose a solid. Let us try to analyze a solid into its constituent parts : we cannot by any contrivance actually take off a superficies without thickness ; if we go to work with our imagination, after having detached the surface from the main body, we shall find it have an upper and an under side : endeavor to split the sides asunder, and suddenly you will find each of them by a kind of magic provided with a lining. The fault then lies in the imagination, which cannot perform what is desired of her for making the experiment ; for those who hold the divisibility of matter surely must allow that every part may be separated from every other, but in all solids, there must be some parts lying uppermost : we only desire you to take off these, and not meddle with anything else, but this it seems you cannot do, for you cannot separate them without tearing up others clinging underneath. Thus our solids resemble

a quantity of fine paper piled up in a stationer's shop, if you set a man with gloves on or a rustic whose hands are hard by labor to take off a single sheet, he will fumble about a long while and at last take up two or three together : so if we attempt to take off a superficies we cannot do our work neatly, but our clumsy-fisted imagination pulls up another adhering to it beneath.

5. Having so little success with superficies, considered by themselves, let us try what can be done with them in their state of junction with the main body. When one thing lies upon another, how porous soever we may imagine them, there must be some solid parts of each which touch, and those who contend that all body has magnitude, must admit that these parts have superficies by which they rest upon others of equal size that support them. But not to perplex ourselves with such minute parts, since we are inquiring only into our conceptions rather than the reality of things, let us consider larger objects that we can easily comprehend : it is certain we may and do conceive of compact substances as of perfect solids, and therefore these will answer our present purpose as well as if they were truly such. Let us suppose then a six-inch cube of glass perfectly smooth standing upon a well polished marble table, here we may conceive a superficies of six inches square that touches a like superficies of the table : but what does it touch? is it not real body? and must not that body be void of thickness? for none ever imagined that bodies could penetrate at all into one another. If you say this body must have an under side, that cannot be, for the under side will be a distinct thing from the body, one being touched by the glass and the other not, but the same thing cannot be touched and not touched at the same time. But this same individual body, individual I mean in depth, which touches the glass, must likewise touch some part of the table below, or else it would fall lower until it did : if you say again it touches only by the under side, then you make it a compound consisting of two parts, the uppermost of which touches the glass and nothing else, and so has nothing to sustain its weight with the weight of the cube above ; and the undermost touches the rest of the table but nothing else, and so has nothing that it can support, nor any weight resting upon it. Wherefore there must be a number of superficies, each whereof touches both the next above and the next below, running on in continuity to make the thickness of the table. Now consider the surface covered by the cube as joining to the rest of the table's surface, that part which it touches on the right hand for instance you must acknowledge to be a body, and as it cannot be diffused or penetrate thereinto, what it touches must be a line without breadth or thickness.

Consider again what this line touches of the further and hither parts of the table and we shall find them to be points, that is, bodies destitute of any dimension.

6. Some have questioned whether magnitude be really inherent in bodies or only an idea wherewith they affect us: I do not know how this matter can be determined with absolute certainty, for we can know nothing of bodies unless by our ideas, but if it be real we must suppose it to correspond with our idea, and everything to be predicated of it, which may be predicated of that. Now though we must acknowledge that our idea of magnitude consists of parts, yet it is not necessary those parts should have a magnitude too; things may affect us with an idea by their united force when they could not do it singly. We know visible objects are compounded of invisible particles: and audible sounds made up of little motions in the air which cannot be heard: the watery vapors dispersed up and down in fair weather affect none of our senses, but when condensed into rain we can both see and feel it; a single drop falls silently down, but when multitudes of them pour in showers we hear them patter against the ground: why then may not bulk and thickness be composed of what has neither? One is no number yet all numbers are made up of units, and two of them are enow to compose the lowest: we have observed before that all magnitude may be expressed by numbers, as of yards, inches, or fractions of an inch, and indeed is no more than a number of parts undistinguished from each other in the thought. Therefore, in things whereof we can perceive the parts singly, we reckon by number, as a hundred men, a thousand sheep, twenty guineas; where we cannot, we estimate by measure or magnitude, as a pint of water, a square yard of clay, an ounce of gold. Now we shall see this doctrine confirmed if we attend to the discourses of such as would prove the divisibility of matter, for you will find them always contented with number two to make a dimension: there is no line, say they, so short but must have two ends, no superficies so narrow as to be without two sides, and no solid so thin as not to have two surfaces; allow them two extremities and their conception does not boggle at any dimension without wanting a middle to complete the idea. Then again, if we take our judgment from the scenes in our imagination, no body can be infinitely divisible, for infinities are the most inconceivable things we can turn our thoughts upon, and I defy any man to form a clear conception of an infinite number of parts in a mountain, or a province, a planet, or a sun.

7. But before I am entitled to give a challenge I must take care to acquit myself manfully in answering that I accepted a little

while ago : let us therefore examine whether it be really true that we have no conception of a body without parts. When we look upon the wainscot of a room where the panels are painted of a different color from the stiles and mouldings, we do not take the objects we behold for fancies or delusions, but for something real and material, yet we conceive of the paint on the panels as square substances utterly devoid of thickness : it argues nothing to tell me the paint must have some depth and that if I scrape off a little with a penknife I shall perceive a color still lying behind, for our business is now only with our manner of conception which takes in nothing of the latent color, nor do we apprehend our eye penetrating at all into the boards or the paint, but touching lightly upon the surface. So if I see a carpenter draw a line with his lead pencil, perhaps I might easily discern a space between the sides if I looked for them, but this I do not, so the breadth does not enter into my idea of the line, which I conceive as a black substance (for I do not suppose it an apparition) extended only in length. Should I, upon hitting my pen against something, chance to dash out a few sparkles of ink upon my paper, I should see them plainly and apprehend them to be substances, yet might neither discern nor conceive any dimensions they had. What shall we say of the smaller stars? I do not deny them to be immense bodies much larger than this whole earth we inhabit, yet every common man who looks at them in the night conceives them as no more than points, and as astronomers tell us that if they were brought a hundred times nearer than they are, we should not find them having any perceivable magnitude. So then, whether there be such things as points, lines, and surfaces, in nature or no, certain it is from experience that we have sensations and ideas of them.

8. Men of thought, like children pulling their playthings to pieces to see what is in the inside, endeavor to separate the objects striking their senses from the rest of the body whereto they belong, in order to turn them round, and as it were handle them on all sides in their contemplation ; but in so doing, as has been observed before, there constantly grows something more to what they so take off, reflection adding other ideas out of her own fund to those sensation had exhibited : so that a point, a line, a superficies, considered apart, is not what it was when lying in the body. Thus they deceive themselves, thinking to find dimensions in objects which have none : they do indeed find them in their idea, but then they find only what their own imagination had laid there just before.

9. The like may be said of figure as has been observed concerning magnitude, for the one cannot well subsist without the other, whatever has magnitude must have some figure, and contrariwise : but possibly neither may reside in bodies any other-wise than as qualities of affecting our senses in such a particular manner ; therefore it is hard to say what figure belongs to things so immensely great or extremely small as to baffle all our methods of admeasurement. We are apt indeed to conceive of points and of infinite space as being round, and the Stoics confidently assigned that figure to the universe, but then where shall we place the centre ? why always in that spot where we happen to stand ourselves, because we can conceive no otherwise of immensity than by spreading our thoughts to boundless distances on all sides of us : but then this centre must move as we move, and according to the time when we make our reflection, whether in June or December, will stand a hundred and sixty millions of miles apart from itself. We imagine points round because we can conceive them equi-distant from every part of a circle drawn about them, which we could not conceive of any other figure lying in the middle ; but then the circle cannot be drawn within the point unless at some distance from it. So that our spheres of both sorts are incomplete, the one being a centre without a circumference and the other a circumference without any or with a moveable centre. In short, the notion of rotundity in these things seems grounded on the following syllogism. They must have some figure, but they cannot have any other besides roundness, therefore they must have that. The minor we may prove well enough, because in all other figures there must be angles or protuberances which we may conceive broken off and what remains only will be the point ; and we may conceive the sides between those angles and protuberances swelled out, therefore the figure before such swelling was not immense. But the major we assume without any foundation, our faculties not being sufficiently acute to inform us with certainty whether there may not be bodies or spaces without any figure at all : thus much we may rest satisfied with, that we can neither conceive a sphere consisting of no parts, nor yet how finite parts can make up an infinite compound.

10. Upon the whole matter it seems too hasty a conclusion to pronounce that all body must have magnitude and divisibility because we cannot conceive of it otherwise : for we have produced instances of our seeing and conceiving bodies without sight or conception of their having all or any of the three dimensions required to make a solid ; and if we cannot comprehend them apart in our imagination without dimensions, why should we presume that im-

agination is a competent judge in the case? For our ideas being all received originally from sensation, reason has no other materials to work upon besides those furnished by the senses; and the objects striking upon them, even when assisted by the best contrivances of art, are all undeniably compounds, so that we have no experience of anything else whereon to ground our judgments. But had we senses piercing enough to discern that first matter whereof all bodies are composed, how know we what other appearances that might exhibit different from any we have ever yet beheld? which might enable us to understand what now remains inconceivable. Therefore the argument drawn from our manner of conception, which we must needs own imperfect, is scarce sufficient to overthrow that taken from the existence of body, which you can never come at until you get to something uncompounded: for a compound is not a Being, but a number of Beings, nor has any other existence than what belongs to the component parts. So then we must necessarily either admit individuals or deny all existence to body, and suppose it only an idea or phantasm of the brain. And that there are such atoms seems to stand confirmed by the current doctrine of cohesion wherein the strength of beams, bars, long stones and other solid bodies consists, enabling them to support heavy weights: for their parts are not held together by any cement or strings, but, as Sir Isaac Newton, and from him our modern naturalists suppose, by the external pressure of ether. Now let us imagine an iron bar sliced out into a multitude of plates as thin as paper and perfectly smooth: I do not say this can be done by art; but, if matter be infinitely divisible, the bar is certainly capable of being so divided and its length is actually made up of such plates standing upon their edges side by side of one another, and it seems incredible they should be made to cohere so firmly, as experience shows they do, by a lateral pressure against the two outermost. You might easily hold up a quire of paper by pressing it with your flat hand against the wainscot, the same I suppose you might do with a ream, or perhaps two or three, only you must shove with both hands and all your might; but if you had glass plates, as finely polished as art could make them, to try with instead of paper, and enow of them to reach almost across the room, you would never be able to prevent the middle ones from slipping through between the rest, especially if you laid a parcel of boxes and trunks over them. Possibly you might contrive by means of strong screws to keep even this glass beam compact, because glass and all other the most finished productions of human industry still have some little roughness, which hinders their sliding down when very forcibly

squeezed : but the plates composing our iron bar, were matter infinitely divisible, must be mathematically smooth, so that the greatest pressure could never make them cohere. Therefore we must conclude that the thinnest plates, whereinto a beam or bar is capable of being divided, are not mathematical planes, nor perfectly smooth surfaces, but have a roughness not separable from the rest of the plate, whereby when forcibly compressed they take hold of the like roughness in the next adjoining plates.

Nevertheless, as one must not expect to bring every one to the same mind upon so abstruse a question, I will desire those who still hold the infinite divisibility of matter to consider that infinity is an inexhaustible fund, and how capable soever matter may be of such division, it can never be effected completely. Let water, air, fire, or whatever causes you please, rend asunder the parts of matter ever so long, they can never reduce them to nothing, but their minutest divisions will still be body, having figure and magnitude : so that we must necessarily conclude there are particles in nature which, notwithstanding all the divisions they have undergone or may suffer hereafter, never were and never will be less than they are. Therefore the most obstinate unbelievers of individuality may without scruple admit the doctrine of atoms actually, if not potentially, indivisible, and that there is a Minimum, below which, though bodies may be capable of being reduced, there is no power in nature that can reduce them : these then we may be permitted to take for our first matter whereout all the bodies of the universe are compounded.

12. I said at first that infinite divisibility of matter was the doctrine now in vogue amongst the learned, but upon second thoughts I believe I have misrepresented them, and the mistake arose from want of distinguishing between infinite and indefinite divisibility. For I have observed that men of sober judgment forbear to decide anything concerning the former, which they own to be an unmanageable subject, too perplexing for the human faculties to determine either way : but concerning the latter, they unanimously agree that we cannot set any bounds to the division, nor assign the precise number of parts into which any given parcel of matter may be crumbled. If my notion of existence has persuaded me that nature must make a stop somewhere in her dividings, I shall not hesitate a moment to subscribe to the article of indefinite divisibility : for our thought knows no bound in the operation, nor does reason ever find an obstacle against contracting or extending her scale without end, in measuring the objects she would contemplate. This is enough to serve the purposes of mathematicians and naturalists and less than this being not enough, I shall endeavor to

confirm it by some observations which, though a digression from my course for the present, yet will not be useless by-and-by, when I may have occasion to divide further than everybody will let me. For there are people whom you can please neither full nor fasting; they will battle tooth and nail for divisibility at one time, and at another will not allow you to use the principles themselves have laid down, but if you go to spin finer than they have been accustomed to, cry out against it as an inconceivable absurdity. Now as in the progress of these inquiries I may be driven to a necessity of supposing very small bodies to contain a multitude of various and dissimilar parts, that I may not shock anybody with an idea he might think quite out of the way if presented to him at once, I shall endeavor to prepare for its reception, by producing instances wherein little parcels of matter are actually divided beyond what is commonly apprehended possible.

13. Those who have gone upon the same undertaking, seldom fail to put us in mind of perfumes, which they say will send forth an odor for many years without losing sensibly of their weight; and of leaf gold, a single grain of which we are told will cover a wire of 1625 feet long so entirely as to leave no spaces open between. But as the little corpuscles of light are probably the smallest bodies affecting our senses, I shall try to make some computation, though far within bounds, how many of them may be thrown off from a certain quantity of inflammable matter. I have been informed that a wax candle, of four to the pound, may be seen in a clear night at two miles distance: this then held up two miles high in the air, would diffuse its light throughout a circumference of four miles in diameter. Let us now consider how near the rays of light must lie to one another in this circumference, so as to be discernible in every part of it, and we cannot well suppose them further apart than one eighth of an inch, for else an eye moving gently to the right or the left would find intervals of darkness when it came between the rays; therefore there must be so many rays as there are square eighths of an inch in such a periphery, and we shall find them upon computation amounting to 354816000. But this is not all, for each ray probably consists of successive corpuscles continually following behind one another, and the business is to find out how many of these successions may proceed from some substance whose quantity is assigned. A candle of the size above mentioned will burn about six hours, therefore a grain of wax, reckoning eighty pounds of Troy to seventy-three Avoirdupois, feeds the flame sixteen seconds. Now in order to discover how many successions of light must be sent out in that time, let us have recourse to the

pretty childless amusement of making gold lace, spoken of at the beginning of our chapter on Reflection. Let a live coal be fixed upon a wheel, and upon turning the wheel a little briskly, you will see the coal draw a trail after it; as you increase the velocity of the wheel, the trail will lengthen more and more. Let the motion be accelerated until the trail just closes into an entire circle, and then observe in what time the wheel performs its circumvolutions, for this will determine the length of a sensation; because it is plain the impression received by the eye from the coal at one point lasts until it comes round to the same point again, or else the circle would not appear complete. We suppose the wheel to turn in this case (for I have never tried the experiment) ten times in a second: it will follow that an eye seeing the candle without discontinuance must have a fresh succession of light strike upon it in every tenth part of a second. But we have not done yet, for the circle made by the coal will not appear so bright as the coal itself when standing still, from whence we may infer that several successions, following one another before the effect of the former is worn off, are requisite to give us a perfect view of the objects we behold: we must think of some other contrivance to discover how many of these successions fall within the compass of a sensation. And for this purpose let a room be darkened excepting a long slit a quarter of an inch wide cut perpendicularly in the window shutter: let a large circular pasteboard be placed so as to turn very smoothly upon an axis laid horizontally upon a level with the bottom of the slit: cut a slit likewise of the same width in the pasteboard from the circumference to the centre; cause it to be whirled round with an even motion just ten times in a second, if that be found, the length of a sensation, and place your eye directly over against the window, but on the opposite side of the pasteboard, by which means you will have no light but what comes through both the slits. In this situation I apprehend you will see light continually near the centre of the pasteboard but none at a distance, because there the aperture will be too small to admit it. If you can observe exactly the limits between light and darkness, you may determine how many successions at least must follow during a turn of the pasteboard: for the rays having no admittance unless during that interval wherein some part of both slits fall in a line with your eye, in which time the pasteboard will have moved half an inch, the proportion this bears to the whole circle described by that part where you see the light terminate will give the successions falling within the compass of a rotation. Suppose for instance you can discern light so far as eight inches from the centre, a circle drawn upon

such a radius will measure fifty inches round and contains a hundred of those spaces the rays have to pass through : since then you still perceive them, you may rest assured they keep flowing in every hundredth part of a turn of the pasteboard, and if ten of these were performed in a second there must be a thousand successions following in that time. Therefore to find the number of corpuscles produced by our grain of wax, during its sixteen seconds burning, we must multiply the prodigious number before set down by sixteen thousand, which will give a produce of 5677056000000.

14. I have proceeded upon a supposition that the rays of light are not continual streams, but little balls or corpuscles following one another at certain distances : and if there runs out no more of them than a thousand in a second, the distance between every ball and the next behind will be a hundred and sixtysix miles and two-thirds upon a calculation from the known velocity of light. Wherefore if you will imagine a ray to be an entire thread or string of balls touching one another, you must multiply the product we have already by as many balls as you can suppose lying within a length of a hundred and sixtysix miles and two-thirds. But this would be carrying the matter too far, for we learn upon the authority of Sir Isaac Newton, that light is emitted by vibrations in the parts of luminous bodies, which vibrations can act only at intervals in that part of their swing when they are moving outwards and not when they are returning, wherefore the matter they throw off cannot flow in a continual uninterrupted stream. Nevertheless, we may find several reasons making it probable that we ought to increase the sum of corpuscles already computed : for as there are creatures much quicker sighted than man, if you could teach a cat to make and communicate the observation, it is not unlikely that puss might give the signal for seeing light much higher up the pasteboard than you could perceive it, which would convince you there are more successions than you had found yourself. Nor could you still be sure of having them all, for a single ball may be too feeble to cause vision at all, and it may require the united force of many to excite a sensation in the optics of any animal whatever : so that you cannot know for certain that the light does not find a passage at a height where neither you nor the cat can distinguish it. We may consider further, that the rays at two miles distance from the candle may lie closer together than one-eighth of an inch ; that light itself is a compound body consisting of seven different colored parts, as appears by experiments with the prism ; neither does the wax turn entirely into light, for we know a great part of it goes off in smoke and vapor ; nor yet perhaps is the substance of the wax

at all converted into light, which some hold to be a body of its own kind dispersed among the pores of luminous bodies and not entering into their composition, in which case it must bear a very inconsiderable proportion to the grain we suppose the wax to have weighed. From all which considerations it may be concluded we have been very moderate in our computation, which is more likely to fall greatly short of the truth than to exceed it.

15. Now, how astonishing soever it may appear, to find a drop of wax shattered into such a multitude of pieces, our astonishment must increase when we reflect on the great tenuity of the wax, and how far it is from being a solid substance. Sir Isaac Newton assures us that gold, the most substantial body we know of, contains more of pore than solid substance: therefore wax, which will swim in water, does not really occupy one fortieth part of the space it seems to fill. Some have gone so far as to suppose that all the matter of this visible universe compressed into a perfect solid would form a cube of but a few inches on every side. I shall not attempt to make calculations of this sort having no sure foundation to build upon: but I think it may be made appear by experiments of the firmest and compactest bodies that the solid matter contained in them bears a very trifling proportion to their apparent magnitude. I believe few will deny me that whenever a heavy body lies upon another, they touch, for nothing else besides their solidity and contact prevents the uppermost from falling still lower. Some perhaps may controvert this point; because it being held by the best authorities that every particle of matter has a certain sphere of attraction, immediately beyond which there begins a sphere of repulsion, whose force decreases in more than duplicate proportion the farther you recede from its internal limits, therefore a body falling towards another, when come within the other's repulsion, will be stopped thereby before contact and kept suspended in the air, the force of repulsion exactly balancing that of gravitation. But this, however plausible in theory, will appear not to be true in fact; because bodies laid on greasy or dirty places upon being taken off again will draw something from thence sticking to their bottom, which shows they were in actual contact before, for the adhering particles can never be supposed to follow what they had constantly kept aloof by the vigor of their repulsion. Besides considering how very small the sphere of strong repulsion is, if a book laid gently upon a table did hang suspended, yet by a smart stroke upon the upper side you might drive it down within the inner sphere of attraction. From hence we may conclude, that bodies lying upon each other have some of their parts in actual

contact, and consequently, since all body is indued with an attraction of cohesion, they must adhere in such parts, and the largeness of their contact may be determined by the strength of their coherence.

Now suppose two plates of gold, the heaviest of substances, as perfectly polished as art and industry can make them, let one be laid flat upon a table and the other suspended horizontally by strings upon one arm of a balance, hanging a weight to the other arm that shall exactly counterpoise it, then let down your balance gently till the plate rests upon that on the table, touching it apparently on its whole superficies. If you increase your weight and the balance be very good, I apprehend a very small one would suffice to draw up the upper plate from the under and consequently to overcome the cohesion between them : a penny-weight might do it though the plates were a foot square, or perhaps a hair could you get a balance perfectly smooth without any friction. Now were a needle worked into the two plates so strongly as that they could not be parted asunder without breaking the needle, it might require many pounds weight to separate them when so fastened. But the parts of compound bodies being held together, not by any glue or cement between, but solely by their mutual cohesion corresponding with their contact, the strength of the needle to resist breaking must be according to the contact its two pieces had together before their disruption : which strength being found so vastly greater than that exerted by the plates to keep themselves united, it is plain the whole superficies of their touching parts bears no discoverable proportion to that of the transverse section in a slender needle. From hence we may gather that the superficies of the plates resemble a net-work of wire, whose meshes are immensely larger than the thickness of the threads, and whose threads do not correspond with those of other plate, but only cross them in some few points. And since if instead of the plates you had a regular cube of gold, and were to try with one of the sides, which make the thickness of the cube, instead of the bottom, the experiment would succeed the same, it follows that the compactest bodies are mere net-work in all dimensions, containing incomparably more of empty pore than solid substance. But it is happy for us that they are so, for else we should have no use of our goods and utensils, by reason of their perpetually sticking together beyond our power to detach them ; nor could you venture to lay your flat hand upon a table for fear of being never able to draw it off again.

16. If it should be thought hard of digestion to imagine that iron and steel, which force their way so readily through other

things should be themselves such hollow shells or wire cages as we have represented, let us remember that all strength is relative, and there is no absurdity in imagining that one hollow shell may penetrate through another a great deal weaker : nor should I despair, if any virtuoso that has nothing else to do would undertake the trouble, to see a knife made of the tinder of coarse cloth that would cut tinder of muslin as cleverly as we do cheese with a knife of steel : but then the experiment must be tried in *vacuo*, for fear any little motion of the air should bend our instrument, and make us hagle or cut awry. On the other hand, I do not doubt that if we could toss a little ball of perfectly solid substance ever so gently against iron, marble, or other the compactest body upon earth, we should see it make its way through them as easily as a leaden bullet would if laid upon the top of a whipped syllabub. Having thus vented my thoughts upon the divisibility and rarity of matter, which, if good for nothing else, may serve to entertain the curious, I shall resume my journey and proceed from the consideration of body to that of mind.

CHAP. IV.

EXISTENCE OF MIND.

How little success soever I may have had in proving the divisibility of matter indefinite, but not absolutely infinite, it will not affect the exclusive title of individuals to existence : for be the smallest particle infinitely divisible, it is still existent only in respect of the infinity of existent parts it contains. And, upon this hypothesis, we must admit a gradation of infinities, some greater and others less ; because, if half an orange contains an infinitude of parts, the other half must contain another, and consequently the whole orange will carry an infinitude double to each of the halves. Now that infinity of parts, whereof the whole material universe consists, although it seems capable of being enlarged by the accession of more matter, will not admit of increase by composition : for there will not be one more Being, nor a larger infinitude in nature upon those parts running into clusters, than there would have been had they continued forever separate. So that compounds have no place among the rank of Beings, nor does their formation add anything to the number of them.

2. Therefore, in order to determine between the divisibility and unity of Mind, let us examine whether it has a distinct exist-

ence of its own, and whether upon the production of one, there must not be a new Being, not barely a new sort of Being, in nature added to those existent before, their infinitude being increased by the accession of that one. And for this question I need only refer to the sense and understanding of every man to answer, whether he does not perceive himself to have a real existence, distinct from all other Beings beside. I do not mean in kind, for there are innumerable other beings of the same species with himself, but in numerical identity, and whether there must not be one more Being in nature for his existence, than there would be without him : but if he consisted of parts, there must have been the same number of Beings existent when he was not, and before the combination of those parts in their vital union, which are become thereby a different kind of Being, that is, the same substance in another mode of existence. Some have doubted the reality of body, of space, of distance, of magnitude, of all sensation, imagining these to be no more than perceptions rising unaccountably in the mind : but I believe no man ever doubted of his existence, at the instant time when he reflected on it. If there be a man of so uncommon a turn as to make this doubt, and he must have another doubt beside, to wit, whether he doubts or no, for nonentity can no more doubt than be assured, he may even turn his back against me, for I pretend to work no conviction upon him. For the rest of us we shall all readily allow, that we have an idea of existence, but whence should we first get it unless from ourselves? for if we are not, we can perceive nothing and know nothing, and consequently can have no assurance of the reality of other things : so that our persuasion of all existence besides, must begin and have its foundation in that of our own.

3. But our ideas being taken originally from sensation, and we having accustomed ourselves to regard whatever appears constantly together as parts of one whole, we contract a grossness of conception, which makes us apprehend ourselves as comprising the whole human composition. For our flesh and members accompanying us wherever we go, and the operation of external objects ending at the surface of our bodies, we conceive sensation diffused throughout them and our very selves extending to the extremities of our organs where we receive the impulse : for because we see with our eyes, and touch with the ends of our fingers, we apprehend ourselves actually present in those parts where we take the impression of objects. But not to insist upon the discoveries of anatomy, by which it appears that their impulse must be conveyed along the nerves before it affects us with any perception, everybody knows, that men may be deprived of their limbs or their

organs by diseases or accidents and yet retain their existence. Let a man lose a leg or an arm, an eye or an ear, he still continues the same man, and holds his rank upon the list of Beings as much as he did before. Whatever can be separated from him, he may look upon as a possession, an instrument or organ of conveyance, and that alone which remains after all imaginable separation, is properly himself. Besides, our organs have their separate offices, not interchangeable with one another: the eye which sees cannot hear, and the ear which hears, can never see; but they being numerically distinct, if they were the perceptive substance, it would follow, that what sees is a different thing or substance from that which hears. Therefore they can only be channels of conveyance to some one individual thing: for no man can doubt but that it is the same himself which sees and hears and receives all other perceptions; and we cannot conceive this self divisible, because what might be taken away upon division, would not be him, for he cannot be parted from himself. Compound bodies consist of parts, having the same nature and primary properties with themselves, nor is it conceivable that any assortment of unsolid or immoveable parts, should form a solid and moveable body: then if composition prevailed in Mind too, every Self must contain a number of little Selves, every Mind many little Minds, and every Sentient principle a multitude of Sentient principles. But this is a supposal that will not bear the mentioning, for who would not be shocked to hear talk of a half or a quarter of a man's self? Besides, if things sentient were divisible, the parts might be dispersed throughout the four quarters of the world, and a man might have perceptions at the same time in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America.

4. To avoid this absurdity, there have been those who have asserted that Self, Mind, or a perceptive Being, may be produced by a combination of unperceptive principles; not to repeat what I had urged before, that then there may be a creation effected by compounding, let us remark, that upon such combination, the parts considered singly, cannot have, nor are they pretended to have, any other properties than they possessed before, neither can they club to take their several share of a perception; for perception has not parts without parts, and therefore cannot be received piecemeal, but the perceptivity resides in the whole compound jointly. Now, it seems very hard to understand how a collection of distinct substances, for such every compound must be, can perceive what is not perceived by each of them. I can conceive a whole camp to hear the evening gun, because every man in the camp hears it, but I cannot comprehend how they can all hear a

sound that escapes every single person. And the case would be the same if they were tied or glued together, or if the brains of all could be crowded into one head : nor can I for my life distinguish between their all hearing it, and every one of them hearing it : so neither can I discern with the utmost stretch of the microscope, a perception in any compound or collection of substances, however compacted or united together ; which must not be complete in each of them. The ancient Hylozoists, as we learn from Cudworth, ascribed an imperfect perception to their atoms, which was not perception till it was rendered complete by the junction of several of them together ; and he seems to have had a notion of this imperfect perceptivity himself, in his plastic nature of elements and vegetables, though he never attempted to complete it by junction. But I can no more comprehend how an imperfect whisper, heard by twenty persons, shall become an audible voice, than how they can all hear a sound heard by none of them singly : I would as soon undertake to explain how a letter might be sent a hundred miles in an hour, by employing twenty men who could walk five miles a piece in the time.

5. We commonly apprehend things to remain the same while they continue to serve the same purposes, and exhibit the same appearances ; thus you call a canal the same, notwithstanding a perpetual influx and efflux of the waters and after you have new turfed the banks, but though it be the same canal, no man will esteem it the same substance ; for it seems necessary to substantial identity, that the component parts should remain unchanged. So if the mind be a compound, then upon some of the parts being slipped away and others substituted in their room, though it might still remain a mind it must be a different one from what it was before : and as Lucretius tells us, the mind grows and decays with the body ; every man would have a different Self in his childhood, his maturity, and his old age.

6. But it may be said, that mind is not so much a collection of particular atoms, as a figure or harmony resulting from the order wherein they lie, and therefore may continue the same although some, or all of the atoms be shifted : for if you place twelve shillings in a circle, change your shillings as often as you please for others, you do not alter the figure which still remains a circle. But what then becomes of our own existence ? for form has none, but is only a modification or particular manner of existence in body ; and harmony has none, being nothing more than the concordance or mutual congruity of sounds whereby they affect the ear in a particular manner. Besides, where shall we place personality ? for there is no difference between similitude

and identity in forms : an egg at York is the very same shape with an egg at London, and a concert of the same music, played upon the like instruments, gives the same harmony in both places : therefore two minds composed of atoms, having an exactly similar disposition, must be the same person, and thus there may be a thousand same persons in so many different parts of the globe, as there may be a thousand same forms and harmonies. The same circle may be drawn at once in Tartary and in Chili, or the same tune played at Canton in China, while it is playing at London. Therefore if one particular form or harmony be you, and another particular form or harmony be me, there might be as many you's and me's in the world as there are clusters of atoms capable of running together in the same manner as ours have done. For it may be remembered, that we are not now supposing mind to consist of a number of particles combined together in such or such order, but to be the order itself, considered apart from the particles, and equally capable of residing in any other that should be brought within its compass. Or if you make any other identity of form than that of equality and similitude, then upon having flatted a globe of wax, by which you absolutely destroy the roundness it had, it will be impossible to restore it to the same figure again : because, if the roundness of one piece of wax be a different thing from the roundness of another, by the same reason the roundness it receives upon a second moulding, will be a different thing from that it had before being flatted, as being a figure newly produced, not one drawn back again from some place where it had lain dormant in the interim.

Nor will it be easier to preserve the identity of Mind in one collection of particles than we found it to distinguish the diversity of minds in several : for if each particular mind were nothing but a certain order of the particles composing it, we must lose our identity upon every turn of thought ; for we may perceive a change in our mind upon passing out of pleasure into pain ; but there can be no change among forms, without a locomotion of the component parts, which must destroy the order they stood in before. If you change the place of any two in your circle of shillings, you spoil your circle while they are passing into each other's stations : therefore if their personality depended upon their circularity, the shillings during that interval must make none, or at least a different person ; or should you fancy the varieties of thought made by a variety of motions of the whole compound, we could never think of two things together, the same body being incapable of moving with two different velocities or in two different directions at once. Let us consider likewise the variations

of character, disposition, and expertness, frequently happening in the same subject: the sucking child who knows not his right hand from his left, may when grown up become master of several sciences; the cross-grained, peevish, unlucky boy may sometimes by good management be made to turn out a sober, discreet, and well-behaved man. But if they were nothing more than compositions, these permanent changes, which render them a different sort of creatures, could not happen without a change of structure in their component parts; which must produce a diversity of compositions and consequently a diversity of persons: contrary to the apprehensions of all mankind who esteem themselves the same persons from the cradle to the grave, notwithstanding any variations of character or capacity they may have gone through in the interval.

7. There seems to lie the same objection against Mr. Locke's doctrine of consciousness constituting identity: it would be presumption in me to contradict a man of his clear and steady judgment, therefore shall suppose I have some how or other misunderstood him; but to the best of my apprehension he seems to have placed our existence in a quality rather than a substance, for by the term Consciousness, I cannot understand a Being, but only a power or property of some Being; nor do I apprehend a man loses his existence or personality, every time he loses his consciousness, by falling fast asleep. Could Mr. Locke himself imagine that his person was annihilated every night when he went to sleep, and re-created again when he awoke in the morning? The most I can allow to consciousness, unless I grossly mistake the word, is, that it should be in most cases the evidence to us of our identity, for scenes that we remember, convince us of our being the very persons present at them. I said in most cases, but not all, for who does not know that he was once a baby wrapped up in swaddling clothes? and who does not believe that baby to be the very same person with his present self? yet I never heard of anybody pretending to have a remembrance, or consciousness of his being in that condition.⁴ Nor do I find little difficulty in settling the identity of consciousness, for in quality, as I observed before in form, I know no difference between identity and similitude: whatever has a like quality with something else, to my thinking has the same. If I have done anything I would conceal, yet I am conscious to myself that I have done it, and I suppose you would be the same upon the like occasion, and so would every other man; therefore we are all one and the same person. Well, but you all are not conscious of the same fact with me, so the identity of the consciousness depends upon

the identity of fact : but this will not do neither, for I am conscious of several actions I have performed, and therefore should be so many different persons. The only way remaining in which I can understand an identity of consciousness, is by placing it in the consciousness of the same person, in which light the idea of person must precede that of consciousness : so it is no help to tell me I may find my personality by my consciousness, because I must fix my idea of personality before I can make use of the explanation.

8. Mr. Locke has somewhere unluckily let drop that he conceives it possible the faculty of thinking may be annexed to a system of matter, and this notion has been eagerly laid hold of by my lord Bolingbroke to confirm his opinion of the corporeity of all thinking substances. For my part I am not so confident of my own understanding as to pronounce it impossible for nature to do what I cannot conceive possible to be done : but this I will say, that I cannot conceive it possible perceptivity should be annexed to a system, by which must be understood a composition of matter, or any other substance whatever, but must reside in something that is numerically one and un compounded. For suppose an object to strike upon any one component part of the system, if it raises a complete perception there, then the rest are useless : if the perception does not begin till this part has communicated the impulse to some other, then is that other the perceptive substance and the first only an organ of conveyance : if both receive it equally, then does the faculty belong not to the system, but to the several parts. Nor can each take its respective share of the perception ; for as we observed before, it is inconceivable that a perception should be received piecemeal or made up of what is no perception. And this matter will appear plainer if we consider the nature of judgment and comparison, where both terms of the one, and both branches of the other, must be apprehended together in order to determine between them. If this man knows the other properties of gold and the other knows what ductility is, they can never know the more for this, either jointly or separately, whether gold be ductile : so if one be ever so well acquainted with St. Peter's at Rome, and the other with St. Paul's at London, they can never tell which is the larger, the handsomer, or make any other comparison by virtue of this knowledge. But you say one may communicate his knowledge to the other ; very true, but then each has the idea of both before him in his imagination, and the judgment is the act of either severally not of both jointly. Nor is the case different with respect to the parts of a percipient system : let the idea of an elephant be impressed upon

particle A and that of a mouse upon particle B, they can never know either jointly or separately which is the larger creature; nor can a judgment be formed until the ideas of both coincide in one and the same individual.

9. And what has been said of perception may be applied equally to volition: for as a body could neither impel nor resist another unless all the particles of the whole mass, be they finite or infinite, had a quality of impelling or resistance; for it is unintelligible to talk of an impulse arising solely from the composition: so neither can any system have a power of beginning motion where there was none in the parts. A hundred men may certainly lift a weight that would crush any one of them, but a thousand would never be able to stir it unless each man had some strength of his own independent on the rest. Whence we may justly conclude perceptivity and activity to be primary qualities, essential to the substances possessing them, inseparable therefrom, belonging to individuals, and not producible by any combination whatsoever of imperceptive and inactive ingredients.

10. If Self be not a substance but a system of substances ranged in some particular order, there appears no such necessary connection between any one Self and any precise collection of substances or percipient form (for we now proceed upon a supposition of forms being percipient) but that they might have contained any other Self: so that these substances and this form, which now constitute Myself, might as well have constituted the Self of John or Thomas, or any other person, without implying a contradiction or absurdity; and we must look for some cause yet undiscovered to assign each system its personality. This cause then, before I was existent, might have assigned my personality to any other similar substances disposed in the like order in some distant part of the globe: now why may not this cause do the same at this present instant? for how should my existing in the spot where I now stand hinder the operations of nature elsewhere, or incapacitate her from doing what she could have done a hundred years ago? therefore there might have been two Myselves some thousand of miles apart. But if such a supposition would shock the ears and understanding of every man, it will necessarily follow that every Self must be a substance numerically distinct from all others, of whose identity no other substance nor system of substances can participate. And if a substance, it must be one uncompound-ed of parts: for I am nothing else besides Myself, nor can contain anything that is not Me, nor yet can I have parts which are neither me nor anything else. As a piece of matter divided makes several pieces, and a compound form dissolved becomes many

lesser forms, so a perceptive substance divided would yield many percipients, and perception always implying personality, each percipient must have a Self distinguishing it from its neighbor: so that upon supposition of a divisibility in the substance of Mind, I should contain as many Selves as there are parts in my composition.

11. Thus have I endeavored to place this matter in as many different lights as I could, and to turn it about in all manner of ways; but it happens sometimes in these abstruse disquisitions that the very pains we take for illustration renders the subject more perplexing, for being forced to spin our thoughts very fine they become liable to entangle in the reader's hands, and the multiplicity of ideas, into which we divide them by such refinements, distracts his attention and causes them to throw a cloud over one another. Therefore, since I apprehend this a matter of importance, I wish every one would consider it afresh in his own way, and satisfy himself, in a manner most suitable to his own liking, whether he has not a real existence distinct from every other being whatever, and whether Self be not an indelible character which cannot be taken from him nor exchanged with any other person. We often talk of what we would do, if we were Such an one, that is, if we were in his place, with his strength of limbs, endowments of mind, fortune, or circumstances of situation: but no man can even in imagination suppose himself to feel for another or act for another, to perceive his sensations or perform his actions, or that that other should be his very self. We have heard of metamorphoses and transmigrations from one form of being into another, I do not desire anybody to believe the truth of those relations, but the pleasure we receive in hearing them shows they are not unfamiliar to our imagination, nor do we apprehend a contradiction in supposing the same person to take various forms. But in all those changes the same Self continues throughout: Calisto when a bear, and Ino when a cow, are the same persons, though different sorts of creatures, that they were while women, nor does Euphorbus lose his identity by becoming Pythagoras: and though they should lose their remembrance or consciousness, still we rejoice or grieve with them according as we think they have deserved in their former state. When the poet tells us that Aristotle's soul of old that was, may now be doomed to animate an ass, or in this very house for aught we know, be doing painful penance in some beau; though he goes too far in calling it a painful penance, for the beau perhaps is well satisfied with his present condition and would think it a terrible misfortune to be restored to the dry notions and musty metaphysics of Aristotle, yet we still apprehend the same percipient substance existing in both. We

may imagine ourselves having new members added to our bodies, four legs, or twenty arms, or a pair of wings sprouting from our shoulders, yet still we should remain the same selves: or we may imagine ourselves losing our limbs, deprived of our faculties, and becoming senseless as the stone before us, yet even in that case we should not apprehend ourselves the same substance with the stone we see: whence it appears that we are possessed of an existence and identity of which we cannot even in imagination divest ourselves.

12. And for individuality if we cannot find that in ourselves we can find it nowhere, for all the bodies we behold are undoubtedly compounds, and we have seen in the last chapter how difficult it is to ascertain whether there be atoms or no, and if there should be, we cannot come at the apprehension of them either by experience or reasoning. But we cannot comprehend ourselves composed of parts so as that something might be taken away and the remainder make an imperfect self, or that such imperfect self should become perfect upon the accession of something else. A house may be half built and then is something of a house but not an entire one; a fœtus may be half formed and then is an imperfect man: but in personality there is no medium between completion and nonentity, we cannot half be, but must either be completely ourselves or not be at all. By such considerations as these I apprehend a man may convince himself of his being neither a form, nor a harmony, nor a system, nor yet a quality or consciousness annexed thereto; but a real-existent substance numerically distinct from all others, uncompounded, and consequently indivisible.

CHAP. V.

SPIRIT.

HAVING settled with ourselves that Mind has a being of its own distinct from that of all other things, and is a pure, unmingled, individual substance, nevertheless, for anything that has yet appeared it may be a single atom of matter, since we have supposed existence and individuality to reside in atoms: now, in order to discover whether it be so or not, let us examine wherein our idea of matter consists. The essence of things arises from the qualities we find them have; for to ask what a thing is, implies a presupposal of some substance, and a want of information concerning what qualities it possesses, or what appearances it ex-

hibits. Mr. Locke pronounces our idea of substance very confused, and so indeed it is if we go to consider it singly, for you cannot form a clear idea of naked substance divested of all its qualities or manners of making itself known to us: but there are some things we apprehend well enough in the concrete, though we cannot in the abstract, as has been made appear with respect to surfaces, which we conceive easily while lying upon the main body, yet cannot by any effort of our imagination detach them therefrom without pulling up a lining besides; so if we cannot form an idea of substance apart from all other ideas, yet when we see qualities affecting our senses, we may have an unconfused idea of something exerting them having a real and actual existence independent of everything else. For forms and qualities are not beings, but modes of existence in other beings, and the appearances they exhibit must come accompanied with another idea of actual existence in the subject containing them. Therefore, if I were to make our idea of substance the same with that of actual independent existence, which we cannot conceive apart from every manner of existing, though we can easily with it, I should not deserve much blame from Mr. Locke, who doubts whether space may not be ranked among the class of substances, because it has a reality independent on any other substances lying within it.

2. But I believe nobody ever suspected the substantiality of space before Mr. Locke, and he goes no further than to declare his ignorance whether it be substance or accident; yet few have denied the reality of space, or that we may conceive a vacuum without any substance whatever to occupy it: this is one of the most familiar ideas to our imagination, for any common person entertains it every time he thinks of an empty bottle. Whence we may conclude that substance, in our ordinary notion of it, is that species of existencies which has perception and action, or which affects our senses, or causes discernible alterations in other substances: wherefore space is not usually ranked among substances, because it does nothing, produces no effect, but is the most passive of things, permitting all else to remain in it, remove from it, or pass through it; we neither see nor feel it, nor does it touch any of our senses, but is rather an idea of reflection, for upon discerning objects in different quarters, and observing their distances, we gather by inference that there must lie a space between them.

3. I shall not pretend to be wiser than Mr. Locke, nor to ascertain whether space be properly substance, but our comfort is that it matters not for our present purpose whether we can decide

the point or no, since nobody ever dreamt of Mind being mere empty space : so the question lies between its being a corporeal atom, or distinct species of substance of a kind peculiar to itself. We get our first idea of substance I conceive from ourselves, our perceptions convincing us of our existence, not as is commonly supposed by logical inference, I see, I feel, therefore I am, for we know our own Being long before we learn to make such abstractions, nor can one imagine a child to form syllogisms, or draw consequences of this kind : but the idea of being is contained in that of perceiving, for you cannot understand a proposition without apprehending the several terms composing it, and in the proposition, I feel, the term I expresses something real and substantial, or else it would not be different from the proposition Nothing feels, which rather implies a denial of feeling than carries an evidence of it, nor can there be an idea of actual feeling without something that feels.

4. On the other hand, to complete our idea of feeling there must likewise be something felt, and this gives us our knowledge of substances without us : for when we grasp a stone in our hand we find it press against our fingers, so that we cannot close them into a fist as we might have done before, whence we apprehend it to be a solid substance : and if we cast it behind our back, where we can neither see nor feel it, still we conceive it retaining its solidity. But we discover its solidity by other ways, for if we see the stone squeezed hard by a pair of pincers, or struck by another stone hitting against it, though there be no feeling concerned in the case, yet we perceive the stone makes a resistance against whatever presses or strikes upon it : but this resistance between bodies never happens until they touch, wherefore I look upon solidity, resistance, and tangibility, as the same thing, or at least to depend upon one another, and to be inseparable from our idea of body. Lucretius asserts roundly that nothing besides body can touch or be touched, whether he knew thus for certain is more than I can tell, but thus much we must allow him, that if there be anything which cannot be touched, it is not body, and where resistance necessarily ensues upon contact there must be body : but when astronomers, in describing an eclipse, talk of the shadow of the earth touching the outer limb of the moon, I suppose Lucretius would not allow this to be touching. And indeed our touch gives us the first evidence of external substances, which do not discover themselves to our other senses, until we have been convinced of their reality by that : wherefore the vulgar apprehend savors, odors, sounds, and light, to contain nothing substantial, and the learned will hardly deny that the effluvia causing smells and

tastes, the undulating particles of air exciting sound, and the little corpuscles of light, might be felt as well as a stone, had we fingers fine enough to pick them up, and squeeze them singly; and how much soever they may contend that light touches neither the colored bodies reflecting it, nor the substance of our eye, but operates and is operated upon by attraction, yet since it is a received maxim that nothing can act at a distance or where it is not, they must admit it touches the ether, or whatever else by its pressure causes that attraction.

5. I know not whether I am singular in the notion, but to me, resistance seems a kind of acting power essential to body; impulse I know it cannot give until received from something else, nor increase it beyond the degree imparted, but when a body resists another striking against it, it does not do so by virtue of any force imparted therefrom, but by an inherent quality of its own. Nor can it be doubted that others have entertained the same notion before, if I translate their Latin expression aright, wherein they style the perseverance of body either in motion or rest, a Force or Power of Inertness. However, as activity has all along been understood of a power of beginning motion, I shall not comprehend the power of resistance, if it be one, under that term.

6. Thus solidity, resistance, or tangibility, seems the only positive ingredient in the essence of body, mobility being rather an accidental property than anything essential. But besides this, we apprehend body to be senseless and inert, which are only negative terms importing no more than a denial of perceptivity and activity; but these negative terms seem the distinguishing characteristic of body. The Hylozoists, indeed, by Cudworth's account of them, held a mean between perceptivity and senselessness, between motion and rest, something that was neither perception nor stupidity, neither action nor inertness, but resembled the thoughts of a man half asleep, or muddled with porter; and that a multitude of these drowsy atoms clubbing forces together might form a genius penetrating, alert, and sprightly: all which whoever can understand must be a much shrewder man than me. But bating this whimsy, it has been universally agreed that matter is of itself void of activity and perception; and though the Stoics and other corporealists conceived that thought and volition might result from a combination of matter luckily disposed into an organized system, yet since we have satisfied ourselves of the distinct existence and individuality of Mind, we may safely conclude that it is another species of substance, essentially distinct from body, and which we call Spirit.

7. As no bounds can be set to the imagination of man, and new fancies arise in proportion as old ones are exploded, it may come into somebody's head one time or another to improve upon the Hylozoists and ascribe a complete perception and volition to the atoms. For he may imagine it possible that the mutual action of bodies upon one another, may arise from a voluntary exertion of power upon motives, that when they cohere it may be from some satisfaction felt in their contiguity, and when they resist or repel, from some uneasiness brought upon them by the impulse; from which two actions all the operations of nature proceed. So that what was supposed to be spoken figuratively by the ancients, that all things were produced by Love and Hatred, whereby they were understood to mean attraction and repulsion, may be literally true. And here the abettors of indifferency will have an advantage over me, for they may infer from bodies acting constantly in the same manner, under the same circumstances, that they have not an elective power, which they conceive an essential property of spirit: but I, having said so much, and being like to say more concerning the certainty of human action, and having remarked that the conduct of persons who have the fullest freedom of will and command of themselves, is more steady and accountable than that of the giddy and sensual, am deprived the benefit of this argument. Therefore I shall not undertake to prove demonstratively that the fact is not so as above supposed, but I must observe that if it could be made out to be true, though it would follow that there was but one kind of substance in nature, it would not follow that this substance was body: for the idea of body including inertness and senselessness, if the atoms were sentient the consequence would be that they were spirits, and mankind would have been all this while under a delusion in taking the trees, the stones, the earth, they see for bodies, when they are not in reality such, but clusters of spirits held together by the delight they take in one another's company; and if any impertinent particles of light come to intrude among them, they drive them in great hurry away to our eyes. But as this is a mere imagination, like Berkeley's ideal world, Leibnitz's pre-established harmony, and Hartley's mechanical volition, built upon bare possibility without support of any proof, I shall remain persuaded with the rest of the world that the bodies we see and handle are substances of a different kind from ourselves who see and handle them.

Now to compare body and spirit together, we must acknowledge the character of substantiality belonging in common to both; but they are generally held to differ in these respects, that spirit

is penetrable, unextended, having perceptivity and activity, by Mr. Locke called *motivity*, to which some add *illocality*, and others *self-motion*; body solid, extended, senseless, inert, occupying space, and moveable upon impulse. I have already laid down the capacity and incapacity of perception and action for the distinguishing marks of either, so have nothing more to add upon them: but concerning the other qualities, as I happen not to enter thoroughly into all the current notions of the schools, I shall take leave to deliver my sentiments with the freedom of one who would judge for himself, but without the arrogance of one who would suffer nobody else to do the like. I shall begin with penetrability which, though confidently asserted, appears to me a doubtful point whereon we have not sufficient foundation to determine either way: we see by a thousand instances every day that bodies protrude and resist one another, nor can the most yielding of them be forced into the same place by all the contrivances of art or powers of nature; but how know we what would be the case with spirit could we see the experiment tried? We live immured in walls of solid bone, so that we cannot come at our sentient part to push against it with our finger, or apply it to the sentient part of another person, in order to know the result. Could we pick a spirit out of its cell and move it along a line upon the table where there lay another spirit with some little body before, we might satisfy ourselves what it would do: If we found it stop at both, or protrude them forward, we must pronounce it equally solid with body: if it passed easily through the body but stopped at the spirit, we must conclude body and spirit alike solid with respect to substances of their own kind, but penetrable by those of the other: if it found resistance from neither, we might then pronounce penetrability the distinguishing property of spirit: but these are trials we can never have an opportunity of making.

Were I permitted to conjecture in a matter wherein nothing better than conjecture can be had, I should suppose spirit naturally penetrable, but capable of rendering itself solid upon occasion with respect to particular bodies, and that hereon our activity depends. I have formerly given my reasons for imagining that the force wherewith we move our limbs is derived from the animal circulation rushing into the muscles through certain nerves, and that the orifices of these nerves are provided with stoppers, which the mind draws up at pleasure to give the animal spirits admittance: now what should hinder our conceiving these stoppers pushed up by little hairs or fibres whose other ends lie within our spiritual part, which by its natural penetrability admits them into the space

where itself resides? but upon the mind rendering herself solid with respect to any particular fibre it is driven forward, thereby lifts up the stopper and opens the passage into the nerves; until volition forbearing to act, the penetrability returns, the fibre no longer pressed falls back to its former station, the stopper following closes the passage, and muscular motion ceases. Whoever should think this conjecture probable, would see that spirit possesses the united powers of body and space: for body resists but cannot admit, space admits but cannot resist, whereas spirit can either resist or admit as it pleases. Nor let it be made an objection that upon the fibre entering the residence of the mind there must be two substances existing in the same place; for I see no inconsistency in imagining substances of different kinds to co-exist together: if space be a substance, all bodies co-exist with some portion of that, and if there be a Being which fills all immensity, all other substances must co-exist with it, or they will have nowhere to exist at all.

9. I have already owned that I have but an imperfect notion of what the schoolmen understand by extension: if it imply a consisting of parts I cannot be suspected of ascribing that to spirit after the pains I have taken to prove that perceptivity can belong only to individuals. But I have an idea of a thing being extended without parts, and so have other people, if one may judge by their discourses: for I have heard of the stench of a brick-kiln reaching into the houses in London, and of a noise extending many miles around; yet I never heard anybody talk of the half or the quarter, or any other part of a smell or a sound. And though these be not substances, yet having once gotten the idea of extension without parts, I do not see why we may not apply it to substance, which we may conceive existing and present throughout a certain portion of space without losing its unity. I cannot well be denied the possibility of such a diffused presence by far the greater part of mankind who hold a simple indivisible Being present in all the regions of immensity. But that we ourselves have this extension in my sense of the word, though bounded within very narrow limits, we may be satisfied by considerations drawn from facts falling daily under our notice and principles universally agreed upon. It is an uncontroverted maxim, and may pass for a self-evident truth, that nothing can act or be acted upon where it is not, and though bodies seem to act at a distance, there is always some medium passing between the agent and the patient, nor is anything done to the latter before the arrival of the medium. Thus an engineer may batter down a wall a mile off, but the ball does no execution until it touches the wall. In like

manner we see and hear, and are otherwise affected with bodies lying far from us, but then something must be thrown from them to strike upon our organs and raise motions there which are propagated onward to the seat of perception: nor can we receive sensations of any kind, unless the nerve, or animal spirit, or ether, or whatever else it be immediately exciting them, either penetrates the mind itself, or at least comes into contiguity with it.

Now let us suppose a chess-board with double sets of men, a red and a green besides the yellow and black, so that every square of the board may be covered with a piece: set this board upon a table before you and I believe it will be granted me that you may have a distinct view of all the pieces at once. We cannot imagine that matter raises different sensations otherwise than by a difference of size, or figure, or velocity, or direction, or composition, or other modification; but the same particle of matter can be susceptible of no more than one modification at once, therefore there must be sixtyfour particles at least operating upon the mind together in the above experiment, I say at least, for it is more than probable that each object upon the board employs many particles to convey its idea: which sixtyfour particles cannot possibly enter, nor become contiguous to a mathematical point, and consequently the mind must at the same instant be actually present throughout such a portion of space as may touch or contain them all. This space I shall call the sphere of our presence, not that I pretend to know it must be round; but because it is the fashion to apply that term to every figure we know nothing of. If the reasonings above used be just, and I can discover no flaw in them, they will demonstrate a remarkable difference between spirit and body, for the sphere of a spirit's presence will be found at least equal to the space occupied by sixtyfour particles of matter: therefore though the atoms should be sentient they cannot receive near the number nor variety of ideas whereof we are capable.

10. Nor is this sphere of presence a novel thought of mine, but at least coeval with Aristotle, of whom it is currently believed that he held the mind, called by him *Entelechia*, coexistent with the whole body, being all in all, and all in every part: by which it is plain he apprehended it to be a true individual, yet present and perceptive throughout the whole space occupied by the body, for had he thought it a compound, it would not have been all in every part, but one portion of it in one limb and the others severally in the rest. Indeed this notion of his is generally exploded and ridiculed, because he carried the sphere of presence a great deal too far, for we are now assured by expe-

rience, that when the nerves are anywhere obstructed in their passage to the brain, no sensation will ensue though the external organs continue to perform their office, whereas were the mind actually present in the eye she might discern what passes there notwithstanding any obstruction of the optic nerves within. But the same objections do not lie against me who suppose the sphere of presence to enclose an exceeding small compass situate probably somewhere in the brain, yet large enough to contain many variously modified particles of matter, though not large enough to hold the hundredth part of those floating about in our sensory ; for which reason we remember much more than we can at any instant recollect, and sometimes have an expression or a name at our tongue's end which we cannot bring out, because we cannot draw the particle, whose modification is the idea of it, into our presence for inspection. And there is another particular wherein I have the misfortune to dissent from Aristotle, for if the entelechia be commensurate with the body, it must grow as that grows, and contract when that is diminished, having a much larger scope in a man of full stature than it had in the sucking child, or if the man lose an arm, it must withdraw from the space occupied by the arm. But I apprehend the presence of a spirit incapable of becoming either larger or smaller than ever it was : for as a solid particle of matter must always occupy, so a spirit must always be present in, the same extent of space, magnitude in the one and presence in the other being an essential primary property annexed indissolubly by nature to the substance possessing them.

11. It is true there are insuperable difficulties among our ideas relating to magnitude, which whoever delights to puzzle himself with may receive good assistance in the sport from the notes in Bayle's dictionary under the article Zenon. One way by which he disproves the reality of magnitude is because in all continued motions the moving body perpetually changing its place must be in two places at once, that is, in every instant or moment of its passage, for it never stands a moment still. But to add to the foresaid sport I would beg leave to ask Monsieur Bayle how he knows there are moments of time any more than mathematical points of space or atoms of body, or that a minute may not be infinitely divisible as well as an inch of whipcord or of empty vacuum : which if it may, then his argument of the moving body being in two places at once will fall to the ground. These amusements may serve to convince us there are subjects in nature beyond our comprehension, some questions to which the wisest man can give no better answer than, I do not know, and to con-

firm what I have laid down in my chapter on judgment, that absolute certainty was not made for man: yet do they not impeach what was added there, that man is so constituted as to do very well without it, being capable of rational moral assurance to the exclusion of all doubt, which is knowledge enough for the direction of conduct and to answer all the uses of life. And since what knowledge we have derives all originally from sensation, that is best to be depended upon which lies nearest the fountain head being drawn from experience by the fewest deductions of reasoning. Now constant experience testifies that bodies cannot have different magnitudes, forms, velocities, directions, or other modifications, at the same time; that while under the same modification they cannot act variously upon one and the same subject; that many of them must have so many several places to exist in, which cannot lie in contact with a mathematical point; nevertheless, that they act very variously upon us in the business of perception at the same instant, and that it is the same Self which receives all their various actions: from whence the sphere of presence, belonging to one individual substance, follows by a single consequence, without that long chain of subtle deductions hung upon one another which must be travelled through before you can discover the force of Bayle's objections, every step wherein still increases the hazard of an unperceived fallacy. As this notion of an indivisible substance, existent and present throughout a divisible portion of space, will be made use of upon several occasions by-and-by, I wish it might be maturely considered before proceeding any further: for I do not pretend to infallibility, nor desire to lead any man into an error through hastiness, therefore let him not trust to my conclusion, but turn over the matter in his thoughts till he has digested it maturely and satisfied himself whether this, which is one of my foundation stones, has a solidity sufficient to bear any superstructure I may hereafter raise upon it.

12. There is one quality more belonging both to body and spirit to which we can neither give a name nor a description, but whereon their vital union together depends. We know that wherever the body goes, the mind constantly accompanies it and keeps her station always in the same part of the human frame, but by what power of either this happens we cannot discover. It cannot proceed from solidity, impulse, or perceptibility in the one, nor from penetrability, activity, or perceptivity in the other, but must be a distinct quality of itself. If I could come into Stahl's notion of digestion and nutrition being an operation of the mind, and that she can perform a voluntary act without the least idea of anything relative to what she is about, I might suppose the mind held in

junction with the body by her own unperceived volition: but as I happen not to enter into his sentiments upon that point, I cannot take the benefit of them to draw such conclusion. Yet perhaps the junction may be so far owing to the mind as to depend upon the forbearance of her volition, and that she might detach herself at any time had she ideas of the proper manner how to proceed for effecting it: for we may have powers which we cannot exercise for want of knowing them, ideal causes being a necessary preparatory to action. But in our present condition it is fortunate that we have not such ideas, for our perceptions all coming to us by the action of our bodily organs, were we to quit them we might lose all our ideas, and so never know how to get back again. Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable, as we shall endeavor to show in another place, that the mind may stand in a situation to receive perceptions without corporeal organs, and then may join herself to particles or systems of matter occasionally without losing her ideal causes flowing from another fund.

13. The notion of illocality is at least as old as Aristotle, but has been continued down to the moderns, for Cudworth declares himself of that opinion: but though he will not allow spirit as such to have any place, he admits it may have one with respect to the body whereto it is vitally united, wherefore he tells us some held that spirit must always be vitally united to some body or other that it may have a place in nature: which seems to make the very existence of spirit to depend upon body, for I cannot conceive a thing to exist at all which has no place in nature. I apprehend this doctrine of illocality arose from the defining extension a having parts without parts, for those who held this definition could no more conceive a mathematical point in space than in body; therefore whatever had a place must possess some portion of space, which being divisible, so much of the substance as lies in the right-hand half of this portion will be a distinct part from that which lies on the left. And that this was Aristotle's way of thinking appears manifest, because he allowed a where to spirit though he would not allow a place; which seems to me a distinction without a difference, for to be somewhere or in some place are in my comprehension synonymous terms. But I do not apprehend the individuality of a substance depends upon the individuality of the space wherein it exists; if we cannot conceive the one without the other it is because our conceptions are taken from the bodies we see, whose divisions always correspond with those of the spaces they occupy: but we must, upon many occasions, admit conclusions we cannot conceive; therefore our want of adequate conception is not sufficient to overthrow the reasons before given for the indivi-

duality of spirit and at the same time its presence throughout a space consisting of distinguishable parts.

14. But which way soever we express ourselves, we cannot well appropriate mobility to body, nor deny that spirit partakes of the like quality, without which there can no more be made a change of Where than a change of Place. While in my chamber this morning I was one where, now I am come down into my study, I am other where ; this Aristotle must needs grant me : but how I could get either from one where or one place, to another where or another place, without locomotion, let him that can comprehend it explain.

15. Some have supposed the mind able to move herself by her own energy, which cannot well consist with what I observed long ago, that our idea of Operation requires there should be two substances concerned, one to act and another to be acted upon : but waving this difficulty, if the mind has such power, we can never know it, because she cannot exert it in her present state. We live imprisoned in walls of flesh and bone, and like a snail can stir nowhere without our houses accompanying us : when we walk, we act upon our legs, which thrust the body forward, and that moves the mind along ; so that in walking we are as much carried as when riding in a coach driven by our own orders. Nor let it be thought the mind moves herself, because in our ordinary movements she goes willingly along with her companion, for this is not always the case ; a man may be pulled forcibly from his seat, though he resist and struggle ever so much, or be ever so averse to stirring ; or he may be carried in his sleep, when there is no exercise of volition : but in these cases, when the body is dragged away, the spirit will not stay behind, which manifestly shows it passive to receive a motion it cannot avoid.

16. Since we find a passive locomotion in spirit, we must acknowledge it capable of impulse from body, for body can give motion no otherwise than by impulse ; and that spirit is capable of imparting impulse we know by our moving our limbs. But impulse, whether given or received, does not necessarily excite perception, for we have none either of the particles vitally united to us or of those ends of fibres whereon we begin our action. Therefore we must look for some other property in body rendering it perceivable, and this we may call perceptibility, without which perceptivity in spirit would be of no avail ; for to produce an effect, there must be an active power in the agent, as well as a passive power in the recipient. Whether spirit has the like perceptibility too, we can never certainly know, because we can never try the experiment necessary to discover it. If I may be

permitted to conjecture once more, I should suppose this not a primary quality in body, but resulting from a combination of many particles thrown into particular figures, or other modifications, because primary qualities must act uniformly, nor could they exhibit that variety of ideas we perceive. Why then may not spirit, by virtue of its indifference either to solidity or penetrability, imitate the like modifications? Suppose a piece of marble skilfully engraven so as to leave the letters of a word standing out from the rest of the surface, if the marble were laid upon your hand, you might feel and understand the word. What then should hinder but that a spirit, being contiguous to another, might make itself solid in the parts of the sphere of its presence corresponding with the shape of the letters, leaving its natural penetrability in the spaces between, which then might produce the same effect as the marble did upon your hand. And thus spirits, when disencumbered from the shackles of matter, may communicate the same perceptions, besides thousands more, that we receive from our organs, both of sensation and reflection.

CHAP. VI.

DURATION OF MIND.

FROM the individuality and distinct existence of Mind may be inferred her perpetual duration; for the powers of nature can neither increase nor diminish the stock of Beings; they may throw them out of their assortments and so dissolve the compounds formed thereby, or destroy the secondary qualities resulting from their composition; but what has existence cannot be annihilated, and what is one cannot be divided, nor can primary qualities, essential to the subject possessing them, be taken away. Perceptivity and activity have appeared to be the properties constituting the essence of spirit, and distinguishing it from other substances: as to what has been offered concerning solidity, extension, locality, and mobility, whether it shall be received or no, affects us not at present.

2. So far then as relates to the individuality, existence, and inherent perceptivity of spirit, I may be counted orthodox, but I will not undertake to preserve that character always, for I am now going to side for a while with the corporealists, whom I take to have the advantage in some particulars over their antagonists. Nor can this be called a desertion, for I have never sworn implicit obedience to any master, but have claimed to use a sober free-

dom to examine whatever I shall hear suggested from any quarter. I laid down in my general introduction, as a reasonable presumption, that the tenets of every sect among mankind must contain a mixture of truth, for else they would never have gained credit, because men do not wilfully embrace error, but are led into it by unwary conclusions from something for which they have a solid foundation. If such presumptions be thought a prejudice, and who can keep perfectly clear from prejudice? it is a more excusable one than that which proceeds from the spirit of opposition. For this engages men to treat an antagonist as an enemy, and even to deny him the rights of an enemy, but my propensity to judge the best of every one, inclines me to seek excuses for him in the fallibility of human reason, which draws false conclusions from true premises: therefore how erroneous soever I may judge the corporealists in the main, I am better satisfied in discovering some latent fallacy misleading them in their deductions, than if I could find nothing similar in their way of thinking with my own.

3. Now the particulars wherein I apprehend them not so grossly mistaken as commonly supposed, are these, that sense, thought, and reason, result from an organization, therefore whatever possesses those faculties must be a compound. No doubt I shall be thought to contradict myself herein, having all along used sentient, percipient, and perceptive, as synonymous terms, and contended so strenuously that every substance to which those epithets belong, must be one and uncompound. We have had no occasion hitherto to distinguish between those terms, and to have done it, while needless, would have tended only to perplex and burden our thoughts; but I am now under a necessity of making a distinction between percipience and perceptivity, which though a pretty nice one I hope to make it understood. The powers we ascribe to ourselves in our discourses depend partly upon our natural abilities, and partly upon the instruments we have to employ: a man may be called a good rider that is expert to keep a firm seat upon the saddle, but while marching among the infantry he is no rider at all; or he may be pronounced able to ride a hundred miles in a day, if he have strength to support the fatigue, but he is not able to ride twenty without a horse, or with a lame one. So when we find a person asleep, or meet him in the dark, we may affirm of him that he has a very piercing sight, if we know his optics are good; yet in these situations he can no more see than the table. In like manner a substance is perceptive, that has a quality of perceiving objects upon application of them; yet it cannot perceive without a proper conveyance to bring the im-

pression of objects to it : therefore if it be so placed as that no impression can ever come at it, it is no more percipient than any clod in the fields. Thus perceptivity is nothing else beside a bare capacity in the subject to receive perceptions when excited, but sense or percipience is the standing so circumstanced, as that the impulse of objects striking upon us may be transmitted so as to raise perceptions : and this requires an organization, which implies a compound of many parts ; for I can no more see without eyes, hear without ears, nor meditate without organs of reflection, than I could without a perceptive spirit to receive the notices transmitted thereby. What notices a separate spirit might receive from other substances accidentally approaching it I need not now inquire, for all the percipients we have any knowledge of being vitally united to some organization, and their perceptions depending thereupon, we may safely pronounce all the percipients we know to be compounds.

4. And the case is plainer with respect to the faculties of remembrance, consciousness, reasoning, judging, dividing, comparing, and all other modes of thinking : for we cannot remember or be conscious without inspecting the records lying in our memory, we cannot judge without a discernment of something distinct from that which judges ; in reasoning we employ our organs of reflection to bring the proper materials before us for our contemplation, and when we divide and compare, there must be something within us exhibiting the objects wherein we observe a difference or similitude. Therefore those who define the mind a thinking substance, necessarily make it a compound whether they discern the consequence or no, for cogitation cannot be performed without the command of certain instruments, to bring ideas before us for our inspection, to change, to marshal, to separate them, and trace their connections or relations from one inference to another. For this reason I remarked in the chapter of sensation that Mind was an equivocal term used to express two very different things, which I called the philosophical and the vulgar mind, though I cannot help acknowledging that men of thought and learning for the most part understand it in the vulgar sense, or rather confound both together. The former I take to be a pure uncompounded spirit endowed with perceptivity and activity, but incapable of actual perception or action without an organization suited to its purposes : by the latter I understand this same spirit together with so much of its organization as is concerned in the business of thinking and reflection, which must be a compound consisting chiefly of corporeal parts separable from one another, and all of them from the spirit whereto they are united. In this

mind our faculties of reason and memory, our knowledge, our talents, our habits, our passions, our sentiments, and whatever else distinguishes the characters of men, reside : and this mind I apprehend to be the same with what is commonly called the human soul.

5. If any shall take offence at my making the soul compound-ed, dissoluble, and perishable, let them consider it is not I who make it so but themselves by their application of the term : for words are mere arbitrary signs, capable of taking any signification that mankind shall agree to put upon them. Were I left to myself I should apply the name of Soul, to our spiritual part alone, and shall do so sometimes where the matters I handle will admit of it ; and then after all that has been delivered already nobody can suspect me of holding it perishable. But the misfortune is that men in their division of body and soul do not make the separation clean, but take in some finer parts of the former into their idea of the latter, as appears manifest by their ascribing faculties to it which cannot subsist without an organization : for a naked spirit is no more a thinking substance than it is a walking substance, it can indeed think whenever joined in composition with proper organs of reflections, and so it can always walk in composition with legs and crural muscles. Thus, after the usual division of man into body and soul, we may again subdivide the latter into organization and spirit ; but this subdivision being not ordinarily taken notice of, the term Soul becomes applied indifferently either to the perceptive spirit or to the whole percipient containing that in conjunction with its system of reflective organs. While men remain unsettled and variable in their notions of the soul they must not blame me for speaking of it in a manner they do not like, or that seem contradictory to what I have spoken concerning it at other times, for this will unavoidably happen so long as in compliance with custom I am obliged to vary the idea belonging to the term. So then the question concerning the corruptibility of Mind or Soul is a question of language rather than of fact, and may be truly answered Ay or No, according to the different senses wherein you understand them. And the like question capable of contrary answers may be proposed concerning Person : who does not acknowledge himself mortal, that he was taken from dust and shall crumble into dust again, and in a few years shall be no more ; we hear such expressions used every day, and they are justly used while we consider our whole human frame as ourselves. But in our seasons of abstraction, when we restrain Self to the spiritual part, we change our tone, for then we claim to be perpetual, unperishable, and unchange-

able, to flourish in immortal youth, unhurt amidst the war of elements, the wreck of matter, and the crush of worlds.

6. Thus in disputes upon the nature of the soul, while it was defined a reasoning, thinking, sentient substance, the corporealists seem to have had the advantage. For issue being joined upon its simplicity or compoundness, it seemed admitted on both sides that if compounded it was Material : therefore finding it uncontroverted that every compound must be made up of matter, and being unable to conceive the faculties of reason, thought, and sense, residing in a simple substance, they were not quite absurd in concluding the soul to be no more than a very curious assortment of corporeal particles. But if we take along with us our foregoing distinction between percipience and perceptivity, we may admit a sentient composed of un sentient parts, yet deny that such composition could consist solely of matter, but must contain one perceptive ingredient to receive the notices brought by the rest. For if a grain of sand were placed where the spirit resides in the most exquisite organization that can be contrived, there would be no more thought or percipience in this compound than there is in the *Venus de Medicis*.

If any one shall still make a difficulty in distinguishing between a capacity and a power of perceiving, let him consider whether he does not apprehend a difference between a blind man and one with good eyes shut up in a coal hole : both lie under an impossibility of seeing, yet both have not lost their sight. When Ulysses stopped the ears of his crew with wax, on sailing by the Sirens, he did not destroy their sense of hearing though he put it out of their power to hear the enchantments. And a strong man bound hand and foot becomes unable to stir, yet retains his vigor and natural ability to move. So a spirit may retain its perceptivity, that is, capacity of receiving perceptions whenever excited, after losing its percipience or power of perceiving by being removed from everything which might bring objects to excite them.

7. Having satisfied ourselves that our spirit or soul, if I may give that appellation to the spiritual part singly, shall have a duration beyond all the powers of nature to cut short, our next step will be to examine what we shall carry with us upon quitting our present habitation : and we can assure ourselves of no more than our two primary faculties of perceptivity and activity, which being inherent in our constitution nothing can divest us of. But these will avail us little of themselves, for we shall neither be able to perceive nor act without something added thereto, furnishing ideas for us to perceive or materials for us to act upon. Therefore, the knowledge of our perpetual duration and perceptivity affords us no

light to judge of our condition hereafter : we know that we shall continue existent and capable of receiving perceptions, but what perceptions shall accost us, whether those of pleasure or pain, of sagacity or dullness, or none at all, we are utterly ignorant. Nor can we tell that our percipience shall remain, nor whether we may or may not carry with us that part of our organization wherein our faculties of reflecting, judging, thinking, reasoning, reside. After what has been said of the extreme divisibility of matter, it appears possible that we may have a complete system of organs within us so small as to elude all our observation, too fine to be discerned when going, or to be missed when gone : so that notwithstanding all the appearances upon death, and though the carcass seems to lose nothing of its weight, there may be a little body composed of members fitted for sense and action which flies off unperceived. But should this be the case, and should our sensitive and rational faculties accompany us, they may be reduced to bare capacities without power of helping ourselves to a single idea, unless some foreign aid shall befriend us. For we have seen in the progress of these inquiries how the mind, in her acts of recollection, of reasoning, of habit, and passion, communicates with the animal circulation : how know we then that she can perform her operations at all when separated therefrom? We find ourselves more or less ready at those operations according to the disposition of our body, and when the communication is cut off by fits or sleep we cannot perform them at all. Therefore it is not impossible that the causes bringing us all our ideas may reside in the grosser parts of our body, that upon parting from them we may lose our remembrance, our knowledge, and all our acquirements, and pass into another state as much a blank paper as ever we came into this, capable of taking any writing that shall be marked upon us, but having all that was written before quite erased.

8. Or it may be that our whole material frame shall be dissolved, and the spirit fly off naked and unattended by any organ, yet retaining its perceptivity, we know not how it may be affected by any corporeal particle into contiguity, or entering the sphere of its presence. Some have asserted that our perceptions are excited, not by animal spirits or fibres, but by vibrations of ether pervading their interstices : if this be true we shall not want for ether wherever we go, but how the stronger vibrations of ether at a distance from gross bodies shall affect us we are utterly at a loss to guess. Neither can we be assured concerning the perceptibility of other spirits, whether they may exhibit ideas to one

another, whether such operation be necessary or voluntary, nor how they may stand disposed either to comfort or torment us.

9. In either case our condition will be determined by the objects accosting us, and company we fall into. We are here luckily situated in an organization enabling us to help ourselves to the conveniences and enjoyments of life, but when turned out of this we know not where to find such another, nor how to get into any other at all. Though surrounded with dangers on all sides, we have sense and experience to avoid them, but when divested of our sense and experience, we may be like a blind man turned out into a crowded street, having nothing but chance to direct our steps, insensible of mischiefs before they fall upon us, and unknowing which way to escape them. We may be tossed about among the elements, driven by streams of air, or whirled round in circles of fire, the little corpuscles of light may hurt us, and the ether tease us with its continual repulsion: in short, we have everything to fear and little to hope for. Thus the discovery of our durable and perceptive nature affords no comfort, for while we confine our contemplation to that, the prospect lies dismal, dark, and uncertain before us. Let us then turn our thoughts upon external nature, in order to discover what rules and powers there may be governing that, in hopes of learning something how they may affect us, and in what manner we are likely to be disposed of.

CHAP. VII.

EFFECTS AND CAUSES.

THOUGH we are all convinced of our short continuance in this present state, we are well satisfied that the course of nature will not be interrupted by our departure: the sun will still rise and set, the tides ebb and flow, the trees continue to bear their fruits, the cattle to multiply, the earth to yield her increase, and the business of mankind to go forward, after we are dead and gone. But the contemplation of these things gives us no instruction how to provide for our future accommodation, nor furnishes us with any light to discover what accommodations may be provided to our hands. Shall we heap up riches? those we must leave behind, or could we carry them with us, our money would not pass current in the other world. Shall we plant gardens or breed up numerous flocks? their produce will not suit our digestion. Shall we raise a family

or spread our fame amongst mankind? we may not remember our own names, nor have an intercourse with the living to know what they say of us. Shall we improve knowledge and cultivate the sciences? our ideas may be totally different, and our sciences unintelligible to us. Shall we rectify our dispositions of mind, and lay in store of virtues? these are habits wherein the animal circulation is concerned, nor can we be sure they shall continue when that is removed from us. Shall we be careful to nourish the little body that is to serve us for our next habitation, to invigorate its limbs and quicken its organs? we know not where they lie, nor what we can do to improve their growth. And as we can do nothing of ourselves, so neither have we assurance of anything that will be done for us: we know not what nests shall be provided to hatch us into life, nor what parents we shall have to protect our tender infancy, and teach us the learning necessary for our conduct; what sustenance the air may afford, or where to find it, or whether we shall want any sustenance at all; what variations of weather may prevail in the ether answering to the pleasing warmth of a vernal sunshine, or the storms and inclemencies of winter, nor how to shelter ourselves from the latter. The subtile fluids causing gravitation, cohesion, electricity, and magnetism, may strike our new senses instead of lights, sounds, savors, and odors, and fill us with agreeable or troublesome sensations. We may meet with different species of animals proportionable to our size, answering to ravenous birds and beasts of prey or such as serve for our uses in life. We may fall into societies of fellow-creatures among whom we may find friends and enemies, who may give mutual delight by their conversation, or vex one another with their contrariety of tempers and opposition of interests. Since then we can find nothing certain by considering the constitution of particular things, let us search for the general laws prevailing throughout all nature: for perhaps we may see that their influence must occasion some resemblance or similar tendency in the municipal laws of the several regions of nature, and we may discover some methods of conduct whereby to put ourselves in a situation to receive benefit and escape damage from that influence. But as those laws depend upon the causes operating in the productions of nature, we must endeavor to investigate the causes from their effects discernible to our senses or discoverable by our reason.

2. We may distribute our prospect of nature into three parts, primary qualities, motion, and situation, which concur in every operation we see or can think of. When a cannon-ball dashing into a heap of sand disperses it all about, the situation into which the particles are thrown, follows from their several situations in the

heap and the contact or propinquity of the ball when striking, from the violent motion wherewith it struck, and from its solidity to give, and their own solidity to receive, an impulse. So the growth of plants is owing to the near situation of nutritious particles in the earth that bears them, the position of their little parts in fibres and tubes fitted for containing the sap, to the action of sun and air, and to the properties of matter whereon that action depends. Nor is the case different with respect to the acts of free agents, which cannot proceed without a close situation of that which is to be the subject of their action or object of their perception, nor could their organs take a different modification whereby to exhibit different ideas without a motion in their parts, nor could anything be perceived or done without perceptibility and mobility in body, or perceptivity and motivity in spirit. And there are three causes commonly observed in the phenomena we see, Chance, Necessity, and Design. When the wind drives about the seeds of thistles, they fall in particular spots by chance; where they light, the peculiar contexture of their parts makes them necessarily produce plants of their own species; and when we cultivate and dress our ground, sow our corn, keep it weeded, and harvest it, we proceed by design.

3. I shall begin with the consideration of motion without which the courses of nature cannot be carried on: but this we may satisfy ourselves is not a quality of body, which is a moveable but no more a moving than a quiescent substance, being alike indifferent to either state, and continuing in either until put out of it by some foreign force. We see bodies moved by other bodies striking or shoving against them, but the mover gives no more motion than it had itself before, and always loses so much as it has imparted to another. And though motion sometimes seems to proceed from the pressure of quiescent bodies, there is always some external impulse occasioning the pressure; for two bodies meeting with equal force in opposite directions, after having stopped one another, will lie forever close together, gently touching, but not pressing each other unless something pushes or strikes against them on the outside. It is true we see motion frequently produced without discerning the cause, but then experiment and reason assure us that bodies never produce motion, but only transmit it by an impulse arising from their natural property of persevering in a motion once received. Thus, while we confine our thoughts to matter, it will appear that every motion is the product of some preceding motion, transferred from body to body, and incapable of increase by the translation. That there is an inexhaustible source of impulse somewhere, though undiscernible

by our senses, we may rest assured when we consider the dissolving power of menstruums, the violence of fire, the strong contraction of our heart and arteries, the stability of heavy masses held down by gravitation to the earth, and the firm cohesion of metals : all which must have some prodigious fund, we know not where to find, from whence to derive the force they exert. It seems not improbable there may be streams of a most subtile matter much finer than ether itself darting incessantly along in all directions with inconceivable velocity : that the solid parts of quiescent bodies lie in the spaces between these streams, which likewise throw and preserve the atoms in their longitudinal position of wire before supposed, that upon the touch of fire thrusting any of the particles aside into the streams, it dashes them about against other particles, driving these likewise upon other streams, and so causes that explosion we find in gunpowder. Just as if an army were marching briskly along in very wide ranks, another army in like loose array might march quietly between them : but if a few men were pushed into the others' ranks, it would cause a violent commotion and tossing to and fro among them. We may help ourselves a little in this idea by considering a cube of glass hung up between candles on all the six sides of it, the rays would pass continually through without being stopped by the glass or jolting against one another ; and this whether the glass remained still or were swung to and fro ; but if by a smart blow the parts of the glass were to change their position, forming a multitude of little cracks, it would become opaque and not afford them a passage, in which case if the streams of light were strong enough they must rend the glass into atoms and keep buffeting them about until by frequent tossings they had brought them to lie in the interstices between themselves.

4. It may seem at first sight impossible that such streams of subtile matter should be able to run in all directions without stopping or jostling one another : but let us consider that we find by experience the same thing happens in the passage of light. Hang a multitude of candles round the room and you shall be able to see any one of them distinctly through the light of all the rest. The stars scattered about in all parts of the upper hemisphere find their way to our eyes, but they must traverse many miles of thick solar radiance before they can come to that shadow of the earth which makes our night : and their rays falling upon my eyes must cross those falling upon the eyes of other persons a mile around me in a variety of angles : yet all this without any stoppage or deviation from their course, for if they were at all af-

fects by the other rays they pass through; it must cause perpetual refractions and we should see them dance about like so many Will-i'-the-whisps. But what makes the difficulty in this case is our conceiving the rays of light to be so many continual streams like those of water, the parts touching close upon one another, whereas it has been observed in CHAP. III. that the corpuscles composing a ray of light may possibly keep a distance of a hundred and sixty miles behind the next preceding them, though they follow so exceeding quick that we think their impulse upon our optics continuous. Now the particles of subtile matter, being much smaller and swifter than those corpuscles, their bulk may be estimated to bear an infinitely less proportion to the spaces between them than a ship does to the length of one hundred leagues. Let us then imagine ships to sail from every port in Europe to America and others from every port in America to Europe, each ship a hundred leagues behind that which parted last from the same port, and their courses be ordered in such manner as that they should cross over one particular spot of the ocean: those ships would so rarely fall foul of one another as to make no perceivable interruption in commerce; why then may not the little particles be allowed to collide so seldom as to cause no disturbance or interruption in the courses of nature.

Another difficulty springs from the extreme minuteness of those particles, which can hardly be thought capable of holding bodies together in such strong cohesion as we experience in metals: but let us remember that the momentum given by all mechanical powers is found by a compound ratio of their quantity of matter and velocity, so that any deficiency in the former may be made up by a proportionable increase of the latter. Nor need we wonder that very small agents should produce great effects, since we know that the burst of a cannon will shake a whole street, but the particles of air giving immediate impulse to the houses can scarce be supposed to weigh many grains. The like appears in explosion of gunpowder where the quantity of matter operating is a very trifle in comparison with the heavy masses it raises and compact bodies it rends. I shall only remark further that this subtile matter, being the cause of gravitation, cohesion, and repulsion, in other bodies, can neither gravitate, nor cohere, nor repel itself; because it will want a prior cause to give it those qualities: nor has it other power than that of impinging like a stone, by virtue of the prodigious velocity wherewith it darts along. Nevertheless, we may count it the primum mobile, or first material agent in all the operations of nature, as driving her two main wheels of attraction and repulsion, from whence all the

lesser works, the power of salts, acids, alkalies, of fire, fluids, electricity, and magnetism, circulating vessels of plants and animals, spring; glues and menstruums derive their activity; according to their several structure and position of their parts fitted to turn the motion of those principal wheels upon them. Nor is it hard to conceive how two bodies may be made to attract by the action of this subtile matter, because they must cover each other from so much of the stream as they receive themselves, which would else have fallen upon the nearest sides of the others, so that this force being wanting to balance that on their opposite sides, they must necessarily be driven towards each other. Then those streams which fall very obliquely, like a cannon-ball bounding from the ground, will drive off other bodies, lying at a certain distance, from whence arises repulsion, which cannot take place between bodies too near together, because in that situation they cannot receive a very oblique rebound, for it must pass beside them. This likewise accounts for the inequality between the two attractions, that of cohesion being found stronger than that of gravitation, because bodies cohering have the whole force of attraction without a competitor to keep them together, whereas those at a distance repel as well as attract, so that their gravitation is no more than the difference between those two coneracting forces.

5. But wherever the sources of this fund may lie, or how copious supplies soever they may contain, they cannot forever answer all demands made upon them. We see bodies continually strike against one another, and when they do so, if not elastic, the motion of both ceases, or if elastic, the force whereby they rebound must be drawn from some such fund as that above mentioned: every time a man claps his two hands together he takes something from the stock of motion which is to carry on the operations of nature. But the collisions occasioned by human action are very trifles in comparison with that great quantity of force spent by nature in all her works: the bearing of rivers against their winding banks, the dashing of seas against the shore, the opposition of winds from one another, or from mountains, the systole or contraction of circulating vessels in animals and plants, but above all these the gravitation of bodies to earths and suns, the cohesion holding the little particles of compounds together, the opposition of centripetal and centrifugal forces keeping the planets in their orbits, the repulsion of air and ether, must make a vast consumption of motion every moment. So that the largest stores of force we can suppose nature once to have had must have been long since exhausted, as being subject to perpetual diminution without any

means of recruiting : and all matter must have been reduced to a state of quiescence by this time, unless perhaps some few straggling atoms which might move about in spaces where they should meet with nothing to obstruct them.

6. Yet though the corporealists can find nothing to renew the decays of motion, we who claim motivity as an essential property of our own may fancy we find it in the action of spirit. Now should this be thought to serve for restoring motion it could not serve for beginning it at first : for we do not act without causes as well final as ideal, wherefore the activity of spirit is set at work by the perceptibility of matter and the modifications it falls into by the motion of its parts presenting us with the motives and guidance of our proceedings. For if nothing moved without us we should have no ideas brought us to perceive, and without perception there could be neither inducement to exert our volition, nor direction which way to turn it. So that upon either hypothesis we must needs adhere to our former conclusion, that every motion is the consequence and effect of some preceding motion, and that it must begin in matter before it can be produced by any such spirits as we have experience of.

7. And the like may be said of situation which follows constantly from some preceding situation. Matter is generally held homogeneous, and that infinite variety of forms constituting the essence of bodies falling under our cognizance, depends upon the structure and order wherein the parts of them are placed. So that the same first matter makes a stone or a metal, a plant or an animal organization, according to the position wherein the several individuals of it are ranged. Thus all secondary qualities arise from order ; neither a clock nor a tree would be what it is, nor could perform its proper functions, if the wheels or the fibres were placed in any other manner than they are : the faculties of sense, thought, and reason, could not subsist unless the spirit resided precisely in that spot whereto all the organs of sensation and reflection tend ; and the modifications exciting our several perceptions vary according to the position wherein the component parts of our organs lie. And that particular forms of order generate one another we may be satisfied by the growth of vegetables, where the peculiar structure of the seed causes it to produce a plant of its own kind : and the structure of plants occasions them to yield flowers and fruits of various shapes, hues, odors and tastes. In these things we are ready enough to acknowledge an order, but as has been shown in CHAP. X. of the last volume, we do not so easily admit it in positions not corresponding with our trains of imagination : nevertheless, it has been made appear there

that strictly speaking there is no such thing as disorder in nature, for every number of particles must lie in some situation with respect to one another, and that is their order however irregular it may seem to our apprehension. Nor are those apparently confused positions unfrequently serviceable to produce what we call order, for the particles nourishing a plant lie undistinguished in the earth, the air, or the vapors, yet they must have an apt position there, or the plant could never draw them in to contribute to its growth. Thus in particular things their order does not depend solely upon the order they had before, but partly upon other things, which are or may be brought contiguous to them, or mingle among them. But the Universe, having nothing external, must receive its order continually from that it had in every preceding moment; so that if the position of all substances could be known precisely at any given point of time, it might be determined from thence what position they would take at any time hereafter. For if it were known how the air, the mountains, the burning sands, the frozen seas, the subterraneous vapors and other causes affecting the weather, stand disposed, we might prognosticate what weather it would be to-morrow, or this day twelvemonth. Nor would the action of free agents disturb the calculation in changes of position wherein they are concerned; for if we could ascertain the exact situation of objects surrounding them and structure of their organs, we might foresee what modifications these organs would fall into, what ideas and motives they would present, and consequently how those agents would act, and what alterations they would make in the position of bodies within their reach. But then in calculations of this sort the article of motion must not be left out of account, because it is that which generates one order out of another: nor is it enough to know the quantity of motion in the whole, but likewise among what particles it is distributed, and in what direction each of them proceeds; for it is obvious that the same motion in different directions must produce very different figures.

8. Secondary qualities, resulting from the order wherein the substances forming a compound lie situate, are continually destroyed and renovated according to the changes made in that order by motions of the component parts. But primary properties belonging to individuals admit of no change; for what has no parts cannot have an order of parts: therefore these properties, being not generated by motion or situation, must remain constantly the same in the subjects possessing them. Body will always continue solid and spirit perceptive, whether in motion or at rest, whether in this part of the world or any other, whether contiguous

to other substances or separate from them all. So that primary properties spring from no assignable cause among the powers of nature, as motion and situation do from former motions and situations.

9. But the inquisitive mind of man looks for something further to account for the different properties of individuals; we find spirit active and perceptive, matter inert and incapable of sense, or should we fancy the atoms sentient, it has been shown the sphere of their presence would be less than that of ours: it is natural then to ask, why there should be such a difference in substances? why they are not all homogeneous and primarily alike? And these properties, being inherent in their nature and inseparable from them, must be as old as themselves, and consequently whatever occasioned the difference between them must have been the foundation of their existence. Nor will the mind be satisfied without a reason limiting the quantity of matter existing: there is no impossibility or absurdity in its being double, or treble, or decuple, to what it is, for there is abundant room for multitudes of atoms more in the empty spaces between those already in being.

10. Neither will there want the like questions concerning motion and order: for it will scarcely satisfy to tell us that every motion and situation follows from a prior, that again from the next preceding, and so backwards throughout all eternity; because if we contemplate a series of changes following one another, there will arise an order of succession as well as of position. In the effects we see produced, things pass out of one form into another, through several intermediate changes: a seed cannot produce the full-grown tree at once, but first shoots up a tender twig, which then becomes a sapling, a waiver, a tellar, and at last a perfect oak laden with acorns: a foetus grows through the stages of infancy, of childhood, of youth, unto the full maturity of manhood: and these gradations in the several productions of nature may be called their order of succession. Now if the situations of all the substances in the universe have followed one another forever, there must have been an eternal order of succession prevailing throughout: but if it should be asked why some other succession might not as well have prevailed eternally, what shall we answer? for I know of no natural repugnance in things against taking any position or series of motions, but their changes might have succeeded forever in a manner quite different from that they have done. Besides, there are some positions which never generate any others, and consequently produce no order of succession at all. Lucretius' atoms falling perpetually downwards with equal velocity could never have changed their order without his whim of a declination, for which there is no founda-

tion either in experience or reason. Actual motion is not essential to any substances we know of, which therefore might all have remained eternally quiescent in their several stations: or if we will needs suppose them to move, it is most natural to conceive them all moving with the same velocity and direction, in which case they could perform no more feats than the Lucretian atoms. Therefore it remains to seek a reason for their having an eternal motion rather than an eternal rest, or for their escaping those unavailing similar motions which could produce nothing, and for their having eternally taken different directions, from whence flows that order of succession we call the course of nature.

11. Another question may arise concerning Time, why such a particular point of it must be the present. To-day must follow yesterday, and precede to-morrow, this I know very well, but how know I that yesterday, to-day and to-morrow, might not have been long since past, or that they might not have been yet to come? Can we fix the beginning of eternity, and compute how many ages have lapsed since then, so that the year 1761 must necessarily be the present year? That year follows year and the second precedes the third there is no dispute, but why might not the whole course of time have been anticipated or retarded, so that it might now have been the reign of Henry I. or George X. instead of George III.? We shall look in vain for a solution to this question in the properties of substances, the effects of motion, or the results of order.

12. Neither can we learn anything from them to determine the original stations of particular substances in the universe whereon all their succeeding ones depend, which we shall want some cause to assign them. We may think this not worth inquiry with respect to matter, for it is all one whether particle A lie in the east and particle B in the west, or the contrary, the course of nature will go on the same, for either particle will answer the same purposes in either place: but with respect to sentient beings it is very material, for had I been stationed in some distant planet and some other spirit here in my room, though the course of nature and business of mankind would have proceeded just as it does, yet my own lot might have been very different: I might have had enjoyments now out of my reach or fallen into disasters I know nothing of. This consideration may put us upon searching for a reason, not only why all nature wears the form and follows the order of succession it does, but why each particular substance possesses its own place in that order and has not the place of any other.

CHAP. VIII.

CHANCE, NECESSITY, AND DESIGN.

THESE three have been severally assigned as the causes producing that order we observe in nature, and as they convey very different and opposite ideas we shall consider each of them apart. Some have laid great stress upon chance, as being the original giving rise to the other two by strewing the particles of matter throughout infinite space, and throwing them into combinations from whence the secondary qualities of compounds necessarily result, and forming others into an organization rendering them capable of thought and design. And in our common discourses we speak of Chance or Fortune as a power influencing the affairs of men and having a principal share in the direction of all events: this is thought frequently to baffle the skill of the wise, the valor of the brave, and strength of the mighty, to turn the scale of victory, and determine the success of all enterprizes. But if we examine the proper idea of chance we shall see that it is neither agent nor power, nor has any other existence except in our own ignorance, but whatever is ascribed to that we might see performed by other causes if we had sagacity to discern them. Even in games at cards and dice we deal the one and throw the other ourselves, and both fall out according to the motion and position we have given them: but as we are not so perfect masters of our motions as to know exactly what they will produce, it is this uncertainty that makes the chance; for there are persons who have learned to pack the cards and cog the dice, and with such there is no chance what hand or what cast will ensue. It is remarkable that we sometimes know the exact proportion between our knowledge and our ignorance, which enables us to calculate chances with a very great nicety: but if there were a person who could discern minutely the little inequalities of the table you throw upon, the roughnesses of the box, the vigor of your arm, the degree of confidence or distrust with which you throw, and all the ideas rising in your fancy, he would make an other-guised calculation than our common gamesters. Therefore chance is relative, being greater or less, or none at all, according to the degree of knowledge in different persons: an event of which there is very little chance to one man, may be probable to another, and inevitable to a third, according as each stands in a situation to discern the causes operating to produce it. To him that sees two hands at whist, there is less chance on which side the odd trick will fall

than to the players : if he look over all the cards, he may still give a shrewder guess ; and if he knows exactly each person's manner of playing, he may compute, without hazard of a mistake, how much will be scored that deal.

2. What is done cannot be undone, therefore a power once executed, ceases with respect to that particular event, wherewith it has no longer any concern : whence we may learn that the power of fortune is only ideal, because in many cases we suppose that remaining after determination of the event imagined to depend thereupon. When a merchant risks his all upon a venture to some distant part of the globe, we say he puts himself under the power of fortune, because the casualties of winds and seas, of fire and enemies, are supposed to lie at her disposal : but what if this merchant sells his venture to another after the time lapsed in which the ship must have succeeded or absolutely failed in her voyage, but before any news of her can be arrived home ? does not the purchaser put himself as much under the power of fortune ? But if fortune had any power during the voyage, she has executed it, and has nothing more to do, nor is there any chance of the success falling out otherwise than it has fallen. Nevertheless, because we know not the event, we still apprehend ourselves under the power of fortune : for when advice comes of the ship being arrived safe, the cargo advantageously disposed of, and the money deposited into safe hands, then, and not before, we conceive the power of fortune determined, and ourselves secure against her caprices.

3. Thus chance is no cause of anything, but serves only to express our ignorance or uncertainty of the manner in which other causes operate ; therefore may be properly applied to the most cogent necessity, or most deliberate design, where we know not the tendency of the one, nor purpose aimed at by the other. What is esteemed more casual than weather ? yet nobody doubts of the air moving, the vapors rarifying, or the clouds condensing, according to a certain impulse received from mechanical causes : but because no mathematician nor naturalist can investigate those causes, so as to calculate what they will produce, therefore we say, the farmer depends upon chance to bring his corn to maturity, and give him a favorable season for harvesting it. So likewise to us who are not in the secret, it may be a matter of fair wager whether the council will sit on such a day, whether they will send more troops to Germany or agree to a cessation of arms, nor would the chances alter, though the whole wisdom of the nation were to be consulted in determining these points : and if our stake were very considerable we should as much put ourselves under the power of fortune, as if we had ventured upon the cast of a die, or

a lot drawn by a child, or the choice made between two crumbs of bread by a sparrow. So then an event happening by chance does not exclude the operations of necessary causes, nor the acts of free agents, nor the provisions of wisdom, for the effects of all three will be casual so long as we cannot foresee them. And though it must be acknowledged, that fortune has a great influence upon all our affairs, no more is to be understood by this expression than that we know not what causes are in act around us which may affect the success of our measures.

It is not uncommon for words to take a little different signification, according to the phrases wherein they stand : it is one thing to say there is a chance of an event falling out so or so, and another to say it was an effect of chance. How ready soever you and I might be to lay a wager upon the meeting of the council, as deeming it a casual event, we shall never think the members meet together by chance, taking it for granted they have some reason either for going or staying away. So if we see a mathematician busy in drawing figures upon paper, though we may offer to bet with one another whether he will make a circle, a parabola, or a parallelogram next, we shall hardly imagine he constructs his schemes by chance. So likewise, if lightning falling upon an oak, should tear it into shatters, though it fell by chance upon that particular tree, there was no chance against its rending asunder whatever it should light upon, nor was there any chance of its not bursting from the clouds when the air was in a disposition to produce it. Since then among events we cannot foresee, we distinguish between those happening by chance and those which do not, it will be proper to examine what we understand by this distinction. In effects produced by necessary agents we esteem those casual which depend upon other causes besides what fall under our cognizance : when we see water poured upon a rising ground, we know it must run downwards by its natural gravitation ; but into what streams it may divide, or in what meanders it may wind, is casual, because depending upon the inequalities of the ground, and obstacles lying in the way, of which we can take no accurate account ; but still there must be water poured, and gravitation pulling downward, or no stream or meander could ensue. In the works of design, it is common for other effects to follow besides those intended : a man walks along meaning only to get from one place to another, but in his passing he treads upon a snail, this is casual, because he had it not under contemplation, nor was it any part of his design ; but he must have had some purpose in view, or he would not have walked at all, and the snail remained safe. So then in both cases, chance has no

place, unless there be some agent at work, some power in act, from whose operations chance may produce something that was unforeseen or unthought of. Therefore those who pretend the world was made by chance, or assign that for the beginning of all things, talk absurdly; for there must always be something in motion previous to chance, nor can this begin until there be causes operating, of which it may be a chance in what manner they will operate. Besides, if we consider the source of chance itself, we shall find it always arise from the situation of things which may interfere with those at any time under contemplation: for upon seeing a body move, or knowing the purpose of a free agent, there is no chance what will ensue supposing all obstructions removed: but we have seen in the last chapter, that every situation follows upon a preceding situation, therefore, if we could know completely the motions, the purposes, and situations, of all substances in the universe, we might learn from thence the order of succession, and should see there is no chance of anything that could happen.

5. I proceed next to Necessity, with which I shall have less to do, as being a more stable term, appropriated chiefly by the studious, and not so subject to the usual variations of vulgar language. Our idea of necessity we take from the action of bodies, which have no force of their own, but transmit that they have received from one to another: even resistance, although inherent in body, can effect nothing without an external impulse. So that necessity cannot be assigned for the origin of things, because itself must have a beginning in the previous condition of things from whence their operations may be necessarily inferred, for no effect is necessary until there are causes at work fitted to produce it: therefore, necessity is at most but a channel of conveyance, transmitting efficacy from cause to effect, and even this purpose it will not answer completely, having no fund to repair the loss of motion, continually occasioned by the collision and pressure of bodies. We may then admit this as one of the laws by which nature preserves the tenor of her course; but can by no means employ it to account for the present order of succession, be it eternal or no, taking place preferably to any other, or to those unavailing situations which could have produced no succession at all.

6. Nor shall we find less difficulty with Design, such as we have experience of, for reason requires materials to work upon, and intelligence cannot subsist without objects previously existing to be understood. Something must suggest the design, and present ideas of the means tending thereto before we can enter upon the prosecution. So that what power soever spirits may have to renew the perpetual decays of motion, and carry on the order

of succession, their action cannot account for ~~the~~ being such an order : because there must have been some previous situation of matter before that action begun, exciting perceptions which gave occasion to their exerting this power.

7. And as we have found these three causes insufficient to account for the order of succession in the situations and motions of things, so can they as little account for that third part of nature, the primary properties of substances : for those are not the consequences of prior properties or positions, but coeval with the subjects possessing them. They cannot spring either from necessity or design, to both which they gave birth : for the necessary agency of matter results from its solidity and inertness, as design does from the perceptivity of spirit ; and chance lies still further remote, having no place until necessity or design have begun their work. Neither will the contemplation of these causes furnish us with an answer to the queries before proposed concerning the course of time, why it might not have run earlier or later than it does ; nor concerning the particular stations of sentient Beings, why each possesses the place it holds among the whole number, and so receives that series of perceptions which might as well have fallen upon another standing in its room.

CHAP. IX.

THE FIRST CAUSE.

Thus having examined all the powers and properties of nature, so far as they fall under our cognizance and observation, we find that the contextures, qualities and operations of particular things, follow from prior situations and motions, these again upon others preceding, and so on without limitation in a continued chain, whose links we cannot number, and whose length we cannot measure. When we endeavor to account for the whole chain, whether finite or infinite, hanging in such a particular manner rather than any other, or being connected in links at all, and consider the general causes hitherto assigned for that purpose, we find them ineffectual, as taking their rise from the positions and qualities of substances existing before, and therefore themselves the effects of some preceding cause. When we reflect on the different primary properties of substances, which are essential to them and inseparable from them, and yet require a reason occasioning the difference, we must conclude that the cause which

made that difference gave them likewise their existence, and at the same time appointed them their several stations; for these too require a cause, every station being naturally indifferent to receive any particular substance equally with any other, and each substance having had some station in every point of its existence. But this cause we have no direct knowledge of, as we see none of its operations; wherever we look around us, we discern nothing at work besides chance, necessity, and volition: neither our senses nor our thoughts can pierce to the end of the chain, nor can we contain the whole of it in our imagination: we have no remembrance nor experience of an existence given together with primary qualities, nor of a substance which had no place in nature first taking its station. From whence we may rationally infer, that all the causes operating to produce the phenomena within our notice are themselves effects of some prior cause, of which we can know nothing more than may be gathered upon the evidence of those effects.

2. There is not a more evident truth or more universally acknowledged among mankind than this, That nothing can produce nothing: therefore if there ever had been a time when there was no Being in nature there could have been none now, and the bodies we daily see and handle are an irrefragable evidence to us that something has existed from all eternity; because either they themselves did so, or they were called into being by what was existent before them and had nothing prior to itself. Thus we must needs acknowledge there is a Being somewhere existent without a cause, for till we find such an one we shall have no cause whereon to found the existence of other things: and such we may safely assign for the First Cause of all existencies, modes of existence, properties, and order of succession in the universe. To this species of existence we commonly apply the terms Self-existence and Necessary-existence, rather for want of properer than for their being fully expressive of the thing understood by them: for self-existence literally implies something that was not, but assumed a being by its own power, than which no imagination can well be more absurd: but we mean by the expression a Being underyived and unproduced either by itself or any other, or in other words, existing perpetually without a cause. I will not undertake to expound the term Necessary, having but a confused idea of the import it carries in this place: it cannot mean a Being that has no power to lay down its existence: for in this sense you and I, the dog and the chimney piece, are necessary beings, because we can none of us annihilate ourselves, or cease to be: but Necessary, I take it, stands here in opposition to Eventual,

as not depending upon the concurrence or operation of other causes, and so amounts to the same as I said before, a Being perpetually existing without a cause.

Nevertheless, we have observed formerly, that one may pronounce some things clearly concerning confused ideas : therefore how obscure soever the term may be, we may affirm without hesitation, that it cannot be local nor temporary, for we cannot conceive such a difference in places or times, as that a Being should be necessary in one spot or year, which is not necessary elsewhere or other when. Therefore bodies are not necessarily existent because we see that any place may be without them, but if there were an absolute necessity, independent on any cause, that yonder rolling stone should exist where it is, it could never be removed therefrom : and the same necessity would require its existence in the next adjoining place, and so in every other, until the whole universe became one enormous mass of stone. For whatever has necessary existence at any time or anywhere, must have it always and everywhere, throughout the whole extent of time and space.

3. But though the existence of the First Cause be necessary, its operations are not so, for necessity always proceeds uniformly under the same circumstances : wherefore the variations of nature may convince us, that there is a choice belonging to the First Cause determining the precise number of substances, allotting them their primary properties, stations, and motions, assigning their positions with respect to one another, and so ascertaining the particular order of succession which constitutes the course of nature. For we cannot conceive otherwise of Non-existence than as alike indifferent to take Being or remain in nonentity, or to receive any properties and modifications that shall be given it : nor of the First Cause otherwise than as proceeding by choice, determining where and in what manner they shall be given. This choice we must call Intelligence, for want of a properer appellation, though very different from our own understandings, which how improved soever, could never act as a first cause, because they do nothing without previous motives, and ideas derived elsewhere : and from this Choice or Intelligence the First Cause is denominated God. For I take the point of intelligence to make the fundamental distinction between theists and atheists : all who hold the world and the affairs of men governed by a superior wisdom and foresight, whether they conceive it residing in one or in many, whether limited in their powers and prescribed to by the laws of nature, or even if they suppose them generated and perishable, must be allowed to believe a God. On the contrary, how highly soever any

may think of the eternity, self-existence, and efficacy of their first mover, yet, while they ascribe its operations to unthinking chance or blind necessity, they cannot escape the charge of atheism.

4. Besides, it seems incongruous to reason, to imagine that any cause should give active powers, unless it has the same or greater within itself. A man indeed may beget a son that shall far outstrip him in understanding and quickness of parts, but then there are many other causes concurring to the production of a child besides the father; but that a sole cause working on no pre-existing materials should do this, is inconceivable. Since then we find a degree of intelligence, prudence and forecast in ourselves, we can with no color deny the same to the origin from whence we sprung. He that made the eye, shall not he see? he that formed the ear, shall not he hear? and he that gave man knowledge, shall he not understand? Our own perceptions indeed come to us from without, but we may consider perception in the mind as a different thing from the modifications of our organs immediately exciting it: we may then conceive the like and other perceptions in God, without the adventitious helps we stand in need of to strike them upon us; or if he have not perceptions of the same kind with ours, we must suppose him to have something else which answers the purposes of them more effectually.

5. Nor is it a contemptible argument for the Being of a God which is drawn from the universal consent of mankind: for our reason when proceeding most carefully being liable to error, we gain a greater confidence in it upon finding it confirmed by the opinion of others, and the more general this confirmation is, the stronger assurance we shall have of our being in the right. But the force of this argument has been invalidated by alleging that far the greater part of mankind take their opinions upon trust, and that crafty persons have found an interest in leading the world into the persuasion of a superior power they did not believe themselves. Therefore to avoid this objection, let us consider the sentiments of those only who have been most careful to judge for themselves, and we shall find them agreed in the course of their reasonings, but some few led to dissent from the rest by their misapprehension of a point of fact, which I conceive may be determined by our experience and observation. The atheists, I believe, to a man were all corporealists, holding no other substance in nature besides matter: and though they could not but acknowledge a sense and understanding in themselves, which was wanting in the stones and clods of the earth, and the most curious works of art, yet they supposed those to be secondary qualities, resulting from an organization wherein the particles of

matter were disposed. The Hylozoists indeed, by Cudworth's account of them, ascribed a little more to their atoms, imagining them endued with a quality which, though not perception, might be styled the seed or principle whereout by the junction of many of them together perception might be completed. Thus both conceived perceptivity to arise from a certain combination or aggregation of imperceptive particles, and that there was nothing existent which was not originally and separately imperceptive, that is, corporeal.

On the other hand, none who admitted perceptivity as a primary property, or held immaterial substances un-compounded of matter, ever denied a God. And it may be remarked for the credit of the spiritualists, that they were more unanimous upon this article than the materialists: for though the stoics, according to Cudworth, must be ranked among the latter; they were so far from atheism that they run into the contrary extreme and all the superstition of dreams, omens, auguries, with other methods of divination: and indeed, if a composition of mere matter consisting of flesh, blood, and fibres, may form sense and understanding in man, it will be hard to show that other compositions may not do the like, or that the order and composition of all matter which we call the Universe may not as well produce a superior intelligence. So Bolingbroke, whom, from his deriding the doctrine of spiritual substance under the name of pneumatic philosophy, we may pronounce a corporealist, nevertheless acknowledges a God: for catching hold of Mr. Locke's notion, he would have us believe that God has annexed the faculty of thinking to that system of matter composing our human frame, so that upon the dissolution of our system we must lose our faculties, our existence; and our personality. But the spiritualists, however varying in other respects, have never disputed the being of a God: some few of them, as Berkeley, have denied the existence of body, the reality of space, distance, time, and all external objects; but then they attributed our perceptions to an immediate act of God impressing ideas of them all upon our minds. Thus we see the matter reduced to this single question, whether perceptivity results from a combination of matter or is a primary property in the subject possessing it: for which reason I have been the more careful in the foregoing chapters to suggest what observations I could think of for showing our distinct existence, individuality, and personality, together with the difference of primary properties between spirit and body: for these facts once well established we shall have the unanimous consent of all serious and thinking persons to conclude from thence that there is an intelligent

cause of all these things. Besides, if there were nothing but matter there could no more be activity than perception, for all exercises of activity contain something of motion, but supposing matter to have a power of moving, yet being indifferent to take any direction and utterly destitute of choice, it must exert that power every way alike, which consequently must destroy its own operations. A body in this case would be like an iron plate, tied by many strings drawn extremely tight to all sides of the wainscot, which must hang motionless in the air although continually pulled with a mighty force, each opposite string counteracting its antagonist, unless you suddenly cut the strings on one side when it would fly violently towards the other where they remained whole. But matter thus propelled to all quarters by its inherent power would want a preference to cut off its impulse on all parts except one, in order to produce a motion that way. Add further, that what has been offered concerning the stationing of substances, the appunctuation of time, and perpetual order of succession, might serve to confirm the same conclusion, if it stood in need of a confirmation.

6. There are people who puzzle themselves with nice speculations concerning space, which they will needs have to be necessary because we cannot conceive it non-existent, nor any portion of it removed, nor other substances to exist without a place to contain them. But how much soever we may suppose space necessary, it does not affect the foregoing argument for an active intelligent cause, for space understands nothing, does nothing, and produces nothing, but is perhaps the most unmanageable idea in our imagination: the most sagacious of us know not whether it be substance or accident, whether finite or infinite, whether one continued thing or consisting of parts, nor whether those parts be determinate points or infinitely divisible; for suppose a particle in the circumference of a large wheel to move only from one point to the next, what must the particles lying near the centre do? for they all move at the same time, but they cannot move a quarter, nor a tenth, nor a hundredth of a point. The like difficulties might as well be started upon time, whereof we cannot conceive an utter absence, nor can the future be made to precede the past, nor can any substances nor even space exist without a present moment for them to exist in. But time was never yet suspected of being a substance, and though we talk of its producing great events, this is only a figurative expression denoting that it gives scope for other agents to work in. Wherefore, these speculations concerning space and time make no advancement in our knowledge, but only serve to convince us of the imperfection of our faculties,

which cannot fully comprehend the nature of everything whereof they can entertain ideas : nor do those who employ them pretend to draw any certain conclusions from them, but only throw them out as a rub in the way of their adversaries. I never heard of any who were converted to atheism, by contemplating the necessary existence of space, but being first prepossessed against the admission of one active, intelligent, and self-existent cause, they endeavor to perplex the question by suggesting another Being alike self-existent and necessary : so that this is an after-thought, not weighing with them in their determination, but used only, in the schoolmen's phrase, as an argument to the man. We discern neither time nor space by our senses, they being ideas of reflection gathered from the situation of objects and the successive changes observable in them. We find the idea of both necessary to the existence of substances, and if we suppose those substances annihilated, still the idea of that space and time wherein they might have existed remains : if we go to imagine those again annihilated, it will amount to the supposition of a place wherein there is no place, and a time wherein there is no time, which is contradictory : but this depends upon our conception which cannot penetrate so thoroughly into substances but that they may exist in a manner we cannot conceive. We have seen that time requires a cause to determine what particular point of it shall be the present : and if space be anything real or more than a mode of existence in other things, it likewise requires a cause to assign it properties distinct from those of body and spirit. Nor should I be singular if I were to suppose both time and space receiving their reality from the First Cause, but having so firm an establishment given them that we can neither by experience discern, nor in imagination conceive, their non-existence.

CHAP. X.

INCOMPREHENSIBILITY.

PERHAPS there has been no transaction throughout all history more frequently quoted in theological treatises than the conversation of Simonides with king Hiero, who desiring him to explain what God was, Simonides asked a day to consider of it ; at the end of this day, instead of giving his answer, he asked for two more, and when these were expired he requested four : for, says he, the more I consider the subject I find the difficulties double upon

me. This answer of his being so frequently taken notice of shows how well it tallies with the sentiments of all who have turned their thoughts upon the like contemplation. Nor is there any wonder that it should, for we knowing nothing of causes unless by their effects, seeing none of the immediate operations of the First Cause, and being confined to a narrow corner of nature, cannot expect to have a full comprehension of the Author of Nature, from whom flow many other effects besides those falling within the reach of our observation. We have just now seen insuperable difficulties in the contemplation of time and space, we have before met with the like in the divisibility of matter, the propagation of force from body to body, and have found mysteries in the action of our own minds, which must proceed always upon motives and ideas, and yet we have no idea of those fibres or other parts of our organization which are the immediate subject of our action. Since then we lie involved in obscurity with respect to our very selves and the objects most nearly surrounding us, how can we attain a perfect knowledge of that cause concerning which we know nothing more than can be gathered from those materials? The very idea of a First Cause is unsuitable to our imagination, for we see all things proceed in a chain wherein there is nothing first, each cause being likewise an effect of others preceding. Nor can we, who are confined to certain measures in our conceptions, comprehend that wherein everything is infinite as having nothing external to limit it. But since our ideas and our language are taken from objects familiar to our experience, it is unavoidable that we must think and speak very imperfectly of God: the terms we employ are for the most part figurative, containing some remote similitude, but not fully expressive of the thing we would signify.

2. We hear it currently asserted that God is a spirit, nor do I find fault with the appellation, as having no properer to substitute in its room: for we know of no more than two substances, Matter and Spirit, therefore since we are sure he is not matter nor contains any material mixture, we can call him no otherwise than spirit. But we cannot suppose this an adequate term, for we may discover so much of him as to show that he is as different from the spirits of men as they are from matter. We know that our own spirits are moveable and passive, residing in some particular station and confined to objects touching the sphere of our presence, receiving an impulse from that matter whereto we are vitally united, transferring us from place to place, necessarily affected with pleasure, pain, and other perceptions, by the various play of our organs, extremely scanty in our knowledge, liable to error and delusion, and never exerting our activity without ideas

to instigate and direct us : none of which particulars can be ascribed to God, whom we must therefore acknowledge a being of his own kind not to be ranked in the same class with any others.

3. So likewise when we declared God intelligent, it was because we had no other word to express our meaning by, for if we had declared him non-intelligent, it would have conveyed the same idea we have of senseless matter, acting necessarily by transmission of impulse, and therefore by no means capable of being a first cause. He that made the eye, shall not he see? and he that formed the ear, shall not he hear? but those who propounded these questions never intended to represent God as provided with optic and auditory nerves, or receiving sound and vision in the manner we do. So likewise if we go on to ask, he that gave man knowledge, shall not he understand? neither does it follow that understanding is the same in him as it is in us: for the thoughts of God are not as our thoughts, nor his ways like our ways. We understand by organs of sensation and reflection, by traces lying in our memory, and slow deductions of reason: nor could we understand anything unless there were something exterior to be understood; or how much soever we may fancy ourselves containing our stores of knowledge within ourselves, they were first deposited there by objects striking upon us from without. Divines tell us that God is a pure act, by which I suppose they mean that his acts contain no mixture of passion, nor require materials or instruments to make them take effect as ours do; for we cannot act without organs of motion, nor subjects to receive our action, nor ideas to determine our volition: but in creation God acted upon Nothing, without instruments to assist, or objects to direct him in the execution. I must own this pure agency is to me an inexplicable idea, yet is this no reason for rejecting it: for we have found upon a careful survey of nature, that all substances and operations conceivable require a cause to assign their several stations, properties, and directions; but this cause must necessarily be inconceivable, for else there would be something conceivable that did not require a cause, which is contrary to the result of our survey taken from experience and reason, the only two sources from whence we can derive any knowledge.

4. Nor was it ever controverted among theists that God is incomprehensible, being of a nature peculiar to himself, and different in species from all other substances. It has been said that man was made after the likeness of God, but this likeness prevails no otherwise than our being less dissimilar than the stocks and stones we toss about; just as the top of a mole-hill is nearer the sun than the bottom, and therefore resembles that glorious luminary in be-

ing raised above the surface of the earth : for we cannot imagine but that the faculties and operations of man differ in kind as well as degree from those of his Maker. Perhaps it might be said with more strictness of truth, that the idea of God is taken from the likeness of man, for our conceptions being all derived from ourselves and the objects affecting us, we can form none other than what is made up of materials furnished us by our experience and our reflection. Therefore we select whatever powers and endowments we can find among ourselves, separating from them all we deem a weakness and imperfection, and heightening them to the utmost pitch imagination can reach ; the aggregate of all these makes our idea of God : whose image it is no wonder we resemble, the features of it being formed from archetypes in our own mind : nor are we without excuse in taking this method, as being the only one in our power to take. But a similitude employed from mere necessity will not justify us in pursuing it too far, nor drawing the conclusions we might do if we had a clear and perfect knowledge of the subject. Wherefore I can see nothing in the doctrine of likeness warranting those high-flown expressions used by some, that the soul of man is a ray and emanation of the divinity, and that God has communicated some sparks of his own perfections to us, or that the divine intelligence is no more than perfect reason, proceeding in the same manner with ours, but having a larger field of premises to work upon.

5. From this inability to apprehend the divine Being, any otherwise than by ideas taken from ourselves, it follows that our conception of him must be very imperfect, and what is worse, frequently erroneous : for we are not always competent judges of what is power or weakness, but often mistake the latter for the former, which induces us to ascribe our own passions, frailties, and imperfections to God, under the notion of excellencies. And this may plead some excuse in extenuation for the atheists ; for perhaps the description which any man would give of the Supreme Being, might be demonstrated in some parts of it impossible and inconsistent : besides that the ideas sometimes inculcated by designing persons for their private ends and those entertained by the vulgar are manifestly absurd. But it is no rule that a thing may not be true, because some on purpose, and others by mistake, have blended it with a mixture of falsehood : wherefore it would become such as profess a freedom of thought and due exercise of their reason, to examine whether everything suggested concerning a Deity be without foundation ; for there is no reason to reject the whole of an opinion, because the frailty of man has grafted some inconsistencies upon it.

6. For how incomprehensible soever the divine nature may be, there are some propositions we may affirm with certainty concerning it: nobody can doubt that the power of God is the same in America as in Europe, the same yesterday and to-morrow as to-day, that he was not born of parents, is not nourished by food, nor shall grow old and decay like ourselves; that all created substances take their stations, from whence fortune arises, by his appointment; that the order of succession, which is the course of nature, proceeds according to his direction; with many other the like assertions which need only the proposing to be assented to. Let us then endeavor to collect what we can discover clearly concerning the divine nature from such observations as we are able to make upon the things about us upon the best exercise of our reason, which though small in quantity may prove sufficient for us to draw any inferences therefrom that we may want to regulate our present conduct, or ascertain our future expectations; leaving all unavailing speculations for the amusement of those who may want something better to employ their leisure.

CHAP. XI.

UNITY.

THERE will be little room to expatiate upon this article, it being too clear to admit of a proof: for it seems a self-evident proposition that the First cause must be One, because if there were more they would want some prior cause to assign them their several stations and properties. And indeed this point with respect to the active cause has never been doubted of, unless by Zoroaster and the Magi, together with their followers the Manicheans: for the heathen polytheism was no exception, their gods being no more than celestial men with a little larger powers than those upon earth, but limited in their provinces, confined in their operations, and subject to the infirmities and disappointments of men. Besides, this was only a popular persuasion, never gaining credit among the studious.

2. We hear the Stoics speaking of the sun, the moon, and the stars, as so many gods, but then they did not understand the term in the same sense as we do now; for they held them to be animals having a superior intelligence to man, and moving in their courses by their own energy, but created Beings subordinate to the supreme God, the governor of all things, whom they supposed

to be the Universe. How they could imagine God a compound consisting of so many parts as there are substances in the world, which is making many to be one, we need not now inquire : for whatever notions they held inconsistent with unity, they did not see the inconsistency, and therefore we cannot deny them orthodox upon this article.

3. Some of the ancients assigned two causes concurring to the production of all things ; Thales, Mind and Water ; Anaximenes, Mind and Fire ; the Stoics, God and Matter, to which they might as well have joined Space and Time if they had thought of them : but then they held their active principle to be One, and the others purely passive to take such forms as should be impressed upon them. Plato and the Pythagoricians asserted the eternity of ideas and forms, the former of which served the Deity for a plan guiding him in his works, and the latter to constitute the essences of things by being applied to Substance, of which they seem to have had a more confused idea than Mr. Locke or myself, for one knows not whether they conceived it as having an existence of its own, or receiving it from time to time upon the application of form. Our modern freethinkers talk confidently of a nature of things, eternal and unalterable, controlling the Deity, so that he cannot do this or the other, but as that shall permit him. I wish they would explain what we are to understand by this nature of things, with which they seem to be so well acquainted, as to tell us precisely what it will require upon every occasion : by their manner of speaking, they seem to make it another cause independent on the First ; or rather make the First Cause dependent upon this for the measures it shall take ; for they say God would be more beneficent and merciful than he is, delivering us from our vices with the miseries consequent upon them, but the nature of things will not let him. How they could avoid the imputation of two First Causes I know not, for they deal together in objections, and are wisely cautious never to give us a complete creed of their own, lest there should appear more holes in it than they can pick in any other. But the ancients, holding the eternity of forms and ideas, supposed them subsistencies inexistent within the divine Mind : what is the proper import of Inexistent, or the distinction between a Subsistence and a Substance, I shall not pretend to explain having no clear apprehension of it myself ; but I think the invention of these terms show that those who employed them found it agreeable to their reason, that there should be nothing external to the Supreme Being which was not produced by his own power, and consequently that the First Cause should be one sole and simple substance.

4. The difficulty of imagining good and evil to proceed from the same cause induced the Magi to suppose two principles, one to be the source of either: but then greater difficulties will arise upon such a supposition. For the primary properties of substances must be given them together with their existence, nor can we conceive such a property superadded to what had it not in its nature before: now the capacity of receiving pleasure or pain, satisfaction or uneasiness, in spirits, is the foundation of all the good and evil befalling them, and had they not been endued with such capacity there could have been neither, but had they been rendered capable of uneasiness only, there could have been no good, or of satisfaction only, there could have been no such thing as evil in the universe. But we cannot suppose two opposite principles should concur in one operation, nor, could they agree so far, is it conceivable creation should be the joint work of several agents. I know that many workmen may join in the productions of art, for these being made up of pre-existent materials, and completed by piece-meal, each may take in hand some of the several parts, while others work upon the rest; but creation is a single act, instantaneous and admitting no gradations, so that were there a hundred creative powers, the primary qualities of each particular substance must proceed from the same cause, and be received at the same time with its existence. Nor did the Magi themselves imagine otherwise, for they attributed the creation of sentient Beings to Oromasdes, who made them capable of happiness, wherein they would have continued without intermission, unless Arimanius had introduced disorders and mischiefs among them. But his malicious purposes could have taken no effect upon Beings that had not likewise been capable of misery. So then the difficulty remains entire as before, because the good principle must have furnished his antagonist with fitting subjects to wreak his malice upon, and concurred in the production of evil, by giving his creatures a capacity of suffering by it. I do not know whether this argument against the quality of principles has been employed before, nor was there any need of it; for the absurdity of two first causes, which must require another prior first to determine the difference of properties and extent of powers between them, was so glaring, that it has quite exploded that notion off the stage: nor are there any now carrying their thoughts so high as to a first cause, but what are satisfied of its individuality and unity.

5. But our knowledge of the Being and unity of God will avail us little, unless we can gather something concerning what he is. Now the knowing what any substance is, implies our knowing the

qualities belonging thereto, its manner of existence, and particularly whether it may stand so circumstanced as to affect ourselves, for else all the rest would terminate in mere speculation. But qualities and modes of existence, when applied to God, are termed attributes: these then I shall endeavor to investigate so far as I can find a solid foundation in the phenomena of nature, and clearest deductions of reason. For I do not pretend to give an exact description of what is incomprehensible, nor do I design to pursue my inquiries further than my own line of conception shall reach, leaving all beyond with an acknowledgment of my ignorance: neither would I proceed upon a fondness to gratify my curiosity, but with a sober and earnest desire of so much understanding in the divine attributes, as it may concern myself and my fellow-creatures to attain.

CHAP. XII.

OMNIPRESENCE.

LITTLE need be said in support of this attribute, which is inseparable from the idea of necessary existence: because, as we have remarked before, there can be no such difference in places as that what is necessary in one spot should not be so elsewhere. And this holds good as well with respect to a particular substance as to a species: therefore there cannot be many necessary substances, though of the same species, because each being absent from the places occupied by the others, there is no other necessity for their being where they are, unless what is brought upon them by a superior cause assigning them their several stations. Therefore whatever has necessary existence anywhere, must be One in number as well as in kind, and exist alike everywhere throughout all the immensity of space. Nor is there any variance of opinion upon this article, all who acknowledge a God, the cause and fountain of all things, believe him to be one pure, undivided, unbounded substance, pervading, containing, and co-existing with all the things he has created.

2. It must be owned this is an incomprehensible idea, too large for our imaginations to grasp, therefore no wonder we find difficulties in it: but these arise all from our narrowness of conception and not from any shadow of positive proof that can be produced against it. For no man ever attempted to show the limits that might circumscribe the divine essence, or point the place

from whence it might be absent. But it is hard for us to reconcile omnipresence with individuality, because all the substances falling under our cognizance having a locality, we cannot conceive the same thing present at immeasurable distances unless successively by removing from one place to another. Large bodies we can apprehend taking up a large compass of space, but then the several parts of them occupy their several points; and body being the only object familiar to our senses we take our idea of occupancy from that. Wherefore some I have met with object, not as an argument overthrowing omnipresence, but as a difficulty wanting solution, that we seem to make God extended, and consequently consisting of parts, because it is the accession of parts that extends everything we know of into magnitude. But how are they assured there can be no extension unless by means of parts? even in matter we have already found infinite divisibility so inconceivable, and the difficulties on either side so much wanting a solution, that the most sober and judicious persons have forborne to decide peremptorily upon it: and in our own spirits we have found an extension of another kind, for our sense assures us of our individuality, and daily experience furnishes us with reasons which to me carry the force of demonstration evincing a sphere of presence, in every part whereof we are actually existent and perceptive, because receiving sensations from a variety of objects at the same time; but neither can the same particle of matter conveying our sensation take various modifications at once, nor can many particles act together upon a mathematical point. And this experience of our own undivided extension may a little help our comprehension of omnipresence, for though we cannot make a new idea we may compound and enlarge those we have in store. Our own manner of existence in a sphere or portion of space sufficient to receive the action of many corporeal particles, we may term a totipresence throughout the contents of that sphere; we may then conceive another substance totipresent in a sphere of an inch, an ell, a rod, a mile, and so rise by degrees to the greatest extent we are able to contain in our imagination; and a totipresence throughout all immensity amounts to the same as omnipresence.

3. But we are unable with our utmost efforts to conceive an immensity of space, much less omnipresence wherein that idea is contained, nevertheless, what we cannot apprehend at once or in the gross, we may by piecemeal: whatever portion of space we fix our thoughts upon at any time we may conceive God to be there, and thus soar from height to height, with a denial of his absence from every point in the progress of our contemplation. And

this method has been recommended of old : " Whither shall I go from thy spirit, or whither shall I flee from thy presence ? If I go up into heaven, thou art there : if I make my bed in the grave, behold thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea ; even there shall thy hand lead me and thy right hand shall hold me." To which we may add from ideas suggested by modern discoveries : If I follow the planets in their orbits, I shall find thee directing their courses ; if I enter the assembly of fixed stars, there art thou holding them in their stations ; if I penetrate the minute fibres of vegetables or examine the little corpuscles of air and ether, there art thou also marshalling their order and invigorating their motions. Thus, though we cannot comprehend God absolutely everywhere, we may comprehend him wherever we can think of : this is an idea easy to our imagination, involving us in no perplexities of an extension without parts, and this we may satisfy ourselves with as being enough to answer all our useful purposes.

CHAP. XIII.

ETERNITY.

No proof seems requisite to establish this point, it being self-evident that something must always have existed, and what can that be besides the First Cause from whom all things else received their being ? Nor can we find a difference in times any more than places with respect to necessary existence, but what was once and anywhere necessarily existing must be so always as well as everywhere. And the same rule extends to the attributes as well as the existence of God ; for if there were a time when he was without any of them, I know not where he could have acquired them, or from what sources derived them. Therefore eternity infers immutability, nor was ever separated from it in the minds of men : for all who believe a God, believe not only that he always was, but likewise that he continues, without variation or shadow of change, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.

2. I know not how we can conceive otherwise of eternity than as a succession of time, with a negation of beginning or end. But the schoolmen are not satisfied with this idea, for they look upon succession as a continual perishing and renewing of things existing in that manner : for I am not and perceive not yesterday, the existence and perceptions I had then being lost and gone, and those

I have now being new ones, such as I had not then, but are brought me by lapse of time; yet my yesterday's existence was the cause of my present, for if I had not been then I should not have been now: which manner of existing they think unworthy to be ascribed to God, as wanting that stability and independency on prior time suitable to our idea of a necessary Being. Wherefore they supposed eternity a standing point with God, or a perpetual Now, so that all past and future ages are as actually present before him as this instant moment is with us. And we hear divines still talking in the same strain of an eternity before all time, or when time was not, or when time shall be no more, and asserting positively that the past is not gone, nor the future yet to come with respect to God. Perhaps they pronounce too confidently upon a matter whereto the human faculties cannot reach, for if we pursue our abstractions to the utmost, either upon time or space, I fear we shall find them both unmanageable subjects, concerning which we can determine nothing with certainty. Nevertheless, they would not want foundation for what they say, if they would deliver themselves a little more reservedly, and give it only as the more probable opinion, that the efflux and succession of time is owing to the power and Will of God, and therefore may take place only among his creatures.

3. We have already remarked there is no visible repugnancy against supposing the course of time might have been accelerated or retarded: I do not mean that twenty years might have passed in ten or taken up forty to run them out, for this were a contradiction, but that the whole order of them might have been removed higher or lower, so that the Augustan age, or that of our remote descendants, might have been the present. In which case the efflux of time would require some cause to fix it where it is: and therefore must depend upon the Will of God to determine that no more or no less of it should be expired. Nor are there no grounds to suspect that even with ourselves the present moment may contain an interval of time though extremely short, for else how should we get the idea of time at all? Mr. Locke says we get it by observing a succession of ideas, and this way I can readily allow that we come by the measures of minutes, hours, days, and years, which we use in computation: but succession implies a previous idea of first and last before it can be attained, for a variety of ideas affords us no notion of succession unless we perceive one come before the other; nor can it be imagined that their degrees of vividness or faintness will do the business, for let a man stand with a candle in his hand between two looking-glasses, he will see a number of flames in the glass before him, each fainter than the

others, yet the whole scene will appear quiescent, nor exhibit any idea of succession. And the ideas of things in our remembrance, though fainter as more remote, would do the like unless we had another idea of precedence annexed to them. So then our idea of precedence seems to be an original, not derived from any other, but gotten by our manner of existence extending to a length of time wherein there is a first and a last.

4. And I may offer to the consideration of the curious whether this does not stand confirmed by the evidence of our senses in their discernment of motion, of which they have an immediate sensation in some velocities but not in others. For you may see the motion of a stone thrown across you very plainly, but you cannot see that in the short hand of your watch. If indeed you look at it again an hour after, you will see that it has moved, because finding it in a different place from where it was before : but this is a logical inference gathered from the joint testimony of your present sense and your memory of the figure to which it pointed the first time : whereas your knowledge of the stone moving came by direct sensation without aid of the memory or reflexive faculty. Now to see a body move I apprehend we must have an actual perception of it at once in two distinguishable places though it cannot actually be in those two places at once, from whence it seems to follow that our acts of immediate perception have a certain duration containing a beginning and end both present to us together, and whatever moves so slow as that the spaces it passes over within that duration are not distinguishable by our senses appears to us quiescent. If any one shall think the discernment of motion effected by that continuance of play in our sensitive organs after the impulse of objects ceasing, mentioned in the chapter on reflection, he will not find it warranted by experience : for a stone may be thrown very swiftly yet without drawing any trail behind, though you observe it ever so carefully, and a live coal whirled very smoothly round upon a wheel will present no idea of movement at all, but appear a quiescent fiery ring. The distinction of places to our sense depends, not upon the real distance between them, but upon their apparently subtending an angle at our eye, which the same extent of latitude may do when near us that cannot do it when removed farther off. Therefore the moon seems to stand still when we look upon her, because the change of place she makes during a single perception does not suffer to subtend an angle : whereas did she hang so low as almost to touch our atmosphere we should see her whisk over us with an amazing rapidity. Hence if any curious person can ascertain precisely what is the least discernible angle and slowest visible motion, he may com-

pute how many of our moments or present times there are in a minute : for by contriving to make a body move equably with that slow pace in a circle whose centre lies at the eye, and casting up how many of those least discernible angles compose an entire circle, he may reckon just so many moments in the time of one circumvolution made by the body. But if we have a measurable Now of our own, the whole of which is present to us together, we may augment it in the same manner we did the sphere of our presence, until it stretch to the utmost length we can contain in our imagination, and that will make the fullest idea we can form of eternity.

5. Many persons perhaps will not readily enter into what has been here said concerning the standing point or perpetual Now, and truly if they do not find it occur easily to their comprehension they may even pass it over, as being scarce worth the while to take much trouble in studying it. For we do not find the conception of a continual perishing and renewal of time by an uninterrupted succession of moments debases our idea of God ; and it would be difficult to make a common man feel the force of the schoolmen's objection or see any hurt in supposing him to exist in that manner, so long as we apprehend the succession to have had no beginning and to meet with no stop. We have indeed a certain period set to our lives, and therefore the lapse of every moment takes away something from the stock of futurity we had in store : but eternity is an inexhaustible fund, therefore time may go on continually perishing without being ever totally destroyed, so that though we should imagine God existing by moments, he will never want moments to exist in. And as he has been pleased to give our spirits an individuality which all the powers of nature cannot dissolve, the efflux of time is no loss to them, who have the same inexhaustible fund for a perpetual supply. Wherefore there is no occasion to alter the common conceptions of mankind upon this matter, or perplex them with objections requiring an answer that few can understand.

CHAP. XIV.

OMNIPOTENCE.

THE very train of reasoning, leading us to acknowledge a God, evinces his omnipotence, or rather, if I may so speak, finds omnipotence in the way towards his existence: for we infer a God because we want a cause from whence all the effects and powers we have any knowledge of must originally proceed. Whatever is done or possible to be done must be done by some agent, and the aggregate of all powers and possibilities make up omnipotence, which we can place in no other subject than God, whom therefore we justly style Almighty. It is true we find power divided among the substances falling under our notice, one wanting what another has: but then the powers of all must derive from some one cause, whom we cannot suppose to want the powers he has given to other things, besides another power not found in any of them, that of creating and allotting primary properties and original stations. Mr. Locke tells us, that active powers alone properly deserve the name, and I think we need make no difficulty of ascribing all those we find in substances to God: for we cannot well doubt that he might if he pleased resist and impel, that is, stop or confer motion like body, or excite perceptions and judgments like our organs; and that he does admit like space appears manifest from the substances we see, each whereof must co-exist in the same place with that which is omnipresent throughout all immensity: nor can we any more doubt of his possessing in an eminent degree all the active powers discoverable in spirits. And for passive powers, such as mobility, inertness, and perceptivity, particularly that of pain, or uneasiness, though we must not attribute them to him, yet are they all effects of an active power exerted at their creation. We see the course of nature proceed by second causes having their several portions of power allotted in small parcels among them, and these allotments requiring so many operations of active power in conferring them, bespeak an omnipotence in the First Cause.

2. Thus the contemplation of the works of nature and all the powers we can discover operating therein, gives us our first notion of omnipotence: but the mind of man does not rest here, for there requires something further than actual operation to complete the idea of power. We find many instances in ourselves wherein we might have acted otherwise than we have done, and conceive ourselves able to take another course in our future

measures than that we shall pursue : nor can we avoid this kin the same of God, for if we were to confine his power to the works he has actually performed, we should destroy that choice which distinguishes him from blind necessity, unthinking chance, or whatever else has been assigned for a first cause : neither can a power pinned down to one particular way of acting, be properly called a power. This extends our idea of power to possibilities as well as real events, and what has never happened nor will ever happen, is esteemed its object equally with what has already or will hereafter come to pass. And now we conceive omnipotence a power to do anything without those impediments and restrictions which obstruct us and all created substances in our operations.

3. Yet still there arises another idea perplexing our imagination with the suggestion of absolute impossibilities, which appear such even to omnipotence itself, and therefore seem to restrain and limit it within a certain compass : such as making a body exist in several places, causing two and two to make five, annihilating time and space, undoing past events or producing contrary ones. But all these things imply contradictions, and contradictions are generally held to be no objects of power, as their possibility would infer a defect rather than enlargement of power : for if upon a power being exerted to produce a particular event, another might likewise ensue, it would show a deficiency in the agent as being unable to prevent another issue from taking effect besides that he intended. But after all I do not know why we should pronounce anything absolutely impossible, but rather conclude that what appears so has been rendered impossible by those laws which God has established immutably : and to suppose him acting contrary to them is supposing him to do otherwise than he has determined to do, which I am sure is no instance of power. He has made body local, and to exist in several places it must be a different thing from what he intended it : he has fixed certain relations between numbers, and to alter those relations would be introducing a confusion he has not thought proper to throw upon us : he has annexed the ideas of time and place to all our ideas of substances, and to separate them would be giving rise to other conceptions than he has thought fitting for us : he has made the past unalterable, and determined that no operation shall have any more than one issue, and to suppose otherwise would be supposing him to have done what he has not done. Therefore, wherever there appears a palpable impossibility we may depend upon the thing never happening, without ascribing the impossibility to any other than the appointment of God, who has established the

properties of substances and issues of events so firmly that we cannot conceive them altered.

4. But there is another limitation of omnipotence invented by our moderns in what they call the nature of things: for they say God could not make man impeccant, could not prevent moral and physical evil, the latter being a necessary consequence of the former, and that he must have a gradation of beings in all stages from nothing up to his own perfections. For my part, I can understand nothing else by the nature of things beside the properties of substances, the situations given them and motions impressed upon them, together with the mutual operations resulting therefrom: and these being given to the substances at or after their existence, could not control the acts of the Almighty where-to they were posterior. It is the nature of plants to vegetate, therefore before there were any plants or growing bodies there could be no such thing as vegetation: it is the nature of fire to burn, but before there was any fire there could be no such thing as burning. In like manner physical evil began with the capacity of sentient Beings to suffer by it, and moral evil depends upon this together with the constitution of man occasioning perpetual struggles between reason and appetite: for if he were not liable to suffering he could not take his measures amiss, and if he were void of reason, he would not do wrong in following appetite, having nothing else to follow. That there is a scale of Beings I know, but that it reaches within one step of Divinity, I neither know nor believe: nor if it did could I ascribe it to anything prior to the good pleasure of their Creator; for I can see no necessity hindering that all beings might have been made of the same species. Therefore the capacity of man, his sensitive-rational constitution, the various orders of Beings, the properties, stations, and motions of substances, could not prescribe rules to the Almighty, from whose power and appointment they proceeded.

5. If it be alleged that we may conceive a nature of things abstracted from the things themselves, let us remember that our abstractions are all taken from our observation of substances, and their mutually affecting one another, and that the abstract is made by an arbitrary separation in our thoughts of what nature has exhibited in the concrete. It is said the rules of natural justice are unalterable, and so they may, because resulting from the nature of man, which does not change with time and place: for he is made a sociable creature, capable of assisting or hurting his fellows, invested with reason and appetite. The brutes wanting reason have no justice belonging to them: nor would there be any rule of it in man had he no temptation to do wrong; or were

he shut up alone like a maggot in a nutshell there would be no place for justice. I see no contradiction in imagining that God might have placed all his sentient creatures apart by themselves without any knowledge or perception of one another, in which case there would have been no such thing as justice in nature: therefore when he gave man his faculties, and placed him in a situation to have intercourse with his fellow-creatures, then he made justice, and then the nature of it began.

6. It is said that God cannot act arbitrarily, and therefore must have some rule or nature of things to guide him. If by Cannot, you mean that he never does, I have no objection; but let us consider what we understand by arbitrary action in men, which is when they act upon whim, or humor, or passion, all which must certainly be denied of him. But why must an action be arbitrary unless confined by some restriction from taking another turn? we find many instances of the contrary in ourselves. It is true if I promise to meet a company upon any occasion, whether of business or pleasure, though the appointment was voluntary at first, I am now under an obligation to keep it, so my liberty to do otherwise is gone: but this is not always my case; I sometimes lay out a plan of several places I will go to, or several things I will do wherein no other mortal has any concern, and having a little steadiness in my temper I pursue it accordingly, without any restriction upon my liberty to depart from it at any time; and since I look upon this steadiness rather as an advantage to my character than otherwise, I am willing to ascribe it in the highest degree to the Almighty, the tenor of whose conduct I conceived fixed, not by law or rule, but by voluntary determination. Wherefore there is no occasion for attributing what we find unalterable to an antecedent nature of things limiting and prescribing laws to God, because we may ground it as well upon his immutability. This seems an idea more worthy of him, and more consistent with our notion of omnipotence; and we may draw as many good uses from the opinion that he will not as that he cannot order the course of nature otherwise than he has done. Provided we take along with us this caution, to be very careful in our judgment of what things are unalterable: a point wherein those, who talk most loudly of a nature of things, have been sometimes grossly mistaken.

7. Many divines, particularly Bishop Beveridge and Dean Sherlock, endeavor to heighten our idea of omnipotence by asserting, that God is not only the Creator, but likewise the continual support of all substances, who would lose their Being the moment he should withdraw his operation upon them. The bishop, after his usual manner, speaks positively as if he knew the thing by ocular

demonstration, and uses the comparison of a book, holden in one's hands, to explain his meaning. For, says he, if I take away my hands the book will fall to the ground without any act of mine to throw it down: so I myself should instantly drop into nothing, were God to withdraw his sustaining power from under me, without his needing to do anything for thrusting me out of Being. Whether the case be so with us I shall not pretend to determine so positively as his Lordship, it being a matter beyond the reach of my understanding to penetrate; but I may say we have no direct evidence of the affirmative, there being rather an appearance of the contrary in the abiding quality of bodies, which, after all the divisions and separations that can be made by fermentation, putrefaction, dissolution, and burning, we still know are not lost out of nature. Nor does it much heighten our idea of omnipotence to imagine powers not derived therefrom, for substances, it seems, have an inherent power of annihilating themselves if omnipotence were not constantly at work to counteract them. There are inconveniences attending this hypothesis, which the Dean labors for many pages to remove: and though it may help to give us a full persuasion of our intimate dependence upon the Deity, the same might as well be attained by contemplation of his omnipresence. Nor would it a little weaken our assurance of our own immortality, built upon the individuality of spirit, to suppose individuals too perishable unless sustained by the immediate hand of God; for though he may still continue to support us, we can never be so sure of his future acts as of those he has already done, for the latter are our proofs of the former, therefore his having given us a durable nature is the strongest evidence we can have from the light of reason that it is his Will we should continue forever. And it is most agreeable to our ideas to conceive a permanency of existence in substances which nothing less than omnipotence can destroy: the powers of nature may form compounds, throw them into different combinations, increase, diminish, alter, or entirely dissipate them again; but cannot take existence from any single particle either of material or spiritual substance: this has been always esteemed a privilege reserved to omnipotence alone, and that it requires an exertion of the same power to annihilate as to create. Nor will our thinking in this manner lessen our apprehension of the divine sovereignty; for nobody doubts that he who made us may destroy us again with a word, nor that we receive the materials for our well being, without which Being were nothing worth, by his appointment, and in this sense he may truly be called our continual support.

8. God is incomprehensible in all his attributes, and if we go to fathom the depths of omnipotence we shall lose ourselves in darkness and perplexities : therefore, letting alone all the subtilities of absolute impossibilities, of an independent nature of things, and of the sustentation of existence in substances, let us fix our view upon a prospect we can clearly discern. Let us conceive of God as performing by second causes all the mighty works we see performed, and able to do whatever we can comprehend possible to be done. Let us consider him giving existence to substances, solidity to matter, perceptivity to spirit, and understanding to man : limiting the ocean, spreading out the earth as a garment, and stretching forth the vast expanse of heaven : rolling the planets in their orbits, fixing the golden sun, and appointing the stars their stations : causing gravitation between large bodies, cohesion between small, elasticity in air and ether : giving motion to the wheels of fortune, stability to the laws of nature, and directing both their certain courses : forming the fibres of plants to fit them for vegetation, the vessels of animals to carry on circulation, and the mental organs to serve as instruments for the understanding : making the earth yield her increase for our sustenance, feeding the cattle upon a thousand hills for our uses, supplying us with air to breathe, water to drink, clothes to put on, and innumerable objects all around to employ and entertain us : commanding the issues of life and death, and having the future condition of spirits at his disposal. The contemplation of these, and a multitude of other things, that a little thought might easily suggest, will, I apprehend, give us the fullest idea of omnipotence that we are capable of, and make us sensible the Lord is our continual support, and that in him we live, and move, and have our being.

CHAP. XV.

OMNISCIENCE.

We have remarked before, that intelligence is not the same thing in God as in ourselves, for our intelligence would not suit a First Cause : we cannot work without motives and ideas suggested by objects previously affecting us, so that there must be something already existing from whence we may receive the information necessary to conduct us in our proceedings. Besides, intelligence is a particular mode of perception wherein the mind is

always passive, taking such judgments as are impressed upon it : for judgment properly is the act of the objects under contemplation, and not of the percipient, otherwise than by his bringing such of them into his thoughts from whence some judgment may result. We may fancy but not understand peaches growing upon an oak, rivers running upwards : nor in general can we understand anything different from what it appears after the most thorough examination. Therefore how imperfect notion soever we have of pure agency, such as is generally ascribed to God, we may see clearly that perception as in us being passive is incompatible with it : for we cannot imagine him passive to receive impressions from the impulse of objects, nor yet can we deny him understanding before there was anything external to be understood, much less refuse him knowledge of the things he has created.

2. The vulgar have an advantage over the studious in some respects, for they discern not the difficulties which perplex the others : they make no boggle at creation, believing they see instances of it in striking fire, which they take to be something new, not existing before, but produced by the collision of flint and steel, for they think nothing of particles detached from the colliding bodies, nor of a subtile matter emitted from within their pores, nor of a circumambient ether, agitated by their vibrations, which being put into a certain violent motion appear in the form of fire. So likewise they seem to have experience of pure agency in their own meditations and voluntary reflections, wherein they imagine themselves acting within themselves, without instrument or material, without other object than their own acts. But our experience, that when our organs are indisposed we cannot think at all, may convince us that we have instruments to employ, and materials to work upon in our mental operations : and upon a closer attention we shall find that even in the most abstracted thought, there must be something to be perceived numerically distinct from that which perceives. And in general the further we pry into the secrets of nature, we shall find her abounding in mysteries that do not occur to common apprehension. Since then it is the view of nature that must give us any conception of the Author of Nature, the more difficulties arise in the phenomena the less able shall we be to comprehend those attributes by which they are to be accounted for : so that it is no wonder Simonides asked still longer time the further he pushed his inquiries upon this subject.

3. Our inability to conceive knowledge without prior means of information, together with the absurdity of refusing God that

knowledge he has given to ourselves, obliges us to ascribe him intelligence, and at the same time to acknowledge this attribute ineffable, being something of a higher nature, but comprehending under it all that belongs to understanding as in the mind, abstracted from the idea of any conveyance bringing it thither. Since then it would be in vain to go about to describe the manner of his knowing, which in the nature of it must be different from ours, and yet we can form no idea of any other knowing than that we experience ourselves, we are excusable because necessitated to think and speak of him in a language suitable to what we have experience of. Thus we say he sees all things, looks backward upon the past, and forward into the future, discerns all possibilities, together with the consequences of his own immediate acts, or those of second causes, to the remotest chain of events, and knows whatever is the object of knowledge. The highest term we have to employ is Intuition, the same as Beholding, a term taken from our sense of vision, and serving only to exclude the slow process of reason, whereby we advance gradually to the knowledge of what we cannot discern directly by our senses or our judgment.

4. The difficulty of apprehending any voluntary act, even that of creation, to proceed without a prior intelligence, or of intelligence subsisting without objects to be understood, has set men upon contriving objects for the divine intelligence coeval with itself: for the ancients held forms, ideas, and truths, to be eternal, obtaining a place from everlasting in the divine mind, and I suppose these are what our moderns would understand by their unalterable nature of things. If you examine what those forms and ideas were, you will find they were not God, nor attributes, nor yet distinct substances, but inexistencies in him: which Inexistency was a very convenient term, implying something that was both a substance and not a substance, and so carrying the advantages of either; as a substance, it was capable of eternal duration, and of furnishing objects for understanding to perceive; as not a substance, it avoided the plurality of necessary Beings, of dividing God into parts, and of making substances uncreated. Nevertheless, admitting the reality of inexistencies, it will be hard to comprehend an inherent eternity belonging to them, for truths are propositions concerning substances, or something relative thereto, therefore cannot be older than the subjects whereof they are predicated: that justice is better than iniquity, springs from the powers of men to benefit or endamage one another, and the consequences resulting to them therefrom which renders actions of one sort better than those of the other. We have seen that if there were no creatures capable of doing good or hurt, there

would be no such thing as justice in nature, and if there were no such thing, there could be nothing affirmed or denied concerning it. The epithet *Eternal* given to some truths, implies there are others not so, and the very distinction made between eternal and temporary truths, shows their duration to depend upon that of the subjects whereto they are applied. The same may be said of forms, which are only modifications of substances : form as denoting figure could have no place before the existence of matter, nor perhaps before the combination of it, for we know not whether the atoms have any figure or no : and extended to a larger sense including the form of *Being* in other substances, it depends upon their primary properties, situations, and connections, which cannot be older than themselves. But it may be urged that although all external objects were annihilated yet we might retain an idea of the forms they had exhibited, therefore there is no inconsistency in supposing the like idea to subsist in some mind before they were existent. But let us consider that the ideas we discern are modifications of our organs, which are exterior to the mind that discerns them : and if we distinguish the perception from the idea and suppose the former in some mind without the latter, it must be a pure act and of course posterior in order if not in time to the exertion of some power by the agent : so that perception must be the act and produce of the divine intelligence, instead of the object or fund in store giving scope to it.

5. It is remarkable that those, who will not let God understand or do anything without ideas, are the very persons who stickle most strenuously for a liberty of indifferency in man : so that they will not allow the supreme Being to enjoy a privilege they assume to themselves. Which by the way shows the inconsistency of this supposed privilege with our notions of freedom, since we cannot conceive the most powerful and uncontrollable of all agents to act indifferently without making him liable to humor and arbitrary proceeding : from whence we may justly infer that what they take for proofs of indifferency are rather instances of weakness and imperfection in man. Perhaps I shall be asked whether I can conceive God to act in creating without a view to some purpose, or without a plan containing that order of succession he was about to establish ; and I shall readily acknowledge that I cannot. But when I consider why I cannot, namely, because of the narrowness of my conception which is confined within the compass of my experience, and because I can comprehend no other manner of knowing than that I have experienced myself, my not conceiving amounts to no more than a negative proof which in a matter of this nature is no proof at all. For though want of conception be a proper

evidence in things familiar to our observation, whose properties and operations we are well acquainted with, as that a stone cannot mount upwards without an external impulse, that water alone cannot compose a vegetable, that solid bodies cannot penetrate one another, and the like; yet in subjects whereof we have no direct experience but only such partial knowledge as may be gathered from their effects, we can expect to comprehend nothing further of them than their ability to produce those effects: whence arises the distinction between things above reason and things contrary to reason. Since then we find an understanding, such as ours in kind, though extended to the highest degree, incapable of assigning properties, allotting stations and directing other circumstances attending creation, but are satisfied nevertheless that all these things require an understanding, let us conclude the divine intelligence a subject above our reason, and forbear to pronounce anything more concerning it than that it is sufficient to work all that admirable contrivance which we discern in the works of nature. Or, if we still think pre-existent ideas necessary, let us ascribe their origin to some attributes yet unknown and unthought of: for we must not imagine that what little we know of God comprises the whole of his essence, but there are not improbably other attributes of which the mind of man has not so much as entertained a suspicion.

6. The like difficulties with that concerning prior information being necessary to complete understanding, may be started concerning remembrance and foresight, the former being in ourselves an inspection of traces in our memory, and the latter an inference from our observation of past events. If the schoolmen's standing point could be made clear to our apprehension, we need ascribe neither remembrance nor foresight to God, as things superfluous; for the past and future, being alike present before him, might be discerned by intuition as well as events now actually occurring. But since it is not easy for us to separate time from succession, and since to common apprehension it does not derogate from our idea of God to suppose him existing by perpetual duration, we may without hurt imagine him to remember as we remember, and to foresee as we foresee events within our own power by knowing our own intention, where we know perfectly what may be done with the instruments and materials we have to employ: taking this conception as the best we can form and not absolutely pronouncing it adequate to the subject.

7. And indeed the fullest conception we can obtain of the attributes, arises from contemplation of their effects, for if we go to penetrate into nice abstractions, we shall find them oftener obscuring than enlightening the mind, oftener contracting than enlarging

the prospect. Therefore, as we did before upon the article of omnipotence, let us now take a short survey of nature, to find the clearest footsteps of omniscience. Let us consider the Creator determining the precise number of substances, allotting them their properties and capacities necessary to complete the grand design he had in view : forming a plan to make a world, which was to last for ages with infinite varieties and successive changes, out of homogeneous matter, where every particle must have its appointed station, every motion its determinate velocity and direction : calculating exactly at one glance all the combinations they will run into, the species of compounds they will produce, together with the secondary qualities, operations, and mutual affections, resulting therefrom. How stupendous must be that wisdom which directed infinite power, and by which everything was established in number, weight, and measure ! He knew the exact quantity requisite of that invisible force whereon fermentation, heat, explosion, repulsion, and the four attractions depend, which had it been greater or less might have produced nothing but disorder in nature. He proportioned the elements that none of them might predominate or fall deficient, and contrived springs for mingling them together, that they might concur in forming the productions he designed. He appointed the degree of influence in the sun and moon, the inequalities of the earth, the rise of exhalations, the variety of soils, and other causes which bring on the change of seasons, vicissitudes of weather, and various dispositions of the air, causing the earth to yield her increase in proper measure, neither redundant nor wanting. He contrived the curious structure of vegetables, the more admirable organization of animals, where every vessel, gland, and fibre, every part, performs its several office for the growth and preservation of the whole. He adapted the contexture of his plants to the wants of his living creatures, so that each species has its proper food, its nests, and places of harbor, and finds uses in that which is unserviceable to others. He ranged his elements in such order, as to carry on the course of nature without perpetually needing his own interposition : so that they produce minerals and fossils below, vapors, clouds, dews, and rain above, insinuate themselves into the seed to make it germinate, and into the plant to make it bear fruits and seeds again, into the foetus to bring it to maturity, and into the perfect animal, causing it to fructify and renew the species. He gave various instincts to brutes and appetites to man, urging both to effect purposes they do not think of themselves. He allotted their several provinces to the causes of destruction, as well as those of formation and preservation : he maketh the storms his ministers, direct-

ing them what to overthrow and what to spare : he commandeth the earthquakes how far to lay waste and where to stop ; the lightning whom to strike and whom to pass over. Blight, famine, and pestilence, have their limits in what quarters and what extent to spread their havock, chance and casualty their directions when and where to fall : and all this by the intervention of second causes, which are so wonderfully contrived and exactly adjusted as never to disturb that order of succession he has established.

8. Nor is his wisdom less conspicuous in the moral than the natural world : he has put much into the power of free agents, and left many things to their choice and management, yet he directs their choice by such unseen springs, as lead them to execute his purposes when they least intended it. He has distributed various constitutions, talents, endowments, passions, and desires, among men, so that some are fitted as well in ability as inclination for every office wanted in society, and all the conveniences of life depending on human industry supplied. Commerce, agriculture, and the mechanic arts, want not hands to carry them on, nor policy, learning, and science, able heads to improve them : the jarring interests and opposite views of private persons serve to balance one another, and are made to produce order by their proper commixture out of that which separately would tend to confusion. He knows how and when to raise up peculiar characters that may found empires and overthrow them, or erect new kingdoms upon the ruins of old ones. Nor does he only provide for the establishment, the security, and general welfare of nations, but so directs the behaviour of men to one another and the dispensations of fortune, that each individual shall receive the precise portion of good and evil intended him. Nor are his cares confined to this sublunary stage, for we have seen that the spirits of men are of a nature to endure after their dissolution from the body, and we cannot suppose their primary properties given them for nothing, but that they shall receive perceptions by other channels than those which convey them now : so that there must be a different set of laws for the several forms of Being we are to undergo, and, as we may reasonably presume, a connection of interests between the visible world and the invisible : to adjust which, requires a more stupendous wisdom than anything falling under our notice can exhibit, though that is enough to excite our wonder and exceed our comprehension.

9. And this consideration may help to remove some objections that have been raised upon the seeming errors of nature, as that she wastes her strength in unprofitable efforts and sometimes thwarts the purposes we suppose her to have intended. Lucretius urges that the world could not have been made in wisdom,

being so full of defects : ravenous beasts, poisonous herbs, and pestilential vapors abound, the rain falls upon the sea where it can do no good, the sun shines upon barren rocks, where it can produce nothing, and man is liable to continual disappointments and disasters. But nature is not thought to work in vain when she contrives a curious structure in the grains of corn fitting them for vegetation, although that purpose be defeated by the corn being made into bread for the nourishment of man : but rain falling into the sea where man receives no benefit by it is exclaimed against as a want of contrivance, because we judge of prudent and vain solely by what relates to ourselves ; as if nature had nothing else to do besides attending our services, and whatever was of no use to us was absolutely useless. Besides that we may be mistaken in our premises, for what is not of immediate use may be remotely ; perhaps the fresh water mingled with the sea may prevent its sending up exhalations that might be hurtful to us, and the sun darting heat upon rocks communicate a warmth to the ground below or air above, which does a good we know not of, or at least we may allow it to influence the weather and thereby affect the growth of fruits and corn. But supposing these things were of no service to us, they may do service to the fish, the insects, or other creatures, who deserve some share in the cares of nature together with ourselves. As to the disasters and disappointments befalling mankind, we many times find reason afterwards to rejoice at their having happened, and many more times there may be reason though we do not discern it : but if there be any from which we receive no real benefit, and that the condition of life were better upon the whole without them, yet they may be some way serviceable to other Beings or to ourselves in another state of being. Nor is it an exception against our argument that we proceed upon what may be without showing what is the case, for the burden of producing evidence lies upon the objector : there are innumerable marks of wisdom in many works of nature, therefore a possibility of there being the like in those where we cannot trace it is a sufficient defence, and whoever would arraign this wisdom ought to show that the latter cannot terminate in any good effect. For our not discerning the expedience in some performances of an agent, does not overthrow the opinion we had entertained of him from others, nor has it that effect upon us in the common occurrences of life : if a man of whose skill in language and knowledge we had experience were to deliver himself darkly and mysteriously upon some occasions, we should not presently conclude he had no meaning in what he said. If we went into the workshop of an artificer, where we

found many things admirably contrived and put together, besides others whereof we could not possibly guess the uses, we should not infer from the latter that he proceeded foolishly and unthinkingly in all we saw before us. In both cases we should attribute the seeming uselessness of anything we see or heard to our own want of discernment: and much more that we do so with respect to the operations of nature, whose tendencies and mutual dependence we have so insufficient faculties and so little opportunities to investigate.

10. When we reflect what a wilderness of thought must be requisite to govern innumerable worlds and order all the particulars belonging to them, we shall find it inconceivable that so much can be contained together in one understanding: therefore some have made it an objection that such a boundless variety is perplex and burden even the divine intelligence. But let us consider why a multitude of thoughts are perplexing and burdensome to ourselves: we perceive by organs and can have no more perceptions than they from time to time excite in us, but the sphere of our presence being too narrow to admit many of them to work upon us together, we are forced to labor and toil in bringing such of them into play as we want, and generally others intrude with them which disturb their operation and perplex our ideas. But how much difficulty soever we may have found in connecting a chain of reasoning or forming a train of thinking, when once become familiar to us by frequent contemplation, we find no difficulty in running it over afterwards and comprehending so much of it as we can contain in one view: for whatever occurs readily to our thought we discern easily and distinctly, nor find any trouble or perplexity in perceiving, where the prospect lies full and clear before us. If then we will needs imagine God to understand as we understand, by the perception of objects, let us remember that the sphere of his presence extends throughout all immensity, that he wants not the ministry of organs to bring objects before him, none being ever absent from him or removed out of his reach. And perceptions take up no room in the thought nor interfere with one another, but it is the want of them that causes perplexity.

11. There are some truths, as was remarked at the end of our chapter on Judgment, reputed self-evident because they strike the mind irresistibly, yet we cannot trace their origin nor deduce the train of reasoning whereby we arrived at them: among this class may be reckoned the Divine Happiness, which we do not discover from the works of nature as we do the other attributes. The mighty fabric of the world manifests an omnipotence, and the

apt concurrence of causes to answer their several uses and purposes declares an omniscience : but we cannot infer the happiness of the Supreme Being from that of his creatures any more than we can the contrary from their miseries. For satisfaction in ourselves is a perception, it is a state the mind is thrown into by the act of objects striking upon our senses or reflection, wherein we are entirely passive nor can help receiving either pleasure or pain while the proper causes are operating : but we cannot ascribe passivity to God nor imagine his condition to depend from time to time upon the agency of anything external. Nevertheless, the very sound of a miserable or an insensible Deity is shocking to the ear and repugnant to all our notions, nor was there ever any one who admitted the Being of a God that did not conceive him unspeakably happy. We find happiness the only thing desirable, or that which renders all other things desirable, and constantly employ our efforts to procure it : therefore we might suppose that where there is almighty power and infinite wisdom, all means of happiness would be put in practice : but God uses no means to obtain it, evil cannot approach him, nor does he want objects or channels to convey him happiness. He made not space for his own reception, matter for his own uses, nor sentient Beings for his own solace and society, but possessed infinite happiness in himself from everlasting, without receiving increase therein by the works of creation. This is what every man's judgment will agree to, and we find no suspicion arise of the contrary : therefore we may pronounce God ineffably happy, but that happiness in him is not just the same as we feel it in ourselves.

END OF VOL. I.



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